Barrilleaux v. Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company et al

Filing 134

ORDER AND REASONS granting 131 Motion for Leave to File Memorandum in Opposition to Sea Support's MSJ; granting 116 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Plaintiff's claim against Sea Support based on a breach of a fiduciary duty to pr ovide him with a copy of the LTD Policy is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Court has previously dismissed all of Plaintiff's other claims against Defendants Sea Support and Hartford.14 Accordingly, the Court will issue a final judgment in favor of Sea Support and Hartford dismissing all of Plaintiff's claims with prejudice. Signed by Judge Susie Morgan. (bwn)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
CHRISTOPHER BARRILLEAUX,

CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiff
VERSUS

NO. 12-1542

HARTFORD LIFE AND
ACCIDENT INSURANCE
COMPANY, et al.

SECTION "E"

Defendants
ORDER AND REASONS
The Court has pending before it Defendant Sea Support Ventures, LLC's ("Sea
Support") motion for partial summary judgment1 and Plaintiff Christopher Barrilleaux's
motion for leave to file a response.2 The motion for leave to file a response is GRANTED.
Having has reviewed the briefs, the record, the applicable law, the Court now issues this
order and reasons granting the motion for partial summary judgment.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Christopher Barrilleaux was employed by Defendant Sea Support Ventures,
LLC. Barrilleaux contends that, as part of the terms of his employment, he was entitled to
long-term disability ("LTD") benefits pursuant to a Policy sponsored by Sea Support and
administered by Defendant Hartford. The parties agree that ERISA governs the LTD
Policy.
The circumstances surrounding Barrilleaux's enrollment (or attempted) enrollment
1

R. Doc. 116.

2

R. Doc. 131.
1

in the LTD Policy are set out at greater length in other orders. For the purposes of deciding
this partial summary judgment motion, it is enough to note that the parties dispute whether
Sea Support ever gave Plaintiff a copy of the LTD Policy.

Plaintiff allegedly became disabled as a result of a workplace injury in March 2007.3
He filed a personal injury lawsuit in state court against Sea Support on or about July 26,
2007.4 At some point Plaintiff made a claim to Hartford for benefits under the LTD Policy.
In a letter dated March 18, 2008, Hartford requested information from Plaintiff and
informed him to "Please read your insurance booklet, and if you have questions or
concerns, please call us. If you do not have an insurance booklet, please obtain one from
your employer. It is important that you understand your Long Term Disability (LTD)
coverage."5 In a letter dated April 8, 2008, Hartford denied LTD benefits on the basis that
Plaintiff was not enrolled in the Policy and had not provided evidence of insurability.6
Plaintiff denies receiving the April 8, 2008 letter from Hartford, but he is silent with respect
to the March 18, 2008 letter.7 Nonetheless, it is undisputed that Hartford denied LTD
benefits because Plaintiff did not enroll for the benefits, either within the thirty-one day
window following eligibility, thereafter by submitting evidence of insurability.
In October 2010, Plaintiff lost his state-court negligence lawsuit against Sea
3

R. Doc. 48-7 at 23.

4

R. Doc. 48-3.

5

R. Doc. 116-2 at 2.

6

R. Doc. 48-6.

7

R. Doc. 131-5.
2

Support.8 In May 2012, he filed this lawsuit. In his amended pleadings, he alleges that Sea
Support breached a fiduciary duty by failing to provide him with a copy of the LTD Policy.9
Sea Support now moves for partial summary judgment, contending that Plaintiff's
claim for breach of fiduciary duty predicated on the failure to provide a copy of the LTD
Policy is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Plaintiff contends that there is a
fact question as to when he had actual knowledge of that breach.
STANDARD OF LAW
Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
If the dispositive issue is one on which the moving party will bear the burden of proof
at trial, the moving party “must come forward with evidence which would ‘entitle it to a
directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.’” Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v.
Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1263-64 (5th Cir. 1991). If the moving party fails to carry this
burden, the motion must be denied. If the moving party successfully carries this burden,
the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to show that a genuine issue of material fact
exists. Id. at 322-23. Once the burden has shifted, the non-moving party must direct the
Court’s attention to something in the pleadings or other evidence in the record that sets
forth specific facts sufficient to establish that a genuine issue of material fact does indeed
8

R. Doc. 48-5.

9

R. Doc. 102 at 5. In that pleading, Plaintiff asserts "On March 25, 2011, more
than four years after the Plaintiff's injury, the Plaintiff was furnished a copy of the Plan
documents for the first time." This is more than three years after he was instructed by
Hartford in the March 18, 2008 letter to request a copy from his employer. Moreover,
Plaintiff submitted no summary judgment evidence supporting this allegation.
3

exist. Id. at 324.
If the dispositive issue is one on which the non-moving party will bear the burden
of proof at trial, however, the moving party may satisfy its burden by simply pointing out
that the evidence in the record is insufficient with respect to an essential element of the
non-moving party’s claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The nonmoving party must then
respond, either by “calling the Court’s attention to supporting evidence already in the
record that was overlooked or ignored by the moving party” or by coming forward with
additional evidence. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 332-33 & 333 n.3.
“An issue is material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action.”
DIRECTV Inc. v. Robson, 420 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir. 2005). When assessing whether a
material factual dispute exists, the Court considers “all of the evidence in the record but
refrains from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.” Delta & Pine
Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 2008); see also
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000). All reasonable
inferences are drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d
1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). There is no genuine issue of material fact if, even viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, no reasonable trier of fact
could find for the non-moving party, thus entitling the moving party to judgment as a
matter of law. Smith v. Amedisys, 298 F.3d 434, 440 (5th Cir. 2002).
ANALYSIS
An ERISA suit "with respect to a fiduciary's breach of any responsibility, duty, or
obligation under this part, or with respect to a violation of this part" must be filed before
"the earlier of–(1) six years after (A) the date of the last action which constituted a part of
4

the breach or violation, or (B) in the case of an omission the latest date on which the
fiduciary could have cured the breach or violation, or (2) three years after the earliest date
on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach or violation; except that in the
case of fraud or concealment, such action may be commenced not later than six years after
the date of discovery of such breach or violation." 29 U.S.C. § 1113.10 In the Fifth Circuit,
"actual knowledge of the breach or violation" means knowledge "not only of the events
constituting the breach, but also that those events supported a claim for breach of fiduciary
duty or violation under ERISA." Babcock v. Hartmax Corp., 182 F.3d 336, 339 (5th Cir.
1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Sea Support contends that the March 18, 2008 Hartford letter informed Plaintiff that
he should request a copy of the LTD Policy, and that the April 8, 2008 Hartford letter
informed Plaintiff that his claim for LTD benefits was denied. According to Sea Support,
this established actual knowledge of the failure to provide a copy of the Policy as well as the
consequences of that breach no later than April 8, 2008, more than four years before he
filed this lawsuit. Therefore, Sea Support moves to dismiss the claim as prescribed under
§ 1113(2).
In opposition, Plaintiff contends that he needs additional discovery from Sea
Support to assert possible defenses "based upon discovery documents contained in the
plaintiff's personnel files and other related corporate documents that the defendant has
failed to produce."11 He also submits an affidavit denying that he received Hartford's April

10

Support.
11

Plaintiff does not suggest any "fraud or concealment" on the part of Sea
R. Doc. 131-4 at 4.
5

8, 2008 denial of benefits letter "by mail at his residence or by any other means."12
The Court has reviewed the parties' arguments and summary judgment evidence.
Although Plaintiff denies receiving the April 8, 2008 letter from Hartford, he does not deny
receiving the March 18, 2008 later instructing him to request a copy of the LTD Policy from
Sea Support if he did not already have one. And the summary judgment evidence
submitted with a prior motion strongly suggests that Plaintiff, on advice of former counsel,
deliberately forewent pursuing benefits under the LTD Policy while his personal injury
lawsuit was pending.13 It strains credulity to suggest that Plaintiff received the March 18,
2008 Hartford letter and then went over a year without receiving LTD benefits or following
up, all while represented by counsel, without having actual knowledge of the alleged breach
by Sea Support. This is the case whether or not he received the April 8, 2008 Hartford
letter expressly denying benefits.
Moreover, although Plaintiff denies having actual knowledge of his claim against Sea
Support for breach of the duty to provide a copy of the Policy as of April 8, 2008, he
provides nothing to suggest when he did have actual knowledge of the claim. See Babcock,
182 F.3d at 340 (finding breach of fiduciary duty claim time-barred because plaintiffs
"fail[ed] to point to any material information related to [their] claims that they learned
after" the events the defendant contended established actual knowledge). And although
Plaintiff insists that he needs additional discovery, he does not do so with sufficiently
"specified reasons," see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d), nor does he explain how he needs materials
in Sea Support's possession to establish when he had actual knowledge of the breach. In
12

R. Doc. 131-5 at 1.

13

R. Doc. 69-1 at 4-5.
6

short, "[e]ven under this permissive definition of actual knowledge," Babcock, 182 F.3d at
339, it cannot be genuinely disputed that Plaintiff had actual knowledge of this claim
against Sea Support more than three years before he filed suit on May 10, 2012. The claim
is time-barred.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that Sea Support's motion for partial
summary judgment is GRANTED. Plaintiff's claim against Sea Support based on a breach
of a fiduciary duty to provide him with a copy of the LTD Policy is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE. The Court has previously dismissed all of Plaintiff's other claims against
Defendants Sea Support and Hartford.14 Accordingly, the Court will issue a final judgment
in favor of Sea Support and Hartford dismissing all of Plaintiff's claims with prejudice.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 13th day of August, 2014.

____________________________
SUSIE MORGAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

14

R. Docs. 124, 125.
7