Weber v. Motiva Enterprises LLC - Norco Refinery
Filing
31
ORDER & REASONS granting 15 Defendant Motiva Enterprises LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment; FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Boyd Weber's claims against Defendant Motiva Enterprises LLC are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, at sole cost to Plaintiff. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 10/31/12. (sek, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
WEBER
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO: 11-2817
MOTIVA ENTERPRISES LLC-NORCO
REFINERY
SECTION: "J” (2)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before
Motion
for
the
Court
Summary
is
Defendant
Judgment
(Rec.
Motiva
Doc.
Enterprises
15),
Plaintiff
Weber’s opposition to same (Rec. Doc. 25), and Defendant’s
LLC’s
Boyd
reply
thereto (Rec. Doc. 28). Defendant’s motion is set for hearing on
September 17, 2012, on the briefs, without oral argument. Having
considered the motion and legal memoranda, the record, and the
applicable law, the Court finds that Defendant’s motion should be
GRANTED for the reasons set forth more fully below.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND FACTS
This
is
an
employment
discrimination
case
brought
under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et
seq. On November 11, 2011, Plaintiff filed the instant suit
1
naming
Motiva
Enterprises
LLC
(“Motiva”)
as
the
Defendant.
Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that he was wrongfully terminated
based on racial discrimination. In his complaint, Plaintiff, a
Caucasian
male,
asserts
that
he
was
terminated
from
his
employment at Motiva on January 22, 2010, after being wrongfully
accused of violating a “lifesaving rule.” (Rec. Doc. 1, p. 3, ¶
6) He alleges that, subsequently, on October 4, 2010, he learned
that a black technician, “who had actually committed a lifesaving
rule violation” was not terminated. (Rec. Doc. 1, p. 3, ¶ 8)
Likewise, Plaintiff also alleges that on May 20, 2011, he learned
of
another
black
technician
who
was
not
terminated
after
violating a lifesaving rule. (Rec. Doc. 1, p. 3, ¶ 9) Plaintiff
reports
that
he
first
brought
this
matter
before
the
Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on January 6, 2011,
“within
300
days
of
learning
that
race
had
to
have
been
a
determining factor in his termination.” (Rec. Doc. 1, p. 4, ¶ 10)
Plaintiff asserts that he signed a Charge of Discrimination with
the EEOC on February 13, 2011, and he received his right to sue
letter on August 15, 2011. (Rec. Doc. 1, p. 4, ¶ 11) Plaintiff
contends
that
he
is
entitled
to
back
pay,
benefits,
and
compensatory damages due to his wrongful termination.
On August 14, 2012, Defendant filed the instant Motion for
2
Summary Judgment, which was set for hearing on August 29, 2012.
The Court continued the hearing date on the motion until its
present hearing date of September 17, 2012.
THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS
In its motion, Defendant argues that it is entitled to
summary
judgment
because
Plaintiff’s
claim
Specifically, Defendant contends that Plaintiff
is
time
barred.
failed to file a
complaint with the EEOC within the required 300 day time period.
Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s claim accrued on the date that
Plaintiff
was
actually
terminated,
January
22,
2010,
and,
therefore, his EEOC complaint should have been filed by November
19, 2010. As such, Defendant contends that the February 13, 2011
EEOC complaint was filed after the 300 day deadline and, thus,
Plaintiff’s suit in this Court is barred, because he failed to
properly exhaust his administrative remedies.1
In response, Plaintiff asserts that his February 13, 2011
EEOC complaint was timely filed because it was filed within 300
days
of
the
date
that
he
learned
his
termination
was
discriminatory. He contends that the 300 day time period begins
1
Defendant also argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on the
merits, because Plaintiff cannot satisfy all of the elements necessary to prove
discrimination. However, because the Court finds that this claim is barred for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies, it will not consider Defendant’s
arguments on that point.
3
running from the time that a plaintiff “reasonably should have
known” that a termination was discriminatory, not necessarily
from the actual termination date. Plaintiff avers that on January
22, 2010, he believed that he was terminated for an alleged
violation of safety protocol; however, it was not until October
4, 2010 and May 20, 2011, that he realized his termination was
discriminatory.
Therefore,
Plaintiff
argues
that
he
properly
exhausted his administrative remedies and, as such, his claims in
this Court are not barred.
DISCUSSION
A.
Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, the
discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (citing FED.
R. CIV. P. 56(c)); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075
(5th Cir. 1994). When assessing whether a dispute as to any
material fact exists, the Court considers “all of the evidence in
the record but refrains from making credibility determinations or
weighing the evidence.” Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide
Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 2008). All
4
reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party,
but
a
party
cannot
defeat
summary
judgment
with
conclusory
allegations or unsubstantiated assertions. Little, 37 F.3d at
1075. A court ultimately must be satisfied that “a reasonable
jury could not return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Delta,
530 F.3d at 399.
If the dispositive issue is one on which the moving party
will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party “must
come forward with evidence which would ‘entitle it to a directed
verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.’” Int’l
Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1263-64 (5th
Cir.
1991)
(citation
omitted).
The
nonmoving
party
can
then
defeat the motion by either countering with sufficient evidence
of its own, or “showing that the moving party’s evidence is so
sheer that it may not persuade the reasonable fact-finder to
return a verdict in favor of the moving party.” Id. at 1265.
If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party
will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may
satisfy its burden by merely pointing out that the evidence in
the record is insufficient with respect to an essential element
of the nonmoving party’s claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325.
The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, by
5
submitting
showing
or
that
referring
a
genuine
to
evidence,
issue
set
exists.
out
See
specific
id.
at
facts
324.
The
nonmovant may not rest upon the pleadings, but must identify
specific facts that establish a genuine issue for trial. See,
e.g., id. at 325; Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.
B.
Applicable Law
In an employment discrimination case, the plaintiff must
exhaust all administrative remedies before pursuing his or her
claims in federal court. Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296
F.3d 376, 379 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Dao v. Auchan Hypermarket,
96 F.3d 787, 789 (5th Cir. 1996)). The plaintiff exhausts his or
her administrative remedies when he/she files a timely charge
with the EEOC and receives a statutory notice of the right to
sue. Dao, 96 F.3d at 788-89
(noting that although filing a claim
with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite, it “‘is a
precondition to filing suit in district court’”(quoting Cruce v.
Brazosport
Indep.
Sch.
Dist.,
703
F.2d
862,
863
(5th
Cir.
1983))).
As
a
general
rule,
discrimination
victims
must
file
a
complaint with the EEOC within 180 days of when the unlawful
employment practice occurred. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). While an
unlawful employment practice that occurred more than 180 days
6
prior to filing “may constitute relevant background evidence in a
proceeding
in
which
the
status
of
a
current
practice
is
at
issue,” it has no present legal consequences. United Air Lines v.
Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977).
In some cases, an exception to
this general rule applies, and an individual is allowed 300 days,
rather than 180 days, to file with the EEOC.2
The limitations period for filing a charge of discrimination
with the EEOC starts
to run from the date the discriminatory act
occurs, or the date that the plaintiff knows or reasonably should
know of the discriminatory act. Delaware State College v. Ricks,
449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980); Merrill v. S. Methodist Univ., 806 F.2d
600, 605 (5th Cir. 1986). The relevant discriminatory act is
either the earlier of: the date the employee was notified of
his/her termination, or the date the employee actually separated
from his/her employment. Delaware State College, 499 U.S. at 258.
Likewise, the
held
that
the
United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has
relevant
question
in
deciding
whether
the
limitations period has expired is ‘when was an employee notified
2
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d); 29 U.S.C. § 633(b). This
exception occurs where the state in which the alleged discrimination occurs “has
a law prohibiting discrimination in employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 633(b). Neither
party to this suit disputes that this 300 day exception applies to the instant
case, and that Plaintiff had 300 days to timely file his complaint with the EEOC.
7
of
termination,’
not
‘when
did
an
employee
learn
that
a
termination may have been discriminatory.’ Chapman v. Homco, 886
F.2d 756, 758 (5th Cir. 1989); see also Miller v. Potter, 359
Fed. Appx. 535, 536 (2010) (“In this Circuit, it is clearly
established that ‘the limitations period starts running when the
plaintiff knows of the discriminatory act, not when the plaintiff
perceives
a
discriminatory
motive
behind
the
act.’”(quoting
Christopher v. Mobil Oil Corp., 950 F.2d 1209, 1217 n.2 (5th Cir.
1992))); Pacheco v. Rice, 966 F.2d 904, 906-07 (5th Cir. 1992)
(“To allow plaintiffs to raise employment discrimination claims
whenever they begin to suspect that their employers had illicit
motives would effectively eviscerate the time limits prescribed
for
filing
such
complaints.”).
Under
Fifth
Circuit
law,
the
limitation period for a discrimination claim can be equitably
tolled
employee
“when
and
[an]
employer’s
induce
him
not
affirmative
to
act
acts
within
mislead
the
the
limitations
period.’” Miller, 359 Fed. Appx. at 537 (quoting Manning v.
Chevron Chem. Co., 332 F.3d 874, 880 (5th Cir. 2003)).
In
the
instant
case,
Plaintiff
was
notified
of
his
termination/terminated by Motiva on January 22, 2010. Therefore,
the
limitations
period
began
to
run
on
January
22,
2010.
Plaintiff filed his complaint with the EEOC on February 13, 2011,
8
more than 300 days after his termination, making his complaint
untimely.
As
such,
Plaintiff
has
failed
to
exhaust
his
administrative remedies and, as a matter of law, is barred from
asserting his claims in the instant action. Although Plaintiff
argues that he is not barred from suit because he did not learn
that his termination was discriminatory until at least October 4,
2010,
the
above-referenced
law
indicates
that
Plaintiff’s
argument is without merit. The only relevant date is the date
that
Plaintiff
received
notice
of
his
termination;
thus,
Plaintiff’s claims in this suit are procedurally barred.3
Furthermore, to the extent that Plaintiff’s argument can be
construed as an argument for equitable tolling of the limitations
period, the Court notes that the limitations period can only be
tolled where an employer takes affirmative acts to mislead the
employee. The facts in this case do not indicate that Plaintiff’s
employer took any affirmative acts to induce him not to act
within the limitations period. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
is GRANTED.
3
Moreover, the Court notes that the Plaintiff has stated that he knew his
termination was discriminatory on October 4, 2010. At that point, Plaintiff was
still within the 300 day time period for filing a complaint with the EEOC.
However, he still chose to wait until after the time period had expired to file
his complaint.
9
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Boyd Weber’s claims
against
Defendant
Motiva
Enterprises
LLC
are
DISMISSED
PREJUDICE, at sole cost to Plaintiff.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 31st day of October, 2012.
____________________________
CARL J. BARBIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
10
WITH
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