LeBlanc v. Strain et al

Filing 49

ORDER denying 42 Motion to Vacate Order and Judgment of Dismissal. Signed by Judge Jay C. Zainey. (jrc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
JANE MARIE LEBLANC

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 12-0957

SHERIFF JACK STRAIN, ET AL.

SECTION: "A" (4)

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Rule 60(b) Motion to Vacate Order and
Judgment of Dismissal (Rec. Doc. 42) filed by plaintiff Jane Marie
Leblanc.

Defendants oppose the motion.

The motion, set for hearing

on May 7, 2014, is before the Court on the briefs without oral
argument.
Plaintiff Jane Marie Leblanc filed this lawsuit to recover
damages due to the death of her son, Jonathan Dore.
2011,

Dore

was

taken

into

custody

by

the

St.

On January 20,
Tammany

Parish

Sheriff’s Office to enter a ninety-day turn-around program after
testing positive for marijuana in violation of his parole.

On

February 14, 2011, Dore was admitted to participate in a work
transition

program

operated

by

Northshore

Workforce

L.L.C.

(“Northshore”) in conjunction with the Louisiana Department of
Public Safety and Corrections (“DOC”).

On March 3, 2011, Dore began

working for Baker Pile Driving and Site Work, L.L.C. (“Baker Pile
Driving”) as a welder.

On Monday, April 18, 2011, after an apparent

drug overdose, Dore was pronounced dead at a Baker Pile Driving
worksite.

On April 15, 2012, Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking damages
and all other just and equitable relief available to her under
federal law and Louisiana state law.

In the complaint, Plaintiff

alleges that Sheriff Jack Strain and Northshore’s managing member
Marlin Peachy are liable for Dore’s death because they neglected and
failed to properly supervise, care for, and guarantee the safety of
Dore while he was in their custody.

Plaintiff also alleges that

Baker Pile Driving and Robert Wayne Baker (“Baker”) are liable for
Dore’s death because they neglected and failed to properly supervise
Dore while he was in their employ.
Defendants filed motions to dismiss and, alternatively, motions
for summary judgment which the Court granted on April 15, 2013.

In

that ruling, the Court found that Plaintiff failed to allege the
deprivation
dismissed

of
all

Furthermore,

any
of

the

right

secured

Plaintiff's
Court

by

federal

federal

declined

to

claims

exercise

law.
with
its

The

Court

prejudice.
supplemental

jurisdiction and dismissed all of Plaintiff’s state law claims
without prejudice, giving her the opportunity to file those claims
in state court if she saw fit.
In the instant motion, Plaintiff moves for the Court to vacate
its prior order and judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 60(b) allows the Court to relieve a

2

party from a “final judgment, order, or proceeding.”1

The decision

to grant or deny relief under Rule 60(b) lies within the sound
discretion of the trial court.2

In exercising this discretion, the

court must “balance the principle of finality of a judgment with the
interest of the court in seeing that justice is done in light of all
the facts.”3
60(b)

is

an

The Fifth Circuit has cautioned that relief under Rule
“extraordinary

remedy”

because

the

“desire

for

a

judicial process that is predictable mandates caution in reopening
judgments.”4
Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to relief from the
Court's

judgment

under

Rule

60(b)(1)

for

"excusable

neglect."

"[F]or purposes of Rule 60(b), 'excusable neglect' is understood to
encompass situations in which the failure to comply with a filing
deadline is attributable to negligence."5

Alternatively, Plaintiff

argues that she is entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(6) for "any
other reason that justifies relief."

To justify relief under Rule

60(b)(6), a party must show “extraordinary circumstances” suggesting

1

Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 60(b).

2

Hesling v. CSX Transp., Inc., 396 F.3d 632, 638 (5th Cir.
2005).
3

Id.

4

In re Pettle, 410 F.3d 189, 191 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Carter v. Fenner, 136 F.3d 1000, 1007 (5th Cir. 1998)).
5

Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd.
P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 394 (1993).
3

that the party is faultless in what gives rise to the grounds for
relief.6
Plaintiff contends that she had a case file that contained
documents and other information useful to her claims.

According to

Plaintiff, despite her and her previous counsel's best efforts, they
were unable to locate this file for an extended period of time.
Plaintiff now argues that her previous counsel opposed Defendants'
motions to dismiss without having the file and was therefore unable
to bring the weight of her claims before this Court.

Plaintiff now

seeks relief from the Court's judgment under Rule 60(b)(1) on the
basis that the circumstances surrounded the missing case file
constitute excusable neglect.
Plaintiff also takes issue with the Court's previous ruling in
that it was rendered under a summary judgment standard without any
discovery having been conducted in the case. Rule 56(d)(1) provides
a procedural mechanism for addressing such a concern, which allows
a party to submit via affidavit a request for the court to delay
ruling on a motion due to lack of discovery.

Plaintiff concedes

that her previous counsel failed to comport with Rule 56(d)(1).
In the Court's previous ruling it noted that an adequate
allegation of the deprivation of a federally secured right stands as
a threshold issue in any cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

6

Id. at 393.
4

A

review of the Court's previous order dismissing the case reveals
that the Court did not look beyond the pleadings to make its
determination that Plaintiff failed to allege the deprivation of any
federally secured right.

This deficiency in Plaintiff's pleadings

provided a basis for the dismissal of Plaintiff's federal law claims
under Rule 12(b)(6).
The Court does not find that the circumstances surrounding
Plaintiff's missing case file constitute excusable neglect under
Rule 60(b)(1).

Furthermore, it is unclear how information from the

file would have helped identify the constitutional rights at issue,
which Plaintiff failed to identify in her complaint or in her
opposition to Defendants' motions.
As previously stated, the pleadings alone provided a sufficient
basis for the dismissal of Plaintiff's federal law claims.

The

Court considered summary judgment type evidence only for determining
the issue of whether the Baker defendants were operating under the
color of state law.

But even if this question had been answered in

the affirmative, Plaintiff still failed to allege the deprivation of
a federally secured right and her federal claims would have been
dismissed.

The Court therefore finds no merit in Plaintiff's

argument that she was prejudiced by the Court ruling on the motions
prior to discovery.
In

the

instant

motion,

Plaintiff

attempts

to

claim

that

violations of her son's Eighth Amendment and Due Process rights are
5

at issue in this lawsuit.

However, the Court does not see how

Plaintiff's failure to assert these constitutional violations prior
to the instant motion was due to the missing case file or lack of
discovery.

The Court declines to consider whether Plaintiff could

state a plausible claim under the Eighth Amendment and Due Process.
Plaintiff's new counsel, in the post-judgment posture of this
case, cannot fill the gaps in Plaintiff's federal claims where her
previous

counsel

failed

to

do

so.

"[I]t

has

long

been

held,

particularly in civil litigation, that the mistakes of counsel, who
is the legal agent of the client, are chargeable to the client."7
Rule 60(b) does not provide a basis for the Court to vacate its
prior judgment.
Accordingly, and for the foregoing reasons;
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff Jane Marie Leblanc's Rule 60(b)
Motion to Vacate Order and Judgment of Dismissal (Rec. Doc. 42) is
DENIED.
July 29, 2014

JAY C. ZAINEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

7

Pryor v. U.S. Postal Serv., 769 F.2d 281, 288 (5th Cir.
1985).
6