Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Signal International, LLC
Filing
499
ORDER AND REASONS denying 472 Motion to Certify for Interlocutory Appeal or Alternatively to Stay Pending Application for Mandamus Relief. Signed by Judge Susie Morgan. (bwn)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
KURIAN DAVID, et al.
Plaintiffs
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
No. 08-1220
SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL, LLC, et al.,
Defendants
SECTION “E”
Related Cases:
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION,
Plaintiff
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
No. 12-557
SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL, LLC, et al.,
Defendants
SECTION "E"
LAKSHMANAN PONNAYAN ACHARI, et al.,
Plaintiffs
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
No. 13-6218
(c/w 13-6219,
13-6220, 13-6221,
14-732, 14-1818)
SIGNAL INTERNATIONAL, LLC, et al.,
Defendants
SECTION "E"
Applies To: David v. Signal (08-1220); EEOC v. Signal (12-557);
Achari v. Signal (13-6218, 13-6219, 13-6220, 13-6221, 14-732)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion to Certify for Interlocutory Appeal or Alternatively
to Stay Pending Application for Mandamus Relief filed by Defendants Signal
1
International, L.L.C., Signal International, Inc., and Signal International Texas, G.P.
(collectively "Signal").1
Defendants Malvern Burnett, the Law Offices of Malvern
Burnett, A.P.C., and Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center, L.L.C. (the "Burnett
Defendants") have filed a similar Motion.2 The question presented is whether the Court
should certify for interlocutory appeal its orders prohibiting the discovery of certain
post-Signal information, including immigration status. For the following reasons, the
Court finds that the criteria for interlocutory appeal are not present and that a
discretionary stay pending the outcome of a petition for mandamus relief is not
warranted. The Motions are DENIED.
BACKGROUND3
A protective order in the above-captioned matters prohibits Signal from
discovering, inter alia, the current immigration status of any plaintiff, the current
address or place of residence of any plaintiff, and the employers or potential employers
of any plaintiff post-termination of employment with Signal.4 Moving Defendants argue
the protective order unduly restricts their ability to discover impeachment evidence.5
The Court has rejected this argument on multiple occasions, finding that the in
terrorem effect of producing the requested information outweighs Signal's interest in
unbridled discovery.
Recognizing the futility of beating a dead horse, Moving
Defendants now ask the Court to certify its orders upholding the protective order for
R. Doc. 1776 in the David Case, R. Doc. 472 in the EEOC Case, and R. Doc. 351 in the Achari Cases.
R. Doc. 1808 in the David Case and R. Doc. 384 in the Achari Cases. The Burnett Defendants
incorporate by reference the arguments set forth in Signal's motion.
3 The facts of the related cases have been detailed ad nauseum in previous orders. Familiarity is assumed.
4 R. Docs. 367 and 476 in the David Case, R. Doc. 285 in the EEOC Case, and R. Doc. 307 in the Achari
Cases.
5 The Burnett Defendants also argue the protective order precludes them from assessing the economic
harm, if any, suffered by the plaintiffs.
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interlocutory appeal. In the alternative, Moving Defendants request a discretionary stay
of the above-captioned matters while they petition the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals for
a writ of mandamus.
LEGAL STANDARD
An interlocutory appeal from a non-final order in a civil case is permissible when
(1) the order involves "a controlling question of law," (2) there is "substantial ground for
difference of opinion" on the question presented, and (3) an immediate appeal would
"materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation."6
The district court
cannot certify an order for interlocutory appeal unless all three criteria are present.7 In
determining whether certification is appropriate, the Court is mindful that interlocutory
appeal is "exceptional" and "does not lie simply to determine the correctness of a
judgment."8
LAW AND ANALYSIS
The parties spill much ink arguing whether the protective order involves a
controlling question of law on which there exists a substantial ground for difference of
opinion. The Court need not decide these issues today. For the reasons explained more
fully below, certification is not warranted because an immediate appeal would hinder—
rather than hasten—the ultimate termination of the related cases.
An immediate appeal materially advances the termination of litigation if it would
eliminate the need for trial, simplify the issues for trial, or reduce the burden of
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
See Aparicio v. Swan Lake, 643 F.2d 1109, 1110 n.2 (5th Cir. 1981) ("Section 1292(b) sets out three
criteria all of which must be met before the district court may properly certify an interlocutory order for
appeal.") (emphasis added).
8 Clark-Dietz & Assocs.-Eng'rs, Inc. v. Basic Constr. Co., 702 F.2d 67, 68—69 (5th Cir. 1983).
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discovery.9
Certification of the protective order would accomplish none of these
objectives.10 As a non-dispositive order, the reversal or affirmance of a discovery order
would seldom (if ever) eliminate the need for trial. Nor would a decision from the Fifth
Circuit simplify the issues for trial or reduce the burden of discovery. If anything,
vacature of the protective order would make discovery even more onerous and unwieldy.
Rather than expediting a final disposition, an interlocutory appeal would actually
delay resolution of the related cases. The David Case is set for trial in less than three
months. Even if the Fifth Circuit chose to hear the interlocutory appeal, the parties
could not realistically expect a decision for at least six months.11 Regardless of the Fifth
Circuit's ruling, the David Case would then have to be returned to the Court's jury
docket, resulting in an additional lengthy delay. Moreover, an extensive delay in the
David Case would likely produce a ripple effect of continuances in the EEOC Case and
the Achari Cases. And once the David Case and the related cases are finally tried,
appealable issues will almost undoubtedly still exist,12 which could lead to another
round of appeals and remands.13
B&B Advisory Servs., LLC v. Bombardier Aerospace Corp., No. Civ. A. 02-2695, 2003 WL 22326511, at
*2 (E.D. La. Oct. 9, 2003); see also Panda Energy Int'l, Inc. v. Factory Mut. Ins., Nos. 3:11–CV–003–K,
3:10–CV–2541–K, No. 09–30453 (SGJ), and No. 09–30453 (SGJ), 2011 WL 610016, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Feb.
14, 2011) ("An appeal materially advances the termination of litigation when it accelerates or simplifies
trial proceedings.").
10 Courts in the Fifth Circuit have recognized that a discovery order is seldom appropriate for
interlocutory appeal. See, e.g., In re Tullius, No. EP-11-mc-365-KC., 2011 WL 5006673, at *2 (W.D. Tex.
Oct. 20, 2011) ("District courts in the Fifth Circuit are hesitant to grant leave to appeal interlocutory
orders relating to discovery."); Decena v. Am. Int'l Cos. (AIG), No. 11-1574, 2012 WL 1640455, at *2 (E.D.
La. May 9, 2o12) ("As several courts have recognized, pretrial discovery orders will seldom meet the
requirements for interlocutory appeal.").
11 As the David Plaintiffs note in their opposition memorandum, the average time for disposition in the
Fifth Circuit is 9.3 months. See R. Doc. 1811-3 at p. 13.
12 The related cases present many issues of first impression, which increases the likelihood of appeal.
13 Such piecemeal appeals are disfavored. See Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 106
(2009) ("Permitting piecemeal, prejudgment appeals . . . undermines 'efficient judicial administration'
and encroaches upon the prerogatives of district court judges, who play a 'special role' in managing
ongoing litigation.) (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981)); ClarkDietz, 702 F.2d at 69 ("The basic rule of appellate jurisdiction restricts review to final judgments, avoiding
the delay and extra effort of piecemeal appeals.").
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Having declined to certify the protective order for interlocutory appeal, the Court
now considers the alternative relief requested by Moving Defendants—a stay pending
resolution of an as-of-yet-filed petition for mandamus relief in the Fifth Circuit. There
is no automatic stay of district proceedings while a petition for writ of mandamus is
pending.14 Accordingly, any such stay is imposed under the district court's general
discretionary authority.15
A district court has inherent authority to manage its docket, which includes the
power to stay proceedings.16 The moving party bears a "heavy burden" to demonstrate
that a stay is appropriate.17 "Where a discretionary stay is proposed, something close to
genuine necessity should be the mother of its invocation."18
For largely the reasons set forth above, Signal has failed to make the necessary
showing. The hardship and inconvenience that would result from a stay substantially
outweighs any benefit,19 especially in light of the fact that mandamus relief is unlikely to
be granted.20 Accordingly, the Court will not issue a stay.
CONCLUSION
Signal seeks to appeal an interlocutory ruling, the resolution of which will not
materially advance the related cases to final judgment. Accordingly, the Court will not
certify the ruling for interlocutory appeal. The Court also finds that Signal has failed to
demonstrate that extraordinary circumstances warrant a discretionary stay.
Woodson v. Surgitek, Inc., 57 F.3d 1406, 1416 (5th Cir. 1995).
See id.
16 Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936).
17 Costal (Bermuda) Ltd. v. E.W. Saybolt & Co., 761 F.2d 195, 203 n.6 (5th Cir. 1985)
18 Id.
19 See Landis, 299 U.S. at 254 (instructing lower courts to "weigh competing interests and maintain an
even balance" in deciding whether to issue a stay).
20 See In re LeBlanc, 559 F. App'x 389, 392—93 (5th Cir. 2014) (noting that writ of mandamus is rarely
issued with respect to discovery orders).
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New Orleans, Louisiana, this 14th day of October, 2014.
________________________________
SUSIE MORGAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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