African Methodist Episcopal Church v. Lucien, Jr. et al

Filing 32

ORDER & REASONS denying 24 Motion for Reconsideration re 14 Motion to Remand. Signed by Judge Nannette Jolivette Brown on 6/28/2012. (Reference: All cases)(rll, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

AFRICAN METHODIST EPISCOPAL
CHURCH

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 11-2656 c/w 11-2660

SAINT JAMES MISSION CHURCH,
ET AL.

SECTION: “G”(4)

ORDER AND REASONS
This case is comprised of two consolidated civil actions, Civil Action No. 11-2656, which
was originally filed in this Court, and Civil Action No. 11-2660, which was filed in the Hammond
City Court, Tangipahoa Parish, and removed to this Court.1 Currently before the Court is a Motion
for Reconsideration of Order Denying Motion to Remand Civil Action No. 11-2660 (“Motion for
Reconsideration”).2 After considering the motion, opposition, record, and applicable law, the Court
will deny the Motion for Reconsideration.

I. Background
On September 27, 2011, Saint James Mission Church–Airport Road (the “Saint James
Mission Church”) filed a Rule to Evict Occupants in the Hammond City Court, Tangipahoa Parish,
against the Annual Conference of the African Methodist Episcopal Church in Mississippi and

1

These two actions were consolidated by Judge Lemelle, Section “B.” Rec. Doc. 12. Subsequently, the
consolidated case was transferred to this Section, Section “G.” Rec. Doc. 13. (Unless otherwise noted, all citations
to the record refer to Civil Action No. 11-2656).
2

Rec. Doc. 24.

1

Louisiana (the “AME Church”) and against Carlton Galmon, Sr., James Martin, and Otis Lewis
(collectively, the “Individual Defendants”). The Saint James Mission Church recently separated
from the AME Church and filed a Rule to Evict in state court against the AME Church and the
Individual Defendants to evict these defendants, as occupants, from certain property that Saint James
Mission Church alleges that it owns. On October 24, 2011, the AME Church removed that action
to this Court, alleging diversity jurisdiction.3
In its Notice of Removal in Civil Action No. 11-2660, the AME Church alleges that this
Court has diversity jurisdiction over the matter.4 Specifically, the AME Church alleges that the
“matter in controversy exceeds the sum of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs” as “[t]he plaintiff
has claimed ownership of certain church property and . . . seeks to take the possession and control
of said church property, including but not limited to land, buildings and furnishings, the value of
which exceeds $250,000.”5 Concerning citizenship, the AME Church states, “In its pleadings,
plaintiff SAINT JAMES MISSION CHURCH-AIRPORT ROAD admits that it is an unincorporated
association under the laws of the State of Louisiana and the defendant is informed and believes that
plaintiff, was, and still is, a citizen of the State of Louisiana, with its principal place of business
exclusively in Tangipahoa Parish, State of Louisiana.”6 The AME Church then admits that the
Individual Defendants are “all citizens of the same state as plaintiff”; however, the AME Church
states that the citizenship of the Individual Defendants “should be disregarded for the purpose of

3

Civil Action No. 11-2660, Rec. Doc. 1.

4

Civil Action No. 11-2660, Rec. Doc. 1 at p. 2.

5

Id.

6

Id. at p. 3.

2

determining jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) for the reason that they
have no personal interest in the dispute over title and ownership of said property at issue.”7
Specifically, the AME Church states that Carlton Galmon, “is the duly assigned pastor of the local
society of members of the African Methodist Episcopal Church who worship at the church in
dispute,” that Otis Lews “is the duly assigned presiding elder,” and that James Martin “is a member
of the African Methodist Episcopal Church at the disputed church.”8 The AME Church then goes
on to state, “These other defendants [the Individual Defendants] are merely members of the African
Methodist Episcopal Church and claim no personal interest in the property at issue.”9
On May 17, 2012, this Court denied the Saint James Mission Church’s Motion to Remand,10
holding that the Individual Defendants are nominal parties whose citizenship should not be taken
into account for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction because “whatever actions the Individual
Defendants took, they were done on behalf of the AME Church” and “the AME Church is, in fact,
the only alleged ‘occupant.’”11
On May 25, 2012, the Saint James Mission Church filed the pending Motion for
Reconsideration, wherein the Saint James Mission Church moves this Court to reconsider its order
denying the Motion to Remand.12 In this motion, the Saint James Mission Church argues that the
Court failed to accept as true the Saint James Mission Church’s factual allegations in its Rule to

7

Id. at p. 4.

8

Id.

9

Id.

10

Rec. Doc. 22.

11

Id. at p. 9.

12

Rec. Doc. 24.

3

Evict filed in state court, and thus, incorrectly denied the Saint James Mission Church’s Motion to
Remand. On May 29, 2012, the AME Church filed its opposition to the pending motion,13 wherein
the AME Church argues that the Court was not required to accept the Saint James Mission Church’s
conclusory allegations in its state court pleading as true and argues that the Saint James Mission
Church is merely restating arguments that this Court has already considered and rejected.

II. Law and Analysis
A. Standard of Review on Motion for Reconsideration
Although the Fifth Circuit has noted that the Federal Rules “do not recognize a ‘motion for
reconsideration’ in haec verba,”14 it has consistently recognized that such a motion may challenge
a judgment or order under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 54(b), 59(e), or 60(b).15 Rules 59 and
60, however, apply only to final judgments.16 When a party seeks to revise an order that adjudicates

13

Rec. Doc. 26.

14

Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 173 (5th Cir. 1990).

15

Id. (Rules 59 and 60); Castrillo v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., No. 09-4369, 2010 WL 1424398, at
*3-4 (E.D. La. Apr. 5, 2010) (Vance, C.J.) (Rule 54).
16

Rule 59 concerns motions to “alter or amend a judgment” whereas Rule 60 can provide relief from “a
final judgment, order, or proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (emphasis added). The Advisory Committee Notes of
1946 state that “[t]he addition of the qualifying word ‘final’ emphasizes the character of judgement, orders or
proceedings from which Rule 60(b) affords relief; and hence interlocutory judgments are not brought within the
restrictions of the rule, but rather they are left subject to the complete power of the court rendering them to afford
such relief from them as justice requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (1946 Advisory Committee Notes). See also Helena
Labs. Corp., 483 F. Supp. 2d 538, 538 n.1 (E.D. Tex. 2007) (motion was improperly filed under Rule 59(e) when
there existed no final judgment that had been entered). See also Lambert v. McMahon, No. 06-10679, 2007 U.S.
App. LEXIS 5220, at *4 (5th Cir. Mar. 6, 2007) (where there was no entry of final judgment, requests could not be
considered under Rule 60(b)); Greene v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 764 F.2d 19, 22 (1st Cir. 1985) (finding that a
district court’s decision to dismiss fewer than all counts of a complaint did not constitute a basis for any final
judgment, such that it was error for the district court to have applied a Rule 60(b) standard to a motion seeking
reconsideration of the dismissal).

4

fewer than all the claims among all of the parties, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) controls.17
The Rule states:
[A]ny order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the
claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action
as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of
a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.18
The district court “possesses the inherent procedural power to reconsider, rescind, or modify
an interlocutory order for cause seen by it to be sufficient.”19 However, this broad discretion20 must
be exercised sparingly in order to forestall the perpetual reexamination of orders and the resulting
burdens and delays.21 Further, the decision of the district court to grant or deny a motion for
reconsideration will only be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.22
The general practice of courts in this district has been to evaluate Rule 54(b) motions to
reconsider interlocutory orders under the same standards that govern Rule 59(e) motions to alter or
amend a final judgment.23 A Rule 59(e) motion “calls into question the correctness of a judgment,”24

17

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). See also Helena Labs, 483 F. Supp. 2d at 538 n.1 (motion for reconsideration
under Rule 59(e) treated as under Rule 54(b) because reconsideration of partial summary judgment order was sought
and no final judgment had yet been entered in the case).
18

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).

19

See Melancon v. Texaco, Inc., 659 F.2d 551, 553 (5th Cir. 1981).

20

See Calpetco 1981 v. Marshall Exploration, Inc., 989 F.2d 1408, 1414-15 (5th Cir. 1993).

21

See, e.g., 18B Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 4478.1 (2d ed. 2002).

22

Martin v. H.M.B. Constr. Co., 279 F.2d 495, 496 (5th Cir. 1960) (citation omitted). See also Garcia v.
Woman’s Hosp. of Tex., 97 F.3d 810, 814 (5th Cir. 1996).
23

See, e.g., Castrillo, 2010 WL 1424398, at *3; Rosemond v. AIG Ins., No. 08-1145, 2009 WL 1211020, at
*2 (E.D. La. May 4, 2009) (Barbier, J.); In re Katrina Canal Breaches, No. 05-4182, 2009 WL 1046016, at *1 (E.D.
La. Apr. 16, 2009) (Duval, J.).
24

Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts v. Transtexas Gas Corp. (In re Transtexas Gas Corp.), 303 F.3d 571,
581 (5th Cir. 2002).

5

and courts have considerable discretion in deciding whether to grant such a motion.25 In exercising
this discretion, courts must carefully balance the interests of justice with the need for finality.26
Courts in the Eastern District of Louisiana have generally considered four factors in deciding a
motion under the Rule 59(e) standard:
(1) the motion is necessary to correct a manifest error of law or fact upon which the
judgment is based;
(2) the movant presents newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence;
(3) the motion is necessary in order to prevent manifest injustice; or
(4) the motion is justified by an intervening change in controlling law.27
Although Rules 59 and 60 set forth specific time frames during which reconsideration may
be sought,28 Rule 54 sets forth no such limitation.29 However, importantly, Rule 54(b) motions, like
those under Rules 59(e) and 60(b), “‘are not the proper vehicle for rehashing evidence, legal
theories, or arguments. . . .’”30 Instead, such motions “serve the narrow purpose of allowing a party
to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.”31 “It is well

25

Edward H. Bohlin Co., Inc. v. Banning Co., Inc., 6 F.3d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 1993).

26

Id. at 355-56.

27

See, e.g., Castrillo, 2010 WL 1424398, at *4 (citations omitted).

28

Fed R. Civ. P. 59(e) (“A motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after the
entry of the judgment.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c) (“A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time
– and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the
proceeding.”).
29

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (stating that the order “may be revised at any time” before entry of final judgment).
The only limitation imposed on Rule 54(b) reconsideration is if the court issues an order expressly stating that there
is “no just reason for delay,” in which case the order becomes a final, appealable judgment. Zapata Gulf Marine
Corp. v. Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Auth., 925 F.2d 812, 815 (5th Cir. 1991).
30

Castrillo, 2010 WL 1424398, at *4 (quoting Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 478-79 (5th Cir.

31

See Waltman v. Int’l Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir. 1989).

2004)).

6

settled that motions for reconsideration should not be used . . . to re-urge matters that have already
been advanced by a party.”32
Reconsideration, therefore, is not to be lightly granted, as “[r]econsideration of a judgment
after its entry is an extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly”33 and the motion must
“clearly establish” that reconsideration is warranted.34 When there exists no independent reason for
reconsideration other than mere disagreement with a prior order, reconsideration is a waste of
judicial time and resources and should not be granted.35

B.

Standard for Analyzing Claims of Improper Joinder When Ruling on a Motion to Remand
When ruling on a motion to remand, the Fifth Circuit has explained that “[t]he starting point

for analyzing claims of improper joinder must be the statutes authorizing removal to federal court
of cases filed in state court.”36 Under the removal statute, “any civil action brought in a State court
of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction may be removed by the
defendant or the defendants to the district court of the United States for the district and division
embracing the place where such action is pending.”37 The removal statute further states that “[a]
civil action otherwise removable solely on the basis of [diversity jurisdiction] may not be removed
32

Helena Labs., 483 F. Supp. 2d at 539 (citing Browning v. Navarro, 894 F.2d 99, 100 (5th Cir. 1990)).

33

Templet, 367 F.3d at 478-79 (citation omitted).

34

Schiller v. Physicians Res. Group Inc., 342 F.3d 563, 567 (5th Cir. 2003).

35

Livingston Downs Racing Ass’n v. Jefferson Downs Corp., 259 F.Supp. 2d 471, 481 (M.D. La. 2002).
See also Mata v. Schoch, 337 BR 138, 145 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (refusing reconsideration where no new evidence was
presented). See also FDIC v. Cage, 810 F.Supp. 745, 747 (S.D. Miss. 1993) (refusing reconsideration where the
motion merely disagreed with the court and did not demonstrate clear error of law or manifest injustice).
36

Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R..R. Co., 385 F.3d 569, 573 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc).

37

28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).

7

if any of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in
which such action is brought.”38
Thus, if a non-diverse defendant was improperly joined, the Court may still have diversity
jurisdiction over the case and the court’s jurisdiction is governed by the doctrine of improper
joinder.39 The Fifth Circuit has explained that because “the purpose of the improper joinder inquiry
is to determine whether or not the in-state defendant was properly joined, the focus of the inquiry
must be on the joinder, not the merits of the plaintiff's case.”40
“[T]he test for fraudulent joinder is whether the defendant has demonstrated that there is no
possibility of recovery by the plaintiff against an in-state defendant, which stated differently means
that there is no reasonable basis for the district court to predict that the plaintiff might be able to
recover against an in-state defendant.”41 The Fifth Circuit “recognize[s] two ways to establish
improper joinder: ‘(1) actual fraud in the pleading of jurisdictional facts, or (2) inability of the
plaintiff to establish a cause of action against the non-diverse party in state court.’”42 Importantly,
“[a] ‘mere theoretical possibility of recovery under local law’ will not preclude a finding of improper
joinder.’”43

38

28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2).

39

Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 573.

40

Id.

41

Id.

42

Id. (quoting Travis v. Irby, 326 F.3d 644, 646-47 (5th Cir. 2003)).

43

Id. at 573 n.9 (quoting Badon v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 236 F.3d 282, 286 n.4 (5th Cir. 2000)).

8

A court may use two different methods to assess a plaintiff’s claims.44 First, the court “may
conduct a Rule 12(b)(6)-type analysis, looking initially at the allegations of the complaint to
determine whether the complaint states a claim under state law against the in-state defendant.”45 If
it is apparent that the plaintiff has “misstated or omitted” determinative facts that would affect the
propriety of joinder, however, the “district court may, in its discretion, pierce the pleadings and
conduct a summary inquiry.”46 In conducting this inquiry, the court “must also take into account
all unchallenged factual allegations, including those alleged in the complaint, in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.”47 All disputed questions of fact and all ambiguities in the controlling state
law must be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor.48
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.”49 “To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint ‘does
not need detailed factual allegations,’ but must provide the plaintiff’s grounds for entitlement to
relief, including factual allegations that when assumed to be true ‘raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.’”50 That is, a complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”51 But the Court is not bound to accept as true

44

Id.

45

Id.

46

Id.

47

Id.

48

Travis, 362 F.3d at 649.

49

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

50

Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007).
51

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

9

legal conclusions couched as factual allegations.52 In other words, a complaint must go beyond
labels, legal conclusions, or formulaic recitations of the elements of a cause of action.53 The court
should not “strain to find inferences favorable to the plaintiffs” or “accept conclusory allegations,
unwarranted deductions, or legal conclusions.”54 A district court can consider the contents of the
pleadings, including attachments thereto, as well as documents attached to the motion, if they are
referenced in the plaintiff’s complaint and are central to the claims.55 The court should not evaluate
the merits of the allegation, but must satisfy itself only that plaintiff has adequately pled a legally
cognizable claim.56

C.

Parties’ Arguments
In its motion, the Saint James Mission Church argues that the Court erred in ruling on the

Motion to Remand “by failing to accept the allegations of fact made by the plaintiff in the state court
proceedings as true.”57 The Saint James Mission Church further contends that its pleading filed in
state court merely seeks to recover possession of property being occupied by the AME Church and
the Individual Defendants, who are non-diverse. The Saint James Mission Church alleges that the
facts contained in its state court pleading establish that it is the owner of the property; that all of the
defendants, including the Individual Defendants, are occupying the property; that the defendants

52

Id.

53

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

54

R2 Investments LDC v. Phillips, 401 F.3d 638, 642 (5th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations omitted).

55

Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 2000).

56

United States ex rel. Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 355 F.3d 370, 376 (5th Cir. 2004).

57

Rec. Doc. 24-1 at p. 4.

10

have been notified to vacate the property; that the defendants have failed to vacate the property; and
that the defendants were cited to appear and show cause as to why they should not be ordered to
vacate the property. The Saint James Mission Church states that the state court pleading does not
make any factual allegations as to whether the Individual Defendants are affiliated with the AME
Church; instead, it merely alleges that they are occupants. Thus, the Saint James Mission Church
contends that if it prevails, the Individual Defendants will be dispossessed of their right to
possession and occupancy of the property, whether due to their connection with the AME Church
or due to a judgment of eviction against them personally.
For support, the Saint James Mission Church relies upon Perino v. Collins Pipeline, Co.,58
wherein the court held that a non-diverse sublessee was not improperly joined, and therefore, the
court lacked diversity jurisdiction. The court noted that under Louisiana law, a principal lessor may
bring an eviction against a sublessee; thus, the court found that the plaintiff in that case was able to
establish a cause of action against the non-diverse defendant.59 Here, the Saint James Mission
Church argues that, under the rationale of Perino, it has pled a cause of action against the Individual
Defendants, and thus, diversity jurisdiction is not present.
In opposition, the AME Church contends that the Saint James Mission Church is merely
attempting to reargue what this Court has already considered and rejected in ruling on the Motion
to Remand. The AME Church argues that the Saint James Mission Church’s reliance on Perino is
misplaced, arguing that Perino considered the joinder of a sublessee in an eviction proceeding
brought by the owner of property where ownership of the property was not contested. The AME
Church states that the only questions at issue were the rights of possession and occupancy of the
58

1 F. Supp. 2d 594 (E.D. La. 1998) (Fallon, J.).

59

Id. at 595.

11

lessee and sublessee to the property. The AME Church contends that nothing in Perino affects this
Court’s analysis in ruling on the Motion to Remand that the Individual Defendants are not “owners,”
“occupants,” “lessees,” or “lessors” under the state law codal provisions relied upon by the Saint
James Mission Church.
The AME Church further agues that the Saint James Mission Church is mistaken when it
states that this Court was required to accept as true all of the allegations in the Saint James Mission
Church’s state court filing when the Court ruled on the Motion to Remand. Instead, the AME
Church argues that the Court was not required to accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual
allegations and that the Saint James Mission Church’s allegation that it owns the property at issue
is merely a legal conclusion. Therefore, the AME Church argues that the Saint James Mission
Church has merely rehashed arguments previously made in its motion to remand and that, therefore,
the Court should deny the Saint James Mission Church’s Motion for Reconsideration.

D.

Analysis
The Saint James Mission Church alleges that this Court erred by not accepting as true the

factual allegations in its state court pleading; however, the Saint James Mission Church’s Rule to
Evict filed in state court is devoid of specific factual allegations as to what capacity the Individual
Defendants are allegedly occupying the property in and merely contains conclusory statements. In
it’s entirety, this Rule to Evict filed in state court states:
RULE TO EVICT
ON MOTION OF PLAINTIFF, and on suggesting to the court that
defendants, as occupants, are occupying the premises located at 43483 S Airport Rd
Hammond LA 70403 (“the property”); that plaintiff is an unincorporated association,
represented by its Trustees; that plaintiff is the owner of the property; that the
property is located within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court; that the plaintiff
12

has notified the defendants to vacate the premises more than five days ago; and
defendants have failed to vacate the premises.60
Thus, the Saint James Mission Church states that the Individual Defendants are occupants but
provides no factual details to support this conclusion or to explain in what capacity they are
occupying the property. Additionally, the state court pleading raised allegations that the Individual
Defendants were occupying the premises in their individual capacities. Therefore, the Court did not
ignore any factual allegations in the Saint James Mission Church’s state court pleadings when
determining that the Individual Defendants were only “occupants” insofar as they acted on behalf
of the AME Church.
Further, although the Saint James Mission Church’s state court pleading is barren of facts
concerning the Individual Defendants, its original Motion to Remand alleged facts about the
Individual Defendants. Specifically, the Saint James Mission Church stated:
Curtis Galmon, Sr. is the former pastor of Saint James AME Mission Church.
He is named as a defendant because he has refused to abide by the wishes of Saint
James. He continues to conduct services at the church.
James Martin is a member of Saint James AME who remained loyal to the
denomination. He has also refused to abide by the wishes of Saint James.
Otis Lewis is the presiding elder and is the local representative of AME.
Presumably he continues to participate in whatever activities are occurring at the
church.
Saint James notified the Bishop that it was leaving the denomination by letter
dated July 15, 2011. Exhibit 1. Thereafter, the congregation disputed the action of
persons, namely Curtis Galmon, Sr, and James Martin, who allegedly changed the
locks on the building. Exhibit 2. Only after the defendants refused to comply with
the wishes of Saint James was it necessary for Saint James to file the rule for
eviction.61

60

Civil Action 11-2660, Rec. Doc. 1-1.

61

Rec. Doc. 14-1 at p. 5.

13

Clearly, from this filing, the Saint James Mission Church alleges that the Individual Defendants are
“occupants” only insofar as they are operating on behalf of the AME Church; they are not alleged
to be “occupants” in their individual capacities. Therefore, although the Saint James Mission
Church’s barren state court pleading did not provide any facts as to whether the Individual
Defendants were occupying the property in their individual capacities or on behalf of the AME
Church, the Saint James Mission Church’s own Motion to Remand supports the Court’s conclusion
that any occupancy done by the Individual Defendants was performed on behalf of the AME Church.
Further, Perino, the case primarily relied upon by the Saint James Mission Church, does not
support a finding that the Individual Defendants were properly joined in this action. In Perino, the
defendants alleged that a sublessee was improperly joined in an eviction proceeding.62 However,
it was clear that by virtue of the sublease, the sublessee was occupying the property in its own
capacity, rather than, on behalf of some other entity.63 Here, the Individual Defendants allegedly
occupy the premises only as agents for the AME Church; thus, Perino is inapposite to the facts of
this case.
In sum, the Saint James Mission Church argues that the Individual Defendants were not
improperly joined because the Saint James Mission Church’s Rule to Evict alleged that the
Individual Defendants are occupants. This is the same argument that the Saint James Mission
Church previously advanced in its Motion to Remand.64 Because the Saint James Mission Church’s
62

1 F. Supp. 2d at 595.

63

Id. at 595-96.

64

Rec. Doc. 14-1 at p. 6-7 (“The allegations of the Rule for Eviction must be taken as true for purposes of
deciding whether the plaintiff could recover against the non-diverse defendants. The allegations are that Saint James
is the owner of the property, that the non-diverse defendants and others are in possession of the property, that the
non-diverse defendants and others have been notified to vacate the premises, and that the non-diverse defendants and
others have failed to vacate the property. The plaintiff has alleged a cause of action against the non-diverse
defendants.”).

14

Motion for Reconsideration merely rehashes arguments concerning whether or not the Saint James
Mission Church stated a valid claim against the Individual Defendants, the Saint James Mission
Church has not met its significant burden to demonstrate that reconsideration is warranted in this
instance. Accordingly;
IT IS ORDERED that the Saint James Mission Church’s Motion to Remand65 is DENIED.

28th
New Orleans, Louisiana, this _______ day of June, 2012.

_____________________________________
NANNETTE JOLIVETTE BROWN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

65

Rec. Doc. 24-1.

15