Lee v. Jones et al
Filing
47
ORDER granting 33 Motion to Intervene. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen Wells Roby on 11/5/2012. (clm)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
CAROLYN LEE, ET AL.
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO: 11-2678
DONALD W. JONES, ET AL.
SECTION: “A” (4)
ORDER
Before the Court are Proposed Intervenors, Savitra George, individually and on behalf of her
minor child Catherine Kennedy, and Jesse Hughes, on behalf of his minor child, Joshua Hughes’,
(“collectively, Intervenors”) Motion to Intervene (R. Doc. 33). This motion seeks leave from the
Court allowing Intervenors to intervene in this matter as party-plaintiffs. The motion is opposed. (R.
Doc. 41). The motion was heard by oral argument on September 26, 2012.1
I.
Background
This is a personal injury lawsuit originally filed in Louisiana state court on September 22, 2011
and removed to federal court on November 26, 2011 pursuant to the Court’s diversity jurisdiction, 28
U.S.C. § 1332. (R. Doc. 1, p. 1; R. Doc. 1-2, p. 8). In the petition, Plaintiffs, Carolyn Lee (“Carolyn”)
and Troynesha Lee, (Troynesha”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) alleged that on or about August 8, 2011,
Carolyn was operating Jesse Hughes’ motor vehicle on an interstate highway in Louisiana when the
car collided with a motor vehicle driven by Donald Jones (“Jones”). (R. Doc. 1-2, pp. 1-2). Jones’
1
A hearing on removal of this case back to state court will also noticed for submission on September 26,
2012 before the presiding district judge in this matter (R. Doc. 41).
truck was owned by his employer, Herring Gas Co., Inc. (“Herring”), and insured by Defendant,
National Interstate (“National”) (all three collectively, “Defendants.”). Id. Plaintiffs allege that as a
result of the collision both Carolyn and Troynesha suffered various personal injuries. Intervenors were
passengers in the case at the time of the accident. (R. Doc. 41-1, pp. 1-7).2 Intervenors allege that they
incurred “general and special damages” as a result of the accident. (R. Doc. 33-1, p. 3).
The Notice of Removal indicates that at the time of the accident, Plaintiffs were domiciled in
Louisiana,3 Defendant Jones was a citizen of Mississippi, Defendant Herring was a corporation
organized under the laws of Mississippi, and Defendant National was a corporation organized under
the laws of Ohio. (R. Doc. 1, p. 3).4 At the time the accident occurred, Intervenors were also residents
of Louisiana. (R. Doc. 41-1, p. 2).
As to the instant motion, the Intervenors seek to intervene in the instant case. The motion is
opposed. The motion was heard by oral argument on September 26, 2012.
II.
Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 24(a) states that a party may intervene as of right
where it “claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and
is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s
ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.” Id. Rule 24(b)
permits intervention with leave of the Court when a potential party “has a claim or defense that shares
2
Specifically, Defendants argue that Satvira George, Catherine Kennedy, and Joshua Hughes were in
Carolyn’s car. Id. Defendants argue that Jessee Hughes, who seeks to intervene on behalf of Joshua Hughes, was
not in the vehicle at the time of the accident. Id.
3
Intervenors argue that, at the time they filed the instant motion, Plaintiffs were domiciled in St. Helena
Parish, Louisiana. (R. Docs. 33-1, p. 1; 41-1, p. 2).
4
In Plaintiffs’ original state court petition, they did not allege that Herring or National were foreign
corporations, but only that these two entities were licensed to transact business in Louisiana. (R. Doc. 1-2, p. 1).
Defendants’ Notice of Removal, however, specified the state where Herring and National were actually domiciled.
2
with the main action a common question of law and fact.” Rule 24(b).
III.
Analysis
A.
Impact of Adding Plaintiffs
The first issue is whether Intervenors’ claims and assertions entitle them to intervene, or
whether their petition must be dismissed, based on the litigation posture of the parties and the Court’s
basis for jurisdiction over this claim.
Jurisdiction in this case premised upon diversity, Title 28 U.S.C. § 1332. § 1332(a)(1) requires
that “the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions . . . between citizens of
different states.” Id. “[T]he required diversity under section 1332(a)(1) must be complete: where one
or more plaintiffs sue one or more defendants, each plaintiff must be of a different citizenship than
each defendant.” Lowe v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, a Division of Litton Systems, Inc., 723 F.2d 1173, 1177
(5th Cir. 1984).
Intervenors’ motion asserts that they intend to bring claims against both the current Plaintiffs,
who are also residents of Louisiana, and Defendants, who are residents of other states. (R. Doc. 33-1,
p. 3). In opposition, Defendants argue that the Court does not have jurisdiction because (1) jurisdiction
over intervention is governed by the Court’s supplemental jurisdiction power, and (2) the plain
language of the applicable law precludes exercise of supplemental jurisdiction when doing so would
destroy diversity. (R. Doc. 41, pp. 4-7). Defendants further argued that Intervenors are attempting to
name Plaintiffs as defendants to purposefully destroy jurisdiction in this case, so that the case would
be remanded to state court. Id. at 3-4.5
5
Defendants did not reiterate this argument at the hearing, and the Court finds this argument irrelevant
based on the outcome of the proposed realignment of the parties as stated at oral argument.
3
1.
Supplemental Jurisdiction
“[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts
shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action
within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy . . . .” 28 U.S.C.
§1367(a). “In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded solely on
section 1332 of this title, the district courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction under subsection
(a) over . . . [parties] seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules, when exercising
supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements
of section 1332.” Id. at § 1367(b); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 560
(2005) (“[s]ection 1367(b) withholds supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of plaintiffs . . . who
seek to intervene pursuant to Rule 24.”); Griffin, 621 F.3d 380, 386 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Exxon, and
finding that in diversity cases, intervention was not allowed even when it occurred as of right under
Rule 24(a)).
Federal courts in this district have found that “[u]nder section 1367(b), supplemental
jurisdiction cannot be invoked in diversity cases by plaintiff intervenors whether they are of right or
permissive” where intervenors did not meet diversity requirements. Lionheard Development, LLC v.
Apex Building Systems, LLC, No. 08-4070, 2011 WL 999537, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 18, 2011) (Vance,
J.)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Plainly, the written assertions in Intervenors’ filing would
place Louisiana residents on both sides of the dispute.6
6
Admittedly, other federal courts have permitted flexibility in permitting a party to re-file claims in a
manner that would not destroy diversity. Atherton v. Casey, 1992 WL 235894, at *2 (E.D. La. Sept. 4, 2012)
(Clement, J.) (finding that Court could not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over additional parties when to do so
would destroy diversity, but remanding case to allow proposed intervenor to re-submit her claim as a declaratory
judgment action).
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2.
Intervenors Would Be Aligned Against Plaintiffs
Clearly, if Intervenors did not dismiss their claims against Plaintiffs, they would be aligned
against Plaintiffs. “The generally accepted test of proper alignment is whether the parties with the
same ultimate interests in the suit are on the same side.” Griffin, 621 F.3d at 388 (internal quotation
marks omitted). “It is well settled that federal courts are not bound by the alignment of the pleader as
to the parties plaintiff or defendant; but that they will work out the relation of each party to the suit
according to the nature of his real interest.” Peters v. Standard Oil Co. of Texas, 174 F.2d 162, 163
(5th Cir. 1949). Once the parties are properly aligned, the fact that a party on one side of the litigation
may have cross-claims against another party will not defeat jurisdiction. See Travelers Insurance Co.
v. First National Bank of Shreveport, 675 F.2d 633, 639 (5th Cir. 1982); Williams v. Carmean, 1999
WL 717645, at *2 (E.D. La. Sept. 13, 1999) (Vance, J.).
A non-diverse cross-claim is supplemental in nature if it arises out of the same “core of
operative facts” as the diverse claim. See Travelers, 675 F.2d at 638 (citation omitted). In other cases
involving personal injury accidents in vehicles where passengers asserted negligence claims against
the driver, courts have aligned the “ultimate interests” of the parties by placing all of the individual
accident victims from a single vehicle on one side of the litigation. See Williams, 1999 WL 717645
at *1-2 (finding that where driver and passenger originally sued third party as co-plaintiffs, driver’s
hiring of counsel to represent himself only made him adverse, and subsequent amendment of
Complaint by passenger to add driver as a defendant did not destroy diversity, but was more properly
seen as a cross-claim under Rule 13(g) that arose out of the same core of operative facts as the instant
suit). Other courts have re-aligned parties where the Court found that the claims asserted against one
of the parties represented a “sham” suit, and the intent was likely to destroy jurisdiction in the action
in order to remand the case to state court. Keen v. Burlington Northern Sante Fe Corp., 438 F. Supp.
5
724, 727-28 &n.3 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (finding that where intervenor daughter brought suit alleging
negligence of defendant mother and defendant railway involving automobile accident in which
mother’s car collided with railway, daughter’s allegation that mother was 1% negligent for the
accident, and the railroad was both 100% responsible by their conduct for the accident and the cause
of all monetary damages, sufficed to find that the “ultimate interest” of mother and daughter were
aligned).
Here, as in Williams, Intervenors were passengers in an automobile which one of the
Intervenors owned and which Carolyn Lee was driving (R. Doc. 41-1, p. 2).7 However, in this case,
Intervenors did not assert their claims alongside Plaintiffs in the original action. Even if Intervenors
had done so, there is no indication that they ever had the same counsel of record. Indeed, at the
hearing Intervernors indicated that they had been attempting to settle the case with Plaintiffs’ insurer.
This indicates that Intervenors and Plaintiffs have been adverse since the date of the accident, and that
the intervention in this case cannot properly be reconciled as a cross-claim against a co-party. Because
Intervenors and Plaintiffs are in fact adverse as to the “ultimate issue” in this case - i.e., the question
of whose negligence caused the accident - intervention will result in Louisiana residents on both sides
of the lawsuit.
Moreover, at oral argument, the parties agreed that if intervention was allowed in the case as
stated, it would destroy diversity and require remand to state court, due to the fact that Intervenors have
claims against both Plaintiffs and Defendants for negligence. However, Plaintiffs indicated that they
had “reached an agreement” to “dismiss . . . Carolyn Lee.” Intervenors did not explicitly state that
both Carolyn and Troynesha Lee would be “dismissed,” or even that this “dismissal” pertained to
Intervenors’ claims against Plaintiffs. Although Intervenors may not have posed their arguments
7
Intervenor Jessie Hughes owned the car in question. Id.
6
clearly at the hearing, their intent must have been to dismiss their claims against both Carolyn and
Troynesha Lee, because they agreed at oral argument that to do otherwise would divest the Court of
jurisdiction to hear their petition.
As a result of this dismissal, the Court finds that Intervenors’ and Plaintiffs’ claims with respect
to the “ultimate issue” in this case - that of negligence giving rise to the accident - are aligned in a
similar manner to those in Keen, because both parties’ goals are now the same: i.e., recovery hinges
on proof that only Defendants were negligent. Because complete diversity between the parties now
exists, intervention is permissible under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
B.
Intervention as of Right
Having resolved the threshold jurisdictional question, the issue is now whether Intervenors’
motion should be granted under either Rule 24(a) or Rule 24(b).
In support of their Motion, Intervenors argue that they have a substantial legal interest in the
lawsuit because they have suffered losses due to the negligence of both Plaintiffs and Defendants. (R.
Doc. 33-1, p. 2). Intervenors further argue that there is a substantial risk that their ability to protect
their property will be impaired without intervention, because it is expected that Intervenors will obtain
funds from Plaintiffs or Defendants through either a settlement or judgment after a trial on the merits.
Id. at pp. 2-3. Finally, Intervenors argue that their interests may not adequately represent their interests
because both Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ interests are adverse to the Intervenors’ interest. Id. at 3.
Intervenors argue that they have incurred general and special damages in the lawsuit. Id. They also
argue that substantial discovery has not yet occurred in the case. Id. at 2.
In opposition, Defendants argue that Intervenors are not entitled to intervene as a matter of
right because the request is not timely. Id. at 10. They further argue that Carolyn Lee is not an
indispensible party-defendant. Id. They further argue that Intervenors need not be plaintiffs in this
7
lawsuit because they can file their own suit in state court against Carolyn Lee’s insurer if need be. Id.
They further argue that disposition of the current matter will not affect Intervenors’ claims because
although not all of their interests are represented in the current suit, the only interest that may be
common to both suits is the issue of fault attributable to Carolyn Lee. Id. They further argue that they
are adequately representing the Intervenors’ interests in the current matter. Id.
Courts in the Fifth Circuit have found that to intervene as of right, (1) the application must be
timely, (2) the applicant must have an interest which is the subject of the action, (3) the applicant’s
interest may be impaired or impeded, and (4) the applicant’s interest is not adequately represented by
a current party. See Ford v. City of Huntsville, 242 F.3d 235, 239 (5th Cir. 2001); Keith v. George
Packing Co., Inc., 806 F.2d 525, 526 (5th Cir. 1986).
1.
Timeliness
First is the issue of timeliness. Courts in the Fifth Circuit consider (1) the length of time the
intervenors knew or should have known of the pendency of the action, (2) the prejudice to the existing
parties, (3) the prejudice to the intervenor, and (4) any unusual circumstances. Ford v. City of
Huntsville, 242 F.3d 235, 239 (5th Cir. 2001). Moreover, courts evaluate timeliness not according to
strict rules, but “from all circumstances.” Doe v. Glickman, 256 F.3d 371, 376 (5th Cir. 2001).
Notably, timeliness is not a tool of retribution, but means to protect against prejudice to another party.
Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202, 1205 (5th Cir. 1994).
Here, the action was originally removed to federal court on October 26, 2011, and Intervenors
brought the instant motion on August 1, 2012 - a period of over nine months. Courts elsewhere have
found such a period untimely. See J.T. Shannon Lumber Co., Inc. v. Gilco Lumber, Inc., 2008 WL
4553048, at *1-*2 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 7, 2008) (insurer’s motion to intervene denied where it was filed
ten months after acknowledgment that it was defending policyholder). Although Defendants argue,
8
without any further reasoning, that Intervenors’ motion is untimely, timeliness requires a circumstantial
inquiry and the absolute length of time is only one factor to consider. Cf. U.S. ex rel. LaCorte v. Merck
& Co., Inc., 2004 WL 595074, at *3 (E.D. La. Mar. 23, 2004) (Roby, M.J.).
In this case however, the second, third, and fourth factors of the test weigh in favor of a finding
of timeliness. First, there is no prejudice to existing parties because as Defendants admit, Intervenors
brought their motion prior to the onset of substantial discovery. See United Rentals, Inc. v. Matritrend,
Inc., 2002 WL 230816, at *2 (E.D. La. Feb. 13, 2002) (Roby, M.J.) (finding that motion for
intervention was timely where, inter alia, it allowed existing parties to complete discovery ahead of
district judge’s scheduling order). Second, there is the danger of real prejudice to Intervenors here
because they were passengers in the automobile, sustained personal injuries, and their right to recover
hinges on a determination of liability in this case; at oral argument they stated that if they are not
allowed to intervene in this case, they will lose their day in court.
This third factor is intermingled with the fourth factor, which is discussed at more length
below. Specifically, the unusual circumstances of this case favor permitting intervention. Specifically,
at oral argument, Defendants stated that Intervenors’ claim should be dismissed because the
prescriptive period for Intervenors’ claim was one year, the accident occurred on August 8, 2011, and
Intervenors’ motion was only properly filed on August 20, 2012, after the applicable prescriptive
period had elapsed. (R. Docs. 1-2, p. 1; 29). Intervenors argued that the filing deadline should be
relaxed because they originally filed their petition on August 1, 2012, and had made a good faith effort
to revise their deficient filings in compliance with the Local Rules. They further argued that the
subject matter of their motion never changed, but that the document was noticed as deficient for its
failure to meet technical specifications. Finally, Intervenors asserted that they were unfamiliar with
court rules in the Eastern District. The Court took the matter under submission.
9
The Court notes that jurisdiction is a substantive issue, which is clearly outside the scope of
the authority delegated to it by the presiding U.S. District Court Judge in consideration of the instant
motion. Nevertheless, the Court clearly has authority to evaluate a party’s filings for technical
compliance with the Local Rules, which deficiencies of Intervenors’ prior filings are premised upon.
Therefore, the Court will assume arguendo that a one-year prescriptive period applies to Intervenors’
claim, and then determine whether the applicable case law requires the pleadings to “relate back” to
the date of filing.
The facts of Intervenors’ attempt to file the instant petition are as follows. Intervenors first
filed their petition on August 1, 2012. (R. Doc. 29). The clerk’s office marked the filing as deficient
on August 2, 2012, and indicated that Intervenors were required to re-file the petition within 7 days.8
Later that day, Intervenors re-filed their petition. (R. Doc. 30). However, this filing was also denied
by the clerk’s office on August 3, 2012, and the clerk’s office again gave Intervenors 7 days to amend
their petition.9 On August 13, 2012, Intervenors filed a third petition. (R. Doc. 31). On August 14,
2012, the court denied this filing, again giving Intervenors 7 days to amend their petition.10 Finally,
on August 20, 2012, Intervenors filed the instant motion in accordance with the local rules (R. Doc.
33).
Local Rule 83.2.7 requires that “every attorney permitted to practice in this court must be
familiar” with these rules,” which include the proper method for submitting documents into court.
8
The stated reason for the deficiency was that the motion failed to state whether there was or was not an
objection by the opposing party, and if the motion was opposed, it should have been set for hearing before the
magistrate judge with a memorandum in support and notice of submission as separate attachments.
9
The stated reason for the deficiency was that the motion again failed to state whether there was or was not
an objection by the opposing party, and if the motion was opposed, it should have been set for hearing before the
magistrate judge with a memorandum in support and notice of submission as separate attachments.
10
The stated reason for the deficiency was that a Notice of Submission was not provided as an attachment.
10
However, the Fifth Circuit cautioned that “[a]lthough a district court’s discretionary authority to
formulate and enforce local rules for the orderly and expeditious handling of cases is quite broad, our
case law establishes that this discretion is limited by considerations of fairness to litigants.” Webb v.
Morella, 457 Fed. App’x 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2012) (reversing district court’s granting of 12(b)(6)
motion as unopposed due to party’s failure to timely file opposition). Instead, the District Court should
consider the availability of lesser sanctions than the dismissal of a party’s claims outright. Ramsey v.
Signal Delivery Service, Inc., 631 F.2d 1210, 1214 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding that where non-compliance
with a local rule filing deadline would lead to disposition of a matter with prejudice, the local rule
should be disregarded). Dismissals are permitted “only when there is a record of extreme delay or
contumacious conduct.” Leura v. Kleberg County, Texas, 460 Fed. App’x 447, 449 (5th Cir. 2012).
Admittedly, the circumstances in these cases are not directly analogous, as they pertain to the
status of litigants in the context of dispositive motions, not individuals who are attempting to become
litigants so that their claims can be adjudicated. Even to the extent that these differences are
reconcilable - Intervenors will lose their day in court if their petition is denied - Intervenors themselves
chose to risk the possibility of dismissal by waiting for almost an entire year to bring their claims.
Nevertheless, the Court notes the Fifth Circuit’s strong aversion to disposing of a party’s day in court
on the basis of a technicality, especially when there has been no showing of bad faith and lesser
“sanctions” are practicable.
The Court finds that Intervenors’ original petition was timely, that their repeated unsuccessful
attempts to re-file their petition were made in good faith, and that a delay of nineteen days is by no
means “extreme.” Therefore, assuming arguendo that Intervenors’ claims would have prescribed
during the pendency of their repeated attempts to properly conform their motion to the strictures of the
local rules, the Court finds that the filing in this case should relate back to date of original filing on
11
August 1, 2012.
For these reasons, the Court finds that Intervenor’s request, in light of the circumstances, is in
fact timely.
2.
Relevance of Subject Matter
Second is the issue of relevance of the subject matter. Here, Intervenors’ claims stem from the
same transaction - the auto accident - which is the basis for the instant suit. Clearly, the subject matter
is relevant.
3.
Impairment of Interest
Third is the issue of impairment of Intervenors’ interest. In this case, the fact that Plaintiffs
are also pursuing a negligence action against Defendants for the same accident, and likely under the
same insurance policy of Defendants, may clearly impair Intervenors’ interest as a practical matter,
because insurance policy payout applicants’ interest may be impaired due to the lateness of the filing.
By the time the filing defects were cured all parties agreed that the limitations period had run. Where
the intervention is timely, to not grant it at this stage would be preclude the intervenors from seeking
relief for the injuries they sustained. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of allowing intervention.
4.
Adequate Representation
Fourth is the issue of adequate representation. Although Defendants state that they are
adequately representing Intervenors’ interest in the instant suit, they provides no basis for this claim,
and given that Intervenors have relinquished their claims against Plaintiffs, they are clearly seeking
recovery directly against Defendants. See Atherton v. Casey, No. 92-1283, 1992 WL 235894, at *1
(E.D. La. Sept. 4, 2012) (finding that mother who brought wrongful death action for daughter’s death
was not adequately represented by purported husband of daughter, because mother had incentive to
prove that purported husband was not actually married to daughter).
12
In this case, Intervenors’ and Plaintiff’s claims were clearly adverse earlier in the litigation,
as Intervenors were apparently attempting to recover from Plaintiffs’ insurer. This fact alone suffices
to demonstrate Plaintiffs’ do not adequately represent Intervenors’ interest. See Benson and Ford, Inc.
v. Wanda Petroleum Co., 833 F.2d 1172, 1175 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding that adequate representation
“requires more than a showing of parallel interest.”) (emphasis added). Further, as applied ro Rule
24(a), a prospective intervenor’s burden for proving inadequate representation is “minimal,” and may
be satisfied by a showing that the current representation “may be inadequate.” Sierra Club v. Espy,
18 F.3d 1202, 1207 (5th Cir. 1994); Centennial Insurance Co. v. Nguyen, No. 04-0298, 2004 WL
1171225, at *4 (E.D. La. May 25, 2004) (Roby, M.J.) (permitting intervention of boat employee who
claimed damages as against boat captain and boat’s insurer, where boat employee argued that captain
showed little interest in defending against declaratory judgment action brought by insurer).
Clearly, Intervenors have shown that representation may in fact be inadequate. Prior to the
Intervenors’ relinquishment of their claims against Plaintiffs, their goals were adverse: Intervenors
were passengers in the car, and Plaintiff Lee was the driver. Therefore, while Plaintiff Lee would have
to disclaim her own negligence in causing the accident, Intervenors could assert rights of recovery
against either Plaintiffs or Defendants by asserting negligence claims against both parties. See Miller
v. Union Pacific R. Co., 290 U.S. 227, 232 (1933) (finding driver’s negligence is severable from
passenger’s negligence); Cf. Dupont v. Southern Pacific Co., 366 F.2d 193, 196 (5th Cir. 1966)
(nothing that consolidation of cases stemming from automobile accident was improper, where
consolidated plaintiff’s counsel represented both driver and passenger, and plaintiff driver’s negligence
remained at issue).
Admittedly, these cases are somewhat dated, not directly on point, and Intervenors are in fact
no longer asserting negligence claims against Plaintiffs. Therefore, the outcome of the instant suit for
13
both Intervenors and Plaintiffs now turns exclusively on whether Defendants was negligent for the
accident. However, other courts have found that a party’s prior conduct alone can factor into a
determination of whether the “minimal” showing of currently inadequate representation has been met.
See Nguyen, 2004 WL 1171225, at *4; Campos v. Crescent Towing & Salvage Co., Inc., No. 01-1339,
2002 WL 31556349, at *5 (E.D. La. Nov. 15, 2002) (finding that no adequate representation where,
inter alia, other parties entered into a settlement agreement without giving credence to claims of third
party).
In sum, Intervenors have met their “minimal” burden of showing that their interest may not be
adequately represented by Plaintiffs, warranting intervention as of right is warranted under Rule 24(a).
Accordingly, there is no need for the Court to analyze permissive intervention under Rule 24(b).
IV.
Conclusion
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that, for the reasons and in the manner stated herein, Proposed Intervenors,
Savitra George, individually and on behalf of her minor child Catherine Kennedy, and Jesse Hughes,
on behalf of his minor child, Joshua Hughes’, (“collectively, Intervenors”) Motion to Intervene (R.
Doc. 33) is GRANTED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 5th day of November 2012.
KAREN WELLS ROBY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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