Phillips and Jordan, Inc. et al v. Coffey et al

Filing 113

ORDER AND REASONS granting 96 Motion to Dismiss Party. Party Michael L. Shumock DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Susie Morgan on 4/10/2014. (bwn)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
PHILLIPS AND JORDAN, INC., et
al.,
Plaintiffs

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

No. 11-1922

PATRICK COFFEY, et al.,
Defendants

SECTION “E”

ORDER & REASONS
Before the Court is Defendant Michael Shumock's motion to dismiss the claims
against him, which Plaintiffs oppose.1 The Court has reviewed the briefs, the record, and
hte applicable law and now issues this order and reasons granting the motion to dismis.
The Court previously issued an order and reasons granting a motion to dismiss
Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant Patrick Coffey for failure to allege any facts which
would make Coffey personally liable as the "alter ego" of Defendants Southern State
Recovery, Inc. and Southern State Contracting, Inc.2 Alabama law recognizes the wellsettled principle that "the limitation of personal liability is a valid corporate attribute."
Culp v. Econ. Mobile Homes, Inc., 895 So. 2d 857, 860 (Ala. 2006). Because Plaintiffs did
not alleged sufficient facts suggesting that Coffey "misused the corporate form or that the
corporation existed as a subterfuge to avoid personal liability," Cleghorn v. Ferron
Metalcraft, 587 So. 2d 400, 401 (Ala. Ct. App. 1991), the Court granted the motion to
dismiss the claims against Coffey.
Defendant Shumock now seeks to piggyback on this holding, contending that
1

R. Docs. 96, 104, 107.

2

R. Doc. 94 at 3-5.
1

Plaintiffs' allegations are likewise deficient as to his personal liability as an alter ego of
Defendants BPW Construction, Inc. and BEM Enterprises, Inc. He points to the bare
allegations in the amended complaint that he (Shumock) "claim[ed] to be [the] principal"
of BPW and BEM and "benefited from the contract," and that he "claims to be a 'party' to
the contract and received direct payment from plaintiff, Metro at one time."3 Because those
vague factual allegations are "similar to the allegations the Plaintiffs made against
Defendant Coffey," Shumock contends he should be dismissed from this case as well.
Shumock is correct. The factual allegations relating to his personal liability are, if
anything, even weaker than those against Coffey, and Plaintiffs offer no convincing
argument otherwise. In their first opposition, they tersely asserted that a prior motion to
dismiss raising the same argument had been dismissed.4 But the order and reasons
denying that earlier motion to dismiss did not address the arguments raised here, and thus
has no relevance or preclusive effect.5
Plaintiffs also filed a "supplemental memorandum and exhibits," in which they
apparently contend that Shumock's signature on two contracts in his capacity as President
of BEM, "demonstrate that his claims are insidious on their face."6 Even considering these
exhibits, which are outside the pleadings, the contracts themselves plainly state that they
are signed by Shumock as "proper company officer," not in any personal capacity.7
3

R. Doc. 60 at 4-5.

4

R. Doc. 104 at 1.

5

See R. Doc. 93.

6

R. Doc. 104 at 2.

7

R. Docs. 107-1 at 2, 107-2 at 2.
2

Plaintiffs have utterly failed to articulate the requisite inequitable conduct necessary to hold
Shumock personally liable for corporate liability, or to explain why Shumock is situated
differently from Coffey. For the same reasons the Court granted the motion to dismiss the
claim against Coffey, Shumock's motion to dismiss is granted.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the motion to dismiss is GRANTED and Plaintiffs' claims
against Shumock are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 10th day of April, 2014.

_____________________________
SUSIE MORGAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

3