Guity et al v. Lawson Environmental Services & Response Company et al
Filing
120
ORDER & REASONS granting in part 102 United States Environmental Services, L.L.C.'s Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs; FURTHER ORDERED that Lawson shall pay to USES $183,991.00 in attorneys' fees and $14,905.32 in costs. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 9/23/14. (sek)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
VICTOR GUITY, ET AL
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO: 11-2506
LAWSON ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICE,
LLC, ET AL
SECTION:
J(1)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs
(Rec. Doc. 102) filed by Defendant and Cross Claimant, United
States Environmental Services, L.L.C. ("USES"), as well as an
Opposition (Rec. Doc.
109) by Cross Claim Defendant, Lawson
Environmental Services, L.L.C. ("Lawson"), and USES' Reply (Rec.
Doc. 117). Having considered the motion, the parties’ submissions,
the record, and the applicable law, the Court finds, for the
reasons expressed below, that the motions should be GRANTED in
part.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This
claim
arises
out
of
an
issue
of
contractual
interpretation. In 2007, USES entered into a contract with BP
America
Company
to
provide
oil
spill
clean-up
services
in
connection with the Macondo well incident. (Rec. Doc. 1-02-1, p.
1). In January, 2010, USES entered into another "Master Service
Contract" with BP Exploration and Production, Inc. ("BPE"), which
1
extended the terms of the original agreement through December 31,
2010. (Rec. Doc. 102-1, p. 1). On July 11, 2010, Lawson also
entered into a Master Service Contract with BPE to provide oil
spill
clean-up
services.
Both
USES'
and
Lawson's
contracts
contained cross-indemnification provisions. (Rec. Doc. 102-1, p.
2).1
Robinson Quintero and Victor Guity (collectively "Plaintiffs")
were employed by Lawson to perform work in connection with Lawson's
contract with BPE. On October 7, 2010, Plaintiffs were performing
duties aboard the M/V BOOMER II in connection with the contract,
and allege they were injured when the M/V BOOMER II collided with
another vessel owned by Lawson. (Rec. Doc. 102-1, p. 3).
On
October 6, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Lawson and
subsequently amended their complaint to add USES as a defendant.
In its answer, on November 5, 2012, USES asserted a cross-claim
1
The indemnification language contained in the Master Service Contracts
reads as follows:
14.04
14.04.01
Cross Indemnity Provision: To the extent Company's other
contractor(s)
executes
cross
indemnification
and
insurance and waiver provisions substantially similar to
those contained in this Section 14.04:
Contractor
agrees
to
Indemnify
Company's
other
contractors(s) (and its subcontractors or Group as
referred to in such other contractor's contract) from
and against all Claims/Losses for the following when
Connected With this Contract:
(I) all injuries to, deaths, or illnesses of persons in
the Contractor Group, and
(ii) all damages to or loses of Contractor's Property,
even if caused by the Negligence/Fault of Company's
other contractors(s) (or its subcontractors or Group, as
applicable) or any other Person.
2
against Lawson, seeking defense and indemnity for Plaintiffs'
claims
in
accordance
indemnification
with
provisions
its
interpretation
contained
in
the
of
the
Master
crossService
Contracts. (Rec. Doc. 102-1, p. 4). Lawson refused to defend USES
in this action, and USES subsequently hired Frilot, LLC, to provide
legal
services
in
defending
against
Plaintiff's
claims.
In
November, 2013, both Plaintiffs reached a settlement agreement with
USES and all claims against USES were dismissed. (Rec. Doc. 102-1,
p. 5). Mr. Guity and Lawson reached a settlement agreement and his
claims against Lawson have been dismissed. (Rec. Doc. 51). Mr.
Quintero and Lawson also reached a settlement agreement, but this
has yet to be finalized.2
On May 21, 2014, the Court granted summary judgment in favor
of USES, finding that under the language of the Master Service
Contracts, "USES is entitled to defense and indemnification by
Lawson."
(Rec. Doc. 96). As directed by the Order, on July 18,
2014, USES filed the instant motion, seeking a total of $184,783.00
in attorneys' fees and $17,195.36 in costs and expenses from
Lawson. (Rec. Doc. 102-1, p. 1). On September 16, 2014, in its
reply to Lawson's opposition, USES amended the amount sought to
reflect a total of $183,991.00 in attorneys' fees and $16,228.93 in
2
On November 22, 2013, the Court issued an order dismissing Mr. Quintero's
claims against Lawson without prejudice, directing the parties to file a motion
for summary judgment enforcing their compromise within sixty (60) days. (Rec.
Doc. 57). As of that date, the Court has granted the parties five (5) extensions
to consummate their settlement, with the most recent granted on September 22,
2014. (Rec. Doc. 119).
3
costs and expenses. (Rec. Doc. 117, p. 1).
PARTIES' ARGUMENTS
The parties do not contest that USES is entitled to attorneys'
fees, however, there exists a dispute regarding the amount. USES
argues that pursuant to the terms of the Lawson-BPA Master Services
Contract, it is entitled to "all attorneys' fees, costs, and
expenses incurred as a result of Lawson's refusal to comply with
its contractual indemnity obligation." (Rec. Doc. 102-1, p. 6).
Lawson contends, however, that according to the language of
the Court's order granting summary judgment in favor of USES,
Lawson is mandated only to "indemnify USES against all claims made
by Plaintiffs against USES in the above-captioned suit." (Rec. Doc.
96, p. 10). Lawson asserts that this language means that USES is
not entitled to recover for attorneys' fees and costs incurred in
relation to USES' cross-claim against Lawson.
USES also argues that the fees and costs sought are reasonable
in
light
of
a
number
of
factors,
including
the
gravity
of
Plaintiffs' claims, the extensive discovery procedures, and the
need to hire an interpreter to facilitate Plaintiffs' claims. (Rec.
Doc. 102-1, p. 8-12). USES further contends that the hourly rates
charged by its counsel were reasonable considering the prevailing
market rates and the attorneys' experience and skill. (Rec. Doc.
102-1, p. 12).
In response, Lawson argues that the fees and costs sought by
4
USES are not reasonable. Instead, Lawson contends that the invoices
provided by USES reflecting the hours billed by USES' counsel are
"rife with double billing, errors in billing, and excessive billing
in time." (Rec. Doc. 109, p. 4). Lawson further asserts that the
costs sought by USES should be reduced, because USES is not
entitled to recovery of costs for computerized research, postage,
express
or
courier
delivery
charges,
telephone
expenses,
or
telecopy expenses. (Rec. Doc. 109, p. 7-8).
LEGAL STANDARD
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit uses
a two-step analysis to calculate fee awards. Hernandez v. U.S.
Customs & Border Prot. Agency, No. 10-4602, 2012 WL 398328, at *13
(E.D. La. Feb. 7, 2012) (Barbier, J.) (citing Jimenez v. Wood
Cnty., Tex., 621 F.3d 372, 379 (5th Cir. 2010)). In the first step,
the Court must calculate the "lodestar," which is accomplished "by
multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended in the case by
the prevailing hourly rate for legal services in the district." Id.
(internal citations omitted).
In determining the number of hours billed for purposes of
calculating the lodestar, the Court must "determine whether the
requested hours expended by . . . counsel were reasonable in light
of the facts of the case and the work performed. The burden of
proving the reasonableness of the hours expended is on the fee
applicant." Hernandez, 2012 WL 398328, at *13 (internal citations
5
omitted). The Court must also determine whether the records show
that the movant's "counsel exercised billing judgment" and "should
exclude all time billed for work that is excessive, duplicative, or
inadequately documented." Id. at *14 (internal citations omitted).
In determining the hourly rates for purposes of calculating
the lodestar, the Court must determine a reasonable rate for each
attorney "at the prevailing market rates in the relevant community
for similar services by attorneys of reasonably comparable skills,
experience, and reputation." Id. (internal citations omitted). The
burden is on the fee applicant to submit "satisfactory evidence
that the requested rate is aligned with prevailing market rates."
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Next, "the second step allows the Court to make downward
adjustments, or in rare cases, upward adjustments, to the lodestar
amount based upon consideration of the twelve Johnson factors." Id.
The twelve Johnson factors are the following:
(1) the time and labor required
(2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions
(3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service
properly
(4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney
due to acceptance of the case
(5) the customary fee
(6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent
(7) time limitations imposed by the client or the
circumstances
(8) the amount involved and the results obtained
(9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the
attorneys
(10) the "undesirability" of the case
(11) the nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client
6
(12) awards in similar cases
Johnson v. Ga. Highway Exp. Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir.
1974), abrogated on other grounds, Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S.
87 (1989).
Courts apply "a strong presumption that [the lodestar] figure
is reasonable." Hernandez, 2012 WL 398328, at *16. Nevertheless,
[T]he Court must still consider the twelve Johnson
factors ... . Though the Court need not be "meticulously
detailed" in its analysis, it must nonetheless articulate
and clearly apply the twelve factors to determine how
each affects the lodestar amount. The Court should give
special consideration to the time and labor involved, the
customary fee, the amount involved and the results
obtained, and the experience, reputation, and ability of
counsel. ... However, to the extent that a factor has
been previously considered in the calculation of the
benchmark lodestar amount, a court should not make
further adjustments on that basis.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
DISCUSSION
Because the Court has previously determined that Lawson had a
duty to defend and indemnify USES for the claims brought against it
by Plaintiffs and failed to do so, USES is entitled to attorney's
fees.
A. Claim Against Lawson
The Court will first address Lawson's assertion that USES is
only entitled to recover attorneys' fees and costs incurred with
regards to defending the claims brought by Plaintiffs Guity and
Quintero and not those related to the indemnity cross-claim filed
7
by USES against Lawson. Lawson relies on the Court's language in
its Order and Reasons granting summary judgment in favor of USES in
which it mandated, "It is further ordered that Lawson shall defend
and indemnify USES against all claims made by Plaintiffs against
USES in the above-captioned matter." (Rec. Doc. 96, p. 10). Lawson
interprets this language to read that "Lawson should only have to
indemnify USES for reasonable costs in the defending the primary
claim made by Plaintiff against USES." (Rec. Doc. 109, p. 2). As
such, Lawson contends that the attorneys' fees sought by USES
should be reduced by a total of $47,248.50. (Rec. Doc. 109, p. 3).
The Court finds this argument to be without merit.
The Court has determined that Lawson had a duty to indemnify
and defend USES in the claims brought by Plaintiffs. (Rec. Doc.
102, p. 10). By failing to do so, Lawson breached its contractual
obligations,
causing
USES
reimbursement
for
expenses
the
to
file
a
incurred
cross-claim
in
defending
seeking
against
Plaintiffs' claims. The attorneys' fees and costs sought by USES
are the sole and direct result of Lawson's failure to honor its
contractual
duties.
The
language
of
the
indemnity
provisions
contained in the Master Services Contract between Lawson and BPE
specifically
provides
that
Lawson
has
a
duty
to
defend
and
indemnify USES "from and against all Claims/Losses . . . Connected
With this Contract." (Rec. Doc. 91, p. 12) (emphasis added). As
addressed by USES, the contract also defines "defend" to include
8
payment of "reasonable attorneys' fees . . . and other reasonable
costs." (Rec. Doc. 91, p. 10; Rec. Doc. 117, p. 3). The cross-claim
against Lawson is undoubtedly "connected with" the Lawson-BPE
Master Services Contract,3 and as such, Lawson has a contractual
duty to indemnify USES for all attorneys' fees and other reasonable
costs and expenses USES has incurred as a result of being forced to
litigate this cross-claim. The mere fact that the Court did not
clearly state that Lawson is required to pay attorneys' fees for
this specific cross-claim in its Order and Reasons does not, as
Lawson argues, imply that Lawson is not bound to do so. Under the
terms of the Master Services Contract as well as this Court's prior
Order and Reasons, Lawson is required to indemnify USES for all
claims comprising this matter, and as such, the Court finds a
reduction of attorneys' fees on this basis to be improper.
B. Billing Judgment
Lawson contends that the amount of attorneys' fees requested
by USES is unreasonable because USES' attorneys' have failed to
"exercise billing judgment." (Rec. Doc. 109, p. 3). The duty to
exercise billing judgment "refers to the usual practice of law
firms in writing off unproductive, excessive, or redundant hours."
Walker v. U.S. Dept of Housing and Urban Development, 99 F.3d 761,
3
The contract defines "Connected with" as "directly or indirectly arising
out of, resulting from, or in any way connected with or related to." The contract
further states that "the indemnities in this Contract are intended to be broad
and cover all Claims/Losses in any way connected to the performance of the
Contract." (Rec. Doc. 91, p. 11).
9
769 (5th Cir. 1996). The party seeking attorneys' fees is "charged
with proving that they have exercised billing judgment," and "the
proper remedy when there is no evidence of billing judgment is to
reduce the hours awarded by a percentage intended to substitute for
the exercise of billing judgment." Id. at 770. Because of USES'
alleged failure to exercise billing judgment, Lawson argues that
the Court should impose a percentage reduction on the attorneys'
fees requested to reflect its improper billing.
Lawson first asserts that the invoices provided by USES
contain "approximately 15 instances of double billing for the same
work." (Rec. Doc. 109, p. 4). USES denies that the invoices reflect
any evidence of double billing, yet out of an abundance of caution
have removed any "instances of questionable duplicative entries,"
totaling a deduction of $375.00 from the attorneys' fees they
originally sought.
Lawson also
points to the fact that "several
instances of work on Guity was billed under Quintero," and that the
same work was billed in both cases. (Rec. Doc. 109, p. 4). Due to
the distinctions in the Plaintiffs' Jones Act claims, USES' counsel
was forced to defend the two claims separately, and thus create
separate files for each claim. (Rec. Doc. 117, p. 3). USES argues
that several entries noted by Lawson as evidence of double-billing
"were not billed twice, but concerned both lawsuits and were
divided evenly and included on both invoices." (Rec. Doc. 117, p.
5).
Additionally, due to the overlap between the cases, the Court
10
finds it reasonable that entries may be mislabeled amongst the two
plaintiffs, and this alone is not evidence of double billing.
Due
in part to Lawson's lack of evidence of double billing as well as
USES' willingness to reduce the amount of fees sought to guard
against any potentially questionable entries, the Court finds that
no percentage reduction is appropriate on the basis of double
billing.
Lawson next contends that USES failed to exercise billing
judgment by billing excessive hours for work performed. (Rec. Doc.
109, p. 5). Despite the alleged "abundant" number of examples of
excess billing presented by Lawson, the Court finds that USES has
not engaged in excessive billing practices which would warrant a
percentage reduction. Lawson first points to an invoice dated
August
14,
2013
reflecting
a
total
of
1.8
hours
billed
for
telephone calls made to three men to alert them of their upcoming
depositions. (Rec. Doc. 109, p. 5). This amount of time seems less
excessive, however, in light of USES' explanation that there was
"difficulty in communicating with the witnesses." (Rec. Doc. 117,
p. 7). Lawson next argues that the billing of approximately two
hours on November 14, 2013 to consult with experts regarding issues
in the expert reports related to the Guity claims was excessive
given that the Guity matter had settled on November 7, 2013. (Rec.
Doc. 109, p. 5). However, although the Guity matter had settled, as
of November 14, 2013, the Quintero case remained ongoing, and USES
11
asserts that "the expert reports issued in the Guity matter were
reviewed as part of USES' counsel [sic] continuing obligation to
defend the case." (Rec. Doc. 117, p. 7). The Court finds that two
hours spent reviewing these reports for purposes of preparation in
the Quintero case is not excessive.
Lawson also asserts that 3.8
hours billed for "researching electronic discovery consultants and
calling them to get quotes" is unreasonable. (Rec. Doc. 109, p. 5).
However, as noted by USES, considering the complex issues in these
matters as well as the extensive documents, 3.8 hours does not
appear to the Court to be an excessive amount of time to review
this data. Finally, Lawson argues that a total of 6.25 hours billed
to travel from New Orleans to Lake Charles on August 18, 2013 was
excessive given that Mapquest provides that the approximate travel
time should be 3½
to 4 hours. (Rec. Doc. 109, p. 6). While USES
does not dispute the approximate travel time for driving, it notes
that USES' counsel first traveled by plane to Houston from New
Orleans then drove to Lake Charles to conduct multiple depositions
in various locations over the span of a few days. (Rec. Doc. 117).
In light of the mixed modes of transportation, this billing appears
reasonable to the Court, and something that could have been easily
made known to Lawson if it had merely inquired of USES.
Any discrepancies in actual work performed and the amount
billed appear minimal at most. Because Lawson has failed to point
to any evidence of extensive excessive billing or any other
12
deficiencies in USES' billing judgment, the Court will not apply a
percentage deduction to the amount of attorneys' fees requested.
C. Lodestar Calculation
After considering the specific rate and hours billed by each
attorney employed to defend USES, the Court finds that the lodestar
calculation provided by USES is not unreasonable.
1. Allen J. Krouse
USES seeks attorneys' fees for a total of 341.65 hours billed
by Allen J. Krouse (182.65 hours on the Quintero case and 159.00
hours on the Guity case) at the rate of $290 per hour. Mr. Krouse
is a partner at the firm of Frilot, L.L.C. and has over thirty (30)
years of experience in commercial litigation, specifically marine,
construction, contract, employment, toxic tort, class actions,
environmental and energy issues, and product liability law. (Rec.
Doc. 102-2, p. 3).
The Court will first determine the reasonableness of the
hourly rate for Mr. Krouse. Only two years ago, in 2012, this Court
found that in the Eastern District of Louisiana, a reasonable
hourly rate for an attorney who had been practicing law for over
eight (8) years and specialized in the field of law at issue was
$300.00 per hour.
Hernandez, 2012 WL 398328, at *14-16. The Court
arrived at its conclusion after an analysis of multiple cases in
this district:
See, e.g. Smith v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 2011 [WL]
13
6371481 (E.D. La. Dec. 20, 2011) (awarding $290.00/hour
for a partner with 16 years experience and $240/hour for
an associate with 8 years of experience); Construction
South, Inc. v. Jenkins, 2011 WL 3892225 (E.D. La. Sept.2,
2011) (awarding $350/hour for two partners with 36 and 30
years of experience; $200/hour for an associate with four
years of experience; and $180/hour for an associate with
two years of experience); Atel Mar. Investors, LP v. Sea
Mar Mgmt., LLC, 2011 WL 2550505 (E.D. La. June 27, 2011)
(awarding $250 for partner with 35 years of experience;
$250 for a partner with 11 years of experience; and $175
for an associate with 2 years of experience); Entergy
La., L.L.C. v. The Wackenhut Corp., 2010 WL 4812921 (E.D.
La. Nov.17, 2010) (awarding $175.00/hour to attorney with
16 years of experience); Wilson v. Tulane Univ., 2010 WL
3943543 (E.D. La. Oct.4, 2010) (awarding $250.00/hour and
$160.00/hour to attorneys with 25 and four years
experience respectively); Hebert v. Rodriguez, 2010 WL
2360718 (E.D. La. June 8, 2010) (awarding $300.00/hour to
partner with 33 years of experience); Gulf Coast
Facilities Mgmt., L.L.C. v. BG LNG Servs., L.L.C., 2010
WL 2773208 (E.D. La. July 13, 2010) (awarding
$300.00/hour to attorneys with 17 years experience and
$180.00/hour and $135.00/hour to attorneys with seven
years and two years experience respectively); Belfor USA
Group, Inc. v. Bellemeade Partners, L.L.C., 2010 WL
6300009 (E.D. La. Feb. 19, 2010) (awarding $250.00/hour,
$210.00/hour, and $180.00/hour to attorneys with 20, 10,
and 4 years of legal experience, respectively); Marks v.
Standard Fire Ins. Co., 2010 WL 487403 (E.D. La. Feb. 3,
2010) (awarding $185.00/hour to attorney with seven years
of experience).
Id. at *15.
Considering the cases discussed above, as well as Mr. Krouse's
extensive experience, the Court finds that a fee of $290.00 per
hour for Mr. Krouse's services is reasonable. Moreover, Mr. Krouse
has informed the Court that in representing USES he reduced his
standard billing rate of $325.00 per hour to $290.00 per hour.
14
Additionally, in light of the complexity and gravity of Plaintiffs'
two distinct claims, a total of 341.65 billed hours appears
reasonable. Lawson does not contest either Mr. Krouse's rate or his
number of hours billed. Therefore, the Court finds that the
lodestar figure for Mr. Krouse (341.65 hours at a rate of $290.00
per hour) is $99,078.50.
2. Suzanne M. Risey
USES seeks attorneys' fees for a total of 71.3 hours billed by
Suzanne M. Risey (35.3 hours on the Quintero case and 36.00 hours
on the Guity case) at the rate of $250 per hour. Ms. Risey is a
partner at the firm and has sixteen (16) years experience in labor
and employment law.
Given the cases cited above, the Court finds
that a fee of $250.00 per hour for Ms. Risey's services is
reasonable. A total of 71.3 hours appears to be a reasonable number
of hours billed by Ms. Risey, and those hours are well-documented.
Lawson has not challenged the hourly rate or number of hours billed
by Ms. Risey. Therefore, the Court finds that the lodestar figure
for Ms. Risey (71.3 hours at a rate of $250.00 per hour) is
$17,825.00.
3. Brandon K. Thibodeaux
USES also seeks attorneys' fees for a total of 88.70 hours
billed by Brandon K. Thibodeaux (42.90 hours on the Quintero case
and 45.80 on the Guity case) at the rate of $150.00 per hour. Mr.
Thibodeaux is an associate at the firm and has approximately five
15
(5) years of experience in commercial litigation and admiralty and
maritime law. In light of the cases cited above, the Court finds
that a fee of $150.00 per hour for Mr. Thibodeaux's services is
reasonable. A total of 91.40 hours appears to be a reasonable
number of hours billed by Mr. Thibodeaux, and those hours are welldocumented. Lawson has not challenged the hourly rate or number of
hours billed by Mr. Thibodeaux. Therefore, the Court finds that the
lodestar figure for Mr. Thibodeaux (91.40 hours at a rate of
$150.00 per hour) is $13,710.00.
4. Krystle M. Ferbos
USES also seeks attorneys' fees for a total of .80 hours
(entirely on the Quintero case) at the rate of $160.00 per hour.
Ms. Ferbos is an associate with the firm and has approximately
three (3) years of experience in commercial litigation, mass tort,
and class actions. In light of the cases cited above, the Court
finds that a fee of $160.00 per hour for Ms. Ferbos's services is
reasonable. A total of .80 hours appears to be a reasonable number
of hours billed by Ms. Ferbos, and those hours are well-documented.
Lawson has not challenged the reasonable hourly rate or number of
hours billed by Ms. Ferbos. Therefore, the Court finds that the
lodestar figure for Ms. Ferbos (.80 hours at a rate of $175.00 per
hour) is $140.00.
5. Toni Ellington
USES also seeks attorneys' fees for a total of 63.20 hours
16
(31.50 on the Quintero case and 31.70 on the Guity case) at the
rate of $150.00 per hour. Ms. Ellington is a former associate with
the firm and has approximately fourteen (14) years of experience in
general litigation, mass tort, personal injury litigation, products
liability, toxic torts, and environmental law.
Given the cases
above, the Court finds that a fee of $175.00 per hour for Ms.
Ellington's services is reasonable. A total of 63.20 hours appears
to be a reasonable number of hours billed by Ms. Ellington, and
those hours are well-documented. Lawson has not challenged the
reasonable hourly rate or number of hours billed by Ms. Ellington.
Therefore, the Court finds that the lodestar figure for Ms.
Ellington
(63.20
hours
at
a
rate
of
$175.00
per
hour)
is
$11,060.00.
6. Ashley Wheelock
USES also seeks attorneys' fees for a total of 1.70
hours
(.70 on the Quintero case and 1.0 on the Guity case) at the rate of
$150.00 per hour. Ms. Wheelock is a former associate with the firm
and has approximately one (1) year of experience in medical
malpractice and healthcare. Given the cases above, the Court finds
that a fee of $150.00 per hour for Ms. Wheelock's services is
reasonable. A total of 1.7 hours appears to be a reasonable number
of
hours
billed
by
Ms.
Wheelock,
and
those
hours
are
well-
documented. Lawson has not challenged the hourly rate or number of
hours billed by Ms. Wheelock. Therefore, the Court finds that the
17
lodestar figure for Ms. Wheelock (1.7 hours at a rate of $150.00
per hour) is $255.00.
D. Johnson Factors
As discussed above, these lodestar figures are presumptively
reasonable, but the Court must nevertheless consider the twelve
Johnson factors to determine whether they warrant a downward
adjustment or, in rare cases, an upward adjustment.
1. Time and Labor Required
The Court finds that the lodestar amounts calculated above
fairly account for the time and labor expended by each attorney in
this case, and so no upward or downward adjustment of the lodestar
calculation is warranted based on this factor.
2. Novelty and Difficulty of the Questions
The
Court
finds
that
the
issues
in
this
case
were
not
sufficiently novel or difficult to warrant an upward adjustment of
the lodestar calculation.
3. Skill Requisite to Perform the Legal Service Properly
The skill of each attorney is already accounted for in the
lodestar calculations.
4. Preclusion of Other Employment
There is no contention in this case that the attorneys were
precluded from taking other employment by virtue of the time and
resources required to be expended in this case, and the Court
therefore finds that this factor does not warrant an upward
18
adjustment of the lodestar amount.
5. Customary Fee
The customary fees charged by each attorney are already
accounted for in the lodestar calculations.
6. Fixed or Contingent Fee
The Court finds that this factor does not warrant an upward or
downward adjustment of the lodestar amount.
7. Time Limitations Imposed by Client or Circumstances
The Court finds that there were no particular time limitations
or constraints imposed on Counsel in this matter that would warrant
an upward or downward adjustment.
8. Amount Involved and Results Obtained
Counsel for USES achieved the results they sought, and this
factor is already accounted for in the lodestar calculations.
9. Experience, Reputation, and Ability of Attorneys
The experience, reputation, and ability of each attorney is
already accounted for in the lodestar calculations.
10. Undesirability of the Case
There is no contention in this case that the this case was
undesirable, and the Court therefore finds that this factor does
not warrant an upward adjustment of the lodestar amount.
11. Nature and Length of Professional Relationship with
Client
USES has recognized that Partner Allen J. Krouse discounted
19
his customary fee of $325 per hour to $290 per hour for the Guity
and Quintero claims, as well as the cross-claim brought against
Lawson, however, the reason for this discount has not been provided
to the court. As such, this factor does not warrant an upward
adjustment from the lodestar amounts.
12. Awards in Similar Cases
This factor is neutral because the Court already considered
recent awards of attorneys' fees in this district and took those
awards into account when calculating the lodestar amounts.
Because it appears that none of the Johnson factors warrants
an upward or downward adjustment from the lodestar amounts, the
Court finds that the lodestar amount calculated for each attorney
– a total of $183,991.004 – is the correct award in this case.
E. Costs/Expenses
In addition to attorneys' fees, USES also seeks $17,195.36 in
costs and expenses.5 (Rec. Doc. 102, p. 1). With respect to costs
and expenses, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that
"federal courts may only award those costs articulated in [18
U.S.C.
§
1920]
absent
explicit
statutory
or
contractual
authorization to the contrary." Mota v. Univ. of Tex. Houston
4
Considering a voluntary reduction in attorney's fees in the amount of
$792.00 imposed by USES in its Reply. (Rec. Doc. 117, p. 1).
5
In its reply, USES has adjusted the amount of costs and expenses sought
to $16,228.93 in order to reflect a deduction of questionable costs included in
its original request. (Rec. Doc. 117, p. 1).
20
Health Science Ctr., 261 F.3d 512, 529 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 441
(1987)). The language of the Lawson-BPE Master Services Contract
reflects
that
USES
is
entitled
to
indemnification
for
costs
incurred in the claims involved in this matter.6 As such, despite
the limitations of 18 U.S.C. § 1920, the Court finds that USES is
contractually entitled to "reasonable costs" and expenses within
the Court's discretion.
Lawson contends that the amount sought by USES for costs and
expenses should be reduced by a total of $2,290.04 for non-taxable
costs including courier expenses, postage, telephone expenses, and
telecopy expenses. (Rec. Doc. 109. p. 8).
A district court has
discretion to deny all costs and expenses when the party seeking
the costs has not provided an itemized breakdown of the costs
incurred and reasons for their necessity. See Fogleman v. ARAMCO,
920 F.2d 278, 286 (5th Cir. 1991). Because neither party has
provided an itemized breakdown of the costs they are disputing,
other than the extensive invoices, the Court, after reviewing the
invoices, finds that a reduction of $2,290.04 in the amount sought
by USES is appropriate. As such, the Court agrees with Lawson that
6
As discussed in more detail above, the Master Services Contract provides
that Lawson will defend and indemnify USES "from and against all Claims/Losses
. . . Connected With this Contract." (Rec. Doc. 91, p. 12). The Contract
specifically defines the term "defend" to "include the obligation to pay
reasonable attorneys' fees, court costs, expert fees, and other reasonable costs
incurred . . . as a result of defending against a Claim/Loss." (Rec. Doc. 91,
p. 11)(emphasis added).
21
an award of $14,905.32 for costs and expenses is reasonable.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT
IS
HEREBY
ORDERED
that
United
States
Environmental
Services, L.L.C.'s Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs (Rec. Doc.
102) is GRANTED in part.
IT
IS
FURTHER
ORDERED
that
Lawson
shall
pay
to
USES
$183,991.00 in attorneys' fees and $14,905.32 in costs.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 23rd day of September, 2014.
CARL J. BARBIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
22
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