Judeh v. Louisiana State University System et al

Filing 48

ORDER AND REASONS - the Court GRANTS in its entirety the motion 13 to dismiss the Louisiana State University Health Sciences Center, the Louisiana State University System, and Ariane Rung. The Court GRANTS the motion 25 of Stephanie Tortu as to p laintiff's claims against Tortu in her official capacity and plaintiff's claims under the First Amendment but DENIES the motion as to plaintiff's due process claims. The Court GRANTS the motion 20 of Donna Williams, Elizabeth Fontham , and Joseph Moerschbaecher as to plaintiff's claims against defendants in their official capacity, plaintiff's First Amendment claims, and the due process claims against Elizabeth Fontham and Joseph Moerschbaecher. The Court, however, DENIES the motion as to plaintiff's claims against Williams for violation of due process.. Signed by Chief Judge Sarah S. Vance on 4/18/13. (jjs, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
HILMI JUDEH

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 12-1758

LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY
SYSTEM, et al.

SECTION: R

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are the motions to dismiss of all
defendants. For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the
motions to dismiss of the Louisiana State University Health
Sciences Center, the Louisiana State University System, Ariane
Rung, Elizabeth Fontham, and Joseph Moerschbaecher. The Court
GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the motions to dismiss of Donna
Williams and Stephanie Tortu.

I.

BACKGROUND
This dispute stems from plaintiff's dismissal from the

Louisiana State University School of Public Health. Plaintiff
enrolled in a Master's of Public Health program in the summer of
2010.1 The following summer, plaintiff secured an internship at
the Louisiana Office of Public Health.2 On June 30, 2011, he
learned from an Office of Public Health employee that another
employee complained that plaintiff had verbally harassed her.
1

R. Doc. 1 at 4.

2

Id.

Plaintiff alleges that because he was not being scheduled for
adequate hours of work, he contacted Professor Donna Williams,
who coordinated placement of a new internship.3
On July 5, 2011, Stephanie Tortu, Associate Dean for
Academic Affairs of the Sciences Center, called a meeting to
discuss plaintiff's conduct. Plaintiff was not informed of or
invited to the meeting but alleges that the following individuals
participated in the meeting: Stephanie Tortu, professors Donna
Williams and Ariane Rung, and Joseph Moerschbaecher, Vice
Chancellor for Academic Affairs at the Sciences Center.4 The
meeting participants allegedly discussed postings that plaintiff
had allegedly made in which he threatened to embarrass a staff
member at the Office of Public Health.5
That same day, plaintiff received a note, instructing him to
report to Stephanie Tortu's office. Donna Williams and Stephanie
Tortu informed him that they, along with Rung and Elizabeth
Fontham, Dean of the School of Public Health, had decided to
expel him from the Sciences Center.6 Although plaintiff asserts
that he was not informed of the misconduct of which he was

3

R. Doc. 1 at 5.

4

Id. at 5-6.

5

Id. at 6.

6

Id.
2

accused,7 plaintiff also claims that Dr. Tortu told him that his
dismissal stemmed from comments he allegedly made about plans to
destroy data at the Office of Public Health.8 Dr. Tortu handed
plaintiff a document that delineated students' rights and
responsibilities and emphasized the "right to a fair and
impartial hearing, if the student is accused of misconduct or
violating university regulations."9
On July 8, 2011, plaintiff submitted a request for an appeal
of his expulsion, which Dr. Tortu told him would be considered by
Vice Chancellor Joseph Moerschbaecher.10 Plaintiff alleges that
Moerschbaecher took no action on the appeal and informed
petitioner on July 26, 2011 that he could ask plaintiff to leave
"whenever he [Moerschbaecher] wanted."11 On July 15, 2012,
plaintiff received a letter from Dr. Tortu, in which she
documented his expulsion and stated that after being reprimanded
for inappropriate behavior towards female students and staff at
the Office of Public Health, he posted remarks on Facebook that

7

R. Doc. 1 at 7

8

Id. at 6.

9

Id. at 7.

10

Id. at 8.

11

Id. at 8.
3

detailed his intention to destroy data in retaliation and to
embarrass a staff member during a meeting.12
Plaintiff brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
Elizabeth Fontham, Stephanie Tortu, Donna Williams, Ariane Rung,
and Joseph Moerschbaecher in their official and individual
capacities, as well as against the Louisiana State University
(LSU) System and the Louisiana State University Health Sciences
Center. Plaintiff asserts that his First, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights were violated by his dismissal from the school.
Defendants filed motions to dismiss, which are now before the
Court.

II.

STANDARD
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff

must plead enough facts “to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1960
(2009)(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads
facts that allow the court to “draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 1949.
A court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and must draw
all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Lormand v.
U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 239 (5th Cir. 2009); Baker v.
12

Id.
4

Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996). But the Court is not
bound to accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual
allegations.

Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949.

A legally sufficient complaint must establish more than a
“sheer possibility” that plaintiff's claim is true. Id. It need
not contain detailed factual allegations, but it must go beyond
labels, legal conclusions, or formulaic recitations of the
elements of a cause of action. Id. In other words, the face of
the complaint must contain enough factual matter to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of
each element of the plaintiff's claim. Lormand, 565 F.3d at 257.
If there are insufficient factual allegations to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level, or if it is apparent from the
face of the complaint that there is an insuperable bar to relief,
the claim must be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Jones v.
Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007); Carbe v. Lappin, 492 F.3d 325,
328 n.9 (5th Cir. 2007).

III. DISCUSSION
A. Improper Parties
Defendants argue that plaintiff has improperly brought suit
against the Louisiana State University System and Louisiana State
University Health Sciences Center. Plaintiff does not oppose
defendants' motion to dismiss these parties, as the Health
5

Sciences Center is not a juridical entity that can be sued, and
the Board of Supervisors of the University System is immune from
suit. See Laxey v. Louisiana Board of Trustees, 22 F.3d 621 (5th
Cir. 1994) (state university and trustees protected from
student's § 1983 claim by sovereign immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment).
Further, plaintiff acknowledges that he may not sue any of
the individual defendants in their official capacities. See Will
v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (suit
against state official in his official capacity constitutes a
suit against the State itself).

The Court therefore dismisses

from the suit all claims against the Louisiana State University
System, Louisiana State University Health Sciences Center, and
the individual defendants in their official capacities.
B. Service of Process
Defendant Stephanie Tortu argues that the claims against her
should be dismissed, since plaintiff failed to serve her within
120 days of filing suit. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m)
states:
If a defendant is not served within 120 days after the
complaint is filed, the court—on motion or on its own
after notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss the action
without prejudice against defendant or order that service
be made within a specified time. But if the plaintiff
shows good cause for the failure, the court must extend
the time for service for an appropriate period.

6

Further, even if a court finds that good cause is lacking, the
court may nevertheless extend the time for service. Newby v.
Enron Corp., 284 F. App'x 146, 149 (5th Cir. 2008).
Here, plaintiff served Dr. Tortu 144 days after filing his
complaint. He states that he attempted service within the 120-day
period but that Dr. Tortu was absent from the School of Public
Health during those attempts or her office could not be reached
by the process servers. Dr. Tortu was eventually served at her
residence. During this time period, plaintiff successfully served
the other defendants, demonstrating that he made an effort to
comply with the requirements of Rule(m).

While his reasons for

failing to do so may not rise to the level of good cause, the
Court finds it appropriate to exercise its discretion to allow
additional time for service. Dr. Tortu received service of
process only 24 days late, and thus the delayed service did not
hinder her defense of the suit in any significant way.
Accordingly, the Court finds that an extension of the time for
service is warranted and that plaintiff’s claims against Dr.
Tortu will not be dismissed under Rule 4(m).
C. Claims against Defendants in their Individual Capacities
In their motions to dismiss, defendants contend that
plaintiff's complaint contains insufficient factual allegations
to state a plausible claim and to overcome defendants' assertion
of qualified immunity. It is well established that qualified

7

immunity shields public officials from suit and liability under §
1983, "unless their conduct violates clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known." Babb v. Dorman, 33 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir.
1994). When a defendant invokes qualified immunity, the plaintiff
bears the burden of demonstrating that the defense is
inapplicable through a two-prong test. McClendon v. City of
Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 323 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc). Plaintiff
first must "claim that the defendants committed a constitutional
violation under current law." Atteberry v. Nocona Gen. Hosp., 430
F.3d 245, 253 (5th Cir. 2005). Plaintiff must then claim that
defendants' actions were objectively unreasonable in light of the
law that was clearly established at the time of the actions
complained of. Id. “To be "clearly established’ for purposes of
qualified immunity, [t]he contours of the right must be
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand
that what he is doing violates that right." Club Retro, L.L.C. v.
Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 194 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal citation
omitted).
1.

First Amendment Claims

Plaintiff first alleges that defendants violated his First
Amendment rights by expelling him in retaliation for his comments
on campus and at the Office of Public Health and for his Facebook
post, all of which plaintiff asserts are protected speech. "To

8

prove a retaliation claim cognizable under the First Amendment,
the plaintiff must show that her speech was constitutionally
protected and that it was a 'substantial' or 'motivating' factor
in the defendant's decision." Kelleher v. Flawn, 761 F.2d 1079,
1083 (5th Cir. 1985)(internal citation omitted). Not all speech
is protected, and in fact, the Supreme Court has held that "a
school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with
its 'basic education mission,' even though the government could
not censor similar speech outside the school." Hazelwood Sch.
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (quoting Bethel Sch.
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986)). Whether the
First Amendment standards set forth for primary school and high
school students apply to post-secondary students has not yet been
directly addressed by the Supreme Court. See Board of Regents v.
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 238 n.4 (2000) (Souter, J. concurring)
("[Our] cases dealing with the rights of teaching institutions to
limit expressive freedom of students have been confined to high
school . . . whose students and their schools' relation to them
are different and at least arguably distinguishable from their
counterparts in college education."); see also Kelly Sarabyn, The
Twenty-Sixth Amendment: Resolving the Federal Circuit Split over
College Students' First Amendment Rights, 14 Tex. J. C.L. & C.R.
27, 47 (2008).
In Martin v. Parrish, the Fifth Circuit applied to the
9

college setting the Supreme Court's holding in Bethel School
District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986), that schools
could regulate the use of indecent language. 805 F.2d 583, 585
(5th Cir. 1986).

In so doing, the court stated:

Bethel admittedly involved a high school audience and it
may be suggested that its justification for speech
restraints rests largely on this fact. Nevertheless, we
view the role of higher education as no less pivotal to
our national interest.
Id.; see also Esfeller v. O'Keefe, 391 Fed. Appx. 337 (5th Cir.
2010) (citing restrictions on student speech in suit brought by
student at state university). At a minimum, this Fifth Circuit
precedent permitting speech restrictions in a higher education
setting demonstrates that plaintiff's speech is not automatically
covered under the First Amendment.
Plaintiff alleges that he was dismissed "because he
allegedly made comments indicating that he planned on destroying
data at a former internship" and that before his dismissal,
defendants had discussed plaintiff's verbal sexual harassment and
his Facebook posting.13 Plaintiff does not admit that he made any
such comments or provide the Court with any additional details as
to the content of his speech. Instead, his complaint relies on
the conclusory statement that his alleged comments were protected
speech. Because not all speech is protected by the First
Amendment, particularly speech by students, and plaintiff fails

13

R. Doc. 1 at 6.
10

to identify the statements he relies on, plaintiff does not state
a plausible claim that he engaged in a protected activity, the
basis for a retaliation claim under the First Amendment. See
Kelleher, 761 F.2d at 1083. Accordingly, plaintiff's complaint
does not set forth a claim under the First Amendment.
2. Due Process Claims
Plaintiff also asserts claims under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, stating that defendants violated his right to due
process by expelling him without affording him notice and an
opportunity to be heard. To state such a claim, plaintiff must
allege facts sufficient to show (1) that he was deprived of a
liberty or property interest protected by the Due Process Clause,
and (2) that he was deprived of that interest without
constitutionally adequate process.14 LaCroix v. Marshall County,
No. 10–60410, 2011 WL 396476, *8 (5th Cir. Feb. 3, 2011).
Plaintiff asserts that he has a valid property interest in his
continuing education at LSU. Defendants appear to concede that
plaintiff has such an interest, although the authority cited,
Goss v. Lopez, addressed the entitlement of high school students
to a public education when state laws provide for such education.

14

Plaintiff alleges violations of substantive and
procedural due process, but his complaint focuses on procedural
due process. In any event, the right to attend a public school is
a state-created right, not a fundamental right, for the purposes
of substantive due process. See Flynn v. Terrebonne Parish School
Bd., No. 03-2500, 2004 WL 2009277, at *3 (E.D. La. Sept. 8, 2004)
(citing Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)).
11

419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975). But, as the Fifth Circuit has relied on
Goss in addressing school disciplinary proceedings at the
university level, the Court finds that plaintiff has adequately
alleged that his place in the LSU program represents a valid
property interest. See, e.g., Esfeller, 391 Fed. Appx. at 342;
Fan v. Brewer, No. 08-3524, 2009 WL 1743824 (S.D. Tex. June 17,
2009), aff'd sub nom. Fenghui Fan v. Brewer, 377 F. App'x 366
(5th Cir. 2010) (assuming that plaintiff had property interest in
graduate studies subject to due process protection).
In Goss, the Supreme Court held that a student subject to
school disciplinary proceedings is entitled to some procedural
due process. 419 U.S. at 574. The Supreme Court stated that a
student must be informed of the charges against him and given an
opportunity to explain his version of the facts but that there
“need be no delay between the time ‘notice’ is given and the time
of the hearing.” Id. at 582. In arguing that plaintiff was
afforded adequate due process, defendants argue that Dr. Tortu
and Dr. Williams informed plaintiff on July 5, 2011 that he was
being dismissed based on his comments and that this meeting
constituted his hearing, whether or not plaintiff was aware that
it was a hearing. Defendants also point to the document that Dr.
Tortu provided to plaintiff, informing him of his right to a
hearing, as well as plaintiff’s participation in an appeal.
Despite these actions by defendants, the Court finds that

12

plaintiff has pleaded facts that support a reasonable inference
that he was not afforded due process and that a constitutional
violation occurred. Although the Supreme Court in Goss suggested
that more formal proceedings may be required in the context of
long suspensions or expulsions, plaintiff, at a minimum, has
pleaded facts indicating that even the "informal give-and-take"
required in Goss was not satisfied. 419 U.S. at 584. Plaintiff
claims that Dr. Tortu and Dr. Williams told him at the meeting on
July 5, 2011 that he was being expelled without his having
received earlier notice that any such action was even
contemplated and without giving him an opportunity to refute the
reasons for his expulsion. It is true that there need not be a
delay between notice and a student's hearing. See Goss, 419 U.S.
at 583. But, plaintiff alleges that defendants had already made a
final decision to expel him by the time he met with them. In
fact, the letter sent to plaintiff by Dr. Tortu on July 15, 2012
stated, “On July 5, 2011, Dr. Donna Williams and I met with you
to inform you that were [sic] formally dismissed from the LSU
School of Public Health.”15 The letter did not characterize the
meeting as including any sort of hearing or discussion but rather
indicated that the purpose of the meeting was to dismiss
plaintiff from the school.

15

R. Doc. 1 at 8.
13

In Williams v. Dade County School Board, the Fifth Circuit
held that a letter sent to parents about their children’s
suspension did not qualify as even an informal administrative
procedure, because the “'hearing' . . . provided was explanatory
in nature and not aimed at ascertaining and weighing the facts.”
441 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1971). Without any opportunity to refute
the allegations of misconduct leveled against him, plaintiff's
meeting with Dr. Tortu and Dr. Williams does not constitute a
hearing or an "informal give-and-take" in which he could explain
himself. Moreover, that Dr. Tortu provided plaintiff with a
document detailing his right to a hearing after informing him of
his expulsion does not transform the meeting into a hearing.
Further, although plaintiff has not demonstrated that he was
entitled to an appeal, his submission of an appeal to Vice
Chancellor Joseph Moerschbaecher does not cure the deficiencies
in the disciplinary process, since plaintiff alleges that
Moerschbaecher took no action on the appeal and informed
plaintiff that he could ask him to leave at any time.
Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff has pleaded adequate
facts to show that his constitutional right to due process was
violated.
The Court must now determine whether the actions of the
defendants were unreasonable in light of the clearly established
law at the time. As discussed above, it was clearly established

14

at the time of plaintiff’s expulsion that he was owed some notice
and a chance to explain himself. The Court finds that the facts
pleaded identify Dr. Williams and Dr. Tortu as the individuals
who led the process of expelling the plaintiff and were
responsible for the way in which the meeting was conducted on
July 5, 2011. By informing plaintiff that the decision had been
made to expel him, the defendants did not allow plaintiff to
explain himself or to refute the charges. Thus, the meeting with
plaintiff cannot be considered a hearing in which plaintiff was
afforded an opportunity to be heard before Dr. Tortu and Dr.
Williams undertook the serious disciplinary measure of expulsion.
Cf. Willis v. Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center, 394
Fed. Appx. 86 (5th Cir. 2010) (no due process violation when,
before expulsion for threatened violence, plaintiff received
letter, notifying him of hearing date and factual basis for
complaint and providing instructions on how to submit evidence,
call witnesses, and challenge impartiality of Board members);
Esfeller, 391 Fed. Appx. at 342-343 (affirming denial of
preliminary injunctive relief since plaintiff likely could not
succeed in showing lack of due process, because plaintiff
received written notice of the charges, was given access to
university files on the matter, and was informed of panel
disciplinary hearing). Accordingly, the Court finds that the
facts pleaded by plaintiff support the inference that Dr. Tortu

15

and Dr. Williams acted unreasonably in light of the clearly
established law at the time.
The Court finds, however, that plaintiff has not pleaded
facts that demonstrate that the actions of Dr. Rung and Dean
Fontham were unreasonable. Plaintiff states only that Dr. Rung, a
professor, participated in the decision to expel plaintiff. The
letter sent by Dr. Tortu in July 2012 stated that Dr. Rung, as
plaintiff’s advisor, was involved in the discussions about his
behavior and the decision to dismiss plaintiff immediately. But,
plaintiff does not allege that Dr. Rung had any other
involvement in the process or made any decisions regarding the
notice to afford plaintiff or the conditions of any hearing. That
Dr. Rung agreed that plaintiff should be expelled is not by
itself unreasonable. Rather, it is the way in which defendants
allegedly acted on this initial determination, i.e., by making
such a decision final without providing plaintiff an opportunity
to be heard, that violates due process.
Similarly, the letter sent by Dr. Tortu in July 2012 stating
that Dean Fontham agreed with the decision does not demonstrate
that Fontham acted unreasonably. Dean Fontham did not participate
in any of the meetings, since she was abroad at the time. The
brief statement by Dr. Tortu that Dean Fontham was aware of the
events and concurred in the decision provides the Court with no
information as to whether Dean Fontham had knowledge of the

16

procedure that was followed in expelling plaintiff or whether
she, like Dr. Rung, was merely informed of plaintiff’s alleged
misconduct and agreed that expulsion was appropriate. Plaintiff
has not alleged that Dean Fontham played any role in the way in
which defendants notified plaintiff of the allegations against
him or deprived him of an opportunity to present his side before
a final decision was made. Cf. Samuel v. Holmes, No. 96-286, 1997
WL 118391 (E.D. La. Mar. 14, 1997) aff'd, 138 F.3d 173 (5th Cir.
1998) (holding that Board Members who voted to terminate
plaintiff were entitled to qualified immunity since they were
presented with recommendation for discharge with no evidence that
their reliance on it was unreasonable). Further, Dean Fontham
cannot be held responsible for the acts of her subordinates, as
only the direct acts or omissions of government officials can
give rise to individual liability under 1983. See Coleman v.
Houston Independent School Dist., 113 F.3d 528 (5th Cir. 1997).
Therefore, the Court finds that plaintiff cannot maintain his
claims against Dean Fontham.
Lastly, the Court finds that plaintiff has not pleaded facts
showing that the actions of Vice Chancellor Moerschbaecher were
unreasonable in light of the clearly established law at the time.
Plaintiff alleges that Moerschbaecher took part in the decision
to expel him but does not include Moerschbaecher in the group of
individuals that Dr. Williams and Dr. Tortu identified as having

17

made the decision.16 Even if Moerschbaecher did participate, this
action alone is not unreasonable, as discussed above.
Moerschbaecher also received plaintiff's appeal. Plaintiff
alleges that Moerschbaecher took no action on the appeal and
approximately two weeks after plaintiff submitted his request for
an appeal, told plaintiff he could ask him to leave whenever he,
Moerschbaecher, wanted.17 But, plaintiff has not shown that he
had a clearly established right to an appeal or that in reviewing
the appeal, Moerschbaecher was required to take any specific
steps. The Court therefore finds that plaintiff has failed to
plead facts indicating that the appeal process as overseen by
Moerschbaecher violated a clear constitutional right and that
Moerschbaecher acted unreasonably.
In dismissing plaintiff's claims against Dean Fontham, Dr.
Rung, and Vice Chancellor Moerschbaecher, the Court notes that
the Fifth Circuit has designed a unique pleading procedure to
manage cases in which defendants raise a defense of qualified
immunity. In Schultea v. Wood, the court stated that a plaintiff
must file a short and plain statement of his complaint that
relies on more than conclusions, and the district court may then,
in its discretion, insist that a plaintiff file a reply under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7(a), specifically responding to

16

R. Doc. 1 at 6.

17

R. Doc. 1 at 8.
18

defendants' qualified immunity defense.

47 F.3d 1427, 1433-34

(5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) "The court's discretion not to order
such a reply is very narrow, however, when greater detail might
assist." See Morin v. Caire, 77 F.3d 116 (5th Cir. 1996).
The Court finds that a reply by plaintiff would not be
helpful here. Plaintiff fully addressed the issue of qualified
immunity in the opposition memoranda he filed. See Truvia v.
Julien, 187 Fed. Appx. 346, 349-50 (5th Cir. 2006) (district
court's failure to require 7(a) reply not an abuse of discretion,
since plaintiffs had ample opportunity to respond and 7(a) reply
would be redundant). More importantly, the Court does not find
that plaintiff's claims against Dr. Rung, Dean Fontham, and Vice
Chancellor Moerschbaecher should be dismissed because they are
overly vague and speculative. In fact, plaintiff's complaint was
very specific as to the precise involvement of these individuals
in the expulsion process. Rather, the Court finds that the facts
that plaintiff has pleaded fail to establish that the actions of
Dr. Rung, Dean Fontham, and Vice Chancellor Moerschbaecher gave
rise to constitutional violations.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS in its entirety

the motion to dismiss of the Louisiana State University Health
Sciences Center, the Louisiana State University System, and
Ariane Rung. The Court GRANTS the motion of Stephanie Tortu as to
19

plaintiff's claims against Tortu in her official capacity and
plaintiff's claims under the First Amendment but DENIES the
motion as to plaintiff's due process claims. The Court GRANTS the
motion of Donna Williams, Elizabeth Fontham, and Joseph
Moerschbaecher as to plaintiff's claims against defendants in
their official capacity, plaintiff's First Amendment claims, and
the due process claims against Elizabeth Fontham and Joseph
Moerschbaecher. The Court, however, DENIES the motion as to
plaintiff's claims against Williams for violation of due process.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 18th day of April, 2013.
__
_________________________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

20