Price et al v. Housing Authority of New Orleans et al
Filing
60
ORDER AND REASONS granting 32 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction; Defendant Housing Authority of New Orleans is dismissed. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle. (ijg, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ORA PRICE
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
No. 12-992
HOUSING AUTHORITY OF NEW ORLEANS
SECTION B(2)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Defendant, Housing Authority of New
Orleans (“Defendant”), with a Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. No.
32) pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1), 12(h)(3), or in the alternative,
12(b)(6).
Also
in
the
alternative,
they
submit
their
motion
pursuant to Rule 12(e). In response, Plaintiffs, Ora, Leonard,
and
Darryl
Price
(“Plaintiffs”)
submitted
a
Memorandum
in
Opposition (Rec. Doc. No. 57). For the reasons articulated below,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 19, 2012, Plaintiffs filed their complaint in this
Court against Defendant and several others, including Interstate
Realty Management Company (“Interstate Realty”). (Rec. Doc. No. 1
at 1). The complaint generally alleged several state and federal
violations, the latter including deprivation of 14th Amendment
rights, violations of the United States Housing Act of 1937, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1437 et seq. (“United States Housing Act”),
and deprivation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.
Id. at 2.
Plaintiffs’ claims appear to arise out of events surrounding
their residential eviction from 3110 Edith Weston Place in New
Orleans, Louisiana. Id. at 6. Plaintiffs contend that they were
wrongly
evicted
premises
that
resulted
in
Plaintiffs
by
Interstate
involved
“police
also
Plaintiff
action
insist
Realty
that
on
for
Ora
the
the
a
shooting
property.”
subsequent
the
grandson,
Price’s
on
and
Id.
at
termination
7-9.
by
Defendant of their Section 8 voucher was wrongful. Id. at 9. On
June 16, 2011, in an evidentiary hearing requested by Interstate
Realty in the First City Court for the Parish of Orleans, a Rule
to Evict was issued against the Plaintiffs.1 (Rec. Doc. No. 31-1
at 3).
Plaintiffs
appealed
that
ruling
1
to
the
Louisiana
Fourth
The court’s findings in the eviction proceeding included that: (1) the “First
City Court has jurisdiction in cases of eviction” under LA. CODE CIV. P. art.
4844; (2) “there is no credible evidence that a formal grievance hearing was
requested by [Plaintiffs Ora, Leonard, or Darryl Price];” and (3) Plaintiffs
violated the lease agreement by allowing Oneal and Leroy Price to live at Ora
Price’s public housing address in contravention of the lease, and additionally
allowed their unauthorized occupancy and (illegal) activities on the property to
“threate[n] the health, safety, and right to peaceful enjoyment” of other
residents and staff, also in violation of the lease agreement. (Rec. Doc. No. 312 at 3; Id. at 4; Id. at 5-6).
In addition to the December 5, 2010 shooting incident involving Oneal and
Leroy Price, the court found, based on testimony, that the two would regularly
be found “loitering” around, or “going in and out of,” the residence “at varying
hours of the day and night.” Id. at 4-5. This activity, the court said, “was part
of an ongoing inquiry by NOPD into suspected criminal activity relating to Oneal
Price and Leroy Price,” and violated the “One Strike Policy” that Plaintiffs
agreed to in their lease. Id. at 5. Further, the court stated that Oneal Price
had a prior drug arrest and on one instance was stopped by police at Plaintiffs’
address, but “fled the scene” and was later arrested and was serving time in jail
at the time of the court’s ruling. Id. at 5. For those reasons, the court granted
the Rule to Evict, finding that “[Plaintiffs] violated the lease agreement by
allowing unauthorized occupants to reside at the leased premises and additionally
allowed those unauthorized occupants to engage in activities which threatened the
health, safety, and right of peaceful enjoyment of residents and staff.” Id. at
6.
2
Circuit
Court
Appeal,2
of
and
on
March
7,
2012, the
Fourth
Circuit affirmed, stating that “[c]onsidering the testimony and
evidence presented at trial,” the trial court did not err in
granting the Rule to Evict.3 Id.; (Rec. Doc. No. 31-3 at 9).
Shortly after being denied a rehearing by the Louisiana Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeal on March 28, 2012, Plaintiffs applied to
the Louisiana Supreme Court. (Rec. Doc. No. 31-1 at 3). One month
before Plaintiffs were denied certiorari review by the Louisiana
Supreme Court on May 18, 2012, they filed their complaint in this
Court on April 19, 2012. Id. at 1, 3. Thus, the instant complaint
was filed amidst a pending state court proceeding.
Plaintiffs’ claim that Defendant “[had] a duty to monitor
and evaluate the administrative and managerial actions of their
contractors [and sub-contractors] vested with the management of
public
housing
to
ensure
compliance
with
mandate[s]
of
the
federal government, . . . federal statute[s], [the C]onstitution
and [C]ode of [F]ederal [R]egulations.”
9).
They
claim
allegations
of
that
Defendant
[Interstate
(Rec. Doc. No. 1 at 5,
“neglected
Realty]
to
against
investigate
the
plaintiff,
and
permitted the revocation of their [S]ection 8 voucher and housing
2
The Court notes that information regarding these state court proceedings was
absent from the former motions submitted by Defendants James Ryan, James Ryan
& Associates, L.L.C., Plaintiffs, and the record, itself.
3
Plaintiffs’ claims in that appeal were that “the trial court erred in granting
the Rule to Evict, adversely affecting [Plaintiffs’] right to occupy the property
under federal law, and that the evidence was insufficient to support such a
ruling,” and further that the judgment “was obtained by fraud and ill practices.”
(Rec. Doc. No. 31-3 at 7, 8).
3
accommodation.” Id. at 9. Plaintiffs also claim that Defendant
“possessed the power of authority to prevent the action taken
against
plaintiffs,
but
failed
to
take
any
action
in
prevention/correction of the adverse action.” Id. at 12.
CONTENTIONS OF DEFENDANTS
Defendant contends that, in accordance with FED. R. CIV. PRO.
12(b)(1),
the
jurisdiction
Court
over
lacks
federal
Plaintiffs’
question
claims,
and
subject
further
matter
that,
in
accordance with FED. R. CIV. PRO. 12(h)(3), Plaintiffs’ complaint
does not state an injury-in-fact and, therefore, Plaintiffs do
not have standing to bring this suit. (Rec. Doc. No. 32 at 1);
(Rec. Doc. No. 32-1 at 3). In the alternative, Defendant contends
that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for which relief can be
granted. (Rec. Doc. No. 32 at 1). Further, Defendant asserts that
“[e]ven assuming that all of the factual allegations in the
Complaint concerning the termination of the Plaintiffs’ lease are
true,” Plaintiffs were not deprived of any rights when they were
evicted. (Rec. Doc. No. 32-1 at 3). Also, in the alternative,
Defendants contend that the complaint filed by Plaintiffs is so
vague that Defendant cannot reasonably prepare a response. Id. at
5. Therefore, if the case is not dismissed, Plaintiffs, pursuant
to FED. R. CIV. PRO. 12(e), should be required to re-plead the
entire complaint, and specifically allege the acts of Defendant
4
complained of, and the statutes under which the claim is brought.
Id.
CONTENTIONS OF PLAINTIFFS
Plaintiffs
insist
that
federal
question
subject
matter
jurisdiction exists for their claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1331, 1343,4 and 1367, 42 U.S.C. § 1437(a), and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983
and 1985. (Rec. Doc. No. 57 at 1, 2). They also state that their
complaint meets the requirements necessary to state a claim. Id.
at 3. Plaintiffs insist that the sufficiency of their complaint
should be judged “not [on] whether or not they will prevail.” Id.
Plaintiffs also maintain that they have a private right of action
against defendants. Id. at 5.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
A court presented with a 12(b)(1) motion for lack of subject
matter
jurisdiction
should
consider
that
motion
first
before
addressing any motion regarding the merits of the case, so as to
avoid prematurely dismissing a case with prejudice. Hitt v. City
of Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606, 608 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam). A
court’s dismissal based on Rule 12(b)(1) is not a determination
on the merits and does not prevent the plaintiff from pursuing
4
28 U.S.C. § 1343(a) in pertinent part, provides for recovery: (1)“for any
act done in furtherance of any conspiracy mentioned in section 1985 of Title
42,” and (2) “from any person who fails to prevent or to aid in preventing any
wrongs mentioned in section 1985 of Title 42 which he had knowledge were about
to occur and power to prevent.” 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(1)-(a)(2).
5
the claim in a court with proper jurisdiction. Ramming v. United
States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Hitt, 561 F.2d
at 608).
B. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
A lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be found in: (1)
the complaint, (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts
contained in the record, or (3) “the complaint supplemented by
undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts.”
Id. (citing Barrera-Montenegro v. United States, 74 F.3d 657, 659
(5th Cir. 1996)). The burden of proof for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion
is on the party asserting jurisdiction. Id. (citing McDaniel v.
United States, 899 F.Supp. 305, 307 (E.D. Tex. 1995)).
Federal subject matter jurisdiction is met when either the
requirements of diversity are established or when the plaintiff’s
claims arise under federal law. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, §1332(a)
(2006). The parties do not allege and the facts do not show that
there is diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Absent
diversity, federal question jurisdiction is required.
“‘[F]ederal question’ jurisdiction has long been governed by
the well-pleaded-complaint rule, which requires that a federal
question
be
facially
apparent
from
a
‘properly
pleaded
complaint.’” Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 11
(2003) (quoting Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392
6
(1987)). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court
to
infer
more
complaint
has
than
the
alleged
mere
—but
possibility
it
has
not
of
misconduct,
‘show[n]’—
‘that
the
the
pleader is entitled to relief.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
679 (2009)(quoting FED. R. CIV. PRO. 8(a)(2)). In addition, “while
legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they
must be supported by factual allegations.” Id.
Plaintiffs filed their complaint pro se. The Supreme Court
has stated that “[a] document filed pro se ‘is to be liberally
construed,’ and ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded,
must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Plaintiffs,
however, do not cite any facts in their complaint regarding the
actions of Defendant, other than that Defendant revoked their
Section
8
Plaintiffs’
defendants,
voucher.
general
of
(Rec.
Doc.
No.
allegations,
various
federal
1
at
against
9).
Also,
several
statutory
and
despite
other
named
state
law
violations, Plaintiffs do not cite any authority under which
Defendant would have any “duty to monitor” or “investigate” the
actions
of
other
named
defendants,
or
prevent
Plaintiffs’
eviction by the state court. (Rec. Doc. No. 1 at 1-2, 9, 12).
Further, most of the facts and allegations contained in
Plaintiffs’ complaint revolve around Plaintiffs’ eviction and the
7
state court eviction proceeding, not Defendant’s actions (i.e.,
the revocation of the Plaintiffs’ voucher, which appears to have
occurred
after
the
eviction).
(Rec.
Doc.
No.
1).
It
is
not
alleged, nor does the record suggest, that Defendant was involved
in
the
eviction
of
Plaintiffs
or
the
eviction
proceeding.
Plaintiffs do, however, loosely allege that Defendant “permitted
the revocation of their [S]ection 8 voucher.” Id. at 9.
According to 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(b)(2), “the [public housing
authority] must terminate program assistance for a family evicted
from housing assisted under the program for serious violation of
the
lease.”
24
C.F.R.
§
982.552(b)(2).
Amongst
the
listed
obligations of a participant family in the Section 8 program:
“[t]he family may not commit any serious or repeated violation of
the lease;” “[t]he composition of the assisted family residing in
the unit must be approved by the [public housing authority] . . .
[and n]o other person . . . may reside in the unit;” and “[t]he
members
of
the
household
may
not
engage
in
.
.
.
criminal
activity that threatens the health, safety or right to peaceful
enjoyment of other residents . . . .” 24 C.F.R. § 982.551(e)-(l).
Many similar obligations were also contained in Plaintiffs’ lease
agreement
with
Interstate
Realty,
and
the
One
Strike
Policy
signed by Plaintiffs. (Rec. Doc. No. 31-2 at 5). Given the state
court findings in the eviction proceeding that Plaintiffs were in
8
violation of several of these obligations, there does not appear
to be anything improper about Defendant’s actions in revoking
Plaintiffs’ Section 8 voucher. (Rec. Doc. No. 31-2 at 5, 6).
Moreover, this Court has previously held that the RookerFeldman doctrine does not allow for district courts to entertain
collateral attacks on state court judgments, which is precisely
what Plaintiffs urge in this case.5 Storyville Dist. New Orleans,
LLC v. Canal St. Dev. Corp., 785 F. Supp. 2d 579, 586 (E.D. La.
2011). Without any supporting facts or authority to accompany
their
conclusory
allegations,
Plaintiffs
have
failed
to
meet
their burden in showing federal court authority to review the
state court judgment at issue.
Plaintiff should seek available
relief within the state court appellate system for such review.
B. Defendants’ 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss and 12(e) Motion for a
More Definite Statement
5
In Storyville, the plaintiffs asserted various civil and constitutional rights
violations arising out of the defendants’ allegedly conspiratorial actions which
resulted in an “erroneous ruling” in the eviction proceeding. Storyville, 785 F.
Supp. 2d at 586. The court noted that application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
is “limited to cases ‘brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries
caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.’”
Id. at 586 (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280,
284 (2005)). “If the issues before the federal district court are ‘inextricably
intertwined’ with a state court judgment, the Court is ‘in essence being called
upon to review the state-court decision,’” and the federal district court does
not have the authority to do so. Id. at 587 (quoting United States v. Shepard,
23 F.3d 923, 924 (5th Cir. 1994)). Further, the court stated, “the casting of a
complaint in the form of a civil rights action cannot circumvent this rule.” Id.
(quoting Liedtke v. State Bar of Texas, 18 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1994)). The
Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply in Storyville because the state court
proceedings had not yet ended at the time of the district court’s decision. Id.
at 590. Here, however, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is fully applicable.
9
Because this Court lacks jurisdiction over the instant case,
Defendants’ 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a
claim and 12(e) Motion for a More Definite Statement will not be
considered at this time.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 27th day of June, 2012.
_________________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
10
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