Celtic Marine Corporation v. James C. Justice Companies, Inc.

Filing 67

ORDER & REASONS: 53 granting Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 5/30/13.(sek, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

CELTIC MARINE CORP.

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 11-3005

JAMES C. JUSTICE COMPANIES,
INC.
ORDER AND REASONS

SECTION: “J” (2)

Before the Court is Defendant James C. Justice Companies,
Inc. (“Justice”)’s Motion for Reconsideration (Rec. Doc. 53),
Plaintiff Celtic Marine Corp. (“Celtic”)’s opposition thereto
(Rec. Doc. 58), Justice’s reply (Rec. Doc. 61), and Celtic’s
surreply to same (Rec. Doc. 63). Justice’s motion was set for
hearing on May 22, 2013, on the briefs.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly allow
motions for reconsideration of an order. Bass v. U.S. Dep’t of
Agric., 211 F.3d 959, 962 (5th Cir. 2000). The Fifth Circuit
treats a motion for reconsideration challenging a prior judgment
as either a motion “to alter or amend” under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 59(e) or a motion for “relief from judgment”
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Lavespere v. Niagara
Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 173 (5th Cir. 1990),
abrogated on other grounds by Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d
1069, 1076 (5th Cir. 1994). The difference in treatment is based
1

on timing. If the motion is filed within twenty-eight days of the
judgment, then it falls under Rule 59(e). Id.; FED. R. CIV. P.
59(e). However, if the motion is filed more than twenty-eight
days after the judgment, but not more than one year after the
entry of judgment, it is governed by Rule 60(b). Id.; FED. R. CIV.
P. 60(c). In the present case, Justice’s motion was filed on
April 23, 2013, which is within twenty-eight days from the March
26, 2013 Order and Reasons that it asks this Court to reconsider.
As a result, Justice’s motion is treated as a motion to alter or
amend under Rule 59(e).
Altering or amending a judgment under Rule 59(e) is an
“extraordinary remedy” used “sparingly” by the courts. Templet v.
Hydrochem, Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 2004). A motion to
alter or amend calls into question the correctness of a judgment
and is permitted only in narrow situations, “primarily to correct
manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered
evidence.” Id.; see also Schiller v. Physicians Res. Grp. Inc.,
342 F.3d 563, 567 (5th Cir. 2003). Manifest error is defined as
“‘[e]vident to the senses, especially to the sight, obvious to
the understanding, evident to the mind, not obscure or hidden,
and

is

synonymous

with

open,

clear,

visible,

unmistakable,

indubitable, indisputable, evidence, and self-evidence.’” In Re

2

Energy Partners, Ltd., 2009 WL 2970393, at *6 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
Sept. 15, 2009) (citations omitted); see also Pechon v. La. Dep't
of Health & Hosp., No. 08-0664, 2009 WL 2046766, at *4 (E.D. La.
July

14,

2009)

(manifest

error

is

one

that

“‘is

plain

and

indisputable, and that amounts to a complete disregard of the
controlling law’”) (citations omitted).
The Fifth Circuit has noted that “such a motion is not the
proper

vehicle

for

rehashing

evidence,

legal

theories,

or

arguments that could have been offered or raised before entry of
judgment.”

Templet, 367 F.3d at 478-79. Nor should it be used to

“re-litigate prior matters that ... simply have been resolved to
the

movant’s

dissatisfaction.”

Voisin

v.

Tetra

Technologies,

Inc., 2010 WL 3943522, at *2 (E.D. La. Oct. 6, 2010). Thus, to
prevail on a motion under Rule 59(e), the movant must clearly
establish at least one of three factors: (1) an intervening
change

in

the

controlling

law,

(2)

the

availability

of

new

evidence not previously available, or (3) a manifest error in law
or fact. Schiller, 342 F.3d at 567; Ross v. Marshall, 426 F.3d
745, 763 (5th Cir. 2005) (to win a Rule 59(e) motion, the movant
“must clearly establish either a manifest error of law or fact or
must present newly discovered evidence”).
In the instant case, Justice argues that this Court made a

3

manifest error of law or fact either by failing to recognize that
a question of fact existed as to whether the parties had amended
their October Settlement Agreement, or by making an impermissible
credibility

determination

in

favor

of

Celtic,

the

movant.

Likewise, Justice also argues that the Court’s determination that
the case could be reopened was a manifest error because the Court
did not order that the parties be returned to their presettlement
status quo. Justice contends that in order to reopen the case,
the Court should have required that all settlement amounts paid
to Celtic be returned to Justice so that the parties could begin
their litigation anew.
A.

Evidence of Amendment

At the time that the Court considered Celtic’s original
Motion to Enforce the Settlement the following evidence regarding
amendment was in front of the Court: (1) an affidavit by James C.
Justice, III, the CEO of Justice, stating that an email chain
between himself and the CEO of Celtic modified and/or amended the
October Settlement Agreement; (2) an affidavit by Robert Bayham,
the Executive Vice-President of Celtic, stating that the parties
have never modified or amended the October Settlement Agreement;
(3) the 2012-2013 email chain between the parties; and (4) the
October Settlement Agreement and the corresponding guaranties.

4

The October Settlement Agreement states that

it “embodies the

entire understanding and agreement of the parties concerning the
resolution

of

the

disputes

between

the

parties."

Ex.

A

to

Celtic’s Opp., Rec. Doc. 58-1, p. 4 ¶ 13. Under Louisiana law,
a contract is the law between the parties, and is read
for its plain meaning. Thus, [] where the words of a
contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd
consequences, the contract's meaning and the intent of
its parties must be sought within the four corners of
the document and cannot be explained or contradicted by
extrinsic evidence, such that, if a court finds the
contract to be unambiguous, it may construe the intent
from

the

face

of

the

document-without

considering

extrinsic evidence-and enter judgment as a matter of
law.
In re Liljeberg Enter., Inc., 304 F.3d 410, 439-40 (5th Cir.
2002).

In

the

instant

case,

the

language

of

the

October

Settlement Agreement was clear and unambiguous, as such, the
Court did not have to consider extrinsic evidence and was able to
make a determination as to the parties’ intent from the face of
the contract. The contract clearly indicated that the parties did
not intend for email communications to amend or modify it as it

5

was the “entire understanding and agreement of the parties.”1
Thus, the Court finds that it did not err.
B.

Reopening of the Case

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) provides that “[o]n
motion and just terms the court may relieve a party . . . from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for . . . any [] reasons
that

justifies

Specifically,
federal

relief.”

courts

district

have

court

to

Fed.

R.

Civ.

found

that

this

reopen

a

Proc.
rule

dismissed

60(b)(6).

“empowers

suit

due

to

a
a

party’s breach of a settlement agreement.” Hernandez v. Companía
Transatlantica, No. 96-0716, 1998 WL 241530, at *2 (E.D. La. May
7, 1998) (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S.
375, 378 (1994)). The decision of whether or not to reopen a case
is left to the discretion of the court. Trade Arbed, Inc. v.
African Exp. MV, 941 F. Supp. 68, 70 (E.D. La. 1996).

1

While the plain language of the October Settlement Agreement is
sufficient to support the Court’s finding, the Court also notes that at the time
the Court considered its previous order, it also had a copy of the February
Settlement Agreement before it. The parties’ briefing explained that due to
Justice’s inability to comply with the February Settlement Agreement, the parties
had entered into the October Settlement Agreement. Both of these agreements were
signed by the parties, notarized, and were drafted in the same format. They
manifested the clear intent of the parties to modify their legal arrangements.
The email chain and affidavit that Justice references does not follow the pattern
of negotiations between these parties, and it does not manifest any intent to be
legally binding upon the parties. In particular, the Court notes that “a selfserving affidavit, without more evidence, will not defeat summary judgment.”
Sanchez v. Dallas/Fort Worth Int’l Airport Bd., 438 Fed. App’x. 343, 346-47 (5th
Cir. 2011). Justice’s affidavit was clearly self serving and unsupported by the
evidence in this case, which shows that the email chain between the parties was
not an amendment or modification of the October Settlement Agreement.

6

In the Court’s previous Order and Reasons it found that
enforcement of the settlement agreement and the claims arising
from the agreement justified reopening this suit. The Court had
jurisdiction to do so under its ancillary jurisdiction, by which
it had retained jurisdiction over the settlement in this case.
This decision was left to the Court’s discretion, and the Court
found that the best way to do so would be by allowing the parties
to reopen the case to affirmatively brief the amounts of payment
they

thought

were

owed

under

the

settlement

agreements

and

related contracts. Ordering Celtic to return monies that no party
disputes were originally owed under the very agreements that this
Court is seeking to enforce is nonsensical and does not represent
just terms for either party. The Court does not find that it has
erred in its decision to reopen this case without restoring the
parties to their presettlement position. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Justice’s motion is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 30th day of May, 2013.

____________________________
CARL J. BARBIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

7