McGowan v. NOE-ILA Pension Fund
Filing
23
ORDER & REASONS granting 10 Motion for Summary Judgment; the plaintiffs claim is hereby dismissed. Signed by Judge Martin L.C. Feldman on 10/15/2012. (caa, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
TROY McGOWAN
CIVIL ACTION
v.
NO. 12-990
NEW ORLEANS EMPLOYERS
INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN’S
ASSOCIATION, AFL-CIO PENSION FUND
SECTION "F"
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is NOE-ILA Pension Fund’s motion to dismiss
or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. For the reasons that
follow, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
Background
This
litigation
arises
out
of
a
pension
fund’s
alleged
improvident termination of a participant’s disability retirement
benefits and retiree health insurance benefits.
The
New
Orleans
Employers
International
Longshoremen’s
Association, AFL-CIO Pension Fund is an employee pension benefit
plan as defined by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974, as amended, Section 3(2)(A)(I), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A)(I).
Pursuant to a Collective Bargaining Agreement for the Port of New
Orleans and Baton Rouge area, the Fund was established to provide
disability and pension benefits to its member participants.
Civil
litigation and enforcement “under the terms of the plan” are
governed by 29 U.S.C. § 1132.
Applicable provisions of the Plan
1
include:
1.16 - Disability means a physical or mental condition
that permanently prevents an Employee from working in
Employment in the Industry.
4.1 - Eligibility for Pension Benefits
...
(f) Disability Pension
Each Participant who satisfies all of the following
requirements is eligible to receive a Disability Pension:
(1) He must become totally and permanently disabled
(“Disabled”) as follows:
(i) if he earns eligibility due to work under a
Collective Bargaining Agreement, he must be
Disabled from performing work covered by the
Collective Bargaining Agreement applicable to
longshoremen;
...
(6) A Disability Pension or pro rata Disability Pension
will terminate the happening of any of the
following:...(ii) ceasing to be Disabled or
engaging in gainful employment other than for
purposes of rehabilitation on a nominal wage basis;
or (iii) the failure to comply with any other
requirements for a Disability Pension.
If
Disability Pension benefits are terminated, the
Board will provide written notice by first class
mail or personal delivery to the affected Qualified
Pensioner, no later than the first month for which
benefits are terminated, setting forth the reasons
for termination and an explanation of the right to
file a written claim for review under the Plan’s
Claims and Review Procedures....
...
9.5 - Claims Review Procedure
(a) Any claimant whose application or claim for
benefits under the Plan has been denied in whole or
in part has the right to appeal the determination
in accordance with the Claims Review Procedure
described in this Section.
(b) Within 180 days after receipt of an adverse benefit
determination for a Disability Claim...the claimant
or his representative may appeal the determination
by making a written request for review to the
Board, stating the claimant’s name, the fact that
he is appealing the initial determination on the
2
claim and the basis of the appeal.
If a timely
written request for review is not made, the initial
decision on the claim will be final. If a timely
written request for review is made, the claimant
may submit written comments, documents, records or
other information relating to the claim.
The
claimant may also obtain, upon request and free of
charge, reasonable access to, and copies of, all
documents, records and other information relevant
to his claim, and with respect to appeals involving
Disability Claims, identification of any medical or
vocational experts whose advice was obtained by the
Plan. A document, record or other information is
“relevant” to a claim if (i) it was relied upon in
making
the
determination
or
was
submitted,
considered or generated in the course of making the
determination;
or
(ii)
it
relates
to
the
administrative processes and safeguards used to
ensure and verify that claim determinations are
consistent with the Plan and that the Plan is
consistently
applied
to
similarly
situated
claimants; or (iii) for Disability Claims, it is a
statement of Plan policy or guidance concerning the
denied benefit without regard to whether it was
relied upon.
The review on appeal will take into account all
comments, documents, records and other information
submitted by the claimant and relating to the
claim, without regard to whether it was submitted
or considered in the initial determination.
For
Disability Claims, no deference will be given to
the initial determination.
If the initial
determination is based in whole or part on medical
judgment, the Trustees will consult with a health
care professional, with appropriate medial training
and experience, who was not consulted in connection
with the initial determination and is not a
subordinate of any individual who was consulted.
(c)
A decision on appeal must be made within a
reasonable period of time following the request for
review and no later than the first regularly
scheduled Board meeting immediately following
receipt of the request for review (which must be at
least quarterly); however, if the request for
review is received within 30 days prior to such
meeting and additional time is needed, it will be
decided no later than the second regularly
3
(d)
(e)
scheduled meeting following receipt of the request
for review....
If a claim is denied in whole or in part on review,
the notice of the decision on review to the
claimant will set forth the following information
in a manner calculated to be understood by the
claimant: (1) The specific reason(s) for the
adverse determination and reference to the specific
Plan provisions on which it is based; (2) A
statement that the claimant is entitled to receive,
upon request and free of charge, reasonable access
to, and copies of, all documents, records and
information relevant to the claim and a statement
of the claimant’s right to bring an action under
Section 502(a) of ERISA; and (3) For Disability
Claims, any internal rule, guideline, protocol or
other similar criterion that was relied upon in
making the determination or a statement that it was
relied upon and that a copy will be provided free
of charge upon request, and to the extent required,
a statement regarding the right of the claimant and
Plan to voluntary alternative dispute resolution
options, such as mediation, and contact information
for the local U.S. Department of Labor Office and
State insurance regulatory agency.
A decision on review of any claim made under the
Plan, or an initial decision on a claim under the
Plan that is not timely appealed, will be
conclusive, final and binding on all persons.
9.6 - Time Limit for Legal Actions
In no event may legal action be brought by or on behalf
of any individual to receive benefits under the Plan
unless the individual or his representative, if any, has
first fully complied with and timely exhausted the Claims
and Claims Review Procedures under the Plan.
In
addition, in no event may legal action be brought to
contest or set aside a decision on a claim, initially or
upon review, or otherwise to receive benefits under the
Plan, unless it is filed in a court of competent
jurisdiction within one (1) year following the date of
written notice of the decision denying the claim on
review or other final decision on a claim.
Section 9.1 provides that “[t]he Plan shall be administered by the
Board, acting in its capacity as the Pension Board.” Thomas R.
4
Daniel identifies himself as the Administrator for the NOE-ILA
Pension
Fund;
the
Plan
itself
identifies
him
as
the
Fund
Administrative Manager.
Troy McGowan, a longshoreman covered by the Plan of benefits
administered
by
the
Fund,
qualified
for
disability
effective
December 2003 after he was injured while winding up the landing
gear on a container.
As a result of his disabling injury, McGowan
settled with his stevedore employer pursuant to the Longshore and
Harbor Worker’s Compensation Act; the settlement was approved on
July 16, 2002.
In the settlement agreement, McGowan stipulated
that he was permanently disabled from returning to work on the
Waterfront.
Years later on April 18, 2011 McGowan and Plan Administrator
Daniel discussed that, if McGowan engaged in gainful employment,
then disability pension and health benefits would be terminated.1
Two days later, Daniel wrote McGowan:
This is to confirm our discussion of April 19, 2011
concerning the termination of your Disability Retirement
pension benefit payments and your retiree health
insurance benefits effective April 30, 2011. You called
me on April 18...to inquire about returning to work as a
longshoreman. I asked you if you were no longer disabled
and you replied that you could perform longshoreman work
and that you were currently working construction at a job
1
In his Response to List of Uncontested Material Facts,
McGowan “admit[s]” this fact; in his complaint, however, he alleges
that he contacted Daniel regarding the hospitalization of his
newborn child “and was confronted by Mr. Daniel with an allegation
that he worked at Lowe’s and therefore should be terminated from
[receiving] benefits.”
5
site at Lowes. You also said you worked in the longshore
industry for several employers during the 2009/2010 labor
contract year.
You qualified to receive a Disability Retirement
pension benefit on December 1, 2003 from the Pension Plan
because you were deemed disabled from performing work as
a longshoreman by the Fund’s physician (see Transcription
from Concentra Medical Centers enclosed). The Trustees
approved your application for a Disability Retirement
benefit on January 1, 2004 to be effective December 1,
2003 in the gross amount of $435.00 per month.
The Plan provides that Disability payments will end
if you cease to be Disabled or if you return to work
other than for the purpose of rehabilitation at a nominal
wage (see pages 15 and 16 of the enclosed Summary Plan
Description booklet). Since you are no longer disabled
from performing longshoreman work, your Disability
retirement benefit payments will end on April 30, 2011.
Your final payment was April 1, 2011. You may retire
with a reduced Early Retirement benefit between the ages
of 51 and 62 or you may defer your retirement date until
age 62 at which time you will receive your full Vested
Retirement benefit.
You and your dependents’ retiree health insurance
benefit will also terminate on April 30, 2011 because you
must be retired in order to qualify to receive those
benefits.
Your post-appeal rights are set forth on pages 36-39
of the enclosed Summary Plan Description booklet. Please
note your right to pursue legal action under Section
502(a) of ERISA. The limitation period is one (1) year
from today.....
The Fund received no written appeal advising it that McGowan
contested the ending of the disability benefits.2
Thereafter, on September 12, 2011, McGowan’s then-attorney,
Scott Bickford, wrote to the Fund that he was assisting McGowan in
2
McGowan suggests that he contests this assertion, and
simply says “see exhibit A.”
Buried in those administrative
hearing meeting minutes from August 17, 2012 is a position advanced
by McGowan and his counsel that McGowan called Mr. Daniel after
receiving the April 20 letter; McGowan suggests that his phone call
was his intention to appeal.
6
returning to work as a longshoreman. Bickford described McGowan as
“re-certified in Hazmat training, lift truck operations, heavy
truck operations and completed the classroom and written test for
top load operations.”
On February 9, 2012, nearly 10 months after the April 20
letter confirming an end to McGowan’s disability benefits, McGowan,
represented by new counsel, William Vincent, sought to continue
eligibility for disability benefits.3
On March 1, 2012 Vincent
again wrote Daniel:
Enclosed please find a Residual Functional Capacity
Evaluation for Longshoreman dated February 27, 2012
completed by Dr. Joseph Miceli.
As per my telephone
conversation with you today, please forward the Soc
Security forms which are required of my client and a
waiver of prescription extending my client’s right to
file court proceedings....
On April 18, 2012 McGowan sued NOE-ILA Pension Fund in this Court,
to challenge the termination of his benefits pursuant to ERISA, 29
U.S.C. § 1001.4
3
Specifically, McGowan’s counsel wrote:
By this letter, I formally request that Mr.
McGowan be reevaluated by a physician employed
by the Fund with regards to his continuing
eligibility for disability benefits. It is my
understanding that this request will be
presented to the board at it’s [sic] upcoming
meeting which would allow time for evaluation
prior to the one year limitation....
4
Meanwhile, the Trustees held an administrative hearing
on August 17, 2012, at which time a written record was developed
and evidence was received from McGowan and his counsel. According
to the minutes of the special “Pension Hearing”, Fund Counsel
7
The defendant now seeks dismissal on the ground that McGowan
failed to allege that he timely exhausted his administrative
remedies; alternatively, the defendant seeks summary relief in its
favor because McGowan filed his complaint without timely exhausting
his administrative remedies.
One day after requesting dismissal,
on September 12, 2012 the Board of the Fund issued its “final
decision” with respect to McGowan’s request through counsel that
disability benefits be continued:
The April 20, 2011 administrative action taken by the
Plan Administrator was correct. The subsequent “appeal”
was untimely.
Thus, the April 20, 2011 stands as
conclusive and final as affirmed here by the Board of
Trustees.
Also since the Fund has requested dismissal of McGowan’s lawsuit
and since the Board has issued its “final decision”, McGowan has
amended his complaint (as a matter of course) on October 1, 2012,
adding allegations that he exhausted his administrative remedies
and that the Board itself failed to comply with the Plan.
McGowan
alleges:
•
•
•
on April 18, 2011 he contacted Daniel regarding the
hospitalization of his child “and was confronted by Mr. Daniel
with an allegation that he worked at Lowe’s and therefore,
should be terminated from benefits.”
on April 20, 2011 Daniel wrote McGowan, informing him that,
effective April 30, 2011, he would no longer be receiving
Disability Retirement pension benefit payments and retiree
health insurance benefits because he was no longer disabled.
McGowan never requested termination of his Disability
Retirement benefits.
stated that “a formal appeal hearing was called in regard to Mr.
Troy McGowan’s disability retirement.”
8
•
•
•
•
•
•
on February 27, 2012 Dr. Joseph Miceli determined that McGowan
was unable to perform longshoreman duties.
the Fund wrongfully terminated the plaintiff’s disability
retirement and retiree health insurance benefits.
the Board of Trustees administering the Plan issued a final
decision on September 4, 2012. “In doing so the Board has
followed the Plan’s administrative procedure to allow
Plaintiff to file this lawsuit under ERISA.”
McGowan has exhausted his administrative remedies.
“[t]he member of the Board allegedly authorized by the Board
violated its own procedure by issuing a final letter advising
Plaintiff to file a suit under ERISA without affording him the
opportunity to appeal to the full Board as dictated by the
Plan.”
The Plan did not schedule an appeal hearing for McGowan until
it was served with this lawsuit on August 3, 2012. Until this
appeal hearing was scheduled, the Board had denied McGowan his
appeal right by representing that the decision reflected in
the first letter sent on April 20, 2012 could be submitted for
judicial review by filing an ERISA lawsuit.
Notwithstanding the allegations asserted in McGowan’s newly-amended
complaint, the defendant maintains that dismissal or summary relief
in its favor is warranted because McGowan failed to comply with the
terms of the Plan, which require exhaustion of administrative
remedies before filing a lawsuit.
I.
A.
Rule 12(b)(6) allows a party to move for dismissal of a
complaint when the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. Such a motion “‘is viewed with disfavor and
is rarely granted.’”
See Lowrey v. Tex. A & M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d
242, 247 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales,
Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir.
1982)).
9
“‘To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d
600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
1937, 1949 (2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“A claim
has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 129
S. Ct. at 1940.
“Factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in
the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).”
Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quotation marks,
citations, and footnote omitted).
The
United
States
Supreme
Court
suggests
a
“two-pronged
approach” to determine whether a complaint states a plausible claim
for relief.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
First, the Court must
identify pleadings that are conclusory and thus not entitled to the
assumption of truth.
supported
by
factual
Id.
A corollary: legal conclusions “must be
allegations.”
Id.
Second,
for
those
pleadings that are more than merely conclusory, the Court assumes
the
veracity
of
those
well-pleaded
factual
allegations
and
determines “whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to
relief.”
Id.
This facial plausibility standard is met when the plaintiffs
10
pleads facts that allow the Court to “draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. at
1949. Claims that are merely conceivable will not survive a motion
to dismiss; claims must be plausible.
Twombley, 550 U.S. at 570;
see also Iqbal, 129 S. Ct at 1949 (“The plausibility standard is
not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully”).
“Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
defendant’s
liability,
it
stops
short
of
the
line
between
possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.”
Iqbal 129
S.
the
Ct.
at
1949
(internal
quotations
omitted).
In
end,
evaluating a motion to dismiss is a “context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense.”
Id. at 1950.
In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court may consider
documents that are essentially “part of the pleadings” -- that is,
any documents attached to or incorporated in the plaintiffs’
complaint that are central to the plaintiffs’ claim for relief.
Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d 285, 288 (5th
Cir. 2004) (citing Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d
496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2000)).
Also, the Court is permitted to
consider matters of public record and other matters subject to
judicial notice without converting the motion into one for summary
judgment.
See United States ex rel. Willard v. Humana Health Plan
11
of Texas Inc., 336 F.3d 375, 379 (5th Cir. 2003).
However, if “other” matters outside the pleadings -- ones that
are neither part of the pleadings nor matters of public record -are presented to and not excluded by the Court, Rule 12(d) requires
that a motion presented under Rule 12(b)(6) “must be treated as one
for summary judgment under Rule 56" and that “[a]ll parties must be
given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is
pertinent to the motion.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d).
B.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 instructs that summary
judgment is proper if the record discloses no genuine issue as to
any material fact such that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
No genuine issue of fact exists if
the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact
to find for the non-moving party.
See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
A genuine issue of
fact exists only "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the non-moving party."
Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The Court emphasizes that the mere argued existence of a
factual dispute does not defeat an otherwise properly supported
motion.
See
id.
Therefore,
"[i]f
the
evidence
is
merely
colorable, or is not significantly probative," summary judgment is
appropriate.
Id. at 249-50 (citations omitted).
12
Summary judgment
is also proper if the party opposing the motion fails to establish
an essential element of his case.
477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
In this regard, the non-moving party
must do more than simply deny the allegations raised by the moving
party.
See Donaghey v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., 974 F.2d
646, 649 (5th Cir. 1992).
Rather, he must come forward with
competent evidence, such as affidavits or depositions, to buttress
his claims.
Id.
Hearsay evidence and unsworn documents do not
qualify as competent opposing evidence.
Martin v. John W. Stone
Oil Distrib., Inc., 819 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1987). Finally, in
evaluating the summary judgment motion, the Court must read the
facts
in
the
light
most
favorable
to
the
non-moving
party.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
II.
The Fund requests that the Court dismiss McGowan’s claim for
arbitrary and capricious termination of benefits because he failed
to exhaust the administrative remedies required by the Plan.5
ERISA gives a plan participant standing to bring a civil
action “to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan
[or] to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan....”
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
29
Before resorting to federal litigation to
recover benefits, “claimants seeking benefits from an ERISA plan
5
Here, materials have been presented that go beyond the
pleadings; the Court will therefore address the defendant’s
alternative request for summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d).
13
must first exhaust available administrative remedies under the
plan.”
Bourgeois v. Pension Plan for Employees of Santa Fe Int’l
Corps., 215 F.3d 475, 479 (5th Cir. 2000)(citing Denton v. First
Nat’l Bank of Waco, 765 F.2d 1295, 1300 (5th Cir. 1985)).
“One of
the policies underlying the exhaustion requirement was Congress’s
desire that ERISA trustees, not federal courts, be responsible for
their action so that not every ERISA action becomes a federal
case.”
Medina v. Anthem Life Ins. Co., 983 F.2d 29, 33 (5th Cir.
1993); Denton, 765 F.2d at 1300 (nothing that the other two
policies underlying the exhaustion requirement are to provide a
clear record of administrative action and to ensure that judicial
review is made under the arbitrary and capricious standard).
The
exceptions to the exhaustion requirement are limited: a claimant
may be excused from the exhaustion requirement if he shows either
that pursuing an administrative remedy would be futile or that he
has been denied meaningful access to administrative remedies.
Denton, 765 F.2d at 1302 (futility exception); Meza v. Gen. Battery
Corp.,
908
F.2d
1262,
1279
(5th
Cir.
1990)(meaningful
access
exception).
The record shows that McGowan’s benefits were terminated
effective April 30, 2011, and that he received notification of this
by letter dated April 20, 2011.
Under the Plan, McGowan was
required to submit a written appeal or written request for a claim
review, in writing, by October 20, 2011, which was within 180 days
14
of the April 20, 2011 denial/termination of benefits letter.
The record shows that McGowan did not comply with the Plan’s
claim review procedures. In fact, McGowan did not submit a written
request to appeal the termination of his benefits within 180 days
of April 20, 2011.6
Therefore, this lawsuit that challenges the
termination of his benefits was filed without McGowan having timely
exhausted the internal review procedures provided by the Plan and,
thus, in contravention of the terms of the Plan. Moreover, McGowan
presents no recognized excuse for his failure to exhaust: he has
not suggested that exhaustion of the internal review process would
have been futile, or that he was denied meaningful access to
internal review.
McGowan disputes whether the April 20 letter from Mr. Daniel
was a “legal” or “real” denial of benefits; he insists that the
contents of the April 20 termination of benefits letter was legally
inadequate such that the appeal period was never triggered.
He
provides no support for his argument and, even if the Court
indulged him, the contents of the April 20 letter is in substantial
compliance with ERISA such that the letter triggered the running of
his administrative appeal period.
See 29 U.S.C. § 1133;7 see also
6
McGowan has argued that he orally advised Daniel that he
intended to appeal the termination of benefits.
But orally
acknowledging an intent to appeal does not comply with the Plan’s
requirement that appeals be made in writing.
7
This provision specifies:
15
Lacy v. Fulbright & Jaworski, 405 F.3d 254, 256-57 (5th Cir.
2005)(holding that an initial denial notice need only be in
substantial compliance with 29 U.S.C. § 1133 and the DOL Regulation
§ 2560.503-1 in order to trigger an ERISA appeal period).
The
record shows that, by the April 20 letter, McGowan was informed
that his benefits were being terminated and why, with references to
the pages of the attached summary plan description book; McGowan
was advised about his post-appeal rights and directed to the pages
of the enclosed summary plan booklet for more information; and he
was also advised about his right to file an ERISA lawsuit. McGowan
fails to persuade the Court that the letter fails to substantially
comply with the statutory and regulatory notice requirements.
To
the contrary, he had all of the Plan appeal procedure pinpointed
for him (“[y]our post-appeal rights are set forth on pages 36-39 of
In
accordance
with
regulations
of
the
Secretary, every employee benefit plan shall
(1) provide adequate notice in writing to any
participant or beneficiary whose claim for
benefits under the plan has been denied,
setting forth the specific reasons for such
denial, written in a manner calculated to be
understood by the participant, and
(2) afford a reasonable opportunity to any
participant whose claim for benefits has been
denied for a full and fair review by the
appropriate named fiduciary of the decision
denying the claim.
29 U.S.C. § 1133. As the Fifth Circuit has observed, a Department
of Labor regulation adds a gloss on § 1133(1)’s notice requirement.
See Lacy, 405 F.3d at 256 (citation omitted); see also 29 C.F.R.
2560.503-1(g).
16
the enclosed Summary Plan Description booklet”).
The April 20
letter was sufficient for the purpose of commencing the running of
the period within which McGowan could have submitted an internal
written appeal.
It is not insignificant to add that McGowan also
had the benefit of counsel.
Because he failed to lodge a timely written appeal, and has
failed to show that either exception to exhaustion applies, McGowan
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the Plan.
Furthermore, any internal appeal lodged after the expiration of the
180 day deadline would be untimely under the Plan and, thus, any
appeal of the termination of benefits decision is now time-barred.
Accordingly, the Fund’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED; the
plaintiff’s claim is hereby dismissed.
New Orleans, Louisiana, October 15, 2012
______________________________
MARTIN L. C. FELDMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
17
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?