St. Bernard Parish v. Lafarge North America, Inc. et al
Filing
276
ORDER & REASONS denying 239 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle on 9/27/2016. (mmm)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ST. BERNARD PARISH
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 11-2350
LAFARGE NORTH AMERICA, INC.,
ET AL.
SECTION "B"(2)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is St. Bernard Parish’s (“Plaintiff” or “the
Parish”) “Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.” Rec. Doc. 239.
Defendant Lafarge North America Inc. (“Defendant” or “Lafarge”)
filed an opposition thereto. Rec. Doc. 251. The Court then granted
Plaintiff
leave
to
file
a
reply
memorandum.
Rec.
Doc.
261.
Plaintiff seeks entry of partial summary judgment finding that the
presumptions
Pennsylvania
afforded
Rule
apply
under
to
the
this
Louisiana
case.
Rec.
Rule
Doc.
and
239
the
at
1.
Additionally, Plaintiff seeks entry of partial summary judgment
finding that Defendant is collaterally estopped from rearguing
certain findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the
Honorable Stanwood R. Duval, Jr. in the matter of In re Katrina
Canal
Breaches
Consolidated
Litigation
(“Consolidated
Litigation”). Rec. Doc. 239 at 1. As stated more fully herein,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.
1
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case arises out of property damage to several St. Bernard
Parish
properties
during
Hurricane
Katrina.
After
Hurricane
Katrina, St. Bernard Parish filed several lawsuits on account of
the flooding. Rec. Doc. 112 at 2. It first filed suit in the U.S.
Court of Federal Claims claiming that the acts or omissions of the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers relating to the Mississippi RiverGulf Outlet (“MRGO”) caused the flooding to the Parish. Rec. Doc.
251 at 8. After a number of other entities filed suit in this Court
against the United States, we established an umbrella litigation
known as In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation,
Civil
Action
Number
05-4182
hereinafter
“the
Consolidated
Litigation”). Rec. Doc. 100. Another group of plaintiffs also filed
suit against Lafarge, alleging that the ING 4727 (“the Barge”), a
barge moored at an LNA facility on the western side of the Inner
Harbor Navigation Canal (“IHNC”), caused the breaches in the
floodwall that that led to the flooding in the Lower Ninth Ward
and St. Bernard Parish. Rec. Doc. 251 at 8. As a result, this Court
created a “BARGE” category within the consolidated litigation to
encompass those lawsuits. On January 20, 2011, Judge Duval issued
an opinion in the exemplar non-jury BARGE trial. In a forty-two
page opinion, the Court issued judgment in favor of Lafarge,
explaining that “the plaintiffs’ allegations were refuted by the
laws
of
nature
considering
the
2
undisputed
physical
evidence
adduced as to the weather conditions in the area during Hurricane
Katrina.” Rec. Doc. 110 at 4. See also In re Katrina Canal Breaches
Consol. Litigation, No. 05-418, 2011 WL 1792542, (E.D. La. Jan.
20, 2011).
On August 23, 2011, St. Bernard Parish filed suit in Division
D of the 34th District Court for the Parish of St. Bernard, State
of Louisiana, alleging that LNA is liable for damages resulting
from breaches in the floodwall allegedly caused by the Barge
breaking from its moorings and alliding with the floodwall. Rec.
Doc. 1 at 1-2; Rec. Doc. 1-1. Plaintiff contends that LNA was
negligent in its handling and mooring of the Barge. Specifically,
Plaintiff argues that LNA allowed the unloaded Barge to moor
outboard of a loaded barge with inadequate lines, creating a “sail
effect,” and that LNA had the opportunity to move the Barge to a
safe location but failed to do so. Rec. Doc. 1-1 at 6-7. Plaintiff
alleges that LNA acted in violation of U.S. Coast Guard standards,
Sector New Orleans Hurricane Plan of the Coast Guard, and LNA
policies and procedures. Rec. Doc. 1-1 at 9.
LNA removed the action to federal court, and it was the
transferred
to
Judge
Duval
Consolidated Litigation.
because
of
its
relation
to
the
On December 6, 2012, Judge Duval granted
summary judgment in favor of Lafarge, noting that “[t]he physical
evidence as this Court has found twice leads inexorably to the
conclusion that Lafarge is entitled to summary judgment and an end
3
to this litigation.” Rec. Doc. 100 at 18. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit disagreed. On February 19, 2014,
the Fifth Circuit reversed the summary judgment ruling, finding
that
there
was
sufficient
third-party
eyewitness
testimony
supporting Plaintiff’s allegations to present the case to a jury.
Rec. Doc. 112 at 16. Upon remand the case was transferred to
Section “B” of this Court and set for trial on May 8, 2017.
Plaintiff now moves for summary judgment on three issues.
II.
THE PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS
In
support
of
its
Motion
for
Partial
Summary
Judgment,
Plaintiff first argues that there is no genuine issue of material
fact that would preclude applying the Pennsylvania Rule in the
case at hand.1 Rec. Doc. 240 at 17. Specifically, Plaintiff argues
that LNA violated statutory rules and regulations intended to
prevent allisions, which resulted in injury to Plaintiff. Rec.
Doc. 240 at 18. Plaintiff likewise argues that the Louisiana Rule
applies to this case.2 Rec. Doc. 240 at 23. In support of this
assertion, Plaintiff alleges that it cannot be disputed that the
Barge broke free from its moorings and then allided with the
The Pennsylvania Rule allocates “sole or contributory fault to a vessel that
is in actual violation of a statutory rule intended to prevent collisions when
the violating vessel fails to show that it could not have been at fault.”
Raffield v. Y & S Marine, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 2d 672, 674 (E.D. La. 2008).
2 “The Louisiana Rule creates a presumption of fault that shifts the burden of
production and persuasion to a moving vessel that drifts into an allision with
a stationary object.” Slatten, LLC v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., No. CIV.A.
13-673, 2014 WL 5500701, at *3 (E.D. La. Oct. 30, 2014)(citing THE LOUISIANA,
70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 164, 173, 18 L.Ed. 85 (1866)).
1
4
eastern
floodwall
of
the
IHNC.
Rec.
Doc.
240
at
23..
Thus,
Plaintiff argues LNA should bear the burden of proving that the
allision would still have occurred even if LNA had properly secured
the Barge. Rec. Doc. 240 at 24.Finally, Plaintiff asserts that
Defendant should be collaterally estopped from rearguing certain
of Judge Duval’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. Rec.
Doc. 240 at 24. Plaintiff argues that the four-part test for
collateral estoppel is satisfied. Rec. Doc. 240 at 26. The essence
of Plaintiff’s argument is that Judge Duval’s ruling in favor of
Defendant
in
the
Consolidated
Litigation
does
not
preclude
Plaintiff from utilizing findings for the purpose of collateral
estoppel. Rec. Doc. 240 at 26-30.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff is not entitled to partial
summary judgment on the applicability of the Pennsylvania Rule or
the Louisiana Rule. Rec. Doc. 251 at 15-22.
Defendant also argues that Plaintiff is not entitled to
partial summary judgment that the Louisiana Rule will apply at
trial. Rec. Doc. 251 at 22. While pointing to several alleges
issues
of
material
fact,
Defendant
also
claims
that
the
presumptions or inapplicable due to the extensive record evidence
as to causation and fault. Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff
errs in asserting that LNA is collaterally estopped from litigating
certain statements in Judge Duval’s opinion from the Consolidated
Litigation. Rec. Doc. 251 at 24. Defendant’s primary arguments in
5
support of this contention are: (1) that Plaintiff’s motion is
fatally
defective
because
it
fails
to
identify
the
specific
findings by Judge Duval that Plaintiff seeks to have held binding
against LNA; and (2) that collateral estoppel does not apply to
the
case
at
hand
because
LNA
prevailed
in
the
Consolidated
Litigation. Rec. Doc. 251 at 24-29. Accordingly, Lafarge urges
hits Court to deny the motion.
III. LAW & ANALYSIS
Summary
judgment
is
appropriate
only
if
“the
pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; see also
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A genuine issue
exists if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a
verdict for the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The movant must point to “portions of ‘the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with affidavits’ which it believes demonstrate
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex, 477
U.S. at 323. If and when the movant carries this burden, the nonmovant must then go beyond the pleadings and present other evidence
to establish a genuine issue. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. V. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
6
However, “where the non-movant bears the burden of proof at
trial, the movant may merely point to an absence of evidence, thus
shifting to the non-movant the burden of demonstrating by competent
summary judgment proof that there is an issue of material fact
warranting trial.” Lindsey v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 16 F.3d 616,
618 (5th Cir. 1994). Conclusory rebuttals of the pleadings are
insufficient to avoid summary judgment. Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Liljeberg Enter., Inc., 7 F.3d 1203, 1207 (5th Cir. 1993).
A. Applicability of the Pennsylvania and Louisiana Presumptions
Plaintiff argues that there is no genuine issue of material
fact that would preclude applying the Pennsylvania Rule in this
case. Rec. Doc. 240 at 17. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that LNA
violated
statutory
rules
and
regulations
intended
to
prevent
allisions, which resulted in injury to Plaintiff. Rec. Doc. 240 at
18. Additionally, LNA points to Judge Duval’s findings from the
Consolidated
Litigation
to
support
its
position
that
the
Pennsylvania Rule should apply to this case. Rec. Doc. 240 at 21.
Namely, Plaintiff highlights Judge Duval’s statement that “There
was a failure to moor at every cleat; there was a failure to double
up the lines; and there was a failure in the configuration- that
being the height differential caused by the tethering of a full
barge to an empty barge.” In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol.
Litigation, No. 05-418, 2011 WL 1792542, at *6 (E.D. La. Jan. 20,
2011); Rec. Doc. 240 at 21.
7
Defendant argues that Plaintiff is not entitled to partial
summary judgment that the Pennsylvania Rule will apply at trial.
Rec. Doc. 251 at 15. In support of this assertion, Defendant first
contends that there is a genuine dispute as to whether Plaintiff’s
injuries (i.e., the flooding) were caused by an allision between
the
Barge
and
the
floodwall.
Rec.
Doc.
251
at
15-17.
Thus,
Defendant argues that the first requirement for application of the
Pennsylvania Rule—namely, injuries caused by an allision—cannot be
met. Rec. Doc. 251 at 17. Second, Defendant asserts that there is
a genuine dispute as to whether LNA violated any statute or
regulation intended to avoid a collision. Rec. Doc. 251 at 18.
Specifically,
Defendant
argues
that
the
plans
and
federal
regulations cited by Plaintiff are either inapplicable to the case
at hand or were not violated by LNA. Rec. Doc. 251 at 18-21.
Finally, Defendant asserts that the Pennsylvania Rule does not
apply here due to the existence of record evidence as to causation.
Rec. Doc. 251 at 22. Defendant cites Fifth Circuit precedent to
support
its
assertion
that
evidentiary
presumptions
are
“superfluous [when] the parties have introduced evidence to dispel
the mysteries that gave rise to the presumptions.” In re Mid-South
Towing Co., 418 F.3d 526, 531 (5th Cir. 2005). Rec. Doc. 251 at
22. In reply, Plaintiff concedes that whether the floodwall failed
as a result of the allision with the barge is an issue for trial,
but argues that the Pennsylvania Rule still applies because it is
8
undisputed that the barge did, at some point, allide with the
floodwall and there is no genuine issue of fact as to whether LNA
violated a statute or regulation. Rec. Doc. 261 at 3-4.
Plaintiff likewise argues that the Louisiana Rule applies to
this case.3 Rec. Doc. 240 at 23. In support of this assertion,
Plaintiff alleges that it cannot be disputed that the Barge broke
free from its moorings and then allided with the eastern floodwall
of the IHNC. Rec. Doc. 240 at 23. Further, Plaintiff contends that
the facts indicate LNA did not handle the Barge with reasonable
care because LNA did not ensure that all mooring lines were doubled
up prior to the storm. Rec. Doc. 240 at 24. Thus, Plaintiff argues
LNA should bear the burden of proving that the allision would still
have occurred even if LNA had properly secured the Barge. Rec.
Doc. 240 at 24.
Defendant also argues that Plaintiff is not entitled to
partial summary judgment that the Louisiana Rule will apply at
trial.
Rec.
Doc.
251
at
22.
First,
Defendant
contends
that
Plaintiff has not met its burden of showing the absence of a
genuine dispute as to whether there was an allision between the
Barge and the floodwall that caused the flooding at issue. Rec.
Doc. 251 at 23. Next, Defendant argues that the Louisiana Rule’s
“The Louisiana Rule creates a presumption of fault that shifts the burden of
production and persuasion to a moving vessel that drifts into an allision with
a stationary object.” Slatten, LLC v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., No. CIV.A.
13-673, 2014 WL 5500701, at *3 (E.D. La. Oct. 30, 2014)(citing THE LOUISIANA,
70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 164, 173, 18 L.Ed. 85 (1866)).
3
9
presumption is inapplicable due to extensive evidence that LNA’s
handling of the Barge was not negligent and the breakaway of the
Barge would have occurred regardless of how it was moored. Rec.
Doc. 251 at 23. Third, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff failed to
prove the absence of any genuine dispute regarding whether LNA
handled the Barge with reasonable care. Rec. Doc. 251 at 24. In
reply, Plaintiff maintains that LNA “admitted the singular fact
necessary to invoke the application of the Louisiana Rule, to wit,
that the Barge allided with the eastern floodwall.” Rec. Doc. 261
at 2.
In cases involving a maritime collision resulting in injury
to a plaintiff, the Pennsylvania Rule operates to shift the burden
of proof from the plaintiff to the defendant if the defendant
violated
a
statute
or
regulation
designed
to
avoid
such
a
collision. The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. 125, 136 (1873). In such
cases, the violating vessel bears the burden of proving that its
fault could not have caused the accident. Id.; Tokio Marine & Fire
Ins. Co., Ltd. V. FLORA MV, 235 F.3d 963, 966 (5th Cir. 2001).
“The rule thus creates a presumption that one who violates a
regulation
intended
to
prevent
collisions
will
be
deemed
responsible; but that presumption is rebuttable.” Id.
Similarly, the Louisiana Rule provides that a drifting vessel
is presumed to be at fault when it allides with a stationary
object. The Louisiana, 70 U.S. 164, 173 (1865). The defendant can
10
rebut the presumption of fault by showing “(1) that the allision
was the fault of the stationary object; (2) that the moving vessel
acted with reasonable care; or (3) that the allision was an
unavoidable accident.” Combo Maritime, Inc. v. U.S. United Bulk
Terminal, LLC, 615 F.3d 599, 605. (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Fischer
v. S/Y NERAIDA, 508 F.3d 586, 593 (5th Cir. 2007)).
However, “[e]videntiary presumptions . . . are designed to
fill
a
factual
presumptions
vacuum.
become
Once
evidence
superfluous
is
because
presented
the
.
parties
.
.
have
introduced evidence to dispel the mysteries that gave rise to the
presumptions.” In re Mid-South Towing Co., 418 F.3d 526, 531 (5th
Cir. 2005) (quoting Rodi Yachts, Inc. v. National Marine, Inc.,
984 F.2d 880, 887 (7th Cir. 1993)). “With the presence of evidence
in the record, ‘the need for presumptions evaporates.’” Slatten,
LLC v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., No. 13-673, 2014 WL 5500701,
at *4 (E.D. La. Oct. 30, 2014) (quoting Combo Maritime, 615 F.3d
at 607). Therefore, the primary issue here is whether there is a
factual void as to fault and causation, if so “application of the
presumptions is unnecessary.” Id.
In this case, there appears to be no factual void.4 In fact,
the Fifth Circuit expressly acknowledged as much in its Judgment
Notably, Plaintiff’s reply memorandum addresses each of LNA’s arguments
concerning the applicability of these presumptions except for Defendant’s
contention that both presumptions are unnecessary in this case due to the
presence of extensive record evidence. See Rec. Dc. 261.
4
11
reversing Judge Duval’s grant of summary judgment. See St. Bernard
Parish v. Lafarge North America, 550 Fed. Appx. 184, 192 (5th Cir.
2013). Specifically, the court stated that “[t]here is a great
deal
of
testimony
supporting
Lafarge’s
position
[regarding
causation], to be sure, and little to support the Parish’s.” Id.
Nevertheless, the court found sufficient evidence in support of
the Parish’s position to prevent summary judgment, including eye
witness testimony. Id. The court provided an in-depth review of
that
evidence
before
concluding
that
the
trial
court
had
impermissibly resolved genuine issues of fact. See id. at 188-93.
Moreover, Plaintiff’s motion demonstrates that it possesses a
great
deal
of
evidence
concerning
LNA’s
pre-hurricane
safety
measures with respect to the barge, see Rec. Doc. 240 at 8-15, and
LNA’s opposition presents plenty of evidence that could be used to
counter the Parish’s contentions. See Rec. Doc. 251-1. Thus, both
parties possess and intend to introduce evidence relevant to fault
and
causation.
Accordingly,
the
record
appears
to
contain
sufficient evidence from both parties concerning causation and
fault,
thus
rendering
both
presumptions
afforded
under
the
Louisiana Rule and the Pennsylvania Rule unnecessary.
Moreover, courts in this circuit have previously refused to
apply such presumptions when there is relevant evidence in the
record. See Slatten, 2014 WL 5500701 at *5 (finding application of
the Louisiana Rule and the Pennsylvania Rule unnecessary because
12
“[t]he record at trial will contain sufficient evidence on which
the Court, as the finder of fact, can determine the liabilities of
the parties.”); St. James Stevedoring Partners, LLC v. Motion
Navigation Ltd., No. 13-541, 2014 WL 3892178, at *7 (E.D. La. Aug.
6, 2014) (refusing to apply the Oregon Rule or the Pennsylvania
Rule because both parties presented evidence regarding fault and
causation). Given the abundance of relevant evidence currently in
the record, we find that application of the Louisiana Rule and the
Pennsylvania Rule would prove superfluous. Therefore, we need not
rule on whether Plaintiff has established the prerequisites for
the application of either rule.
B. Collateral Estoppel
Plaintiff
asserts
that
Court
should
employ
offensive
collateral estoppel to preclude Defendant from rearguing certain
of Judge Duval’s findings of fact. Rec. Doc. 240 at 24. Plaintiff
argues
that
the
four-part
test
for
collateral
estoppel
is
satisfied, including the third prong which requires that the issue
was necessary to the prior judgment. Rec. Doc. 240 at 26. The
essence of Plaintiff’s argument is that Judge Duval’s ruling in
favor of Defendant in the Consolidated Litigation does not preclude
Plaintiff from utilizing findings for the purpose of collateral
estoppel. Rec. Doc. 240 at 26-30. Thus, Plaintiff argues that some
of Judge Duval’s findings, such as that “the Barge obviously came
into contact with the IHNC floodwall as demonstrated by the damaged
13
concrete cap, the scrape markings on the bottom of the vessel and
the
vessel’s
presence
in
the
Lower
Ninth
Ward”
qualify
as
determinations that were necessary to the judgment. Rec. Doc. 240
at 30 (citing Duval Order at p. 25).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff errs in asserting that it is
collaterally estopped from litigating certain statements in Judge
Duval’s opinion from the Consolidated Litigation. Rec. Doc. 251 at
24. Defendant first notes that Plaintiff’s motion is fatally
defective because it fails to identify the specific findings by
Judge Duval that Plaintiff seeks to have held binding against LNA.
Rec. Doc. 251 at 24. Defendant next asserts that collateral
estoppel does not apply to the case at hand because LNA prevailed
in the Consolidated Litigation. Rec. Doc. 251 at 25-29. Further,
Defendant alleges that collateral estoppel is inapplicable because
Plaintiff could have participated in the Consolidated Litigation.
Rec. Doc. 251 at 29-30. Finally, Defendant points to a prior
agreement between LNA and Plaintiff to forego collateral estoppel.
Rec. Doc. 251 at 30-31.
“A district court has broad discretion to determine whether
collateral
estoppel
is
appropriately
employed
offensively
to
preclude issue relitigation.” Winters v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical
Co., 149 F.3d 387, 391 (5th Cir. 1998). The Fifth Circuit in Sport
Supply Group, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co. noted that collateral
estoppel “is appropriate only when four conditions are met:”
14
First, the issue under consideration in a
subsequent action must be identical to the
issue litigated in a prior action. Second, the
issue must have been fully and vigorously
litigated in the prior action. Third, the
issue must have been necessary to support the
judgment in the prior case. Fourth, there must
be no special circumstances that would render
preclusion inappropriate or unfair.
335 F.3d 453, 458 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Gandy Nursery, Inc. v.
United States, 318 F.3d 631, 639 (5th Cir. 2003)).
As Defendant points out, the primary issue with Plaintiff’s
argument is that the Parish fails to clearly identify all of the
findings of fact to which it believes collateral estoppel should
apply. Instead, “Plaintiff asks this Court to hold that certain
facts at issue here have already been determined by Judge Duval in
the Consolidated Litigation and, as a result, seek to promote the
interests
of
judicial
economy
by
preventing
Defendant
from
attempting to relitigate them here.” Rec. Doc. 240 at 25 (emphasis
added). Plaintiff’s motion cites a handful of factual findings
made by Judge Duval as examples of facts that were allegedly
necessary to the Judge Duval’s final judgment, but the Parish does
not indicate which other facts it seeks to estop Defendant from
relitigating. See Rec. Doc. 240 at 29-30. Further, Plaintifffailed
to seize the opportunity to provide such clarity by not even
acknowledging Plaintiff’s argument about the lack of specificity
in its reply brief. See Rec. Doc. 261.
15
Without identification of specific facts or legal issues,
this Court is unable to apply employ offensive collateral estoppel
because
it
is
impossible
to
determine
whether
each
of
the
conditions is met. See Matter of Lewisville Props., Inc., 849 F.2d
946, 949 (5th Cir. 1988) (affirming district court’s refusal to
apply offensive collateral estoppel because the appellant did not
identify specific facts or legal issues decided in the previous
case but asserted a much broader theory); Kosinksi v. C.I.R., 541
F.3d 671, 675 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding that Plaintiff’s claim for
collateral estoppel was insufficient because it failed to identify
a precise issue). Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff asks this
Court to generally apply collateral estoppel to all facts decided
by Judge Duval that will ultimately prove to be at issue in this
litigation, that request is declined. Nevertheless, this Court
will proceed on the assumption that Plaintiff only seeks to estop
Defendants from relitigating the few factual findings explicitly
referenced in the motion.
In discussing the third condition for establishing collateral
estoppel, Plaintiff references the following factual findings made
by Judge Duval: (1) that LNA failed to moor the barge at every
cleat; (2) that LNA failed to double up the lines; (3) that LNA
tethered a full barge to an empty barge; and (4) that the Barge
came into contact with the IHNC floodwall, which was demonstrated
by the damaged concrete cap, the scrape markings on the bottom of
16
the vessel; and the vessel’s presence in the Lower Ninth Ward.
Rec. Doc. 240 at 29-30. As the parties’ briefing recognizes,
Plaintiff’s other major obstacle in establishing the applicability
of collateral estoppel is the requisite third element—whether the
factual findings were necessary to support the judgment in the
prior case. LNA maintains that it is a “bedrock principle” that
collateral estoppel cannot apply against a party when, as here,
that party prevailed in the earlier case. Rec. Doc. 251 at 25. The
Parish counters that there is no such categorical rule. Rec. Doc.
240 at 29. Rather, Plaintiff maintains that the Court must examine
Judge Duval’s prior judgment to determine whether the factual
findings were actually dicta or whether they were necessary to the
judgment.
Id.
Accordingly,
Plaintiff
argues
that
the
factual
findings referenced above were necessary to Judge Duval’s finding
that the Louisiana and Pennsylvania Rules applied to this case.
Defendant
contends
that
Judge
Duval
did
not
find
that
the
presumptions applied, and that, in any event, the factual findings
could not have been necessary to the judgment because it was in
favor of LNA. Plaintiff’s argument is meritless.
Judge Duval clearly made no finding as to the applicability
of the Pennsylvania Rule, expressly omitting discussion of whether
LNA violated any specific statute or regulation. In re Katrina
Canal
Breaches
Consol.
Litigation,
2011
WL
1792542,
at
*22
(“Pretermitting whether Lafarge violated any specific statute ore
17
regulation as it pertained to the mooring of the ING 4727 . . .
.”). The opinion is less clear as to whether Judge Duval found the
Louisiana Rule applicable, but it is of no consequence here. See
id. at *20-21. The Court explicitly found that the barge did not
cause either the North Breach or the South Breach. The factual
findings referenced above concerning LNA’s alleged negligence in
mooring the barge and an allision between the barge and the
floodwall were therefore not necessary to the Judgment. Rather,
the Judgement relied upon a finding that the breaches had already
occurred and the flooding had already started prior to any contact
between the barge and the floodwall, meaning it was irrelevant
whether the barge was negligently moored or whether it made contact
with the wall. The Judgement clearly did not depend on these
factual findings and thus collateral estoppel cannot apply. See
Bobby v. Bies, 556 U.S. 825, 834 (2009) (“If a judgment does not
depend
on
a
given
determination,
relitigation
of
that
determination is not precluded.”).
IV.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED. Given the many
factual disputes in this voluminous record and movant's own
prior opposition to summary dispostion, we are concerned that
valuable resources are being wasted by needless manuvering
and time consuming actions that art not proportionate to
asserted claims and defenses.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 27th day of September, 2016.
___________________________________
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
18
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