Evans v. Transocean Offshore USA Inc.

Filing 28

ORDER AND REASONS denying 17 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Chief Judge Sarah S. Vance on 12/10/13. (jjs, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MITCHELL EVANS

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 12-1338

TRANSOCEAN OFFSHORE USA, INC.

SECTION: R

ORDER AND REASONS
Defendant GlobalSantaFe Drilling Company ("GSF") moves for
summary judgment dismissing plaintiff Mitchell Evans' Jones Act
negligence and unseaworthiness claims.

Because the facts

specifically averred by the plaintiff would permit a reasonable
jury to find in his favor, the Court DENIES the motion.

I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff claims to have injured his lower back while

working as a roustabout for GSF aboard the DEVELOPMENT DRILLER I
("DDI").

On March 12, 2012, plaintiff was cleaning drilling mud

from the deck of the DDI when he allegedly slipped in an area he
had previously throughly cleaned with soap and water.1

Rather

than reporting the incident, plaintiff cleaned the area again
with soap and water, completed his tour, and went to bed.2

1

R. Doc. 17-4 at 4-5; R. Doc. 22-2 at 13-15.

2

R. Doc. 22-2 at 19-22.

He

reported the alleged accident when he woke up the next morning.3
Plaintiff sued Transocean Offshore USA, Inc. on May 23,
2012, alleging Jones Act negligence and unseaworthiness.4

He

also seeks maintenance and cure benefits, as well as punitive
damages and attorney's fees for the withholding of these
benefits.5

On August 14, 2012, plaintiff filed his First Amended

Complaint, substituting GSF as a defendant.6

Plaintiff now

claims that he slipped on hydraulic oil that leaked onto the deck
after he had already cleaned the area where the accident
occurred.7

At plaintiff's deposition, defendant asked plaintiff

if he had slipped on drilling mud:
A.
Q.

Okay.

A.

I'm pretty sure it was hydraulic oil that I slipped in.

Q.

Hydraulic oil from where?

A.

Id.

No, sir.

Around on the hoist of the cable here or something.
The [Offshore Installation Manager ("OIM")] told me
there had been a hydraulic leak down there after I got
hurt.

The OIM, Steve McElhose, denies making this statement, but

3

Id. at 21-22.

4

R. Doc. 1.

5

Id.

6

R. Doc. 5.

7

R. Doc. 22-2 at 15.
2

GSF accepts plaintiff's allegations as true for the purposes of
this motion.
Later, defendant questioned plaintiff about the alleged
hydraulic leak:
Q.

Okay.

And you didn't see that hydraulic?

A.

No, sir.

Q.

And who told you that there was a hydraulic leak there?

A.

The OIM on duty.

. . .
Q.

Okay.

Now, did you ever see what you slipped in?

A.

I'd seen, it was like an oil sheen down there, but I
wasn't for sure what it was.

Q.

Was the oil sheen different than what the drilling mud
would look like?

A.

It would be hard to tell. Because, after the drilling
mud was down there, it just looked like oil and all on
the old deck.8

Defendant then asked plaintiff if he had examined the area
where the accident occurred after he first cleaned it:
A.

Yes.

Q.

Did it have any sheen at that time?

A.

No, sir.

Q.

So, you're telling me when you came back to that area
and you slipped in it, you saw a sheen?

8

Id. at 16-17.
3

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Okay.
oil?

A.

I don't know for a fact it was.9

Now, do you know that that sheen was hydraulic

Finally, defendant questioned plaintiff about the basis for
his conclusion that he slipped in hydraulic oil rather than
drilling mud:
Q.

Okay. What evidence do you have that what you slipped
on was hydraulic fluid that leaked from the coil as
opposed to drilling mud that you had not cleaned up?

A.

That would just be the OIM telling me that there had
been a hydraulic leak down there that they had been
trying to get fixed.

Q.

But you never went–and he told you that when? the day
after [sic]?

A.

Yes, sir.

the next morning [sic].10

Defendant now moves for summary judgment on plaintiff's
negligence and unseaworthiness claims.11

It argues that even

accepting as true plaintiff's assertion that the OIM told him
there had been a hydraulic oil leak, because the OIM did not have
personal knowledge of the substance in which plaintiff slipped,
his statement cannot form the basis of plaintiff's conclusion
that he slipped in hydraulic oil.

9

Id. at 17.

10

Id. at 20-21.

11

R. Doc. 17-1.
4

It further contends that based

on the evidence, a reasonable jury could not find by a
preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff slipped in hydraulic
oil as opposed to drilling mud.

II.

LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is warranted when “the movant shows that

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);
Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).
When assessing whether a dispute as to any material fact exists,
the Court considers “all of the evidence in the record but
refrains from making credibility determinations or weighing the
evidence.”

Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins.

Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 2008).

All reasonable

inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, but
“unsupported allegations or affidavits setting forth ultimate or
conclusory facts and conclusions of law are insufficient to
either support or defeat a motion for summary judgment.”

Galindo

v. Precision Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Where, as here, the dispositive issue is one on which the
nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the
moving party may satisfy its burden merely by pointing out that
the evidence in the record is insufficient with respect to an
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essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim.
477 U.S. at 325.

See Celotex,

The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party,

who must, by submitting or referring to evidence, set out
specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists.
324.

See id. at

The proper inquiry is whether reasonable jurors could find

by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled
to a verdict in his favor.

Walker v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 853

F.2d 355, 366 (5th Cir. 1988) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).

The mere existence of a

scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will
therefore be insufficient.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

The nonmovant may not rest upon the pleadings, but must
identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue for trial.
Id. at 325.

See also Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (“Rule 56 ‘mandates

the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery
and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to
that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden
of proof at trial.’”) (emphasis in original) (citing Celotex, 477
U.S. at 332).

Summary judgment is appropriate where "critical

evidence is so weak or tenuous on an essential fact that it could
not support a judgment in favor of the nonmovant."

Little v.

Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting
Armstrong v. City of Dallas, 997 F.2d 62, 67 (5th Cir. 1993)).
III. DISCUSSION
6

Defendant argues that because the OIM did not see the
substance in which plaintiff slipped, he does not have personal
knowledge of what the substance was.

Without personal knowledge,

defendant argues, the OIM's alleged statement cannot form the
basis of plaintiff's conclusion that he slipped on hydraulic oil.
Defendant contends that plaintiff's testimony reveals no other
basis for his belief that the substance was hydraulic oil as
opposed to drilling mud.
It is clear from plaintiff's deposition testimony that
although he was able to detect an oily sheen at the accident site
that was not present after he first cleaned the area, he was
unable at that time to discern from its appearance whether the
sheen was caused by hydraulic oil or drilling mud.

It is also

true that the OIM lacked personal knowledge of the nature of the
substance.

The defendant does not allege–at least for the

purposes of this motion–that the OIM lacked personal knowledge of
the existence of a hydraulic leak at the accident site.
Accepting as true plaintiff's uncontroverted assertions (1) that
he had thoroughly cleaned the accident site, which was free of an
oily sheen before his fall; (2) that after slipping, he noticed
an oily sheen, although he could not be sure it was hydraulic
fluid; and (3) that the OIM told him the next morning that there
was a hydraulic leak in the area, that evidence, taken together,
could permit a reasonable inference that the plaintiff slipped on
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hydraulic oil.

That plaintiff was unable to identify the

substance from his own observations is not dispositive.

IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES defendant's

motion for summary judgment.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 10th day of December, 2013.
____________________________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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