Scott v. Cenac Towing Co., LLC et al

Filing 69

ORDER & REASONS denying 62 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Martin L.C. Feldman on 1/15/2014. (Reference: 12-0811)(caa, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
STEPHEN SCOTT

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 12-811

CENAC TOWING CO., LLC ET AL.

SECTION “F”

ORDER & REASONS
Before the Court is Settoon Towing, LLC’s motion for summary
judgment on its cross claim against Cenac Towing Co., LLC. For the
reasons that follow, the motion is DENIED.
Background
This case involves a dispute over the amount of reimbursement
owed under defendants' agreement to split the cost of plaintiff's
maintenance and cure.
The lawsuit arises out of a marine personal injury action by
Stephen Scott against Cenac Towing Co., LLC and Settoon Towing,
LLC.

For eighteen years, Scott worked, first for Cenac and then

for Settoon, as a seaman on board their vessels. While working for
both companies, Scott encountered benzene-containing chemicals and
solvents, including gasoline, diesel, and crude oil.

He was later

diagnosed

insufficient

with

aplastic

anemia,

production of new blood cells.

which

causes

Scott alleged that his condition

developed as a result of his exposure to benzene.
Scott sued Cenac and Settoon in this Court in March 2012.
alleged

claims

of

negligence

and

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unseaworthiness,

and

He

sought

maintenance and cure and damages under the Jones Act and general
maritime law.

Consistent with its obligation under the general

maritime law, Settoon paid Scott's maintenance and cure, except for
various medical expenses that were covered by two group health
insurers, CIGNA and UMR.

In April 2012, Settoon answered Scott's

complaint and simultaneously filed a cross claim against Cenac,
alleging that Cenac was liable to Settoon for its proportionate
share of maintenance and cure.
In December 2012, Settoon and Cenac agreed to jointly fund a
settlement with Scott, and in February 2013, Scott signed a Receipt
and Release Agreement dismissing his claims against both defendants
in exchange for the settlement.

Before confecting the settlement

agreement, Settoon and Cenac separately agreed to split the cost of
maintenance and cure, resolving Settoon's cross claim.

In August

2013, after a dispute arose between Settoon and Cenac regarding the
scope of their maintenance and cure agreement, the Court reopened
this case to allow Settoon to pursue its cross claim.
moves

for

summary

judgment,

contending

that

Cenac

Settoon now
agreed

to

reimburse it for 50% of Scott's total maintenance and cure.
Standard for Summary Judgment
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 instructs that summary
judgment is proper if the record discloses no genuine issue as to
any material fact such that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.

No genuine issue of fact exists if

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the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact
to find for the non-moving party.

See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.

v. Zenith Radio., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

A genuine issue of

fact exists only "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the non-moving party."

Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The Court emphasizes that the mere argued existence of a
factual dispute does not defeat an otherwise properly supported
motion.

See

id.

Therefore,

"[i]f

the

evidence

is

merely

colorable, or is not significantly probative," summary judgment is
appropriate.

Id. at 249-50 (citations omitted).

Summary judgment

is also proper if the party opposing the motion fails to establish
an essential element of his case.
477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

In this regard, the non-moving party

must do more than simply deny the allegations raised by the moving
party.

See Donaghey v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., 974 F.2d

646, 649 (5th Cir. 1992).

Rather, he must come forward with

competent evidence, such as affidavits or depositions, to buttress
his claims.

Id.

Hearsay evidence and unsworn documents do not

qualify as competent opposing evidence.

Martin v. John W. Stone

Oil Distrib., Inc., 819 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1987). Finally, in
evaluating the summary judgment motion, the Court must read the
facts

in

the

light

most

favorable

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

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to

the

non-moving

party.

I. Discussion
Settoon contends there is no genuine dispute that Cenac agreed
to pay 50% of Scott's total maintenance and cure.

Cenac counters

that it never agreed to pay 50% of the total maintenance and cure;
rather, it only agreed to pay 50% of Settoon's out-of-pocket
expenses.

The record evidence provides support for both parties'

positions: one email from Settoon's counsel to Cenac's reads "it is
my understanding that you will also recommend that your client pay
50 percent of the maintenance/cure expenses," but another reads "my
understanding is that your client will reimburse Settoon 50 percent
of its payments to the plaintiff."

Nothing of record reveals

whether the parties intended the reimbursement agreement to cover
benefits paid by the group policy health insurers.

This owes, at

least in part, to the parties' failure to reduce their agreement to
writing.

The Court is persuaded that material and disputed fact

issues remain regarding the scope of the reimbursement agreement.1
Accordingly, Settoon's motion for summary judgment is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, January 15, 2014
______________________________
MARTIN L. C. FELDMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

1

Why counsel need to resolve this tempest through the medium of
a full-blown trial is rather confounding, but summary relief is
certainly not warranted on this record.
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