Waste Management of Louisiana, L.L.C. v. River Birch, Inc. et al

Filing 54

ORDER AND REASONS: ORDERED that 49 Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Stay Order is DENIED. Signed by Judge Nannette Jolivette Brown on 3/14/2012. (clm, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
WASTE MANAGEMENT OF
LOUISIANA, LLC
V.
RIVER BIRCH, INC., HIGHWAY 90,
LLC, FREDERICK R. HEEBE, and
ALBERT J. WARD, JR.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 11-2405
JUDGE NANNETTE JOLIVETTE
BROWN
MAGISTRATE JUDGE KAREN
WELLS ROBY

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Plaintiff Waste Management of Louisiana, LLC’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion
for Partial Reconsideration of the Stay Order,1 in which Plaintiff seeks partial reconsideration of this
Court’s February 15, 2012 order in which it granted a complete stay of this action “until the federal
criminal investigation into the events that form the basis of Waste Management’s amended
complaint [in the instant case] is resolved or until the statute of limitations for any criminal actions
arising out of those events have expired, whichever occurs first.”2 Defendants River Birch, Inc.,
HWY-90 LLC, Frederick R. Heebe, and Albert J. Ward (collectively, “Defendants”) filed their
opposition on March 6, 2012.3 Following leave of Court, Plaintiff filed its reply memorandum in
further support of its motion for partial reconsideration on March 14, 2012.4
Having considered the motion, the response, the reply, the record, and the applicable law, for

1

Rec. Doc. 49.

2

Rec. Doc. 48 at p. 13.

3

Rec. Doc. 50.

4

Rec. Doc. 53.

1

the following reasons, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.

I. Background
The Court has previously set forth the factual and procedural background of this case in its
Order and Reasons granting Defendants’ Motions for a Stay,5 and the Court does not see a need
again to set out the relevant factual and procedural background of this case. Instead, the Court refers
the parties to its prior order.6

II. Law and Analysis
A. Standard of Review on Motion for Reconsideration7
Although the Fifth Circuit has noted that the Federal Rules “do not recognize a ‘motion for
reconsideration’ in haec verba,”8 it has consistently recognized that such a motion may challenge
a judgment or order under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 54(b), 59(e), or 60(b).9 Rules 59 and
60, however, apply only to final judgments.10 When a party seeks to revise an order that adjudicates
5

See Order and Reasons, Rec. Doc. 48 at pp. 1-7.

6

Id.

7

The Court notes that Plaintiff brought this motion under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Defendants state that the motion should have been brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e)
because the motion for partial reconsideration was filed within 28 days of the date upon which the order from which
relief is sought was entered. However, as explained below, it is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) that governs.
8

Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 173 (5th Cir. 1990).

9

Id. (Rules 59 and 60); Castrillo v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., No. 09-4369, 2010 W L 1424398, at
*3-4 (E.D. La. Apr. 5, 2010) (Vance, C.J.) (Rule 54).
10
Rule 59 concerns motions to “alter or amend a judgment” whereas Rule 60 can provide relief from “a
final judgment, order, or proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (emphasis added). The Advisory Committee Notes of
1946 state that “[t]he addition of the qualifying word ‘final’ emphasizes the character of judgement, orders or
proceedings from which Rule 60(b) affords relief; and hence interlocutory judgments are not brought within the

2

fewer than all the claims among all of the parties, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) controls.11
The Rule states:
[A]ny order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the
claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action
as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of
a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.12
Under Rule 54(b), the district court “possesses the inherent procedural power to reconsider,
rescind, or modify an interlocutory order for cause seen by it to be sufficient.”13 However, this broad
discretion14 must be exercised sparingly in order to forestall the perpetual reexamination of orders
and the resulting burdens and delays.15 Further, the decision of the district court to grant or deny a
motion for reconsideration will only be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.16
The general practice of courts in this district has been to evaluate Rule 54(b) motions to
reconsider interlocutory orders under the same standards that govern Rule 59(e) motions to alter or

restrictions of the rule, but rather they are left subject to the complete power of the court rendering them to afford
such relief from them as justice requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (1946 Advisory Committee Notes). See also,
Helena Labs. Corp., 483 F. Supp. 2d 538 (E.D. Tex. 2007) (motion was improperly filed under Rule 59(e) when
there existed no final judgment that had been entered). See also, Lambert v. McMahon, No. 06-10679, 2007 U.S.
App. LEXIS 5220 (5th Cir. Mar. 6, 2007) (where there was no entry of final judgment, requests could not be
considered under Rule 60(b)); Greene v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 764 F.2d 19, 37 (1st Cir. 1985) (finding that a
district court’s decision to dismiss fewer than all counts of a complaint did not constitute a basis for any final
judgment, such that it was error for the district court to have applied a Rule 60(b) standard to a motion seeking
reconsideration of the dismissal).
11

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). See also, Helena Labs, 483 F. Supp. 2d 538 (motion for reconsideration under
Rule 59(e) treated as under Rule 54(b) because reconsideration of partial summary judgment order was sought and
no final judgment had yet been entered in the case).
12

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).

13

Melancon v. Texaco, Inc., 659 F.2d 551, 553 (5th Cir. 1981).

14

See Calpetco 1981 v. Marshall Exploration, Inc., 989 F.2d 1408, 1414-15 (5th Cir. 1993).

15

See, e.g., 18B Charles A. W right et al., Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 4478.1 (2d ed. 2002).

16

Martin v. H.M.B. Constr. Co., 279 F.2d 495, 496 (5th Cir. 1960) (citation omitted). See also, Garcia v.
Woman’s Hosp. of Tex., 97 F.3d 810, 814 (5th Cir. 1996).

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amend a final judgment.17 A Rule 59(e) motion “calls into question the correctness of a judgment,”18
and courts have considerable discretion in deciding whether to grant such a motion.19 In exercising
this discretion, courts must carefully balance the interests of justice with the need for finality.20
Courts in the Eastern District of Louisiana have generally considered four factors in deciding a
motion under the Rule 59(e) standard:
(1) the motion is necessary to correct a manifest error of law or fact upon which the
judgment is based;
(2) the movant presents newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence;
(3) the motion is necessary in order to prevent manifest injustice; or
(4) the motion is justified by an intervening change in controlling law.21
Although Rules 59 and 60 set forth specific time frames during which reconsideration may
be sought,22 Rule 54 sets forth no such limitation.23 However, importantly, Rule 54(b) motions, like
those under Rules 59(e) and 60(b), are not the proper vehicle for rehashing evidence, legal theories,

17

See, e.g., Castrillo, 2010 W L 1424398, at *3; Rosemond v. AIG Ins., No. 08-1145, 2009 W L 1211020, at
*2 (E.D. La. May 4, 2009) (Barbier, J.); In re Katrina Canal Breaches, No. 05-4182, 2009 W L 1046016, at *1 (E.D.
La. Apr. 16, 2009) (Duval, J.).
18

Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts v. Transtexas Gas Corp. (In re Transtexas Gas Corp.), 303 F.3d 571,
581 (5th Cir. 2002).
19

Edward H. Bohlin Co., Inc. v. Banning Co., Inc., 6 F.3d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 1993).

20

Id. at 355-56.

21

See, e.g., Castrillo, 2010 W L 1424398, at *4 (citations omitted).

22

Fed R. Civ. P. 59(e) (“A motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after the
entry of the judgment.”) Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c) (“A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time –
and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the
proceeding.”).
23
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (stating that the order “may be revised at any time” before entry of final judgment).
The only limitation imposed on Rule 54(b) reconsideration is if the court issues an order expressly stating that there
is “no just reason for delay,” in which case the order becomes a final, appealable judgment. Zapata Gulf Marine
Corp. v. Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Auth., 925 F.2d 812, 815 (5th Cir. 1991).

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or arguments.24 Instead, they “serve the narrow purpose of allowing a party to correct manifest errors
of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.”25 “It is well settled that motions for
reconsideration should not be used . . . to re-urge matters that have already been advanced by a
party.”26
Reconsideration, therefore, is not to be lightly granted, as “[r]econsideration of a judgment
after its entry is an extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly”27 and the motion must
“clearly establish” that reconsideration is warranted.28 When there exists no independent reason for
reconsideration other than mere disagreement with a prior order, reconsideration is a waste of
judicial time and resources and should not be granted.29

B. Analysis
In its Motion for Partial Reconsideration, Plaintiff requests the Court to “reconsider the scope
of that Stay Order so as to permit Waste Management to obtain a limited amount of document
discovery . . . .”30 Specifically, Plaintiff argues that this Court should require production of a copy

24

Simon v. United States, 891 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1990).

25

Waltman v. Int’l Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir. 1989).

26

Helena Labs., 483 F. Supp. 2d at 539 (citing Browning v. Navarro, 894 F.2d 99, 100 (5th Cir. 1990)).

27

Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 478-79 (5th Cir. 2004).

28

Schiller v. Physicians Res. Group Inc., 342 F.3d 563, 567 (5th Cir. 2003).

29

Livingston Downs Racing Ass’n v. Jefferson Downs Corp., 259 F.Supp. 2d 471 (M .D. La. 2002). See
also, Mata v. Schoch, 337 BR 138 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (refusing reconsideration where no new evidence was
presented). See also, FDIC v. Cage, 810 F.Supp. 745, 747 (D. Miss. 1993) (refusing reconsideration where the
motion merely disagreed with the court and did not demonstrate clear error of law or manifest injustice).
30

Rec Doc. 49 at p. 1.

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of a set of documents already seized by the FBI as part of the ongoing criminal investigation.31
Plaintiff argues that doing so will “raise no burden or relevance issues; will implicate no testimonial
privileges, and [] will serve only to further the efficient disposition of this litigation upon its
resumption.”32
Defendants respond that Plaintiff previously argued for “a staged discovery process that
included, among other things, the production of documents seized by the FBI . . .” and that the Court
previously rejected Plaintiff’s request for staged discovery by granting a complete stay.33 Defendants
argue that Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration does nothing more than rehash arguments previously
presented.34 This Court is inclined to agree with Defendants that Plaintiff does nothing more than
restate arguments previously made, and the Court notes that Plaintiff specifically proposed staged
discovery to begin with “only document production and other written discovery . . .”, specifically
to include “copies of any documents that have already been seized by the Government during its raid
of River Birch’s offices.”35
In a reply to Defendants’ opposition, Plaintiff attempts to characterize the Court’s prior order
as not encompassing its current request to obtain documents already seized by the FBI as part of the

31

Id.

32

Id.

33

Rec Doc. 50 at pp. 1-2.

34

Defendants also argue that Plaintiff “grossly oversimplifies what would be required of the Court and the
parties if [Plaintiff’s] motion was granted.” Rec Doc. 50 at pp. 1-2. Defendants then specifically outline numerous
problems that would result if this Court granted Plaintiff’s requested discovery. Because this Court finds that
Plaintiff’s motion for partial reconsideration only rehashes arguments previously presented in support of Plaintiff’s
position that a stay is unwarranted, the Court need not consider these other arguments advanced by Defendants
regarding why they believe a complete stay is warranted.
35

See Rec. Doc. 27 at p. 13.

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ongoing criminal investigation by stating “neither the Court nor the Defendants addressed the
production of the ‘Seized Documents’ as requiring a Stay.”36 Although the Court did not focus its
decision on specific discovery requests Plaintiff might have, clearly the Court considered the effect
of any discovery when it rejected Plaintiff’s argument regarding “staged discovery.”
Plaintiff provides nothing to demonstrate that there have been any alleged errors that rise to
the level of manifest error required for a motion to reconsider; Plaintiff makes no arguments
regarding newly discovery or previously unavailable evidence; Plaintiff makes no argument that
manifest injustice will result if the Court does not reconsider its prior ruling; and Plaintiff makes no
argument that there has been an intervening change in controlling law. Instead, Plaintiff only
expounds upon arguments presented in its original opposition to the motions for a stay.
Because Plaintiff does nothing more than “re-urge matters that have already been advanced
by a party,”37 reconsideration is inappropriate. Reconsideration is an “extraordinary remedy” that
must be used sparingly and with full consideration of the importance of finality of judgments. Here,
Plaintiff has presented no independent reason to justify reconsideration, and simply allowing a party
to reassert the same arguments does nothing but waste judicial time and resources while calling into
question the finality of judgments.

III. Conclusion
Mere disagreement with a prior ruling, as asserted here, does not support a motion for
reconsideration, and the Court, therefore, finds reconsideration unwarranted here. For the reasons

36

Rec. Doc. 53 at p. 2.

37

Helena Labs., 483 F. Supp. 2d at 539 (citing Browning, 894 F.2d at 100).

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set forth above, as well as the reasons given in the original Order and Reasons granting a complete
stay of these proceedings,38
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Stay Order39 is
DENIED.
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this ______ day of March, 2012.
14th

________________________________________
NANNETTE JOLIVETTE BROWN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

38

Rec. Doc. 48.s

39

Rec. Doc. 49.

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