Pelas v. EAN Holdings, LLC et al
Filing
14
ORDER & REASONS denying 7 Motion to Remand to State Court. Signed by Judge Martin L.C. Feldman on 1/11/2012. (caa, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
CATINA PELAS
CIVIL ACTION
v.
NO. 11-2876
EAN HOLDINGS, LLC, ET AL.
SECTION "F"
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is the plaintiff’s motion to remand.
For the reasons that follow, the motion is DENIED.
Background
This personal injury litigation arises out of a rental
car that allegedly malfunctioned. On October 12, 2010 Catina Pelas
was driving a rental car when it allegedly malfunctioned, causing
her to lose control and crash along Highway 23 in Plaquemines
Parish, Louisiana.1
As a result of the single-car accident, Pelas
claims she injured her sternum and shoulder.
1
According to the state court petition, Chris Whitely
rented a 2010 Hyundai Elantra from Enterprise (or its holding
company) for Pelas, who was also an authorized driver in accordance
with the car rental agreement. When Pelas drove the car off the
Enterprise lot in Gretna, she headed toward Plaquemines Parish.
Upon entering Highway 23 in Belle Chasse, Pelas pressed the
accelerator as she traveled in the left lane.
However, as her
speed increased, the car pulled severely to the left; Pelas decided
to enter the right lane so that she could pull the car over on the
shoulder. As she attempted to merge into the right lane, Pelas
lost control of the car, which veered sharply to the left, crossing
a median and traveling into oncoming traffic headed northbound on
Highway 23, finally and abruptly stopping after hitting an
“object.”
1
On
October
11,
2011
Pelas
sued
EAN
Holdings,
LLC,
Enterprise Leasing Company of New Orleans, Enterprise Rent-A-Car
Company, EAN-New Orleans, LLC, EAN Services, LLC, and Enterprise
Holdings, Inc.
in state court, asserting that the defendants were
negligent and they breached warranties imposed upon them as lessors
under La.C.C. art. 2696-2697.
Regarding damages, Pelas claims:
Plaintiff sustained severe, painful and
permanent injuries, including, but not limited
to, injuries to her sternum and shoulder for
which she has endured significant, pain,
suffering disability, loss of wages, loss of
earning capacity, medical expenses, travel
expenses, associated miscellaneous expenses,
mental anguish, emotional distress, loss of
enjoyment of life, depression, and anxiety for
which she claims a reasonable sum....
On November 18, 2011 the defendants2 removed the lawsuit to this
Court, invoking this Court’s diversity jurisdiction.
The plaintiff now seeks to remand this lawsuit back to
state court.
I.
A.
A defendant may generally remove a civil action filed in
state court if the federal court has original jurisdiction over the
2
The defendants assert in their Notice of Removal that
EAN Holdings, LLC is the only proper defendant in this matter and
they point out that both Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company and
Enterprise Leasing Company of New Orleans no longer exist as they
were merged into EAN Holdings, LLC and Enterprise Holdings, Inc.,
respectively.
2
case, that is, if the plaintiff could have brought the action in
federal court from the outset.
the
plaintiffs
challenge
See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
removal
in
this
case,
the
Although
removing
defendants carry the burden of showing the propriety of this
Court's removal jurisdiction.
See Jernigan v. Ashland Oil, Inc.,
989 F.2d 812, 815 (5th Cir. 1993); Willy v. Coastal Corp., 855 F.2d
1160, 1164 (5th Cir. 1988).
In addition, any ambiguities are
construed against removal, Butler v. Polk, 592 F.2d 1293, 1296 (5th
Cir. 1979), as the removal statute should be strictly construed in
favor of remand.
York v. Horizon Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 712 F.
Supp. 85, 87 (E.D. La. 1989); see also Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v.
Sheets, 313 U.S. 100 (1941).
B.
To exercise diversity jurisdiction, complete diversity
must exist between the plaintiffs and all of the properly joined
defendants, and the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000. See
28 U.S.C. § 1332.
The only dispute here is whether the amount-in-
controversy requirement is met.
To determine whether it has jurisdiction, the Court must
consider the allegations in the state court petition as they
existed at the time of removal.
See Manguno v. Prudential Prop. &
Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720 (5th Cir. 2002); see also Cavallini v.
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 44 F.3d 256, 264 (5th Cir. 1995).
Louisiana law forbids a plaintiff from including a specific amount
3
of damages in her prayer for relief.
LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 893.3
When the plaintiff has alleged an indeterminate amount of damages,
as is the case in Louisiana, the removing party must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy
exceeds $75,000.
Simon v. Wal-Mart Stores, 193 F.3d 848, 850 (5th
Cir. 1999); see also De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1412
(5th Cir. 1995).
This showing may be made by either (1) showing
that it is facially apparent that the plaintiff’s claims likely
exceed
$75,000,
or
(2)
setting
forth
“summary
judgment
type
evidence” of facts in controversy that support a finding of the
jurisdictional amount. Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.,
276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002);
Luckett v. Delta Airlines,
Inc., 171 F.3d 295, 298 (5th Cir. 1999).
Where the complaint is
ambiguous as to whether the injuries surpass the jurisdictional
amount in controversy, the Court may consider a post-removal
affidavit
that
clarifies
the
original
complaint.
Asociacion
Nacional de Pescadores a Pequena Escala o Artesanales de Colombia
(ANPAC) v. Dow Quimica de Colombia, 988 F.2d 559, 565 (5th Cir.
1993), abrogated on other grounds by Marathon Oil Co. V. Ruhrgas,
145 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 1998).
If the removing party satisfies its burden, the plaintiff
3
This provision further provides that “if a specific
amount of damages is necessary to establish . . . the lack of
jurisdiction of federal courts due to insufficiency of damages . .
. a general allegation that the claim exceeds or is less than the
requisite amount is required.” La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 893.
4
can only defeat removal by showing that it is “legally certain that
[her] recovery will not exceed the amount stated in the state
complaint.” De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1412 (5th Cir.
1995); see St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S.
283, 289 (1938) (“It must appear to a legal certainty that the
claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount to justify
dismissal.”)).
Absent
a
statute
that
restricts
recovery,
“[l]itigants who want to prevent removal must file a binding
stipulation or affidavit with their complaints; once a defendant
has removed the case, St. Paul makes later filings irrelevant.” De
Aguilar, 47 F.3d at 1412 (quoting In re Shell Oil Co., 970 F.2d
355, 356 (7th Cir. 1992) (per curiam)).
II.
The defendants contend that it is facially apparent that
from
the
allegations
of
the
state
court
petition
that
the
jurisdictional minimum amount in controversy requirement is met.
The Court agrees.
In making the “facially apparent” determination, the
proper procedure is to examine the plain wording of the complaint
and decide whether the allegations set forth a claim that likely
exceeds the jurisdictional amount.
See Allen v. R&H Oil and Gas
Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1336 (5th Cir. 1995).
The defendants contend
that the allegations of the state court petition here -- where
Pelas
alleges
permanent
injury
5
to
her
shoulder
and
sternum,
together with claims for past lost wages, future loss of earning
capacity, loss of enjoyment of life, mental anguish, emotional
distress,
depression,
anxiety,
medical
expenses,
etc.
--
are
allegations that are likely to result in an award in excess of the
federal jurisdictional amount. In support of their contention, the
defendants invoke Gebbia v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 233 F.3d 880 (5th
Cir. 2000); Lopez v. Ford Motor Co., Inc., No. 98-135, 1998 WL
113934, at *1 (E.D. La. Mar. 11, 1998)(Clement, J.); and Corkern v.
Outback Steakhouse of Florida, Inc., No. 05-5487, 2006 WL 285994
(E.D. La. Feb. 6, 2006)(Vance, J.).
In each of these cases, the
plaintiff
physical
alleged,
in
addition
to
injuries,
medical
expenses, mental anguish, emotional distress, loss of enjoyment of
life,
lost
disability.
wages,
loss
See id.
of
earning
capacity,
and
permanent
And in each of these cases the courts
determined that it was facially apparent from the complaint that
the jurisdictional minimum amount in controversy was satisfied.
See id.
The same result is compelled here.
Based
on
the
plaintiff’s
allegations
of
severe
and
permanent injuries to her sternum and shoulder, and her claims for
lost wages, loss of future earnings, mental anguish, emotional
distress, depression, anxiety, loss of enjoyment of life, and
medical expenses, it is facially apparent from the state court
petition that her claims are likely to result in an award in excess
6
of the $75,000 jurisdictional minimum.4 Accordingly, the plaintiff
is not entitled to remand unless she shows to a legal certainty
that she cannot recover over $75,000 in damages.
to make the required showing.
Pelas has failed
In her reply papers, Pelas suggests
that her medical expenses are nowhere near the minimum controversy
requirement, but she likewise concedes that her medical expenses
are uncertain because it is “unclear” whether or not her shoulder
will require surgery.5
While the defendants carried their burden
to show that it is facially apparent from Pelas’ petition that she
is likely to recover more than $75,000 in damages, Pelas falls
4
The Court also notes that other factors are present that
shed some light on the quantum inquiry. First, the plaintiff did
not originally allege that her claims do not exceed the requisite
jurisdictional amount, as required by LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 893
(“...The prayer for relief shall be for such damages as are
reasonable in the premises except that if a specific amount of
damages is necessary to establish ... the lack of jurisdiction of
federal courts due to insufficiency of damages ...a general
allegation that the claim ... is less than the requisite amount is
required.”). Moreover, although the plaintiff seeks remand on the
ground that the amount in controversy is less than $75,000,
curiously, she has refused to stipulate to that when defendants
offered her the opportunity to avoid removal of her lawsuit. (She
claims, by way of her reply papers, that this is so because it is
unclear whether her injuries might require surgery.) Also, the
plaintiff requested a jury trial, which suggests that it is
facially apparent that the amount in controversy at least exceeds
the minimum amount necessary for a jury trial in the forum in which
suit was originally filed. See Lopez v. Ford Motor Co., Inc., No.
98-135, 1998 WL 113934, at *1 (E.D. La. Mar. 11, 1998)(Clement,
J.).
Quite obviously, if plaintiff’s present insistence about
jurisdictional amount has any credibility, this case will settle
for less than $75,000.
5
Pelas fails to suggest any estimated quantum for any of
the other damage components in her laundry list, such as loss of
future earnings or emotional damages.
7
short of satisfying her burden of showing to a legal certainty that
she will not.
Accordingly, the plaintiff’s motion to remand is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, January 11, 2012
______________________________
MARTIN L. C. FELDMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
8
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?