Schneider v. Gulf Industries, Inc.
Filing
92
ORDER AND REASONS granting 35 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle on 7/2/2013. (ijg, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
CRAIG B. SCHNEIDER
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO.: 12-342
GULF INDUSTRIES, INC.
SECTION “B”(1)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Defendant Gulf Industries, Inc.'s ("Gulf
Industries") Motion for Summary Judgment. (Rec. Doc. No. 35). In
response, Plaintiff filed a Response Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant's
Motion
for
Summary
Judgment.(Rec.
Doc.
No.
77).
Defendant filed a reply thereto. (Rec. Doc. No. 85).
Accordingly, and for the reasons pronounced below, IT IS
ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. No.
35) is hereby GRANTED.
Cause of Action and Facts of the Case:
This
dispute
arises
out
of
the
alleged
termination
of
Plaintiff Craig Schneider on May 24, 2011. Plaintiff alleges that
he was terminated in violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act. (Rec. Doc. No. 77 at 3). Defendant Gulf Industries
claims that Plaintiff was not terminated - rather, he voluntarily
resigned. Consequently, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has no
1
cognizable claim under the ADEA.(Rec. Doc. No. 35 at 2).
Gulf Industries is in the business of providing roadway safety
products such as stripping in territories including Louisiana,
Mississippi, Florida, Tennessee, Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Texas.
(Rec. Doc. No. 77 at 1). Plaintiff Schneider served as the Chief
Executive Officer of Gulf Industries from around October/November
2007 through May 2011. (Rec. Doc. No. 35-2 at 1; Rec. Doc. No. 77
at 1). In March 2011, Douglas Brooks invested $3.5 million in Gulf
Industries and purchased a majority interest of the stock. (Rec.
Doc. No. 35-1 at 1). At that time, the Board of Directors, which
included the Plaintiff, unanimously elected Mr. Brooks as the new
CEO. (Id. at 2, 4). The Board, again including the Plaintiff,
further voted to make Plaintiff the CFO of the company. (Rec. Doc.
No. 35-3 at 11).
Plaintiff contends that he felt he was not being given
assignments in his position as CFO and that he spoke to Clayton
Sims, a consultant for Gulf Industries, about his desire to be
given more work. (Rec. Doc. No. 35-3 at 13). Schneider contends
that he was advised by Mr. Sims to write an email to Mr.Brooks
regarding his concerns. (Rec. Doc. No. 35-3 at 14). Plaintiff
stated that his goal in writing an email to Mr. Brooks was to set
up a meeting to discuss his concerns. (Rec. Doc. No. 35-3 at 15).
On May 24, 2011, the Plaintiff sent an email to Mr. Brooks stating
the following: "I am writing to inform you of my willingness to
2
resign from Gulf Industries. It has become apparent that you do not
view me as part of the company's future...This resignation would
include
resigning
as
a
Trustee
and
Board
member
also.
My
resignation is contingent upon a reasonable separation package...I
am thankful to Gulf Industries for the opportunities I have been
afforded." (Rec. Doc. No. 35-7 at 5; Rec. Doc. No. 77-5, at 4). In
response to this email,
Mr. Brooks emailed the Plaintiff writing
"I did talk to Clayton today and he will contact you to discuss
your resignation. I wish you good luck for the future." (Rec. Doc.
No. 35-7 at 1). Defendant contends that this constituted an
acceptance of Plaintiff's resignation. (Rec. Doc. No. 35-1 at 9).
Plaintiff later stated he was advised by Clayton Sims to send a
conditional letter of resignation. (Rec. Doc. No. 77-5, at 7).
Plaintiff further contends that he did not intend to resign and
that Sims had assured him that he (Mr. Sims) would discuss his
situation with Brooks and set up a meeting so that Schneider's
position and function at the company could be discussed. (Rec. Doc.
No. 77-5 at 7). On June 1, 2011, Plaintiff was sent a formal letter
from Doug Brooks accepting the alleged resignation. (Rec. Doc. No.
35-7 at 6). Plaintiff then initiated this suit in federal court
against
Gulf
Industries
alleged
ADEA.(Rec. Doc. No. 1).
Law and Analysis
3
age
discrimination
under
the
A. Motion for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions,
interrogatory
answers,
and
admissions,
together
with
any
affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986).
would
allow
nonmovant.
(1986).
a
A genuine issue exists if the evidence
reasonable
jury
to
return
a
verdict
for
the
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248,
Although the Court must consider the evidence with all
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, the nonmovant must produce specific facts to demonstrate
that a genuine issue exists for trial.
Webb v. Cardiothoracic
Surgery Assocs. of N. Texas, 139 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir. 1998).
The nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and use affidavits,
depositions, interrogatory responses, admissions, or other evidence
to establish a genuine issue.
Id.
Accordingly, conclusory
rebuttals of the pleadings are insufficient to avoid summary
judgment.
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Liljeberg Enter., Inc., 7 F.3d
1203, 1207 (5th Cir. 1993).
B. Constructive Discharge
Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), it is
unlawful for an employer to "discharge any individual or otherwise
4
discriminate
against
any
individual
with
respect
to
his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). In order
to assert a claim under the ADEA, the plaintiff must establish a
prima facie case of discrimination. Brown v. Bunge Corp., 207 F.3d
776, 781 (5th Cir. 2000). To establish a prima facie
case, the
plaintiff must prove: (1) that he is a member of a protected class,
(2) that he was qualified for the position he held, (3) that he was
discharged, and (4) that he was replaced by someone younger. Id. In
the case at bar, the only contested issue is whether the plaintiff
was discharged such that his claims fall within the province of the
ADEA.1
In the case at bar, Plaintiff did send Gulf Industries' CEO
Doug Brooks an email stating that he was willing to resign and
giving some terms for resignation. (Rec. Doc. No. 35-7 at 5).
Plaintiff now contends that it was not his intention to resign rather he hoped to initiate a conversation. The email Schneider
sent to Doug Brooks, however, does not evince this intent and
Plaintiff does not present case law to support his contention that
1
Defendant claims that the plaintiff was not replaced by
someone younger. However, the facts establish that Monica Hodges,
who was younger that the plaintiff, took over as Chief Financial
Officer after Plaintiff's departure. Defendant's contention that
the fact that Ms. Hodges already worked for Gulf Industries and
thus her appointment to CFO does not constitute a "replacement"
is inapposite.
5
his email did not constitute a resignation.
Nonetheless, the fact that a plaintiff tendered a letter of
resignation does not end our inquiry into the possibility of
discharge. "When an employee resigns, he may satisfy the discharge
requirements by proving constructive discharge." Bunge Corp., 207
F.3d at 782. The Fifth Circuit has stated that, in order to prove
constructive discharge:
an employee must offer evidence that the employer made
the employee's working conditions so intolerable that a
reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign.
Stated more simply, [the plaintiff's] resignation must
have been reasonable under all the circumstances. Whether
a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign
depends on the facts of each case, but we consider the
following factors relevant, singly or in combination: (1)
demotion; (2) reduction in salary; (3) reduction in job
responsibilities; (4) reassignment to menial or degrading
work; (5) reassignment to work under a younger
supervisor; (6) badgering, harassment or humiliation by
the employer calculated to encourage the employee's
resignation; or (7) offers of early retirement [or
continued employment on terms less favorable than the
employee's former status].
Bunge Corp., 207 F.3d at 782 (citing Barrow v. New
Orleans Steamship Ass'n, 10 F.3d 292, 297 (5th Cir. 1994).
In the case at bar, Plaintiff Schneider was demoted from CEO
to CFO after Doug Brooks became the controlling shareholder in the
company. However, Plaintiff admits that he, as a member of the
Board of Directors, voted to make Mr. Brooks the CEO and that his
own title be changed to Chief Financial Officer. Furthermore,
Plaintiff admits that his salary was not reduced as a result of his
6
change in title. Schneider does not allege that he was reassigned
to menial or degrading work, that he was reassigned to work under
a younger supervisor, nor does Plaintiff alleged that he was
harassed
or
humiliated
in
anyway
so
as
to
encourage
his
resignation2.
Plaintiff contends that he became alarmed about his position
in the company when Doug Brooks requested that materials related to
the
company's
financial
status
be
brought
to
him
directly.
Plaintiff also felt that he was not being given sufficient work.
However, Defendant has stated and Plaintiff has acknowledged that
he was expected to work on a significant lawsuit that the company
was facing. (Rec. Doc. No. 35-3 at 14). These conditions do not
constitute the conditions that the Fifth Circuit has previously
held were sufficient to demonstrate constructive discharge.
In Guthrie v. J.C. Penny Co., Inc., 803 F.2d 202, 207-08 (5th
Cir. 1986), the Fifth Circuit Court found that evidence including
witness testimony
that the plaintiff's supervisor had strongly
criticized him in front of the staff, undermining his authority;
that the plaintiff was demoted; that the company had inquired
repeatedly about the plaintiff's retirement plans; and that the
2
Humiliation and embarrassment must be significant to
support a finding of constructive termination. See Shawgo v.
Spradlin, 701 F.2d 470, 481-82 (5 th Cir. 1983)(publicity and
derogatory comments resulting from disciplinary proceedings were
not constructive discharge); Junior v. Texaco, Inc., 688 F.2d
377, 380 (5th Cir. 1982)(unfavorable work evaluations were not
constructive discharge).
7
plaintiff's manager had singled him out for criticism and applied
tougher standards to him than to his younger colleagues was
sufficient for a reasonable jury to find the Plaintiff had been
constructively
discharged.
See
also
Stephens
v.
C.I.T.
Group/Equipment Financing, Inc., 955 F.2d 1023, 1027 (5th Cir.
1992)("The combination of the demotion, the continuing limitations
on his salary and responsibility, and [the employer's] re[peatedly
asking him whether he was going to quit his job, could make working
conditions intolerable for a reasonable person in [Plaintiff's]
position."). Plaintiff does not present a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether his working conditions were so intolerable so as
to constitute constructive discharge. As Plaintiff cannot satisfy
the constructive discharge standard, he is consequently unable to
make a prima facie case for age discrimination.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 2nd day of July, 2013.
_____________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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