Thomas et al v. New Orleans City et al
Filing
40
ORDER AND REASONS that defendants' motions to dismiss are GRANTED & the plaintiffs claims are hereby dismissed. With the exception of the plaintiffs state law claims & the plaintiffs claims against the unserved school security officers, which are dismissed without prejudice, the plaintiffs claims are dismissed with prejudice. Signed by Judge Martin L.C. Feldman on 8/2/2012.(caa, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
CHANELL THOMAS, individually
and on behalf of minor son, D.T.
CIVIL ACTION
v.
NO. 12-896
CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, ET AL.
SECTION "F"
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are two motions: (1) a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)
filed
by
the
City
of
New
Orleans,
the
New
Orleans
Police
Department, Superintendent Ronal Serpas, and NOPD Officers Davis
and Boyd; and (2) motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) filed by the Louisiana
Recovery School District, Patrick Dobard, in his official capacity
as Superintendent of RSD, Kelly Batiste, individually and in her
official capacity as the Principal of Fannie C. Williams Charter
School, and Tarynesa Williams, individually and in her official
capacity as the Vice Principal of Fannie C. Williams Charter
School.
For the reasons that follow, the motions are GRANTED.
Background
This civil rights litigation concerns a mother’s challenge to
the allegedly excessive corporal punishment of her seven year old
son, a special education student, by school administrators and
school security and city police officers; in particular, the boy
and
his
mother
charge
that,
in
1
response
to
an
unspecified
behavioral issue, a school principal and vice principal tried to
lock the boy in a closet and, when he ran away, he was struck with
a fly swatter, held down on the ground and, ultimately, handcuffed
by responding police officers who then followed the boy and his
aunt to the hospital so that he could undergo a psychological
evaluation.
Taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the facts
are as follows:
In 2011 D.T. was a third-grade special education
student at Fannie C. Williams Charter School, located in New
Orleans.
On April 7, 2011, the school’s principal, Kelly S.
Batiste, and vice principal, Tarynesa Williams, attempted to lock
D.T. in a closet in response to “an alleged behavioral issue.”1
Terrified, D.T. tried to run from Batiste and Williams; in doing
so, he knocked papers off of Batiste’s desk.
Williams then struck
D.T. with a fly swatter and shoved him down.
Batiste and Williams
then instructed two school security officers2 to hold D.T. down.3
Meanwhile, the police were called.
When New Orleans Police
Department Officers Davis and another unidentified officer arrived
1
This incident
Batiste’s office.
apparently
took
place
in
Principal
2
In the complaint, the school security officers are
identified only as Officer Montgomery and Officer Stewart;
apparently neither has been served with process or appeared in this
litigation.
3
Each of these individuals knew or should have known that
D.T. was easily frightened and did not like to be touched.
2
at the school, they allegedly shoved down D.T. and held him with
excessive force until D.T.’s hands were handcuffed behind his back
for an unknown length of time.4
When D.T.’s mother, Chanell
Thomas, arrived she was not allowed in the room with D.T. to
comfort him.
When D.T.’s aunt, Tamila Pierce, arrived she was
told to drive D.T. to Children’s Hospital while Officer Brian Boyd
followed behind in his car.
Once at the hospital, Pierce and D.T.
were told to relocate to Tulane Medical Center, where D.T. was
evaluated for body aches and a psychological evaluation.
On April 5, 2012 Chanell Thomas, individually and on behalf of
her minor son, D.T., sued the City of New Orleans; Mayor Mitch
Landrieu; the New Orleans Police Department; Superintendent Ronal
Serpas; NOPD Officers Davis, Boyd, and John Doe; the Louisiana
Recovery School District; Superintendent Patrick Dobard; Principal
of Fannie C. Williams Charter School, Kelly S. Batiste; and
Assistant Principal Tarynesa Williams; as well as the two school
security officers, Montgomery and Stewart.
Although it is not
entirely clear from the complaint, it appears that as to the
individual state defendants, Dobard is sued only in his official
capacity, Batiste is sued in her official and individual capacity,
4
The plaintiffs do not estimate the amount of time that
elapsed or whether D.T. was held down by school security until the
time the police officers arrived and, if so, how he was shoved down
again by police officers.
3
and Williams is sued in her official and individual capacity.5
With regard to the individual City defendants, it appears they are
all sued in their official capacity and that NOPD Officers Davis,
John Doe, and Boyd are sued in their individual capacities.6
The
plaintiffs assert that their lawsuit arises under the Fourth,
Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution;
as well as arising under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988; under the
Louisiana governmental tort liability statutes; and under Louisiana
civil law for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional
distress, loss of consortium, negligence, negligent supervision,
gross negligence, assault, false imprisonment, false arrest, and
civil conspiracy.
In sum, the plaintiffs assert four counts.
In Count 1, the
plaintiffs assert that Batiste and Williams used excessive force
against D.T., and unreasonably arrested and seized him, when they
5
The plaintiffs suggest that they “sue[] each and all
Defendants in both their individual and official capacities.” But
the Court must look to the substantive allegations, and not to the
plaintiffs’ conclusory statement, to make this determination.
6
The Court notes that plaintiffs only reference Mayor
Landrieu in the case caption; he is not listed as a party in the
complaint nor are any claims asserted against him except to the
extent the complaint’s introduction suggests “Action is also
brought against the City of New Orleans (Mayor Mitch Landrieu) and
the New Orleans Police Department (Superintendent Ronal Serpas) for
their failure to properly train and supervise [Officer Davis and
John Doe] in the proper use of force and techniques used to secure
a minor child with special needs....” Likewise, Officer Davis is
named in the caption of the complaint, but he is not listed as a
party; unlike Mayor Landrieu, however, Officer Davis is mentioned
in Counts 3 and 4.
4
attempted to lock him in a closet and when they held him down and
restrained him.7
assaulted,
According to the plaintiffs, D.T. was violently
battered,
tortured
and
suffered
humiliation
and
degradation due to outrageous treatment, and suffered intentional
infliction of emotional distress due to the punishment and torture
by Batiste and Williams with the fly swatter.
Count 2 focuses on Dobard and the RSD; the plaintiffs assert
that Dobard and the RSD “acting under color of law and pursuant to
official policy or custom had knowledge, or...should have had
knowledge [and power to prevent] or aid in preventing” the force
used against D.T. but “with deliberate indifference and callous
disregard of [D.T.’s] rights failed or refused to do so.”8
Count 3 focuses on NOPD Officers Davis and John Doe; the
plaintiffs assert that D.T. was met with excessive force when they
“handcuffed
an
already
terrified,
unarmed,
defenseless
child
weighing in at less than 60 pounds, who did not resist arrest nor
could resist arrest in restraints, was never violent, nor a threat
to the defendants.”
The plaintiffs also assert that Officer Boyd
7
At the end of Count 1 plaintiffs allege that Batiste,
Williams, and Officer Montgomery and Officer Doe, were acting under
color of state law under the direction and control of
Superintendent Patrick Dobard and for the Recovery School District.
8
The plaintiffs also suggest in the complaint’s
introduction that the Louisiana Recovery School District and
Superintendent Patrick Dobard failed to properly train and
supervise Batiste, Williams, Montgomery, and Stewart in the proper
de-escalation procedures prescribed by state or federal law for
dealing with a child that has special needs.
5
“deprived [D.T.] of his liberty without due process...and deprived
him of equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the
U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. §
1983.”
Finally, in Count 4, the plaintiffs focus on NOPD Officer
Boyd,
Ronal
Serpas,
and
the
Officers Davis and John Doe.
Brian
Boyd
was
Superintendent
acting
Ronal
NOPD
also
mentioning
The plaintiffs assert that Officer
under
Serpas
generally,
the
and
direction
for
the
New
and
control
Orleans
of
Police
Department and that
[a]cting under color of law and pursuant to official
policy or custom, Ronal Serpas and the New Orleans Police
Department knowingly, recklessly, or with deliberate
indifference to [D.T.’s] rights, failed to instruct,
supervise, control and discipline on a continuing basis
Officers Davis and John Doe in their duties to refrain
from: (a) unlawfully and maliciously harassing a citizen
who was acting in accordance with his constitutional and
statutory rights, privileges, and immunities; (b)
unlawfully and maliciously arresting a citizen and
otherwise using unreasonable excessive force by placing
a seven year old defenseless child in handcuffs which is
a violation of [D.T.’s] his civil rights; (c)conspiring
to violate the rights, privileges and immunities
guaranteed to [D.T.] by the Constitution and laws of the
United States and Louisiana; and (d) otherwise depriving
D.T. of his constitutional and statutory rights,
privileges, and immunities under [federal and state law].
The plaintiffs also assert that Serpas, individually and for the
New Orleans Police Department, should have exercised their duties
to train and supervise, which would have prevented the violations
of
D.T.’s
rights.
The
plaintiffs
6
also
assert
that
Serpas,
individually and as the superintendent for NOPD, under color of
law, “approved or ratified the unlawful, deliberate, malicious,
reckless, and wanton conduct of the Defendant police officer.”
The plaintiffs seek damages including damages for battery and
torture; damages for infliction of mental and emotional distress
due to outrageous conduct of all adult defendants; damages for
assault; loss of consortium; bystander “Lejuene” damages; false
imprisonment/arrest; past, present and future mental anguish; past,
present and future pain and suffering; past, present and future
medical expenses; punitive damages under § 1983 for torture and
injury done with malice; and attorney’s fees and court costs.
The defendants now seek dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.
I.
A.
Motions filed under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure allow a party to challenge the Court’s subject
matter jurisdiction.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1).
Patrick Dobard, sued
in his official capacity, and Batiste and Williams, to the extent
that they are sued in their official capacities, invoke the
doctrine of sovereign immunity.
The burden of proof for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is
on the party asserting jurisdiction. Ramming v. United States, 281
F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001).
The Court may find a plausible set
7
of facts to support subject matter jurisdiction by considering any
of the following: “(1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint
supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3)
the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's
resolution of disputed facts.” Barrera-Montenegro v. United States,
74 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1996).
B.
All defendants seek dismissal for failure to state a claim
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
The standard of
review applicable to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) is
similar to that applicable to motions to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6). See Williams v. Wynne, 533 F.3d 360, 364-65 n.2 (5th Cir.
2008)(observing that the Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) standards
are similar, but noting that applying the Rule 12(b)(1) standard
permits the Court to consider a broader range of materials in
resolving the motion).
Rule 12(b)(6) allows a party to move for dismissal of a
complaint when the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. Such a motion “‘is viewed with disfavor and
is rarely granted.’”
See Lowrey v. Tex. A & M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d
242, 247 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales,
Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir.
1982)).
“‘To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
8
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d
600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
1937, 1949 (2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“A claim
has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 129
S. Ct. at 1940.
“Factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in
the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).”
Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quotation marks,
citations, and footnote omitted).
The
United
States
Supreme
Court
suggests
a
“two-pronged
approach” to determine whether a complaint states a plausible claim
for relief.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
First, the Court must
identify pleadings that are conclusory and thus not entitled to the
assumption of truth.
supported
by
factual
Id.
A corollary: legal conclusions “must be
allegations.”
Id.
Second,
for
those
pleadings that are more than merely conclusory, the Court assumes
the
veracity
of
those
well-pleaded
factual
allegations
and
determines “whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to
relief.”
Id.
This facial plausibility standard is met when the plaintiffs
pleads facts that allow the Court to “draw the reasonable inference
9
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. at
1949. Claims that are merely conceivable will not survive a motion
to dismiss; claims must be plausible.
Twombley, 550 U.S. at 570;
see also Iqbal, 129 S. Ct at 1949 (“The plausibility standard is
not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully”).
“Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
defendant’s
liability,
it
stops
short
of
the
line
between
possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.”
Iqbal 129
S.
the
Ct.
at
1949
(internal
quotations
omitted).
In
end,
evaluating a motion to dismiss is a “context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense.”
Id. at 1950.
In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court may consider
documents that are essentially “part of the pleadings” -- that is,
any documents attached to or incorporated in the plaintiffs’
complaint that are central to the plaintiffs’ claim for relief.
Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d 285, 288 (5th
Cir. 2004) (citing Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d
496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2000)).
Also, the Court is permitted to
consider matters of public record and other matters subject to
judicial notice without converting the motion into one for summary
judgment.
See United States ex rel. Willard v. Humana Health Plan
of Texas Inc., 336 F.3d 375, 379 (5th Cir. 2003).
10
The plaintiffs here do not attach or refer to matters outside
of their complaint, but accompanying their opposition papers they
submit certain evidence that purports to be a Behavior Intervention
Plan for D.T. and a School Security Officers Manual. Even if these
documents were central to the plaintiffs’ claims and referred to or
incorporated into the complaint, the Court would disregard them as
immaterial.9
The Behavior Intervention Plan and School Security
Officers Manual both post-date the incident that gives rise to the
complaint, and the Manual also post-dates the filing date of the
complaint.10
II.
The State defendants -- RSD, Dobard, Batiste, and Williams --
9
The State defendants request that the Court strike the
plaintiffs’ exhibits as immaterial pursuant to Rule 12(f). Rule
12(f) provides that the Court “may strike from a pleading an
insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or
scandalous matter....”
The Court finds that striking the
immaterial exhibits is unnecessary; it is sufficient that the
materials are disregarded. It is interesting to note, however, that
in addition to outlining the recommended intervention by teachers
(including that he does not like to be touched), the Behavior
Intervention Plan also provides more information than the
complaint’s allegations regarding D.T.’s behavior issues, including
that he suffers from PTSD and ADHD and that he has a “tendency to
run away and off campus” when scared and upset. But, again, any
insight provided by the Behavior Intervention Plan is immaterial to
the incident here, which occurred before this particular Plan was
developed.
10
For some reason, the Manual accompanies the plaintiffs’
opposition to the City defendants’ motion to dismiss but the Manual
appears to focus on procedures for school security officers, who
have not been served with the complaint and, even if they had,
would not be considered City defendants.
11
first seek dismissal of claims asserted against them in their
official capacity on the ground that they are immune from suit.
The Court must first consider, however, whether the RSD is even an
entity capable of being sued.
A.
Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that “capacity to sue or be sued is determined... by the law of the
state where the court is located.”
defines
a
juridical
person
as
“an
The Louisiana Civil Code
entity
to
which
the
law
attributes personality, such as a corporation or partnership.”
La.C.C. art. 24.
With regard to governmental agencies, the
legislature will specifically endow the agency with the capacity to
sue or be sued in its own name.
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Roberts v. Sewerage and Water
Board of New Orleans, 634 So.2d 341 (La. 1994) provides the
framework for determining a governmental entity’s juridical status.
In determining “whether the entity can appropriately be regarded as
an additional and separate government unit for the particular
purpose at issue”, the state high court instructs that courts focus
their analysis on such factors as independent managing, financing,
and operations of the board and, if “the organic law grants it the
legal capacity to function independently and not just as the agency
or
division
of
another
governmental
entity,”
then
the
local
government unit at issue may be deemed a separate juridical person.
12
See id. at 346-47.
Applying this framework, the Louisiana Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeal has held that RSD is not a juridical entity
capable of suing or being sued. Tankerson v. Vallas, 34 So.3d 355,
356 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/10/10)(“we find that RSD is not a juridical
person and that the proper party to be sued in a claim for or
against the RSD is the [Department of Education].”).
Another
Section of this Court has likewise determined that “the RSD is not
a juridical person capable of suing or being sued under the Roberts
analysis.”
See Williams v. Recovery School District, --- F. Supp.
2d ---, No. 11-1588, 2012 WL 893421, at *3 (E.D. La. Mar. 15,
2012)(Vance, J.) (citing Adams v. Orleans Parish Recovery Sch.
Dist., No. 11-30751, 2012 WL 612777, at *1 (5th Cir. Feb. 27,
2012)(unpublished)(noting that “RSD is not an entity that can sue
or be sued” and citing Tankerson).
The Court agrees.
Indeed, the plaintiffs arguments to the contrary fail to
undermine the observations made by Judge Vance in Williams, which
apply equally here:
Although the Louisiana Supreme Court has not
yet spoken on this issue, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeal held that the Recovery School District
was not a juridical person capable of suing or being sued
The [Tankerson] court
under the Roberts analysis....
noted that both the Department of Education and the State
Board of Elementary and Secondary Education are a “body
corporate” under the Louisiana Revised Statutes....
La.Rev.Stat.
36:642
(Department
of
Education);
La.Rev.Stat. 17:1 (Board of Elementary and Secondary
Education). The court also noted that while Louisiana
Revised Statute 17:51 “makes a parish school board a
‘body corporate with power to sue[,]’ [t]he statute
authorizing the RSD (La.Rev.Stat. 17:1990) contains no
13
equivalent language....” For these reasons, the court
held that “the RSD does not function independently of the
DOE and BESE as it is not a body corporate capable of
being sued or suing indirectly.”
Moreover, RSD’s organizing statute clearly
states that RSD “shall be administered by the state
Department of Education, subject to the approval of the
State Board of Elementary and Secondary Education.”
La.Rev.Stat. § 17:1990(A)(2).
This power structure
further contrasts RSD with parish school boards, which
“must comply with State laws ... [but] are autonomous
political creatures that are separate and distinct
entities providing the framework for education in their
respective parishes.” Here, however, RSD is by statute
an “intermediate educational unit” that is not capable of
self-administration. La.Rev.Stat. § 17:1990(B)(1)(a).
Accordingly, the Court finds that the RSD is not a
juridical person capable of suing or being sued under the
Roberts analysis.
Williams, 2012 WL 893421, at *3 (internal citations omitted).
The
plaintiffs’ claims against the RSD must be dismissed.
B.
Having determined that the RSD is not a juridical entity
capable of suing or being sued, the Court now considers the State
defendants’ invocation of sovereign immunity. Patrick Dobard, sued
in his official capacity, and Batiste and Williams, to the extent
that they are sued in their official capacities, invoke the
doctrine of sovereign immunity and urge the Court to dismiss
plaintiffs’ official capacity claims on the ground that this Court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction; they contend that, because the
Louisiana Recovery School District is not an entity capable of
being sued, the Louisiana Department of Education would be the
proper defendant here.
But, they continue, the Louisiana DOE and
14
its employees who are sued in their official capacities are
entitled to sovereign immunity from suit in federal court.
The
Court agrees.
The Eleventh Amendment bars suits by private citizens against
a state in federal court.
K.P. v. LeBlanc, 627 F.3d 115, 124 (5th
Cir. 2010)(citing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 700 (1978)). This
immunity extends to protect state actors who act in their official
capacities.
Id.
Informed
by
the
Eleventh
Amendment,
“an
unconsenting state is immune from suits brought in federal courts
by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another state.”
Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506
U.S. 139, 144 (1993). Unless a state has waived Eleventh Amendment
immunity, neither a state nor its agencies are subject to suit in
federal court.
Id.
The State of Louisiana has not consented to this lawsuit.
Louisiana has not waived its sovereign immunity for suits brought
in federal court. Richardson v. Southern University, 118 F.3d 450,
453 (5th Cir. 1997); Delahoussaye v. City of New Iberia, 937 F.2d
144, 147 (5th Cir. 1991).
Louisiana Revised Statute 13:5106(A), in
fact, provides that “[n]o suit against the state or a state agency
or political subdivision shall be instituted in any court other
than a Louisiana state court.”
Moreover, Louisiana has not waived
sovereign immunity for suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Champagne v.
Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office, 188 F.3d 312, 314 (5th Cir.
15
1999).
Accordingly, in each unsanctioned instance of federal
lawsuit, the State or its agency must affirmatively waive its
sovereign immunity.
Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeny, 495
U.S. 299, 305 (1990); Stem v. Ahearn, 908 F.2d 1, 4 (5th Cir. 1990).
The State of Louisiana, through its agencies and officials sued in
their official capacities has represented that it does not consent
to this suit and it declines to waive its sovereign immunity.
The State defendants point out that, while the plaintiffs have
not named the Department of Education as a defendant, it would be
the proper defendant.
Indeed, this Court has already determined
that the RSD is not amenable to suit because it is merely a suboffice of the DOE without independent capacity to sue or be sued.
It is not a juridical entity.
The defendants anticipate that the
plaintiffs may attempt to amend their complaint to substitute DOE
for RSD and because Patrick Dobard, Kelly Batiste, and Tarynesa
Williams are each DOE-employed officials who are sued in their
official
capacities;
the
defendants
contend
that
the
DOE
is
entitled to sovereign immunity from suit in federal court and that
DOE’s sovereign immunity extends to Dobard, Batiste, and Williams,
to the extent they are sued in their official capacities.
The Court does not consider a request to amend where none is
made, but because the plaintiffs do not credibly dispute that their
official capacity claims against Dobard, Batiste, and Williams are
effectively claims against the DOE, the Court properly resorts to
16
the analysis applied to determining whether a political entity is
an “arm of the State” for the purposes of sovereign immunity.
As
the State defendants point out, however, the Court need not apply
anew the Vogt factors11 because the Fifth Circuit has previously
determined that the Louisiana Department of Education and DOE’s
superintendent, sued in his official capacity, are entitled to
sovereign immunity in federal court.
See Swindle v. Linvingston
Parish School Bd., 655 F.3d 386, 388 (5th Cir. 2011).
The Fifth
Circuit observed:
The State Superintendent of Education, sued in his
official capacity, the DOE and the BESE, argue that they
are immune from the suit because they are entitled to
sovereign immunity. We agree. “[T]he Constitution does
not provide for federal jurisdiction over suits [for
money damages] against nonconsenting States.” Kimel v.
Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73, 120 S.Ct. 631, 145
L.Ed.2d 522 (2000). Sovereign immunity also extends to
state officials sued in their official capacity for
monetary relief.
See id.; Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d
11
In Vogt v. Board of Commissioners of the Orleans Parish
Levee District, 294 F.3d 684, 689 (5th Cir. 2002), the Fifth Circuit
summarized the factors relevant in determining whether a lawsuit is
effectively one against the sovereign state:
(1) whether state statutes and case law
characterize the agency as an arm of the
state;
(2) the source of the funds for the entity;
(3) the degree of local autonomy the entity
enjoys;
(4) whether the entity is concerned primarily
with local, as opposed to statewide problems;
(5) whether the entity has authority to sue
and be sued in its own name; and
(6) whether the entity has the right to hold
and use property.
(internal citations omitted).
17
611 (1978)(“[O]fficial-capacity suits generally represent
only another way of pleading an action against an entity
of which an officer is an agent”).
Id. at 399.
Guided by Swindle, the Court finds that the Louisiana
Department
of
Education’s
employees,
Superintendent
Dobard,
Principal Batiste, and Vice Principal Williams, sued in their
official capacities, are entitled to sovereign immunity from this
suit for monetary relief.
Accordingly, the official capacity
claims against Dobard, Batiste, and Williams are dismissed for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.12
III.
Plaintiffs bring this civil rights challenge under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for alleged violations of D.T.’s constitutional rights.
Section 1983 creates a private right of action for violations of
federally-secured rights under color of state law; it provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State..., subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
12
The State defendants alternatively suggest that all §
1983 claims against RSD, and official capacity claims against
Dobard, Williams, and Batiste are not only barred by sovereign
immunity, but also fail to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. The Court agrees. It is well-established that the State
of Louisiana, its agencies and officers sued in their official
capacities cannot be sued under § 1983 for monetary relief; § 1983
claims may only be brought against persons as the statute and case
law define that term. Neither a State, its agencies nor officials
acting in their official capacities are persons under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. See Fairley v. Stalder, 294 Fed.Appx. 805, 808-09 (5th Cir.
2008)(quoting “long and clearly established Supreme Court precedent
on the matter,” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,
71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989)).
18
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws...shall be liable to
the party injured....
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
To state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must
satisfy three elements:
(1)
(2)
(3)
deprivation of a right secured by the U.S.
Constitution or federal law;
that occurred under color of state law, and
was caused by a state actor.
Victoria W. V. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 482 (5th Cir. 2004)(citation
omitted).
A.
When plaintiffs seek money damages from government officials
for alleged violations of constitutional or statutory rights,
officials in their official capacities may invoke the defense of
qualified immunity.
Because it is an immunity from suit and not a
defense to liability, courts are advised to resolve the issue “at
the earliest possible stage in litigation.”
Hunter v. Bryant, 502
U.S. 224, 227 (1991)(per curiam).
“Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil
damages liability,” the U.S. Supreme Court has recently reiterated,
“unless the official violated a statutory or constitutional right
that was clearly established that the time of the challenged
conduct.” Reichle v. Howards, 132 S.Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012); Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)(This doctrine protects
government officials against individual civil liability “insofar as
19
their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.”).
“Qualified immunity balances two important interests –
the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise
power
irresponsibly
and
the
need
to
shield
officials
from
harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their
duties
reasonably.”
Pearson
v.
Callahan,
555
U.S.
223
(2009)(noting that “[t]he protection of qualified immunity applies
regardless of whether the government official’s error is ‘a mistake
of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of
law and fact.’”).
In fact, “[q]ualified immunity represents the
norm” and “is designed to shield from civil liability all but the
plainly incompetent or those who violate the law.”
Brady v. Fort
Bend County, 58 F.3d 173, 174 (5th Cir. 1995).
In
resolving
government
officials’
qualified
immunity
defenses, courts have traditionally applied the two-prong process
articulated in Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991) and mandated
by the Supreme Court in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
First, the Court must determine whether the plaintiffs have shown
a violation of a constitutional right.
Id. at 201.
The second
inquiry requires the Court to consider “whether the right at issue
was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the defendant’s alleged
20
misconduct.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009).13
Although
the Supreme Court has left to the district court’s discretion the
sequence for undertaking these two inquiries, the Supreme Court has
increasingly indicated a preference for first considering whether
a purported right was clearly established by prior case law
“without resolving the often more difficult question whether the
purported right exists at all.”
See Reichle, 132 S.Ct. at 2093
(“This approach comports with our usual reluctance to decide
constitutional questions unnecessarily.”); see also Camreta v.
Greene, 563 U.S. ---, 131 S.Ct. 2020, 2031 (2011)(observing that
“our usual adjudicatory rules suggest that a court should forbear
resolving this issue”)(emphasis in original); see also Pearson, 555
U.S. at 238-39 (listing circumstances in which courts might be best
13
In Pearson, the Supreme Court receded from Saucier, in
determining that, while the sequence articulated in Saucier is
often appropriate, it is no longer mandatory; accordingly, the
Court may consider these inquiries in any sequence and need not
even consider both. See Pearson, 129 S.Ct. at 818-20 (reasoning
that because the Saucier process sometimes unnecessarily “results
in a substantial expenditure of scare judicial resources on
difficult questions that have no effect on the outcome of the
case...courts should have the discretion to decide whether that
procedure is worthwhile in particular cases”).
Step two of the qualified immunity analysis requires
courts to determine whether the defendants’ conduct “was
objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law.”
Thompson v. Upshur County, Tex., 245 F.3d 447, 457 (5th Cir.
2001)(citations omitted). “Fair warning” is the touchstone of this
analysis.
Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 501-02 (5th Cir.
2008)(citations omitted).
“In other words, ‘existing precedent
must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond
debate.’” Reichle, 132 S.Ct. at 2093 (quoting Camreta v. Greene,
563 U.S. ---, 131 S.Ct. 2020 (2011)).
21
served to bypass the first step of the Saucier process, such as
“when qualified immunity is asserted at the pleadings stage, the
precise factual basis for the plaintiff’s claim or claims [is] hard
to identify”).
In other words:
qualified immunity “protects ‘all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law,’ so we
do not deny immunity unless ‘existing precedent must have placed
the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.’”
Morgan
v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 370-71 (5th Cir. 2011)(en banc)(internal
quotations, citations, and footnotes omitted).
Once a defendant
has invoked the defense of qualified immunity, the burden shifts to
the plaintiff to show that the defense is unavailable. See Collier
v. Montgomery, 569 F.3d 214, 217-18 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Although
nominally an affirmative defense, the plaintiff has the burden to
negate the assertion of qualified immunity once properly raised”);
see also McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 323 (5th Cir.
2002)(en banc).
A plaintiff must establish that the defendants
were either personally involved in the deprivation or that their
wrongful actions were causally connected to the deprivation. James
v. Texas Collin Co., 535 F.3d 365, 373 (5th Cir. 2008).
And, “each
individual defendant’s entitlement to qualified immunity [should be
examined] separately.”
Jacobs v. West Feliciana Sheriff’s Dept.,
228 F.3d 388, 395 (5th Cir. 2000)(citation omitted).
22
1.
The State Defendants Are Entitled to Qualified
Immunity Because The Plaintiffs Have Failed to
State a Substantive Due Process Claim.
Principal Batiste and Vice Principal Williams seek to dismiss
the plaintiffs’ individual capacity claims on the ground that they
are
entitled
to
qualified
immunity.
They
contend
that
the
plaintiffs’ unexplained use of the phrase “unreasonable seizure” is
insufficient to state a Fourth Amendment claim.
Moreover, they
contend that the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim, that the
defendants violated D.T.’s substantive due process right to bodily
integrity, fails as a matter of law.
The Court agrees.
Although it is not clearly identified in the complaint, the
plaintiffs in their opposition papers suggests that they presents
a cognizable Fourteenth Amendment claim “i.e., Ms. Batiste and Ms.
Williams violated plaintiff[s’] substantive due process right
(liberty interest) to be free of state-occasioned damage to his
body.”14 A summary of the facts contained in the complaint relating
to this alleged substantive due process violation, as pertaining to
14
The defendants point out that the plaintiffs use the
phrase “unreasonable seizure” with regard to her claim against
Batiste and Williams. However, the defendants contend and this
Court agrees that there are no facts pleaded that could be
construed as a Fourth Amendment claim against Batiste and Williams.
Because the plaintiffs make no argument in their opposition papers
that would suggest that they are attempting to pursue a Fourth
Amendment claim against Batiste and Williams, it appears that any
prior intention to do so has been abandoned. In any event, any
attempt to pursue such a claim against Williams and Batiste is
technically deficient and dismissed for failure to state a claim.
See infra.
23
Williams and Batiste is as follows:
While in Principal Batiste’s office, Williams and Batiste
both tried to lock D.T. in a closet due to an alleged
behavioral issue. When D.T. tried to run from them, he
knocked papers off of Batiste’s desk.
Williams then
struck him with a fly swatter and shoved him down.
Batiste and Williams then instructed two school security
officers to hold D.T. down, even though they should have
known that D.T. was easily frightened and did not like to
be touched.
(emphasis added).
The plaintiffs suggest that these allegations
sufficiently state a claim for violation of D.T.’s substantive due
process right.
Batiste and Williams counter that, given the
plaintiffs’ allegation in their complaint that their conduct toward
D.T. was “due to an alleged behavior issue”, the § 1983 substantive
due process claim must be dismissed.
The Court agrees.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
that no state shall “deprive a person of life, liberty or property
without due process of law.”
The Supreme Court has acknowledged:
“Although a literal reading of the Clause might suggest that it
governs only the procedures by which a State may deprive persons of
liberty, for at least 105 years,...the Clause has been understood
to contain a substantive component as well....” Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)(internal citations omitted).
substantive
component
of
the
Due
Process
Clause
“This
‘protects
individual liberty against certain government actions regardless of
the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.’”
Doe v.
Taylor Ind. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, (5th Cir. 1994)(citation and
24
internal quotations omitted).
The“common law principle” of corporal punishment “predates the
American Revolution.”
Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909, 917 (5th
Cir. 1976)(en banc), aff’d, 430 U.S. 651 (1977)
(“Paddling of
recalcitrant children has long been an accepted method of promoting
good behavior and instilling notions of responsibility and decorum
into the mischievous heads of school children.”).
As the Fifth
Circuit has recognized “coincidently with the genesis of corporal
punishment, reasonable limits traditionally have been imposed upon
student discipline so as not to give teachers a license to commit
state-sanctioned child abuse.”
Id.
The Due Process Clause as incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment generally protects the right to be free from bodily
restraint and punishment.
See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,
673-74 (1977)(rejecting Eighth Amendment and procedural due process
challenge to constitutionality of corporal punishment where state
has adequate common law remedies).15
The United States Supreme
Court has not determined, for qualified immunity purposes, “whether
or under what circumstances corporal punishment of a public school
child may give rise to an independent federal cause of action to
vindicate substantive rights under the Due Process Clause” (see
15
In Ingraham, the Supreme Court determined that 20 swats
to a student, which caused him to miss school for days with bruises
and disabled his arms for a week, did not violate procedural due
process guarantees.
25
Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 678 n.47), but the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court
of
Appeals
case
literature
clearly
“dictate[s]
that
injuries
sustained incidentally to corporal punishment, irrespective of the
severity of those injuries or the sensitivity of the student, do
not implicate the due process clause if the forum state affords
adequate post-punishment civil or criminal remedies for the student
to vindicate legal transgressions.”
See Moore v. Willis Indep.
Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 871, 875 (5th Cir. 2000)(quoting Fee v.
Herndon, 900 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 908,
111 S.Ct. 279, 112 L.Ed.2d 233 (1990)(emphasis in original)).
It is well-established, then, as a matter of law under Fifth
Circuit
precedent,
that
the
conduct
of
which
the
plaintiffs
complain is not a constitutional violation: the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit does not permit public school
students to bring claims for excessive corporal punishment as
substantive due process violations under § 1983 if the state
provides an otherwise adequate remedy. Moore, 233 F.3d at 874-75.16
16
The Fifth Circuit has observed:
We have held consistently that, as long as the
state provides an adequate remedy, a public
school student cannot state a claim for denial
of substantive due process through excessive
corporal punishment, whether it be against the
school system, administrators, or the employee
who is alleged to have inflicted the damage.
In Fee v. Herndon, we reiterated that
“[c]orporal punishment in public schools ‘is a
deprivation of substantive due process when it
is arbitrary, capricious, or wholly unrelated
to the legitimate state goal of maintaining an
26
The Fifth Circuit has already determined that Louisiana affords
adequate remedies for excessive corporate punishment through its
tort law and by statute.
See Coleman v. Franklin Parish Sch. Bd.,
702 F.2d 74, 76 (5th Cir. 1983).
Because there are adequate local
remedies through state tort law, the plaintiffs’ substantive due
process claim fails as a matter of law.
Notwithstanding the clearly established law that precludes
their claim, the plaintiffs invoke two cases that they say support
the viability of the Fourteenth Amendment claim, Jefferson v.
Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1987) and Fee v.
Herndon, 900 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1990).
position.
Neither case supports that
In Jefferson, the Fifth Circuit held that the restraint
of a second-grade student to a chair for a whole school day and a
“substantial portion” of a second day violated that student’s right
to bodily integrity.
817 F.2d at 305.
The plaintiffs here insist
that “if constraining a student to a chair violated the student’s
atmosphere conducive to learning.’” Educators
in states that proscribe student mistreatment
and provide a remedy “do not, by definition,
act ‘arbitrarily,’ a necessary predicate for
substantive due process relief.”
Moore, 233 F.3d at 875 (internal citations and footnotes
omitted)(because Texas law provides adequate remedies, the court
held there was no substantive due process violation under
circumstances where student suffered severe injuries as a result of
punishment imposed by physical education teacher that forced
student to do 100 squat thrusts because he violated a class rule of
talking during roll call). In other words, as a matter of law,
corporal punishment is not arbitrary if the state has local
remedies to address the allegedly offensive conduct.
27
substantive due process rights, then constraining a student to the
floor and attempting to lock him in a closet qualifies as a
violation of the same Constitutional right.”
But the plaintiffs
overlook the materially different context informing the Fifth
Circuit’s holding in Jefferson:
We are persuaded that in January 1985, a competent
teacher knew or should have known that to tie a secondgrade student to a chair for an entire school day and for
a substantial portion of a second school day, as an
educational exercise, with no suggested justification,
such as punishment or discipline, was constitutionally
impermissible. A young student who is not being properly
punished or disciplined has a constitutional right not to
be lashed to a chair through the school day and denied,
among other things, the basic liberty of access to the
bathroom when needed.
Jefferson, 817 F.2d at 305. Jefferson’s facts separate it from the
case of D.T.
The plaintiffs’ invocation of Fee to support her position is
similarly misleading and unreliable.
Taking a quotation from Fee
out of context, the plaintiffs insist that the Fifth Circuit held
that infliction of “corporal punishment in schools is a deprivation
of substantive due process when it is arbitrary, capricious, or
wholly unrelated to the legitimate state goal of maintaining an
atmosphere conducive to learning.”17
Fee,
in
fact,
more
accurately
17
advances
the
defendants’
This proposition is followed by the Fifth Circuit’s
observation that “[t]hus, reasonable corporal punishment is not at
odds with the fourteenth amendment and does not constitute
arbitrary state action.” Fee. 900 F.2d at 808.
28
position.
The Fifth Circuit characterized the dispute there as
“present[ing] the question of whether the federal Constitution
independently
shields
public
school
students
discipline, irrespective of state-law safeguards.”
at 808.
from
excessive
Fee, 900 F.2d
In Fee, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a
plaintiff’s claims on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Id.
Contrary to the plaintiffs’ attempt here to cherry-pick certain
principles of law that inform this Circuit’s substantive due
process jurisprudence, the Fifth Circuit in Fee made observations
so uniquely and powerfully pertinent to this matter that they
undermine plaintiffs’ attempt to state a constitutional violation:
A sixth grade special-education student became disruptive
during classroom instruction, prompting the use of
corporal punishment by the school’s principal to restore
discipline. The parents...maintain that the principal
beat their emotionally disturbed child so excessively,
however, that the student was forced to remain in
psychiatric rehabilitation for months....
The plaintiffs commenced this action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against the school district and various
educators, averring that the fourteenth amendment’s
substantive due process guarantee operates to ban
excessive corporal punishment in public schools. Pendent
state-law tort claims were attached to this civil rights
suit....
Indisputably, however, state remedies–both
criminal and civil–are available in Texas and proscribe
the excessive use of corporal punishment against
students, including emotionally handicapped children.
That being so, our precedents instruct that the
substantive component of the due process clause, though
selectively applied in other contexts, is inoperative
under the facts herein presented.
We adhere to this circuit’s rule that no arbitrary state
action exists, by definition, where states affirmatively
impose reasonable limitations upon corporal punishment
29
and provide adequate criminal and civil remedies for
departures from such laws. Accordingly, we conclude that
defendants here, all of whom allegedly acted in
contravention of Texas’s criminal or civil laws, have not
implicated
federal
substantive
due
process
considerations, irrespective of the argued capriciousness
of the corporal punishment imposed.
Thus, federal
constitutional relief is not among the plaintiffs’
available remedies, and consequently we affirm.
Fee, 900 F.2d at 805-06.
As Fee makes clear, “the doctrine of
substantive due process focuses expressly upon the arbitrariness of
state action”.
Id. at 810.
Given that Louisiana provides for
adequate post-punishment relief in favor of students through its
tort law, the plaintiffs cannot rely on substantive due process
concerns here.18
The plaintiffs simply have failed to plead facts that, if
true,
would
show
Constitutional
that
Batiste
rights.
and
Accordingly,
Williams
Batiste
violated
and
D.T.’s
Williams,
individually, are entitled to immunity from suit from suit from the
plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims.
2.
The City Defendants Are Entitled to Qualified
Immunity Because the Plaintiffs Have Failed to
Allege a Violation of a Clearly Established
Constitutional Right.
The City defendants -- first, the NOPD officers -- sued in
18
In the opposition papers but not in the complaint, the
plaintiffs assert that Williams and Batiste knew that D.T. “ha[d]
been diagnosed with behavioral/emotional problems including but not
limited to PTSD and ADHD.” But this would not save the plaintiffs’
claim because they have alleged in their complaint that Williams
and Batiste’s conduct was in response to an alleged behavioral
issue.
30
their individual capacity contend that it is unclear what federal
right the plaintiffs are alleging were violated and, even assuming
the plaintiffs attempt to assert an excessive force or unreasonable
seizure claim, the plaintiffs fail to allege facts that support a
constitutional violation.
Accordingly, the City defendants, sued
in their individual capacity, insist that they are entitled to
qualified immunity.
Because the plaintiffs maintain the burden of
overcoming a defendants’ invocation of qualified immunity and here
they
fail
to
do
so,
the
individual
capacity
claims
against
defendants must be dismissed.19
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated....” This is the sacred mandate of
the Fourth Amendment.
“Students have a constitutional right under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures while on school premises.”
Porter v. Ascension Parish
Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 621-22 (5th Cir. 2004)(citing New Jersey v.
TLO, 469 U.S. 325, 334-37 (1985)); Hassan v. Lubbock Indep. Sch.
Dist., 55 F.3d 1075, 1079 (5th Cir. 1995)(noting that a student’s
19
The Court observes that the plaintiffs continue to argue
that D.T.’s substantive due process rights were violated. But the
Court has already determined that this claim fails as a matter of
law and the plaintiffs fail to explain how this claim would fare
any better against the police officers who, according to the
plaintiffs’ allegations, responded to the school officials’ call
for back-up.
31
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizure “extends
to seizures by or at the direction of school officials.”).
But
“[t]he [Supreme] Court [has] indicated that although the Fourth
Amendment applies in schools, the nature of those rights is what is
appropriate for children in school.”
Milligan v. City of Slidell,
226 F.3d 652, 654-55 (5th Cir. 2000)(citation omitted).
“Fourth
Amendment rights...are different in public schools than elsewhere;
the
‘reasonableness’
inquiry
cannot
disregard
the
schools’
custodial and tutelary responsibility for children.” Vernonia Sch.
Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995).
Notwithstanding these precedents, there is some confusion
among counsel as to whether the Fourth Amendment even applies in
this case.20
Perhaps this confusion is not entirely unfounded:
“permitting students to bring excessive force claims under the
Fourth Amendment would eviscerate this circuit’s rule against
prohibiting
substantive
due
process
claims
on
schoolchildren for excessive corporal punishment.”
the
part
of
See Flores v.
School Bd. of DeSoto Parish, 116 Fed.Appx. 504, 510 (5th Cir. Nov.
16, 2004)(unpublished)(noting that “[t]he Supreme Court and this
circuit have...recognized that preservation of order in the schools
allows for closer supervision and control of school children than
would otherwise be permitted under the Fourth Amendment.”).
20
The Court notes that the plaintiffs’
defendants’ papers suffer from the same inadequacies.
32
and
In
City
Flores, a special education student and his mother sued various
school-related agencies after an incident in which a teacher
allegedly threw a student against the wall, placed his hands around
the student’s neck, and began to choke him while threatening bodily
harm.
Id.
In an unpublished opinion, the Fifth Circuit declined
to recognize the plaintiffs’ claim under the Fourth Amendment
“[g]iven
th[e]
prohibition
corporal
punishment,
schoolchildren,
and
the
constitutional
claims
for
special
the
against
constitutional
status
of
fact
that
the
momentary
‘seizure’
complained of in this case is not the type of detention or physical
restraint normally associated with Fourth Amendment claims.”
In Doe v. S&S Consol. I.S.D., 149 F. Supp. 2d 274, (E.D.
Tex.), aff’d, 309 F.3d 307 (2002), a mother and her child sued
school
officials
under
§
1983
for
wrapping
the
emotionally
disturbed and disruptive student in sheets, duct-taping her mouth
shut, placing her face down on a cot, and leaving her in an
isolated
room.
qualified
The
immunity
district
grounds,
court
the
summarily
Fourth
dismissed,
Amendment
claim
on
in
particular, finding that the plaintiffs failed to allege the
violation
Amendment.
of
a
clearly
established
Id. at 286-87.
right
under
the
Fourth
In rejecting the argument that the
child had been unreasonably “seized” by school officials, the
district court simply “d[id] not believe that the amendment readily
captures school officials restraining a ‘raging’ child or placing
33
her in a timeout room.”
If
the
Fifth
Id. at 287.
Circuit
has
The Fifth Circuit affirmed.
declined
to
recognize
school
children’s claims under the Fourth Amendment for school officials’
use of restraining techniques,21 it seems that school children’s
claims against police officers responding to a school’s request for
back-up cannot be analyzed in a way that is divorced from the
school context.22
This is particularly so when Fourth Amendment
reasonableness analyses are so context-driven.
The fact that this
Court even has to speculate as to what standard23 to apply to the
21
See Flores, 116 Fed.Appx. at 510 (unpublished); see also
Christine Florick Nishimura, Note, Eliminating the Use of Restraint
and Seclusion Against Students with Disabilities, 16 Tex. J. On
C.L. & C.R. 189 (Spring 2011)(noting that “the Fifth Circuit...has
practically eviscerated all Fourth Amendment claims relating to
restraint [of schoolchildren]”).
22
It is, after all, the student’s constitutional rights
on which the Court must focus.
23
The Court articulates the standards typically applied
to police officers but notes that it has not been suggested by
counsel that these standards apply to police officer conduct toward
students on school grounds.
When a plaintiff brings a claim under federal law
contending that a police officer used excessive force in
apprehending or arresting a person in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, the plaintiff must first demonstrate that he was seized,
which may be shown when “by means of physical force or show of
authority, [an officer] has in some way restrained the liberty of
a citizen”. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968). Then,
the plaintiff must show that he suffered “(1) an injury that (2)
resulted directly and only from the use of force that was excessive
to the need and that (3) the force was objectively unreasonable.”
Goodson v. City of Corpus Christi, 202 F.3d 730, 740 (5th Cir.
2000). The injury must be more than de minimis, evaluated in the
context in which the force was deployed. Tarver v. City of Edna,
410 F.3d 745, 751-52 (5th Cir. 2005)(finding that the plaintiff
failed to satisfy the injury requirement for a § 1983 claim because
34
police
officers’
conduct
toward
a
student
here
in
order
to
determine if their conduct was constitutionally permissible seems
determinative
of
the
qualified
immunity
analysis:
clearly
established law does not put the constitutionality of the police
officers’ conduct beyond debate.24
The plaintiffs’ allegations (that “Officers Davis and John Doe
shoved
down
[D.T.]
and
held
him
with
excessive
force
until
Defendants Officers Davis and John Doe handcuffed him, with his
hands behind his back” and that Officer Boyd unlawfully seized or
arrested D.T. when he followed behind D.T.’s aunt’s car when she
took D.T. for a psychological evaluation), without more, do not
he did not allege any degree of physical harm greater than de
minimis from the handcuffing”); Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d
307, 314 (5th Cir. 2001)(holding that “handcuffing too tightly,
without more, does not amount to excessive force.”).
Only
substantial psychological injuries are sufficient to satisfy the
injury element of a claim for excessive force under the Fourth
Amendment. See Flores v. City of Palacios, 381 F.3d 391, 397-98
(5th Cir. 2004).
24
Cf. Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 371-72 (5th Cir.
2011)(en banc). As the Fifth Circuit has observed:
Although the Supreme Court has repeatedly
admonished courts not to define clearly
established law at a high level of generality,
this does not mean that “a case directly on
point”
is
required.
Rather
“existing
precedent must have placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate.” The
sine qua non of the clearly-established
inquiry is “fair warning.”
35
plausibly
give
rise
to
an
entitlement
to
relief.25
And
the
plaintiffs have not carried their burden to show that the defense
of qualified immunity is unavailable; they have not alleged or
demonstrated that the officers violated a clearly established
constitutional right.26
The individual capacity claims asserted
against the NOPD officers must be dismissed.27
To the extent the plaintiffs’ complaint can be read to assert
individual
capacity
claims
against
Mayor
Landrieu
and
25
As to Officer Brian Boyd, it appears that the plaintiffs
attempt to claim that he violated D.T.’s right to be free from
unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. But the
plaintiffs have failed to allege facts that, if true, would
demonstrate that Officer Boyd’s conduct in escorting D.T. and his
aunt to the hospital so that D.T. could undergo a psychological
evaluation constituted an unreasonable seizure under the
circumstances that amounts to a clear violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights. According to the allegations of the complaint,
Officer Boyd simply told D.T.’s aunt to drive D.T. to the hospital
and Boyd followed behind in his own car. The plaintiffs have cited
no law to suggest that this conduct violated a clearly established
right that would overcome Officer Boyd’s invocation of qualified
immunity.
26
Because the plaintiffs fail to invoke a Fourth Amendment
case from any court that would suggest that the conduct they allege
runs afoul of the Fourth Amendment, the Court does not undertake a
detailed Fourth Amendment analysis; it need not carry the
plaintiffs’ burden for them.
27
Finally, as to any remaining § 1983 claims that the
plaintiffs attempt to assert against some unidentified officer,
those claims are dismissed for failure to state a claim.
See
Everson v. N.O.P.D. Officers (Names Unknown), No. 07-7027, 2009 WL
122759, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 15, 2009). The plaintiffs have made
no effort to amend their complaint to name the officer identified
only as John Doe. And, in any event, they appear to abandon any
such claims by failing to brief the issue in their opposition
papers.
36
Superintendent Serpas, any such claims must also be dismissed for
failure to state a claim.
Landrieu and Serpas invoke their
entitlement to qualified immunity and, not only are there no
allegations that either Landrieu or Serpas directly participated in
the
alleged
deprivation
of
D.T.’s
constitutional
rights,
the
plaintiffs abandon in their opposition papers any attempt to link
Landrieu’s and Serpas’ individual liability to D.T.’s claim of
constitutional
violation
and,
thus,
fail
to
overcome
these
defendants’ entitlement to immunity.28
B.
The plaintiffs also assert § 1983 claims against the City, as
well as perhaps official capacity claims against Mayor Landrieu and
Superintendent Serpas.
The defendants’ challenge the sufficiency
of the complaint’s allegations.
Because the plaintiffs make only
conclusory assertions that are not entitled to the presumption of
truth, these claims do not withstand the defendants’ challenge.
Municipalities are “persons” within the meaning of § 1983.
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
But
“[t]hey are liable only for their own acts and not those attributed
to them by principles of respondeat superior.”
Victoria W. v.
Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 482 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Monell, 436
U.S. at 691-92).
“[A] local government may not be sued under §
28
As to Landrieu and Serpas, the plaintiffs suggest only
the possibility of Monell liability in their opposition papers.
37
1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.
Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom
... inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is
responsible under § 1983.”
In
other
words,
Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
municipal
liability
for
civil
rights
violations under § 1983 is based on causation conduct, rather than
respondeat superior.
(5th Cir. 2008).
Bolton v. City of Dallas, 541 F.3d 545, 548
Thus, in determining whether municipal liability
attaches, the Court looks to whether the plaintiff has shown,
first, that the municipality adopted a policy29 with “deliberate
indifference” to its known and obvious consequences, and, second,
that
the
municipality
was
the
“moving
force”
behind
the
constitutional violation. City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S.
378 (1989).30
The City defendants contend that the plaintiffs fail to state
a Monell claim that is plausible on its face.
The Court agrees.
29
Official municipal policy pursuant to Monell, the U.S.
Supreme Court has observed, “includes the decisions of a
government’s lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and
practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the
force of law.”
See Connick v. Thompson, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1359
(2011)(citations omitted)(“These are ‘action[s] for which the
municipality is actually responsible.’”).
30
A plaintiff must show that unconstitutional conduct is
directly attributable to the municipality through some official
custom or policy; “isolated unconstitutional actions by municipal
employees will almost never trigger liability.” See Piotrowski v.
City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001)(citations
omitted).
38
The plaintiffs seem to assert that the City through Ronal
Serpas failed to train, supervise, or discipline Officers Davis and
Boyd.
The plaintiffs’ allegations are too vague and conclusory.
Not only do the plaintiffs fail to identify in their pleadings an
official policy or custom, they fall well short of alleging that
the City adopted a policy or participated in a widespread practice
with deliberate indifference to its known consequences;31 they also
fail to allege causation: a violation of constitutional rights
whose “moving force” is the City’s policy or custom.
Putting aside this Court’s observation that the plaintiffs
have failed to demonstrate that the individual defendants’ conduct
was
objectively
constitutional
unreasonable
law,32
the
in
Court
light
need
of
only
clearly
established
reference
the
limp
31
To establish deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must
show a pattern of violations that are fairly similar to what
ultimately transpired so that the failure of the City to respond
with different training, better supervision, or punishment reflects
a deliberate and conscious choice to endanger constitutional
rights. See Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536 (5th Cir. 1998).
The plaintiffs have failed to plead facts that if taken as true
would allow the Court to draw the inference that the City is liable
for the alleged misconduct of the named police officers.
32
This Court’s finding that the plaintiffs have failed to
adequately allege that the police officers’ actions were
objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law is
distinguishable from the inquiry into whether the plaintiffs’ claim
that City defendants violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights
fails as a matter of law. Of course, if the plaintiffs fail to
allege a constitutional violation, the inquiry into Monell
liability is moot. Cf. Becerra v. Asher, 105 F.3d 1042, 1048 (5th
Cir. 1997)(“[w]ithout an underlying constitutional violation, an
essential element of municipal liability is missing”).
To the
extent the plaintiffs seek to hold the City defendants liable for
39
allegations of the complaint to demonstrate that the plaintiffs
have failed to state a claim for municipal liability.
In Count 4,
the plaintiffs focus on NOPD Officer Boyd, Ronal Serpas, and the
NOPD generally, with mention of Officers Davis and John Doe.
The
plaintiffs assert that Officer Brian Boyd was acting under the
direction and control of Superintendent Ronal Serpas and for the
New Orleans Police Department and that
[a]cting under color of law and pursuant to official
policy or custom, Ronal Serpas and the New Orleans Police
Department knowingly, recklessly, or with deliberate
indifference to [D.T.’s] rights, failed to instruct,
supervise, control and discipline on a continuing basis
Officers Davis and John Doe in their duties to refrain
from: (a) unlawfully and maliciously harassing a citizen
who was acting in accordance with his constitutional and
statutory rights, privileges, and immunities; (b)
unlawfully and maliciously arresting a citizen and
otherwise using unreasonable excessive force by placing
a seven year old defenseless child in handcuffs which is
a violation of [D.T.’s] his civil rights; (c)conspiring
to violate the rights, privileges and immunities
guaranteed to [D.T.] by the Constitution and laws of the
United States and Louisiana; and (d) otherwise depriving
[D.T.] of his constitutional and statutory rights,
privileges, and immunities under [federal and state law].
These allegations are so generic and conclusory, they are not
entitled to the presumption of truthfulness.
false safety of boilerplate.
They rely on the
Courts “do not presume true a number
of categories of statements,” the Fifth Circuit reminds, “including
substantive due process violation, this Court has already
determined that the plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim fails
as a matter of law and the plaintiffs fail to suggest how the
substantive due process analysis would be materially different as
applied to the City defendants’ conduct toward D.T.
40
legal conclusions; mere ‘labels’; ‘[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action’; ‘conclusory statements’; and ‘naked
assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.’”
F.3d at 370 (citations omitted).
Morgan, 659
These allegations simply fail to
include sufficient factual matter which, accepted as true, would
state a claim for municipal liability that is plausible on its
face.
The factual allegations in the complaint focus instead on
individual police officer conduct, for which the City is not
liable, absent a showing that the moving force behind the conduct
is the City’s identifiable policy or custom.
IV.
The plaintiffs have also named the NOPD as a defendant.
However, the NOPD is not recognized as a legal entity or person
capable of being sued.
See, e.g., Everson v. N.O.P.D. Officers
(Names Unknown), No. 07-7027, 2009 WL 122759, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan.
15, 2009).
Accordingly, the claims asserted against the NOPD are
dismissed.
Finally, the plaintiffs have asserted various state law claims
in conjunction with their § 1983 claims.
This Court has subject
matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1331 and discretionary supplemental jurisdiction over
the state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Section 1367(c)
provides
that
“the
district
courts
may
decline
to
exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if– ...
41
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction.”
Indeed, when a district court dismisses
all federal claims before trial, it is usually accepted practice to
dismiss any pendent state law claims.
See Bass v. Parkwood Hosp.,
180 F.3d 234, 246 (5th Cir. 1999)(citation omitted).
Because this
Court has determined that dismissal of the plaintiffs’ § 1983
claims is warranted, this Court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over any remaining state law claims; any such claims
are dismissed without prejudice.
Accordingly, the defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED
and
the
plaintiffs’
claims
are
hereby
dismissed.
With
the
exception of the plaintiffs’ state law claims and the plaintiffs’
claims against the unserved school security officers, which are
dismissed without prejudice, the plaintiffs’ claims are dismissed
with prejudice.
New Orleans, Louisiana, August 2, 2012
______________________________
MARTIN L. C. FELDMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
42
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