Jones et al v. Gusman et al

Filing 909

ORDER AND REASONS denying 885 Motion for Temporary Restraining Order; deferring ruling on 885 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. ORDERED that the Court's courtroom deputy shall schedule a date for a hearing on the City's motion for a preliminary injunction. Signed by Judge Lance M Africk on 9/28/2015. (Reference: 12-859)(blg)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

LASHAWN JONES, ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

No. 12-859

MARLIN GUSMAN, ET AL.

SECTION I

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a motion 1 filed by third party defendant, the City of New Orleans
(“City”), seeking a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and preliminary injunction “prohibiting
the Sheriff of Orleans Parish from transferring pretrial detainees to jails in other parishes while
housing state inmates in the recently completed Orleans Parish Prison.” 2 Orleans Parish Sheriff
(“Sheriff”) Marlin Gusman opposes the City’s motion. 3 The plaintiff class and the United States
jointly filed a response 4 supporting the City’s motion, and the “Orleans Public Defenders” also
filed a motion for leave to file a brief 5 as amicus curiae in support of the City, which motion the
Court denied. 6 For the following reasons, the City’s motion for a TRO is DENIED, and
consideration of the City’s request for a preliminary injunction is DEFERRED until an
evidentiary hearing can be held at which the parties are represented.
BACKGROUND
Generally, there are two broad categories of prisoners currently incarcerated in the
Orleans Parish prison system: pretrial inmates and Louisiana Department of Corrections inmates

1

R. Doc. No. 885.
R. Doc. No. 885, at 1.
3
R. Doc. No. 895.
4
R. Doc. No. 893.
5
R. Doc. No. 891-3.
6
R. Doc. No. 901.
2

1

(“DOC inmates”). 7 Pretrial inmates are prisoners awaiting trial who face state criminal and/or
Orleans Parish municipal charges not yet adjudicated. DOC inmates are convicted prisoners
sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment in the custody of the Louisiana Department of
Corrections (“DOC”). The City claims that it is not financially responsible for many of the DOC
inmates incarcerated in Orleans Parish. 8

The City further asserts that although the DOC

reimburses the Sheriff for each DOC inmate incarcerated in Orleans Parish, the reimbursements
are insufficient because the Sheriff only receives “a fraction of the cost [it requires] to house
DOC Inmates.” 9
On September 10, 2015, the Sheriff informed the City that he had reached an agreement
with the Louisiana Sheriff’s Association to secure “out of parish inmate housing at a rate of $30
per inmate per day for the pretrial inmates which will be housed out of parish.” 10 According to
plaintiffs, the Sheriff has already transferred roughly 200 pretrial inmates to the East Carroll
Detention Center and the Franklin Parish Detention Center, both of which are located
approximately three to four hours from New Orleans. 11 The Sheriff anticipates that about 280–
300 inmates will be initially incarcerated outside Orleans Parish. 12
On September 11, 2015, the City filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction requesting that the “Sheriff of Orleans Parish [be prohibited] from
7

Although the Court has identified two broad categories of inmates, the Court is also aware that
some DOC inmates have parole holds and some face additional open criminal charges filed in
Orleans Parish which have not yet been resolved.
8
R. Doc. No. 889, at 3. It is not clear from the City’s briefing which subcategories of DOC
inmates the City believes should not be incarcerated in Orleans Parish, although the City has
elsewhere indicated to the Court its view that DOC inmates incarcerated pursuant to the Sheriff’s
re-entry program should be moved to DOC facilities. The Sheriff does not address this issue in
his opposition brief, however, and the Court declines to decide it without the benefit of further
briefing by the parties and further development of the record.
9
R. Doc. No. 885-1, at 2.
10
R. Doc. No. 885-4.
11
R. Doc. No. 893, at 9–10.
12
R. Doc. No. 885-4.

2

transferring pretrial detainees to jails in other parishes while housing state inmates [i.e., DOC
inmates] in the recently completed [Phase II] Orleans Parish Prison.” 13
LAW AND ANALYSIS
I.

STANDARD OF LAW
In Rudney v. International Offshore Services, LLC, this Court addressed the legal

standard to be applied when evaluating a request for a TRO and a preliminary injunction:
In a situation where notice and an opportunity to present evidence have occurred,
a court follows the same procedure for a TRO as it would for a preliminary
injunction. Lewis v. S.S. Baune, 534 F.2d 1115, 1121 (5th Cir. 1976); Kan. Hosp.
Ass'n v. Whiteman, 835 F.Supp. 1548, 1551 (D. Kan. 1993) (citing 11 Charles A.
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2951 (1973)). In
order to obtain a preliminary injunction, the movant must show: (1) there is a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) there is a substantial threat of
irreparable injury, (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs the injury to
the nonmovant, and (4) that granting the injunction will not disserve the public
interest. PCI Transp., Inc. v. Fort Worth & W. R.R., 418 F.3d 535, 545 (5th Cir.
2005); Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers
Local No. 70, 415 U .S. 423, 441 (1974) (“[T]he party seeking the injunction…
bear[s] the burden of demonstrating the various factors justifying preliminary
injunctive relief….”).
A “preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy which should not be granted
unless the party seeking it has ‘clearly carried the burden of persuasion’ on all
four requirements.” Lake Charles Diesel, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 328 F.3d
192, 196 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Canal Auth. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 572
(5th Cir. 1974)). Courts have wide discretion with respect to whether to grant
preliminary injunctions. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Dixon, 835 F.2d 554, 558
(5th Cir. 1987).

No. 07-3908, 2007 WL 2900230, at *2 (E.D. La. Oct. 1, 2007) (Africk, J.).
Furthermore, “[e]ven if all persuasion elements are satisfied, an injunction remains ‘a
matter of equitable discretion; it does not follow from [a substantial] success on the merits as a
matter of course.’” Ensco Offshore Co. v. Salazar, 781 F. Supp. 2d 332, 335 (E.D. La. 2011)
(quoting Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 32 (2008)). Indeed, “[t]he decision to
13

R. Doc. No. 885, at 1.

3

grant a preliminary injunction is to be treated as the exception rather than the rule.”
Buckenburger v. Strain, No. 06-5670, 2006 WL 4503353, at *7 (E.D. La. Oct. 20, 2006) (Africk,
J.) (quoting Cherokee Pump & Equip. Inc. v. Aurora Pump, 38 F.3d 246, 249 (5th Cir. 1994)).
II.

ANALYSIS
The City’s first memorandum in support of its motion is equivocal as to the actual legal

basis upon which the City seeks a TRO. Most of the City’s brief simply appears aimed at
convincing the Court that the Sheriff’s movement of the pretrial inmates is an ill-advised idea.
The Court expresses no view with respect to the wisdom of the Sheriff’s plan to move pretrial
inmates instead of DOC inmates, but notes that an ill-advised idea is not the same as a prohibited
one. In order to carry its burden and justify a TRO, the City must do more than advance policy
arguments and criticize the Sheriff’s management decisions. 14
In its supplemental memorandum in support of its motion, the City argues that a TRO is
warranted because the Sheriff, by transferring pretrial inmates instead of DOC inmates, is
“unlawfully usurp[ing] the City’s authority to regulate expenses for confinement of Pretrial
Inmates under La. Rev. Stat. § 15:304.” 15 The City also asserts that “by paying a rate that

14

To the extent the City argues that “there is no guarantee that the relocated inmates will be
provided constitutionally adequate accommodations or accommodations that meet the terms of
the Consent Decree,” R. Doc. No. 885-1, at 4, the Court observes that this is a matter of
speculation and the Court does not address it at this stage of the proceedings.
15
R. Doc. No. 889, at 1. La. Rev. Stat. § 15:304 provides in its entirety:
All expenses incurred in the different parishes of the state or in the city of New
Orleans by the arrest, confinement, and prosecution of persons accused or
convicted of crimes, their removal to prison, the pay of witnesses specifically
provided for by law, jurors and all prosecutorial expenses whatever attending
criminal proceedings shall be paid by the respective parishes in which the offense
charged may have been committed or by the city of New Orleans, as the case may
be. The expenses shall be paid by the parish treasurer or by the city of New
Orleans after an account of the expenses shall be duly certified to be correct by
the presiding judge and the clerk of court. The fees, salaries, and expenses to be
paid shall be fixed and regulated by the parish or city authority unless otherwise

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exceeds what the [DOC] pays local sheriffs to house its inmates . . . , the Sheriff has failed to
mitigate his damages.” 16
In its reply memorandum to the Sheriff’s opposition, the City further states, “[i]n
relocating inmates to alleviate or prevent overcrowding . . . the Sheriff did not comply with the
explicit notice and furlough requirements of La. Rev. Stat. § 15:764.” 17 The City adds that the

provided by law; however, those persons serving as jurors in the trial of criminal
cases in the city of New Orleans shall be entitled to compensation of sixteen
dollars for each and every day or part of a day on which they serve as jurors in
any criminal case to be paid by the city of New Orleans; provided further that this
shall not become effective until the council of the city of New Orleans will have
appropriated sufficient funds for this purpose. Notwithstanding the provisions of
this Section, the city of New Orleans shall only pay the above expenses after the
special account created pursuant to R.S. 15:571.11(D), and to the extent
authorized thereby, shall have been depleted. Nothing in this Section shall be
construed to make the parishes or the city of New Orleans responsible for the
expenses associated with the costs, expert fees, or attorney fees of a defendant in a
criminal proceeding.
16
17

R. Doc. No. 889, at 1.
R. Doc. No. 902-1, at 1. La. Rev. Stat. § 15:764 provides in its entirety:
A. If the prisoner population of a parish jail exceeds the rated design capacity of
the parish jail for seven consecutive days, the sheriff of that parish shall certify
that fact in writing, by first class mail or personal delivery, to each district,
municipal and traffic court judge in the parish, to the district attorney and the
chief of police of any municipality within the parish, and to the senior official of
the parish governing authority. If this condition exists for seven consecutive days
after notification of said officials, the sheriff shall declare a parish jail
overcrowding state of emergency and shall notify such officials.
B. After the declaration of emergency is made in accordance with Subsection A of
this Section, the sheriff may reduce overcrowding in the parish jail by any or all
of the following means:
(1) The substitution of appearance tickets or summons for booking at the parish
jail and the release or furlough of pre-trial arrestees, based on factors included in
Code of Criminal Procedure Article 317 and on any other factors related to public
safety or the likelihood of court appearance, however only persons charged with
violations of municipal ordinances which are nonviolent offenses shall be eligible
for such release.

5

Sheriff’s ongoing relocation of pretrial inmates violates “constitutional requirements in the Fifth,
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.” 18
When analyzing the City’s motion, it is important to clarify the precise form of relief the
City is requesting and the specific legal bases the City cites for that request. The City requests
that this Court issue a TRO “prohibiting the Sheriff of Orleans Parish from transferring pretrial
detainees to jails in other parishes while housing [DOC inmates] in the recently completed
Orleans Parish Prison.” The City claims that by transferring pretrial inmates and not DOC
inmates, the Sheriff is violating (1) the terms of the Consent Judgment; 19 (2) La. Rev. Stat. §
15:304; (3) a duty the Sheriff owes the City to mitigate damages 20 under the Consent Judgment;
(4) La. Rev. Stat. § 15:764; and (5) “constitutional requirements.” 21

(2) The furlough of individuals who have been convicted under municipal
ordinance for nonviolent offenses who are within one year of release.
18

R. Doc. No. 902-1, at 1.
The Court entered a Consent Judgment in this case on June 6, 2013. R. Doc. No. 466.
20
It seems odd to the Court that the City identifies such costs as “damages” considering the fact
that the City is already under a legal obligation to pay expenses connected with the operation of
the Orleans Parish prison system. See La. R.S. § 15:304.
21
The Court also notes that the Sheriff makes a one-sentence argument, without legal citation,
that the City’s request for injunctive relief is moot “because the inmates have already been
relocated.” R. Doc. No. 894, at 2. The City does not address this argument. It is true that “a
request for injunctive relief generally becomes moot upon the happening of the event sought to
be enjoined.” Harris v. City of Houston, 151 F.3d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 1998). But that rule comes
from an opinion in which the Fifth Circuit further clarified that mootness exists when “no order
of the court can affect the rights of the parties with regard to the requested relief.” Id. The rule
applies in situations where, for example, a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief in the form of
reinstatement to her position as secretary for a judge, but the judge is removed from office before
the court renders a decision, see Danos v. Jones, 652 F.3d 577, 583 (5th Cir. 2011), or where a
prisoner appeals his unsuccessful challenge of a prison policy but that policy is abandoned while
the appeal is pending, see DeMoss v. Crain, 636 F.3d 145, 151 (5th Cir. 2011). Those cases are
clearly distinguishable from this one, where a court order directing the Sheriff to cease
transferring pretrial detainees and to remove DOC inmates from Orleans Parish detention
facilities would constitute meaningful relief to the City. More importantly, however, the Court
will not decide this legal issue without legal authority being fully briefed and argued by the
parties.
19

6

A. Substantial Likelihood of Success on the Merits
Although a party must show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits to justify a
preliminary injunction, a party “is not required to prove entitlement to summary judgment.”
Janvey v. Alguire, 647 F.3d 585, 595–96 (5th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations and citations
omitted). “To assess the likelihood of success on the merits, [courts] look to standards provided
by the substantive law.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). The “absence of
likelihood of success on the merits is sufficient to make . . . a preliminary injunction improvident
as a matter of law.” Texas Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570,
574 (5th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). The substantive standards of law cited by the City in
support of its motion do not indicate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.
First, the City has not demonstrated that the Sheriff’s actions are substantially likely to
violate the terms of the Consent Judgment. Allegations that the Sheriff’s plan leads to additional
expenses and “needlessly complicates the administration of justice for pretrial inmates” 22 relate
to the wisdom of the Sheriff’s plan, not its legality.

Furthermore, while the Court has

encouraged the City and the Sheriff to work together toward resolving deficiencies highlighted
by the Consent Judgment,—a recommendation that has for the most part been disregarded,
which further illustrates a continued failure to act in the public’s interest—the City has no legal
right pursuant to the terms of the Consent Judgment to be included in contract negotiations. In
short, the City’s argument that the Sheriff is taking an ill-advised route to satisfying the problems
addressed in the Consent Judgment does not support the claim that the Sheriff is violating the
Consent Judgment itself.

22

R. Doc. No. 885, at 1.

7

Second, the City has not established a substantial likelihood of success on the merits with
respect to its claim that the Sheriff’s decision regarding which prisoners to relocate “unlawfully
usurps the City’s authority to regulate expenses for confinement of pretrial inmates under La.
Rev. Stat. § 15:304.” 23 Section 15:304 provides in relevant part that “[a]ll expenses incurred . . .
in the City of New Orleans . . . by the arrest, confinement, and prosecution of persons accused or
convicted of crimes, their removal to prison, [and other related expenses] shall be paid . . . by the
City of New Orleans.” La. R.S. § 15:304. The statute further states that “[t]he fees, salaries, and
expenses to be paid shall be fixed and regulated by the parish or city authority unless otherwise
provided by law[.]” Id. The City argues that this language demonstrates that the City has the
“exclusive authority to fix and regulate those expenses” and that the Sheriff’s “unilateral and
unpublished contracts with third parties for expenses incurred in the confinement of individuals
accused of crimes is incompatible” with the City’s authority pursuant to § 15:304. 24
The cases addressing § 15:304 and the other relevant statutes do not support the City’s
position. As a recent decision from this district explains,
In Louisiana, sheriffs are the final policy makers with respect to the
management of jails. Under Louisiana law, the authority of the Orleans Parish
Criminal Sheriff is derived from the state Constitution, not from the City of New
Orleans. The sheriff’s office, not the City, controls the inmates of the jail, the
employees of the jail, and the daily management and operation of the jail.
Cousin v. St. Tammany Parish Jail, No. 14-1514, 2015 WL 5017113, at *3 (E.D. La. Aug. 19,
2015) (Lemelle, J.). While the law may not be exactly clear as to where the Sheriff’s authority to
manage the jail meets the City’s authority to limit expenses, case law supports the general
proposition that “the City’s financial obligations do not constitute authority to control how the
sheriff fulfills his duties.” Broussard v. Foti, No. 00-2318, 2001 WL 258055, at *2 (E.D. La.
23
24

R. Doc. No. 889, at 1.
R. Doc. No. 889, at 2–3.

8

Mar. 14, 2001) (Vance, J.). Indeed, Broussard held that the City’s lack of regulatory authority
over the parish prison precluded liability on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. Id.
Although the Sheriff’s authority to spend the City’s money on the prison must surely
have some limit, the case law indicates that the City faces an uphill battle with respect to its
argument that the Sheriff does not have the authority to transfer inmates without City approval.
Whether the City will ultimately be financially responsible for the transferred inmates, no matter
to whom their custody is assigned, is a separate issue to be resolved in connection with the third
party claim.
Third, the City has not demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success as to its claim
that the Sheriff owes the City a duty to mitigate his damages and that he has violated that duty.
Even if such a duty does exist, the City has not alleged factual information sufficient to permit
this Court to conclude that there is a substantial likelihood the duty has been breached.
Fourth, the City has not shown that it is substantially likely to succeed on its assertion
that the Sheriff’s actions violate “the explicit notice and furlough requirements of La. Rev. Stat.
§ 15:764.” 25 The title of that statutory section makes clear that it applies in cases of “Parish jail
overcrowding,” 26 and it is unclear whether “jail overcrowding” within the meaning of the statute
has occurred in this case. The Sheriff claims that a Louisiana Attorney General’s opinion
supports his argument that the City is obligated to pay for inmates transferred to other parishes
even if the sheriff does not follow the procedures outlined in § 15:764. 27 However, given the
lack of case law supporting the applicability of § 15:764, unresolved issues involving the
placement of inmates, questions relating to the prisoner population that the Temporary Detention
25

R. Doc. No. 902-1, at 1.
R. Doc. No. 902-1, at 1.
27
R. Doc. No. 903-3.
26

9

Center and Phase II can accommodate, and the Sheriff’s contentions in opposition, the Court
cannot at this stage conclude that the City has demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success
on this claim. The Court declines to determine the applicability of § 15:764 to the circumstances
of this case without the benefit of further briefing and an evidentiary hearing.
Fifth, to the extent that the City avers in its reply memorandum that the Sheriff should be
enjoined because the transfer violates the “constitutional requirements in the Fifth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendments,” the Court notes that the City’s assertion relies on arguments relating
to inconveniences associated with such a transfer and not a denial of access to the courts and
representation by counsel. Many of such issues may be fact-intensive as to a particular inmate or
group of inmates. Constitutional issues raised by the City 28—or by plaintiffs in their brief in
support of the City—even if within the scope of this litigation, shall be left for another day. 29
B. Substantial Threat of Irreparable Injury
As a general rule “an injury is irreparable only if it cannot be undone through monetary
remedies.” Enter. Int'l Inc. v. Corporacion Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana, 762 F.2d 464, 472–73
(5th Cir. 1985). However, the “fact that economic damages may be available does not always
mean that a remedy at law is ‘adequate.’” Janvey v. Alguire, 647 F.3d at 600. “Proving that a
claim for monetary damages would be difficult to collect, such as in the case of insolvency or

28

The Court notes that there is an unresolved issue with respect to whether the City, a third party
defendant as to the Sheriff’s funding claim and the movant herein, who is not a party to the
Consent Judgment, see R. Doc. No. 466, possesses standing to raise constitutional claims on
behalf of plaintiffs or other prisoners. See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492–93
(2009) (a party must have standing to seek injunctive relief).
29
The Court also observes that actions such as those taken by the Sheriff will always take some
measure of time before issues such as those raised by plaintiffs can be, if necessary, addressed
and rectified.

10

potential distribution of assets, evinces circumstances that would support issuing an injunction.”
Rudney, 2007 WL 2900230, at *4 (Africk, J.) (citations omitted).
The Sheriff asserts that the City cannot show irreparable injury because it only claims
monetary harm. 30 This assertion is questionable because it is doubtful that the Sheriff, funded as
his office is by the City, could satisfy a judgment with other than City funds. Regardless, the
issue is moot until there has been a showing that the Sheriff’s prisoner arrangements are actually
causing the City monetary harm. The Court, therefore, does not decide whether the City has
shown a substantial threat of irreparable injury, as there is insufficient evidence in the briefing
and record at this stage to demonstrate that the Sheriff’s current actions are fiscally
irresponsible. 31
C. Threatened Injury to the Movant Outweighs the Threatened Injury to the
Nonmovant
“This part of the injunction test is essentially a balancing of the equities between the
opposing parties.” Sargent v. United States, No. 08-3887, 2008 WL 3154761, at *8 (E.D. La.
Aug. 5, 2008) (Barbier, J.) (citing DSC Commc'ns Corp. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 81 F.3d 597, 600
(5th Cir. 1996)). When applying this factor, courts balance the threatened injury only to the
movant and nonmovant. The movant and nonmovant are the City and the Sheriff, respectively.
It follows that for purposes of reviewing this factor, the Court does not consider any threatened
injury to prisoners. The Court finds that this factor is neutral at this stage of the proceedings, as
the Court lacks the factual information necessary to evaluate the threatened injuries to the City
and the Sheriff.

30

R. Doc. No. 895, at 5.
For example, the Court will need to consider evidence regarding the costs of incarcerating
inmates in Orleans Parish, the amount of reimbursements to the Orleans Parish Sheriff’s office
from the DOC, transport and staffing costs associated with transferring prisoners, etc.
31

11

D. Granting the Injunction will not Disserve the Public Interest
As another court in this district has observed,
Both the United States Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit have stressed the
importance of this factor in the injunction analysis. The Supreme Court has stated
that “courts of equity should pay particular regard for the public consequences in
employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction.” Weinberger v. RomeroBarcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (citing R.R. Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S.
496, 500 (1941)). In Mississippi Power, the Fifth Circuit emphasized the
increasing importance of weighing the public interest, beyond the interests of the
named litigants, when considering an injunction. 760 F.2d at 618.

Sargent, 2008 WL 3154761, at *8 (Barbier, J.).
There are numerous issues of public interest related to the transfer to other parishes of
inmates with matters pending before Orleans Parish courts, irrespective of whether they are
pretrial inmates or DOC inmates. Plaintiffs express concern that transferring pretrial inmates
could result in a failure to appear at court settings and create logistical difficulties for counsel’s
representation. 32 However, as previously stated, the City may lack standing to argue that the
transfer of pretrial inmates has constitutional ramifications and, regardless, such contentions are
fact-intensive. 33 To the extent the City asserts that the unwarranted transfer of pretrial inmates
will result in undue expense to taxpayers, the Court declines to decide this issue at this stage of
the proceedings considering the Court’s earlier conclusion that it currently lacks the evidence
required to make such a finding.
CONCLUSION
The list of critical issues upon which the parties in this case refuse to reach a consensus
goes on and on. Orleans Parish Prison continues to be a place where the level of violence is
unacceptable. The housing of acutely mentally ill inmates who will be evicted from the Elayn

32
33

R. Doc. No. 893, at 3; R. Doc. No. 891-3, at 3.
Supra note 28.

12

Hunt Correctional Center in the summer of 2017 remains unresolved. The parties have not
agreed on a long-term plan regarding the transportation of inmates safely to and from the
“Docks.” There is presently no consensus with respect to whether to build “Phase III,” whether
to renovate the fourth floor of Phase II, and how to pay for either plan. No agreement exists with
respect to the incarceration of DOC inmates in Orleans Parish. The dispute over the hiring and
pay of prison deputies continues. In short, many of the most critical issues the Orleans Parish
detention facilities pose for our community linger more than three years from the
commencement of this litigation.
The parties once again turn to this Court instead of working with one another to resolve
their disagreement. The Court has found the lack of meaningful and constructive communication
between our elected officials to be baffling. The Court finds that the City has not “clearly carried
the burden of persuasion” with respect to the elements necessary for a court to issue a TRO.
Accordingly, even if the City may ultimately prevail after adjudication on the merits, a TRO is
not warranted at this time.
IT IS ORDERED that the motion for a temporary restraining order is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court’s courtroom deputy shall schedule a date
for a hearing on the City’s motion for a preliminary injunction.

New Orleans, Louisiana, September 28, 2015.

___________________________________
LANCE M. AFRICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

13