Leeway Properties, Inc. v. Jonesfilm et al
Filing
47
ORDER AND REASONS granting Jonesfilm's 29 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying Hoffman's 30 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction; denying Leeway Properties Inc's 31 Motion to Dismiss Voluntarily, as set forth in document. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 9/26/12. (ecm, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LEEWAY PROPERTIES, INC.
*
CIVIL ACTION NO. 11‐2628
Plaintiff
*
*
SECTION: H
*
JUDGE JANE TRICHE MILAZZO
VERSUS
*
*
*
MAGISTRATE: 3
JONESFILM, ET AL
*
MAG. DANIEL KNOWLES, III
Defendants *
*
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
ORDER AND REASONS
The matters before the Court are a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Jonesfilm (Doc.
29); a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction filed by Peter Hoffman (Doc. 30); and a Motion to
Voluntarily Dismiss filed by Leeway Properties, Inc. (Doc. 31). For the following reasons, the
Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, the Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction is
DENIED and the Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss is DENIED.
1
BACKGROUND
On March 18, 2005 Jonesfilm obtained a judgment from the Los Angeles Superior Court
against Peter Hoffman in the amount of $290,911.00, plus interest from the date of July 20, 2004
at the rate of ten percent per annum until paid. On January 19, 2006 Jonesfilm filed a Petition with
the Orleans Parish District Court to have that Judgment made executory in Louisiana. The Court
granted the motion and the California judgment was made executory and filed in the Orleans
Parish Mortgage Records on March 15, 2006.
On July 29, 2011 Jonesfilm requested a writ of fieri facias for the seizure and sale of certain
properties located at 910 and 912 Royal Street in New Orleans, Louisiana (“Subject Property”). The
Court granted the writ on August 10, 2011. On October 14, 2011 Leeway Properties, Inc.
(“Leeway”) filed a petition for injunctive relief against Jonesfilm and Peter Hoffman in the Civil
District Court, Parish of Orleans, requesting the Court to stay the foreclosure of the Subject
Property. Jonesfilm removed the action to this court on October 19, 2011. This Court subsequently
denied Leeway's Motion for preliminary injunction on November 8, 2011.
Following this Court's November 8, 2011 ruling, payment was voluntarily made to Jonesfilm
prior to the scheduled November 27, 2011 sheriff's sale thereby averting the sale. Jonesfilm
subsequently filed, recorded, and served a Satisfaction of the Louisiana Court’s March 14, 2006
Judgment and recorded a Cancellation of that Judgment in the Orleans Parish Mortgage Records
on December 21, 2011.
2
On December 28, 2011 Jonesfilm filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 29.) No
opposition was filed by the Plaintiff. On January 24, 2012 Peter Hoffman filed a Motion to Dismiss
for Lack of Jurisdiction. (Doc. 30.) Jonesfilm opposed this Motion on February 7, 2012. (Doc. 32.)
On January 26, 2012 Leeway filed a Motion for Voluntary Dismissal. (Doc. 31.) Jonesfilm opposed
that Motion on February 7, 2012. (Doc. 33.)
LAW AND ANALYSIS
I. Jonesfilm’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Leeway’s Motion for Voluntary Dismissal
Before the Court is Defendant Jonesfilm’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 29) and
Plaintiff Leeway’s Motion for Voluntary Dismissal (Doc. 31). The essence of the parties’ Motions
is to have the Court decide whether or not Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed with or without
prejudice. For the following reasons, Jonesfilm’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and
Plaintiff’s claims are dismissed with prejudice.
A. Legal Standards
i. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate “[i]f the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
3
In determining whether the movant is entitled to summary judgment, the Court views facts
in the light most favorable to the non‐movant and draws all reasonable inferences in her favor.
Coleman v. Houston Independent School District, 113 F.3d 528 (5th Cir. 1997). After a proper
motion for summary judgment is made, the non‐movant must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). The non‐
movant’s burden, however is not satisfied by some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, or
by conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions or a scintilla of evidence. Little v. Liquid Air
Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). Summary judgment is appropriate if the non‐movant
“fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s
case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
ii. Voluntary Dismissal
Rule 41(a) governs voluntary dismissals. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41. Specifically, Rule 41 provides
that a plaintiff may voluntarily dismiss without a court order only when the notice of dismissal has
been filed before the opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment
or when there is a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared. Fed. R. Civ. P.
41(a)(1)(A). Federal Rule 41(a)(2) provides the guidelines for a voluntary dismissal with a court
order. “Except as provided Rule 41(a)(1), an action may be dismissed at the plaintiff's request only
by court order, on terms that the court considers proper.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2).
A unilateral motion to voluntarily dismiss an action “[i]s permissible only before the
4
defendant has filed an answer or a motion for summary judgment.” Exxon Corp. v. Md. Cas. Co.,
599 F.2d 659, 661 (5th Cir. 1979). The theory behind this rule is that once a defendant “[h]as
become actively engaged in the defense of a suit, he is entitled to have the case adjudicated” and
therefore, the case cannot “[b]e terminated without either his consent, permission of the court,
or a dismissal with prejudice that assures him against the renewal of hostilities.” Id. Ultimately,
“[a]s a general rule, motions for voluntary dismissal should be freely granted unless the non‐
moving party will suffer some plain legal prejudice other than the mere prospect of a second
lawsuit.” Elbaor v. Tripath Imaging, Inc., 279 F.3d 314, 317 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Manshack v. Sw.
Elec. Power Co., 915 F.2d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1990).
B. Analysis
Jonesfilm argues that Leeway’s petition for injunctive, declaratory and injunctive relief
should be dismissed with prejudice. (Doc. 29.) Jonesfilm notes that the Court has already decided
the only legal issues under Leeway’s Petition when it denied Leeway’s preliminary injunction. (Id.)
Jonesfilm further contends that any objection to the judicial mortgage has been waived and is moot
because Leeway paid the full amount of the judgment and Jonesfilm subsequently served the
Satisfaction of the Judgment and recorded the Cancellation of the Judgment. (Id.) Leeway did not
oppose Jonesfilm’s Motion, however did file a Motion for Voluntary Dismissal. (Doc. 31.) In its
Motion for Voluntary Dismissal Leeway agrees that their Petition for Injunction is moot, however
argues that the Court should grant their Motion and dismiss the case without prejudice. (Doc. 31‐1
5
at 3.)
Due to the fact that the parties agree that the Court has decided the only legal questions
relevant to Leeway’s Petition, dismissal of Leeway’s action is appropriate. Thus, the only real
question before the Court is whether to grant Jonesfilm’s Motion for Summary Judgment or
Leeway’s Motion for Voluntary Dismissal.
This Court finds that Jonesfilm’s first filed Motion for Summary Judgment is adequate in
showing that there is no genuine dispute of material fact and that Jonesfilm is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. On the other hand, while a plaintiff is precluded “from dismissing a lawsuit
without the court’s permission if either an answer or a motion for summary judgment has been
served on the plaintiff and the defendant does not consent,” voluntary dismissal should be freely
granted “unless the defendant will suffer some plain legal prejudice other than the mere prospect
of a second lawsuit.” Hyde v. Hoffmann‐La Roche, Inc., 511 F.3d 506, 508 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal
citations omitted). Thus, the Court must determine if Jonesfilm will suffer “plain legal prejudice”
if this suit is not dismissed with prejudice.
“Although the mere prospect of a second lawsuit is not enough prejudice to a defendant
to warrant denial of a motion to dismiss without prejudice,” when a plaintiff does not seek
dismissal until “[a]fter the defendant has exerted significant time and effort, then a court may, in
its discretion, refuse to grant a voluntary dismissal.” U.S. ex rel. Doe v. Dow Chem. Co., 343 F.3d
325, 330 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Davis v. Huskipower Outdoor Equip. Corp., 936 F.2d 193, 199 (5th
6
Cir. 1991)). In making this determination the court may consider “[w]hether the suit is still in the
pretrial stages; whether the parties have filed numerous pleadings and memoranda, have attended
conferences, and whether prior court determinations were adverse to the plaintiff; or whether
hearings have been held, whether any defendants have been dismissed on summary judgment, and
whether the parties have undertaken significant discovery.” Oxford v. Williams Companies, Inc.,
154 F. Supp. 2d 942, 951‐952 (E.D. Tex. 2001) (citing various cases)1.
While only three months may have passed between Leeway's initial Petition and its Motion
for Voluntary Dismissal, the parties and this Court have already devoted substantial time and effort
in this action, namely the briefing, argument, and hearing leading up to this Court's November 8,
2011 Order denying the preliminary injunction. Leeway has since then filed a new action in state
court that essentially seeks to re‐litigate the same issue, the only difference being the new action
seeks monetary damages rather than injunctive relief. This redundant action in state court risks
yielding results inconsistent with the judgment of this Court, and further prejudices Jonesfilm by
requiring it to devote additional time and resources to an already adjudicated issue to which it has
already devoted substantial time and resources. Leeway has given no explanation as to why it
desires voluntary dismissal of this action, but the law is clear that Leeway cannot use this
procedural vehicle simply to avoid a potentially adverse ruling from Jonesfilm's pending Motion
1
Templeton v. Nedlloyd Lines, 901 F.2d 1273, 1275‐1276 (5th Cir. 1990); Davis, 936 F.2d
at 199; Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Coasta Lines Cargo Servs., Inc., 903 F.2d 352, 360
(5th Cir. 1990).
7
for Summary Judgment. Under Rule 41, a court has discretion to deny voluntary dismissal once the
defendant has served an answer or motion for summary judgment, both of which have been served
here. In this case, both prejudice to Jonesfilm and judicial economy militate against granting
Leeway's Motion for Voluntary Dismissal. As such, Jonesfilm’s Motion for Summary Judgment is
granted and Leeway’s Motion for Voluntary Dismissal is denied.
II. Peter Hoffman’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction
Before the Court is Defendant Peter Hoffman’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal
Jurisdiction. (Doc. 30.) For the following reasons the Motion is denied.
A. Legal Standard
“Where a defendant challenges personal jurisdiction, the party seeking to invoke the power
of the court bears the burden of proving that jurisdiction exists.” Luv N’ Care, Ltd. v. Insta‐Mix, Inc.,
438 F.3d 465, 469 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Wyatt v. Kaplan, 686 F.2d 276, 280 (5th Cir. 1982)). When
a court rules on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction without holding an evidentiary
hearing, as in this case, the nonmoving party must only make a prima facie showing, and the court
must accept as true the nonmover's allegations and resolve all factual disputes in its favor. Guidry
v. U.S. Tobacco, Co., Inc., 188 F.3d 619, 625 (5th Cir. 1999). “In determining whether personal
jurisdiction exists, the trial court is not restricted to a review of the plaintiff's pleadings.” Jobe v.
ATR Marketing, Inc., 87 F.3d 751, 753 (5th Cir. 1996). The Court may consider matters outside the
8
complaint, including affidavits, interrogatories, depositions, or any combination of the recognized
methods of discovery. Id. (citing Colwell Realty Investments v. Triple T. Inns of Arizona, 785 F.2d
1330 (5th Cir.1986)).
“A federal court sitting in diversity must satisfy two requirements to exercise personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.” Pervasive Software, Inc. v. Lexware CMBG & Co. KG,
– F.3d –, No. 11‐50097, 2012 WL 2948453, at *4 (5th Cir. July 20, 2012). First, the forum state’s
long‐arm statue must accord personal jurisdiction. Id. Second, the forum state’s exercise of
jurisdiction must comport with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. (citing
Mink v. AAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 335 (5th Cir. 1999)). Louisiana’s long‐arm statute extends
jurisdiction to the full limits of due process. See La. R.S. § 13:3201, et seq. Thus, the Court’s inquiry
must focus on whether subjecting Peter Hoffman and SAFE to suit in Louisiana would be consistent
with the Fourteenth Amendment. Dickson Marine, Inc. v. Panalpina, Inc., 179 F.3d 331, 336 (5th
Cir. 1999).
“The Due Process Clause protects an individual’s liberty interest in not being subject to the
binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful ‘contacts, ties, or
relations.’” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 329 (1945)). The Due Process Clause protects a corporation, as it does
an individual. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319. Ultimately, the Due Process clause permits the exercise
of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when (1) a defendant has purposefully
9
availed itself of the benefits and projections of the forum state by establishing “minimum contacts”
with the forum state; and (2) exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendant does not offend
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Latshaw v. Johnston, 167 F.3d 208, 211
(5th Cir. 1999)(citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316).
“Minimum contacts” can be established through specific jurisdiction or general jurisdiction.
Alpine View Co. Ltd. v. Atlas Copco AB, 205 F.3d 208, 215 (5th Cir. 2000). Specific personal
jurisdiction exists when a defendant has purposely directed its activities, or availed itself of the
privileges of conducting its activities, toward the forum state and the controversy arises out of or
is related to those activities. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472. General personal jurisdiction exists
when the defendant has engaged in continuous and systematic activities in the forum state,
regardless of whether or not it is related to the plaintiff’s cause of action. Helicopteros Nacionales
de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 (1984).
“If a nonresident defendant has sufficient related or unrelated minimum contacts with the
forum, we must then consider whether the ‘fairness’ prong of the jurisdictional inquiry is satisfied.”
Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480
U.S. 102, 105 (1987)). The fairness inquiry is determined by analyzing several factors. Asahi, 480
U.S. at 113. These factors are: (1) the burden upon the nonresident defendant; (2) the interests
of the forum state; (3) the plaintiff’s interest in securing relief; (4) the judicial system’s interest in
obtaining an efficient resolution of controversies; and (5) the shared interest of the states in
10
furthering fundamental substantive social policies. Bullion v. Gillespie, 895 F.2d 213, 216 n. 5 (5th
Cir. 1990) (internal citations omitted).
B. Analysis
Peter Hoffman (“Hoffman”) alleges that this Court does not have in personam jurisdiction
over him with regard to Jonesfilm’s counterclaim for attorneys fees. (Doc. 30.) Specifically, he
argues that the Court neither has specific jurisdiction, because jonesfilm’s claims are not based on
actions Hoffman performed in Louisiana, nor general jurisdiction as Jonesfilm cannot meet the
difficult test of establishing that Hoffman has continuous and systematic contacts in Louisiana. (Id.)
Jonesfilm opposes Hoffman’s contentions and asserts that this Court has both specific and general
jurisdiction over him. (Doc. 32.)
This Court has already found that it has general jurisdiction over Peter Hoffman. See
Jonesfilm v. Hoffman, No. 11‐1994, 2012 WL 4325461, at *4 (E.D. La. Sept. 20, 2012) (Peter
Hoffman “[h]as engaged in continuous and systematic contacts, both of a personal and business
nature, such that it would not be unconstitutional to exercise jurisdiction over him.”) In that
decision, this Court noted that Peter’s residency in Louisiana indicated a general submission to the
state’s power. Id. The Court found that Hoffman “[n]ot only had continuous contacts with the
state of Louisiana, but [had] significantly benefitted from the state of Louisiana” both personally
and professionally. Id. at *5. Furthermore, this Court held “[t]hat the fairness inquiry lends in favor
of this Court having general personal jurisdiction over Peter [Hoffman].” Id. Ultimately, the Court
11
ruled “[t]hat the assertion of general personal jurisdiction over Peter [Hoffman] does not deprive
him of his due process liberty interests and suit in this forum is proper.” Id. For these reasons
Hoffman’s Motion is denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Jonesfilm’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, Peter
Hoffman’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction is DENIED and Leeway Properties, Inc.’s
Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 26th day of September, 2012.
_________________________________
JANE TRICHE MILAZZO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
12
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?