Jones et al v. Gusman et al
Filing
873
ORDER AND REASONS denying 858 MOTION to Stay re 837 Order. Signed by Judge Lance M Africk on 7/16/2015.(Reference: 12-859)(blg)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LASHAWN JONES, ET AL.
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 12-859
MARLIN N. GUSMAN, ET AL.
SECTION I
ORDER AND REASONS
The Court has before it a motion1 and supplemental memorandum2 filed by the City of New
Orleans (“the City”) requesting a stay pending its appeal of the Court’s order and reasons3 denying
the City’s motion4 to invalidate or terminate the contract for medical and mental health care entered
into by the Orleans Parish Sheriff (“the Sheriff”) and Correct Care Solutions, Inc. (“CCS”). The
Sheriff opposes the motion.5 For the following reasons, the City’s motion for a stay pending appeal
is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
The factual and procedural history of this matter is set forth at greater length in the order and
reasons from which the City has appealed.6 For the purposes of this motion, a brief summary is
appropriate. The Sheriff and CCS executed a contract for the provision of medical and mental health
care to the inmates of Orleans Parish Prison (“OPP”).7 The City perceives the contract to be poorly
1
R. Doc. No. 858.
R. Doc. No. 866.
3
R. Doc. No. 837.
4
R. Doc. No. 791.
5
R. Doc. No. 868.
6
R. Doc. No. 837.
7
The Court had nothing to do with the Sheriff’s selection of CCS or the negotiation and
execution of the contract between CCS and the Sheriff. Furthermore, “the Court takes no
2
1
negotiated and too expensive. Consequently, the City filed a motion to invalidate or terminate the
CCS contract.
The “foundational premise” of the Court’s prior opinion was that “there must be
constitutionally adequate medical and mental health care at OPP.”8 A significant factor in the
Court’s analysis was the City’s total failure to explain how medical and mental health care would
continue at OPP if the CCS contract abruptly ended. Nonetheless, the Court held that the City may
enter into a new contract for health care at OPP, either with a new provider or through a renegotiated
contract with CCS.9 Implicit, if not explicit, in this Court’s order and reasons was that the Sheriff,
not the Court, would terminate the CCS contract if another medical and mental health care contract
was entered into between the City and another provider.
If the City enters into another healthcare contract, the Court once again admonishes the
parties to work together to assure a smooth transition. The onus will be on the Sheriff “to avoid
consequences associated with the existence of duplicative contracts for health care at OPP,”10 i.e.,
the Sheriff will terminate the CCS contract as the City will not be responsible for the payment of two
contracts.11
STANDARD OF LAW
“It has always been held that as part of its traditional equipment for the administration of
justice, a federal court can stay the enforcement of a judgment pending the outcome of an appeal.”
position with respect to whether the Sheriff should have entered into the CCS contract or the cost
of the contract.” R. Doc. No. 837, at 8-9.
8
R. Doc. No. 837, at 9.
9
R. Doc. No. 837, at 16.
10
R. Doc. No. 837, at 16-17.
11
It goes without saying that any contract for medical and mental health care entered into
by the City must comply with the Consent Judgment.
2
Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 421 (2009) (alterations and quotation marks omitted). “A stay is not
a matter of right, even if irreparable injury might otherwise result.” Id. at 433 (quotation omitted).
“It is instead an exercise of judicial discretion, and the propriety of its issue is dependent upon the
circumstances of the particular case.” Id. (quotation marks and alteration omitted). “The party
requesting a stay bears the burden of showing that the circumstances justify an exercise of that
discretion.” Id. at 433-34.
When deciding whether to grant a stay, the Court considers four factors: “(1) whether the
stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the
applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially
injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.” Id. at 434
(quotation marks omitted). “The first two factors . . . are the most critical.” Id.
ANALYSIS
The City’s motion for a stay pending appeal is a misguided duplicative attempt to have this
Court terminate the CCS contract. Practically speaking, the City does not merely want a stay of the
Court’s order and reasons; rather, it wants a stay of its duty to fund medical and mental health care
at OPP, which care is presently being provided through the only concrete plan before the Court: the
CCS contract. As the Sheriff notes,12 granting the City’s proposed “stay” and cutting off funding of
the CCS contract would moot the appeal, give the City the same relief it sought but failed to obtain
through the underlying motion, and interrupt the availability of health care at OPP.
Proceeding to the legal merits of the City’s motion, the Court finds that none of the relevant
four factors favor issuance of the City’s requested stay pending appeal. See Nken, 556 U.S. at 434.
12
R. Doc. No. 868, at 2.
3
First, the City has not established a “strong showing” of likely success on the merits of the
appeal. Id. For the reasons previously articulated, the Court remains unpersuaded that Louisiana
Revised Statute § 15:70313 limits the Sheriff’s authority to contract for health care at OPP when the
City has failed to do so.14
Second, although the City articulates a number of purported burdens due to the continued
existence of the CCS contract, it has not demonstrated that it will be irreparably injured absent the
requested stay. For example, the City worries about the “precedential effect” of the Court’s order
and reasons with respect to the City’s relationship with other City agencies.15 But the relationship
between the City and the Orleans Parish Sheriff’s Office is unique and the risk of other agencies
“procur[ing] services at exorbitant prices in the shadows of a closed procurement process”16 is at
13
Section 15:703 states that “the governing authority of each parish shall appoint annually
a physician who shall attend the prisoners who are confined in parish jails whenever they are
sick.” Id. § 15:703(A) (emphasis added). Alternatively, “[i]n lieu of appointing a physician, the
governing authority of any parish may enter into a contract with a health care provider, licensed
or regulated by the laws of this state, to provide requisite health care services, as required in this
Section.” Id. § 15:703(B) (emphasis added).
14
R. Doc. No. 837, at 12; see also R. Doc. No. 837, at 11-15. Because the Court does not
read § 15:703 as a limit on the Sheriff’s authority under these circumstances, the Court has not
“permit[ted] a government official to exceed his or her authority under State or local law” in
violation of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(B), as the City now argues
for the first time. R. Doc. No. 866, at 3-4.
Furthermore, as the Court stated in its order and reasons rejecting the City’s request that
this Court invalidate or terminate the CCS contract, “[t]he City, having failed to pursue its appeal
of the Consent Judgment, cannot plausibly claim to be surprised that the Sheriff would take
affirmative steps to comply with the Consent Judgment’s requirements that he ensure
constitutionally adequate medical and mental health care as well as the staffing required to
provide that care, including entering into a health care services contract.” R. Doc. No. 837, at 1011.
15
R. Doc. No. 866, at 4-5; see also R. Doc. No. 872, at 2 (“[T]he Court’s order establishes
a dangerous precedent that any City entity can now procure services without concern for the
budget requirements of the Home Rule Charter and the Louisiana Local Government Budget
Act.”).
16
R. Doc. No. 866, at 4.
4
most hypothetical.17
Third, granting the City’s requested stay would be injurious to the well-being of inmates at
OPP. To the extent that the City even addresses this factor, it merely asserts that “it will not allow
the jail to go without medical and mental health services.”18 Once again, the City’s vague assurance
that it “has been in contact with other vendors to discuss providing care on an interim basis at a more
cost-effective price” is well short of providing a concrete plan for continuity of medical and mental
health care at OPP.19
Fourth, with respect to the public interest, the City contends that “a stay will force the Sheriff
to work with the City towards creating the stable, long-term solutions envisioned by the Court” and
will “expedit[e] the implementation of the Consent Judgment.”20 Implementation of the Consent
Judgment is certainly in the public interest, but the City has not adequately explained how that
interest will be promoted by the immediate defunding of the only mechanism in place for providing
constitutionally required medical and mental health care to inmates at OPP.
CONCLUSION
The City has not carried its burden to show that any of the relevant factors weigh in favor
of granting its requested stay. Accordingly,
17
The City likewise fails to explain how its complaints about the cost of the CCS contract
and the practical difficulties of negotiating a new contract while one is already in place rise to
the level of irreparable harm. See R. Doc. No. 858-1, at 1-2; R. Doc. No. 866, at 1-2.
18
R. Doc. No. 866, at 5.
19
R. Doc. No. 866, at 2; see also R. Doc. No. 872, at 3.
20
R. Doc. No. 866, at 5.
5
IT IS ORDERED that the City’s motion for a stay pending appeal is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, July 16, 2015.
________________________________
LANCE M. AFRICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
6
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