Trujillo v. Shivers et al

Filing 9

ORDER & REASONS denying 7 Motion to Dismiss or Alternatively Stay on the Basis of Abstention. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 10/12/12. (sek, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

PAMELA TRUJILLO

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 12-1532

ENOCH SHIVERS, ET AL.

SECTION: "J”(4)

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively
Stay, on the Basis of Abstention (Rec. Doc. 7), filed on behalf of
Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., (“Ryder”), Performance Food Group, Inc.,
(“Performance Food Group”), and Zurich American Insurance Co.,
(“Zurich”)

(collectively

“Defendants”).

Pamela

(“Plaintiff”) has filed an Opposition (Rec. Doc. 8).

Trujillo
Having

considered the Defendants’ motion, the parties’ memoranda, and the
applicable law, the Court finds that the Defendants’ motion should
be DENIED for reasons set forth more fully below.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND FACTS
This lawsuit arises out of a June 17, 2011 motor vehicle
accident in St. Tammany Parish.

Plaintiff allegedly sustained

personal injuries when a Performance Food Group employee, Enoch

Shivers, improperly changed lanes while traveling on eastbound
Interstate 12, forcing the plaintiff to lose control of her
vehicle, leave the roadway, and flip three or four times.

On June

11, 2012, Plaintiff filed a petition against Enoch Shivers and
Defendants in the 22nd Judicial District Court for the Parish of
St. Tammany seeking compensation for the injures that she allegedly
sustained in the accident.

Four days later, on June 15, 2012,

Plaintiff filed an identical complaint against Defendants in this
Court, asserting diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 as
the jurisdictional basis for the action.
PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS
Defendants
alternatively

argue

stay

that

these

the

parallel

Court
federal

should

dismiss,

proceedings

out

or
of

deference to the 22nd Judicial District Court for the Parish of St.
Tammany.

In Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United

States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), the Supreme Court adopted a multifactored test used to determine whether exceptional circumstances
exist that warrant a stay of a parallel federal proceeding.

The

Defendants argue, applying the Colorado River factors, that there
are exceptional circumstances in this case warranting dismissal, or
alternatively, a stay of the parallel federal proceedings.
Plaintiff counters that the only issue is whether the Court
may stay the federal proceedings pending the resolution of the
parallel state proceedings, because outright dismissal on the basis
of traditional abstention principles is never permitted in an

action for damages.

Plaintiff further argues that the Defendants’

request for a stay should be denied, because Defendants cannot meet
their burden of showing “exceptional circumstances,” as none of the
Colorado River factors weigh in favor of abstention.
LEGAL STANDARD
Abstention is a very narrow exception to the duty of a federal
district court to adjudicate a controversy that is properly before
it.

Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,

16 (1983); Colorado River Water Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. at
813.

Under the Colorado River doctrine, a federal court may only

abstain under “exceptional circumstances.”

Brown v. Pacific Life

Ins. Co., 462 F.3d 384, 394 (5th Cir. 2006)(quoting Kelly Inv. Inc.
v. Contintental Common Corp., 315 F.3d 494, 497 (5th Cir. 2002)).
There are six factors the court must balance on a case-by-case
basis

to

determine

whether

exceptional

circumstances

warrant

abstention: (1) assumption by either state or federal court over a
res, (2) relative inconvenience of the fora, (3) avoidance of
piecemeal litigation, (4) the order in which jurisdiction was
obtained by the concurrent fora, (5) the extent federal law
provides the rules of decision on the merits, and (6) the adequacy
of the state proceedings in protecting the rights of the party
invoking federal jurisdiction.
omitted).

Brown, 462 F.3d at 395 (citations

“[T]he decision whether to dismiss a federal action

because of parallel state-court litigation does not rest on a
mechanical checklist, but on a careful balancing of the important

factors as they apply in a given case, with the balance heavily
weighted in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction.”

Moses H. Cone

Mem. Hosp., 460 U.S. at 16 (emphasis added).
DISCUSSION
A. Assumption of Either Court Over a Res
Neither

this

Court

nor

the

state

court

has

exercised

jurisdiction over any res in this personal injury suit.

“The

absence of this factor is not neutral. Rather the absence of this
factor weighs against abstention.”

Murphy v. Uncle Ben’s, Inc.,

168 F.3d 734, 738 (5th Cir. 1999).

Thus, this factor weighs

against abstention.
B. The Relative Inconvenience of the Forums
The Defendants argue that St. Tammany Parish is the more
convenient forum for disposition of this case. They point out that
St. Tammany Parish is where Plaintiff resides, where the accident
occurred, where the officer and agency charged with investigating
the accident are presumably located, and where several sources of
proof are located. The Plaintiff argues that neither forum is more
or

less

convenient

courthouses,

and

due

that

to

the

the

close

proximity

inconsequential

of

difference

the

two

in

the

convenience of the federal forum weighs against abstention.
The Plaintiff has the stronger argument.

The Court’s inquiry

with respect to this factor is “‘whether the inconvenience of the
federal forum is so great’ that abstention is warranted,” not
whether the state forum is more convenient.

Kelly Inv., Inc., 315

F.3d at 498 (quoting Evanston Ins. Co. v. Jimco, Inc., 844 F.2d
1185, 1192 (5th Cir. 1988)).

When “the federal and state courts

are in approximately the same geographic location within the
state,” this factor weighs against abstention.

Black Sea Inv.,

Inc. v. United Heritage Corp., 204 F.3d 647, 650 (5th Cir. 2000).
The

St.

Tammany

Parish

courthouse

is

located

in

Covington,

Louisiana, and the Eastern District is located in New Orleans,
Louisiana, approximately an hour away.

The Court finds that the

difference in the relative convenience of the two forums is
inconsequential. Thus, any additional inconvenience of the federal
forum is not so great that abstention is warranted.

This factor

weighs against abstention.
C. Avoidance of Piecemeal Litigation
The Defendants argue, without citing any authority, that
allowing both suits to proceed on parallel tracks would clearly
result in piecemeal litigation.

According to Defendants, the

serious risk of conflicting state and federal rulings on discovery
issues

and

conflicting

pre-trial
jury

motions,

verdicts

warrants abstention.

if

as
both

well

as

matters

the

risk

proceed

to

of

two

trial,

The Plaintiff counters that allowing both

suits to proceed will not result in piecemeal litigation, because
both suits involve the same issues of fact, liability, and damages.
The Plaintiff points out that the identical attorneys represent the
Defendants in both suits, and that if a money judgment is rendered
in Plaintiff’s favor in the federal suit, the full satisfaction of

that money judgment by or on behalf of the Defendants will satisfy
the Plaintiff’s claims in the state suit.
The Defendants’ emphasis on the duplicative nature of the
state and federal proceedings and the potential for inconsistent
pre-trial rulings and verdicts is misguided.1

Black Sea Inv., 204

F.3d at 650 (“Duplicative litigation, wasteful though it may be, is
a necessary cost of our nation’s maintenance of two separate and
distinct judicial systems possessed of frequently overlapping
jurisdiction.

The real concern at the heart of the third Colorado

River factor is the avoidance of piecemeal litigation, and the
concomitant danger of inconsistent rulings with respect to a piece
of property.”); Stewart v. Western Heritage Ins. Co., 43 F.3d 488,
492 (5th Cir. 2006). The potential for piecemeal litigation exists
when there is an additional claim or party in one of the suits that
is not present in the other suit.

See Stewart, 43 F.3d at 492.

Since this case does not involve a property dispute, and the
parties and claims are identical in both lawsuits, this factor
weighs against abstention. Black Sea Inv., 204 F.3d at 650-51; See
also Stewart, 438 F.3d at 492.

1

The Defendants’ concerns about inconsistent rulings and verdicts are not
unique to this case. In every instance where a federal court considers staying
a parallel federal proceeding on the basis of traditional abstention principles,
there is potential for inconsistent rulings and verdicts. See American Guaranty
& Liability Ins. Co. v. Anco Insulations, Inc., 408 F.3d 248, 251 (5th Cir. 2005)
(explaining that “[a]s an initial matter, a stay under Colorado River is
permissible only when the federal and state cases are ‘parallel,’” and that
parallel suits are suits that involve the same parties and the same issues).
However, there is no risk of inconsistent judgments in this case, because if one
court renders judgment before the other, the judgment will have a res judicata
effect. Kelly Inv., Inc., 315 F.3d at 498-99.

D. The Order in Which Jurisdiction Was Obtained
The Defendants argue that this factor weighs in favor of
abstention, because the Plaintiff filed the state suit before the
federal suit.

The Plaintiff counters that the order of filing is

not determinative, and that the Court must also take into account
how much progress has been made in the two actions.

The Plaintiff

further

in

argues

that

this

favor

does

not

weigh

favor

of

abstention, because both suits are in their infancy and no more
progress has been made in one forum than the other.

“The inquiry

under this factor is ‘how much progress had been made in the two
actions.’”

Stewart, 438 F.3d at 492.

Where no progress has been

made on the merits of either case and the suits are proceeding at
approximately the same pace, this factor weighs against abstention.
Black Sea Inv., 204 F.3d at 651.

In this case, although the state

suit was filed first, neither suit has progressed beyond the filing
of the complaint.

Under these circumstances, the factor weighs

against abstention.
E. The Extent to Which Federal Law Provides the Rules of
Decision on the Merits
The Defendants point out that federal law will not govern in
this diversity case arising out of a motor vehicle accident.

The

Plaintiffs argue that the lack of federal law in this diversity
case is a neutral factor in the abstention analysis. “‘The absence
of a federal-law issue does not counsel in favor of abstention,’”
and “‘the presence of state law issues weighs in favor of surrender

only in rare circumstances.’”

Black Sea Inv., 204 F.3d at 651

(quoting Evanston Ins. Co., 844 F.2d at 1189).

In Black Sea

Investments, the Fifth Circuit found that this factor was “at most
neutral” in a case where the federal court needed to apply a recent
Texas Supreme Court decision, the effect of which the parties
disputed.

Id.

In this case, the Defendants have not identified

any contested state-law issues like those in Black Sea Investments,
much less shown the kind of rare circumstances that would cause
this factor to weigh in favor of abstention.

Thus, in this

diversity suit, which involves relatively straightforward Louisiana
tort law, this factor is neutral at most.
F. The Adequacy of the State Proceedings to Protect the Rights
of the Party Invoking Federal Jurisdiction
The

Defendants

argue

that

the

state

proceedings

will

adequately protect the plaintiff’s rights and that this factor
weighs heavily in favor of abstention. The Plaintiff concedes that
the state proceedings may be adequate, but argues that this factor
is neutral.

The adequacy of the state proceedings to protect

Plaintiff’s rights “‘can only be a neutral factor or one that
weighs against, not for, abstention.’”

The fact that the state

proceedings appear to be adequate is a neutral factor in the
abstention analysis.

Black Sea Inv., 204 F.3d at 651.

As the

parties agree that the state proceedings are adequate to protect
plaintiff’s rights, this factor is neutral.
Although all of the Colorado River factors are either neutral

or

weigh

against

maintenance

of

abstention,

identical

the

lawsuits

Defendants
would

not

argue

that

serve

the

judicial

efficiency, and that dismissal of the matter would serve the
“compelling interest of preserving judicial efficiency.”

The only

authority

judicial

that

Defendants

cite

in

support

of

their

efficiency argument is Robichaux Construction, Inc. v. Solid Waste
Disposal, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 242 (E.D. La. 1989). This decision is
not binding on the Court, and the part of the decision that
Defendants rely on has been undermined by subsequent Fifth Circuit
authority.

In Robichaux, the district court referenced judicial

economy and efficiency in the context of analyzing the “avoidance
of piecemeal litigation factor,” without citing any authority.

In

2000, the Fifth Circuit reversed a district court that “expressly
granted

a

stay

primarily

to

avoid

wasteful,

duplicative

litigation,” Black Sea Inv., 204 F.3d at 650-52, and explained that
“[d]uplicative

litigation,

wasteful

though

it

may

be,

is

a

necessary cost of our nation’s maintenance of two separate and
distinct judicial systems possessed of frequently overlapping
jurisdiction.” Id. at 650 (alterations added). In 2006, the Fifth
Circuit

re-emphasized

that

there

is

a

difference

between

“duplicative” and “piecemeal” litigation and that duplicative
litigation alone, despite its conceded inefficiency, is not a
sufficient reason for a federal court to abstain.

Stewart, 438

F.3d at 492 (“While duplicative litigation is permitted, Colorado
River prevents ‘piecemeal litigation,’ and the concomitant danger

of inconsistent rulings with respect to a piece of property.”)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Moreover, Defendants have taken the portion of Robichaux that
they rely on out of context.

Although the district court’s

decision to abstain in Robichaux was partly based on concerns about
judicial efficiency and economy, two Colorado River factors weighed
in favor of abstention.

See Robichaux, 707 F. Supp. at 244-45.

In

Robichaux, the state suits were filed several months before the
federal suits, and one of them was on the verge of trial when the
federal suit was filed.

Id. at 245, n.10.

Moreover, there was

significant potential for piecemeal litigation, because the parties
and claims were not identical in the state suit and the federal
RICO suit, although they were related.

Id. at 243-245.

The

Colorado River factors are applied on a case-by-case basis, and in
this case, unlike Robichaux, all of the Colorado River factors are
either neutral or weigh against abstention.

The Plaintiff filed

the instant federal suit a mere four days after filing her state
suit; there has been little progress in either suit; and the
parties and claims are identical in both suits. Thus, the verbiage
and result in Robichaux have no bearing on the Court’s analysis in
this case.
As all of the Colorado River factors are either neutral or
weigh against abstention in this case, the Court finds that there
are no exceptional circumstances warranting abstention.

Thus, it

is unnecessary to address the issue of whether outright dismissal

is permitted under Colorado River abstention principles, as neither
a stay nor a dismissal is warranted under the circumstances.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, or
Alternatively Stay on the Basis of Abstention is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 12th day of October, 2012.

CARL J. BARBIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE