Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Signal International, LLC
Filing
194
ORDER granting in part 103 Motion to Strike ; granting in part 110 Motion to Strike. Signal International shall re-urge its answers and affirmative defenses within 14 days of entry of this Order, amending both pleadings to correct the issues described in the Court's order. Signed by Judge Susie Morgan. (cbn)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
KURIAN DAVID, et al.,
Plaintiffs
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
No. 08-1220
SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL, LLC, et al.,
Defendants
SECTION “E”
Related Case:
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION,
Plaintiff
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
No. 12-557
SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL, LLC, et al.,
Defendants
SECTION “E”
Applies to: EEOC v. Signal International (Civil Action No. 12-557)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are two motions filed in the EEOC v. Signal International, LLC et
al matter (Civil Action No. 12-557; “EEOC”): (1) plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission’s (“EEOC”) “Motion to Strike or Alternatively to Dismiss Defendant’s
Affirmative Answers,”1 and (2) plaintiff-intervenors Vijayan, Kadakkarappally, and David’s
“Motion to Strike, or Alternatively, to Dismiss, Defendant Signal’s Affirmative Defenses.”2
Defendant Signal International, LLC (“Signal”) filed an opposition to both Motions in one
1
R. Doc. 103.
2
R. Doc. 110.
1
document.3
EEOC seeks an Order from this Court striking all 17 affirmative defenses contained
in Signal’s “Answer and Affirmative Defenses”4 to the EEOC’s complaint.5 Plaintiffs seek
an order from this Court striking all 19 of the affirmative defenses contained in Signal’s
“Answer and Affirmative Defenses”6 to the plaintiff-intervenors’ class complaint in
intervention. Both EEOC and plaintiff-intervenors argue that Signal’s affirmative defenses
are legally invalid, that they are legally insufficient under the pleading standard set forth
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that they do no respond to a single cause of action,
that they deprive EEOC and the plaintiff-intervenors of fair notice to the defenses claimed,
that they are either conclusory or merely a denial of the pleadings, and thus insufficient and
redundant, and that they should be stricken from the record. In response, Signal argues its
affirmative answers satisfy the pleading standard set forth by Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 8(b) and 8(c), and are thus sufficient for purposes of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(f), because the amount of detail required for a sufficiently pled affirmative
defense is lower than the amount of detail that must be included in a complaint.
The Court agrees with EEOC and plaintiff-intervenors that certain affirmative
defenses asserted by Signal must be stricken, but notes that Signal should be given an
3
R. Doc. 112.
4
R. Doc. 91.
5
In its motion to strike, EEOC also requests that Signal’s “Twenty-Second through Twenty-Fifth”
defenses and Signal’s “Twenty-Seventh through Fortieth-Third [sic]” defenses. See R. Doc. 103 at p. 1.
Signal asserts only 17 affirmative defenses, all of which EEOC seeks to strike. If EEOC seeks to strike
anything else from Signal’s answer, EEOC failed to provide justification for such an order. To the extent
EEOC’s motion to strike requests an order striking anything beyond Signal’s affirmative defenses, the
motion is denied.
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R. Doc. 90.
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opportunity to amend its affirmative defenses and re-urge them in a timely fashion. “The
court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial,
impertinent, or scandalous matter.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f). An affirmative defense is “subject
to the same pleading requirement as is the complaint,” and a defendant “must plead an
affirmative defense with enough specificity or factual particularity to give the plaintiff ‘fair
notice’ of the defense that is being advanced.” Woodfield v. Bowman, 193 F.3d 354, 362
(5th Cir.1999). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 provides the requirements that all
pleadings must satisfy, and subsections (b) and (c) of the Rule govern the pleading
requirements for defenses and affirmative defenses, respectively. Under Rule 8(b) and (c),
a defendant must “state in short and plain terms its defenses to each claim asserted against
it” and must “affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense . . . .” FED. R. CIV. P.
8(b)(1)(A) and (c)(1).7
A motion to strike under Rule 12(f) “is a drastic remedy to be resorted to only when
required for the purposes of justice.” Augustus v. Board of Pub. Instruction of Escambia
Country, 306 F.2d 862, 868 (5th Cir. 1962) (quoting Brown v. Williamson Tobacco Corp.
v. United States, 201 F.2d 819,822 (6th Cir. 1953)); see also Kaiser Aluminum & Chem.
Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1057 (5th Cir. 1982). “[E]ven when
technically appropriate and well-founded,” motions to strike are not be granted “in the
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Signal, EEOC, and the plaintiff-intervenors all argue for varying degrees of application of the
well-known Twombly-Iqbal pleading standard to Signal’s affirmative defenses. See Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Signal argues that this standard,
which the Court uses when analyzing the sufficiency of a complaint, does not apply to affirmative defenses.
EEOC and the plaintiff-intervenors argue that Twombly-Iqbal does apply to affirmative defenses, and that
Signal’s affirmative defenses do not meet the facial plausibility standard created by those two cases. The
Court need not resolve this dispute, however, as the “fair notice” standard set forth by Rule 8 and the Fifth
Circuit in Woodfield is a lower threshold than Twombly-Iqbal, and Signal’s affirmative answers do not
meet even that lowered standard.
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absence of a showing of prejudice to the moving party.” Abene v. Jaybar, LLC, 802 F. Supp.
716, 723 (E.D. La. 2011) (quoting 5C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1381 (3d ed. 2004)). The decision to grant or deny a motion
to strike lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Tarver v. Foret, No. 95-1192,
1996 WL 3536, at *1 (E.D. La. Jan. 3, 1996).
Signal’s affirmative answers are, for the most part, as EEOC and the plaintiffintervenors both characterize them, “shotgun” pleadings, devoid of the kind of factual
specificity EEOC and the plaintiff-intervenors would need to have fair notice of the defenses
Signal is asserting, and to which particular causes of action Signal is claiming each
particular defense is meant to apply. See Woodfield, 193 F.3d at 362. Because Signal’s
affirmative defenses are vague and conclusory, EEOC and the plaintiff-intervenors would
be prejudiced if they were required to litigate every possible application of each and every
defense. However, this is an issue that can be remedied if Signal better defines the defenses
it is asserting to at least comply with the fair notice requirement of Rule 8 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. By adding more detail to each of its affirmative defenses and
explicitly stating which defenses apply to which causes of action, Signal will be able to assert
all of the affirmative defenses it sees fit, the EEOC and the plaintiff-intervenors will be given
fair notice of those defenses and be able to prepare to litigate those issues, and this matter
can continue to move forward.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Motions to Strike be and hereby are
GRANTED IN PART, as set forth above.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the following affirmative defenses contained in
Signal’s Answer and Affirmative Defenses to EEOC’s complaint be and hereby are
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STRICKEN, as they are impermissibly vague: 8 and 11.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the following affirmative defenses contained in
Signal’s Answer and Affirmative Defenses to EEOC’s complaint be and hereby are
STRICKEN, as they are merely conclusory denials of EEOC’s pleadings: 1, 4, 5, 9, and 1217.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the following affirmative defenses contained in
Signal’s Answer and Affirmative Defenses to EEOC’s complaint be and hereby are
STRICKEN, as they are not directed at any particular cause of action, and thus deprive
EEOC of fair notice of the defense claimed and which cause of action that defense is
supposed to apply to: 2, 3, 6, 7, and 10.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the following affirmative defenses contained in
Signal’s Answer and Affirmative Defenses to plaintiff-intervenors’ class complaint in
intervention be and hereby are STRICKEN, as they are impermissibly vague: 8 and 11.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the following affirmative defenses contained in
Signal’s Answer and Affirmative Defenses to plaintiff-intervenors’ class complaint in
intervention be and hereby are STRICKEN, as they are merely conclusory denials of
plaintiff-intervenors’ pleadings, and thus redundant: 1, 4, 5, 9, and 12-19. Paragraph 117A
of Signal’s Answer and Affirmative Defenses is also stricken, as it is redundant and
confusing.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the following affirmative defenses contained in
Signal’s Answer and Affirmative Defenses to plaintiff-intervenors’ class complaint in
intervention be and hereby are STRICKEN, as they are not directed at any particular cause
of action, and thus deprive plaintiff-intervenors of fair notice of the defense claimed and
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which cause of action that defense is supposed to apply to: 2, 3, 6, 7, and 10.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Signal shall re-urge its answers and affirmative
defenses within fourteen (14) days of the entry of this Order, amending both pleadings
to correct the issues described above.
20th
New Orleans, Louisiana, this ____ day of May, 2013.
_____________________________
SUSIE MORGAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Court to Notify:
Magistrate Judge Daniel E. Knowles
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