Nagle et al v. Gusman et al
Filing
113
ORDER AND REASONS - the Court GRANTS summary judgment 68 in favor of plaintiffs on their state law negligence claim against Thompson and their state law vicarious liability claim against Sheriff Gusman. The Court also GRANTS summary judgment on pl aintiffs' § 1983 claim against Thompson. In addition, the Court GRANTS partial summary judgment on the "constitutional violation" component of the third element of plaintiffs' § 1983 claim under Monell against Sheriff Gusman. In light of the Court's grant of summary judgment against Defendant Thompson, plaintiffs' motion 63 for a default judgment against Defendant Thompson is moot. Signed by Chief Judge Sarah S. Vance on 11/17/14. (jjs)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MARGARET GOETZEE NAGLE, ET
AL.
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO: 12-1910
SHERIFF MARLIN GUSMAN, ET AL.
SECTION: R
ORDER AND REASONS
On July 23, 2012, Margaret Goetzee Nagle and John Eric
Goetzee (plaintiffs) filed this section 1983 civil rights suit
and state law wrongful death and negligence suit against numerous
employees
of
the
Orleans
Parish
Sheriff's
Office,
Sheriff Marlin Gusman and Deputy William Thompson.1
including
Plaintiffs
are the siblings and next of kin of William Wesley Goetzee (Mr.
Goetzee).2
Mr. Goetzee was a commander in the United States
Coast Guard Reserve and a civilian employee of the Coast Guard
who committed suicide on August 7, 2011 while being held as a
pretrial detainee on the tenth floor of the House of Detention at
Orleans Parish Prison (OPP) on charges related to a suicide
attempt five days earlier.3
On the day of Mr. Goetzee's death,
1
R. Doc. 1.
See R. Doc. 68-2 at ¶ 15 (Plaintiffs' Rule 56.1
Statement of Undisputed Facts). Defendants have not contested any
of the facts in Plaintiffs' 56.1 Statement. Therefore, the facts
are deemed admitted for the purposes of this motion. See E.D. La.
Local Rule 56.2.
3
See id. at ¶¶ 8, 9, 11 & 13.
2
1
Thompson, the guard who had been assigned to maintain direct
observation of Mr. Goetzee, repeatedly left his post.4
It was
during one of these absences that Mr. Goetzee committed suicide.5
All
defendants
complaint.6
except
for
Thompson
answered
plaintiffs'
On January 4, 2013, plaintiffs moved for an entry of
default against Thompson.7
Thompson that same day.8
The Court entered a default against
Plaintiffs now move the Court to enter
a default judgment against Thompson for their state law tort
claims and section 1983 claim.9
In the alternative, plaintiffs
move for summary judgment against Thompson.10
In addition, plaintiffs move for partial summary judgment
against Defendant Sheriff Gusman on their state law claim for
vicarious liability for Thompson's tortious misconduct and on
part of their federal claim against Gusman, in his official
capacity, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Monell v. Department of
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion for
partial summary judgment against Thompson and the motion for
partial summary judgment against Sheriff Gusman.
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
See id. at ¶¶ 42-47.
See id. at ¶¶ 50-52.
R. Docs. 3 & 29.
R. Doc. 6.
R. Doc. 7.
R. Doc. 64.
R. Doc. 68.
2
I.
BACKGROUND
This action arises out of the August 7, 2011 suicide of
plaintiffs' brother, Mr. Goetzee, while he was in custody at OPP
as a pretrial detainee on charges related to a suicide attempt
five days earlier.11
Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Goetzee experienced a "profound
mental health crisis and breakdown" while working in "highly
responsible and high-stress positions with the Coast Guard,"12
including "working around the clock during and following both
Hurricane Katrina and the BP oil spill."13
On the morning of
August
a
marked
a
uniformed
2,
Protective
2011,
Mr.
Services
vehicle
enforcement officer.14
door,
entered
the
passenger seat.15
Goetzee
approached
occupied
by
Federal
law-
Mr. Goetzee opened the front passenger
vehicle,
and
seated
himself
in
the
front
The officer asked Mr. Goetzee why he thought
he could just sit down in his vehicle.16
At that point, Mr.
Goetzee took several deep breaths and lunged for the officer's
service weapon, exclaiming, "I want to kill myself, give me your
gun."17
The
officer,
with
the
11
assistance
of
several
other
See R. Doc. 68-2 at ¶¶ 8, 9, 11 & 13.
R. Doc. 1 at 2.
13
R. Doc. 68-1 at 7.
14
See id. at ¶¶ 17-18.
15
See id. at ¶ 19.
16
See R. Doc. 68-4 at 108 (Pls.' Ex. 6: Criminal
Complaint and Affidavit of F.B.I. Special Agent Patrick Strawn).
17
See R. Doc. 68-2 at ¶¶ 20-21.
12
3
federal law enforcement officers, subdued Mr. Goetzee and placed
him
in
handcuffs.18
Mr.
Goetzee
was
then
transferred
by
ambulance to Tulane Medical Center.19
After Mr. Goetzee received treatment for physical injuries
related
to
his
encounter
with
Medical Center released him.20
the
federal
officers,
Tulane
Plaintiffs allege that while Mr.
Goetzee's fiancee was in the process of arranging for appropriate
mental health care for him at East Jefferson Hospital, federal
agents picked Mr. Goetzee up and transported him to OPP.21
Mr.
Goetzee was booked into OPP at approximately 9:00 P.M. on August
2, 2011.22
The
next
day,
prison
officials
brought
Mr.
Goetzee
to
federal court for his initial appearance on charges related to
his conflict with the federal officer during his suicide attempt
the
day
before.23
At
Mr.
Goetzee's
initial
appearance,
Mr.
Goetzee's attorney explained to the court that when he had tried
to
meet
with
Mr.
Goetzee
before
the
appearance,
unresponsive and obviously having mental issues."24
day,
while
still
in
custody,
Mr.
18
Goetzee
was
4
was
That same
admitted
See id. at ¶ 22.
See id. at ¶¶ 23-24.
20
See R. Doc. 1 at 14.
21
See id. at 14-15.
22
See R. Doc. 68-2 at ¶ 25.
23
See id. at ¶ 27.
24
See R. Doc. 68-4 at 117 (Pls.' Ex. 9: Initial
Appearance transcript).
19
"[h]e
to
University hospital to "rule out delirium."25
He was discharged
two days later on August 5, 2011 with a diagnosis of psychosis
and transferred back to OPP.26
At OPP, Mr. Goetzee was placed on
the tenth floor of the House of Detention, where OPP housed all
of its inmates on suicide watch.27
On
August
6
and
7,
2011,
observation and suicide watch.28
Mr.
Goetzee
was
under
direct
This meant that an Orleans
Parish Sheriff's Office employee was required to "maintain direct
and constant observation" of Mr. Goetzee at all times.29
Orleans
Parish Sheriff's Office training materials taught that one of the
two "greatest myths" about suicide is the myth that "[y]ou can't
stop someone who is truly set on killing themselves."30
Orleans
Parish Sheriff's Office training materials also indicated that
failure to observe a suicide watch inmate would be an example of
a "wrongful death" tort.31
events
giving
rise
to
this
In addition, at the time of the
action,
it
was
Orleans
Parish
Sheriff's Office policy that "all inmates with active suicidal
25
See R. Doc. 68-2 at ¶ 28.
See id. at ¶ 31.
27
See id. at ¶¶ 10, 32.
28
See id. at ¶ 33.
29
See id. at ¶ 41; R. Doc. 68-4 at 22 (Pls.' Ex. 3:
Defendants' Responses to Requests for Admission at #23).
30
See R. Doc. 68-2 at ¶ 73; R. Doc. 68-4 at 244 (Pls.'
Ex. 30: Orleans Parish Sheriff's Office Peace Officer Skills
Training - Jail and Corrections Training Curriculum (OPSO POST
Curriculum)).
31
See R. Doc. 68-2 at ¶ 77; R. Doc. 68-4 at 240, 242
(Pls.' Ex. 30: OPSO POST Curriculum).
26
5
ideation . . . be directly observed by the Security staff at all
times" because "the few moments required to successfully commit
suicide necessitates continuous, direct observation."32
On the morning of August 7, 2011, Thompson, a commissioned
deputy with the Orleans Parish Sheriff's Office, was assigned to
conduct
direct
Goetzee.33
supervision
(a.k.a.
suicide
watch)
of
Mr.
During his suicide watch shift, Thompson left his
post at least three times, leaving Mr. Goetzee unobserved each
time: first, to help another employee distribute meals to other
inmates; second, to take a restroom break; and third, to visit
the nurses' station.34
During these absences, Mr. Goetzee went
unobserved for an hour and a half, fifteen minutes, and two hours
respectively.35
No other staff took Thompson's place observing
Mr. Goetzee during the times when Thompson abandoned his post.36
During
Thompson's
final
absence,
which
he
spent
in
the
nurses' station, an inmate notified another on-duty officer that
Mr. Goetzee was lying on the floor of his cell, unresponsive.37
When New Orleans Emergency Medical Services personnel arrived,
they were unable to revive him.
He was then pronounced dead at
32
See R. Doc. 68-2 at ¶ 80; R. Doc. 68-4 at 274 (Pls.'
Ex. 32: Office of the Criminal Sheriff Interoffice Memo re:
Observation of Suicidal Inmates, October 15, 2007) (emphasis in
original).
33
See R. Doc. 68-2 at ¶¶ 35-36, 42.
34
See id. at ¶¶ 44-47.
35
See id. at ¶ 58.
36
See id. at ¶ 48
37
See id. at ¶ 50.
6
LSU Interim Hospital.
Mr. Goetzee had asphyxiated after his
airway became blocked by a wad of toilet paper.38
When the
coroner autopsied Mr. Goetzee, he found toilet paper in at least
four
locations
in
Mr.
Goetzee's
body.39
Specifically,
the
coroner recovered a "bolus of toilet paper" that obstructed Mr.
Goetzee's
airway
and
"residual
masticated
paper"
from
Mr.
Goetzee's mouth, esophagus, and stomach.40
After Mr. Goetzee died, the OPSO Mental Health Director, Dr.
Higgins, performed a "Psychological Autopsy" in which he assessed
the events surrounding Mr. Goetzee's death.
He concluded: "Mr.
Goetzee was treated appropriately by the OPSO Medical Department.
He was ordered Direct Observation. . . . Medical had continued
the order for direct observation up until the time of his death;
however security failed to provide the continuous observation
allowing Mr. Goetzee to kill himself."41
As a result of these events, Thompson later pleaded guilty
to the felony crime of malfeasance in office.
While under oath,
and as part of his plea, Thompson accepted the state's factual
basis for the charge.
The factual basis specified that Mr.
Goetzee was under suicide watch on August 7, 2011; that OPSO
38
39
See id. at ¶ 53.
See R. Doc. 68-4 at 2, 6 (Pls.' Ex. 1: Coroner's
Report).
40
Id.
See R. Doc. 68-2 at ¶ 54; R. Doc. 68-4 at 186 (Pls.'
Ex. 23: OPSO Medical Department, Psychological Autopsy).
41
7
policy required detainees under suicide watch to be continuously
monitored and for an "observations and restraint checklist" to be
maintained for each such detainee; that Thompson was assigned to
continuously
monitor
Mr.
Goetzee
beginning
at
10:20
A.M.
on
August 7, 2011; that Thompson left his post three times during
his assigned shift for one and half hours, fifteen minutes, and
two
hours,
respectively;
that
Mr.
Goetzee
was
discovered
unconscious by another inmate at around 5:45 P.M., when Thompson
was not monitoring him; that Mr. Goetzee died of swallowing
toilet paper; and that Thompson had fraudulently submitted his
observation checklist for August 7, 2011, because the checklist
indicated that Thompson had continuously monitored Mr. Goetzee
all day when in fact Thompson had not done so.42
Defendant Thompson has also given a deposition in this case.
At his deposition, Thompson stated that during the times when he
was observing Mr. Goetzee, he never saw him with toilet paper.43
Instead, he expressed the belief that it was during the time when
he was not observing Mr. Goetzee that Mr. Goetzee swallowed the
toilet paper.44
42
See id. at ¶ 58; R. Doc. 68-4 at 195-97 (Pls.' Ex. 24:
Transcript of Boykin Examination Hearing in State of Louisiana v.
William Thompson, Case No. 510-225).
43
See R. Doc. 79-4 at 5 (Pls.' Ex. 33: Excerpts from
Thompson Deposition) ("Q: So at least during the times when you
saw Mr. Goetzee on the day he died, you didn't see him with
toilet paper? A: No.").
44
See id. at 6 ("Q: . . . [I]t's your belief that it was
during that hour and a half when Mr. Goetzee swallowed a roll of
8
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is warranted when "the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23
(1986); E.E.O.C. v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 481 (5th Cir.
2014).
When assessing whether a dispute as to any material fact
exists, the Court considers "all of the evidence in the record
but refrain[s] from making credibility determinations or weighing
the evidence."
Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness
Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398–99 (5th Cir. 2008).
inferences
are
drawn
in
favor
of
the
All reasonable
nonmoving
party,
but
"unsupported allegations or affidavits setting forth 'ultimate or
conclusory facts and conclusions of law' are insufficient to
either support or defeat a motion for summary judgment."
Galindo
v. Precision Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985); see
also
Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.
1994).
"No genuine dispute of fact exists if the record taken as
a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
non-moving party."
Simbaki, 767 F.3d at 481.
III. DISCUSSION
A.
The Admissibility of Defendant Thompson's Deposition
toilet paper and killed himself? A: Yes.").
9
Before addressing the merits of this dispute, the Court must
attend to a preliminary evidentiary matter.
Defendants argue
that Thompson's deposition testimony, attached to plaintiffs'
motion
for
summary
judgment,
deposition is "incomplete."45
its
technical
is
inadmissible
because
the
The Court concludes that despite
incompleteness,
the
Court
may
consider
the
deposition in the same fashion as a sworn affidavit.
Defendants explicitly agree46 that the Court has discretion
to determine whether the use of incomplete deposition testimony
is
permissible,
admissibility
have
provided
been
met
that
and
"customary
if
no
standards
unfairness
of
inheres."
Daigle v. Maine Med. Ctr., Inc., 14 F.3d 684, 692 (1st Cir. 1994)
(citing Lentomyynti Oy v. Medivac, Inc., 997 F.2d 364, 371 (7th
Cir. 1993)).
The Fifth Circuit has not addressed the question of
whether incomplete depositions may be used to support a motion
for
summary
judgment.
Two
decisions
by
the
Ninth
Circuit,
however, provide persuasive authority that they may.
In Hoover v. Switlik Parachute Co., the Ninth Circuit held
that deposition testimony that had not been subject to crossexamination
by
the
party
opposing
its
introduction
could
be
considered for summary judgment purposes so long as it met the
requirements for an affidavit.
45
46
R. Doc. 76 at 1.
See R. Doc. 76 at 2.
10
663 F.2d 964, 966 (9th Cir.
1981).
There, one defendant, Pioneer, sought to use deposition
testimony against a co-defendant, Switlik, even though Pioneer
had taken the depositions before Switlik had been added to the
litigation.
The
court
observed
that
the
statements
in
the
depositions had been "made on personal knowledge and set forth
facts that were admissible in evidence."
Id.
Therefore, the
"depositions were the equivalents of affidavits" and the court
would consider them.
Id.
Next, in In re Sunset Bay Associates, the Ninth Circuit
confronted the precise issue raised by defendants here: whether a
court
may
rely
upon
deposition
testimony
that
has
not
been
completed or signed when deciding a motion for summary judgment.
See 944 F.2d 1503, 1509 (9th Cir. 1991).
The defendants argued
that the incomplete status of the deposition denied them a chance
to cross-examine the deponent.
Relying
on
Hoover,
the
The court rejected that argument.
court
held
that
even
an
unsigned
deposition could be admitted as an affidavit when the deponent
was sworn.
Id. at 1510.
The court explained: "Because there is
no reason to believe that the sworn answers to questions are less
reliable than an affidavit, to the extent that the content of the
deposition
testimony
is
otherwise
admissible,
should be admissible on summary judgment."
Here,
Thompson
was
sworn,
and
the
that
testimony
Id.
statements
the
Court
relies upon from Thompson's deposition are based on his own
11
personal knowledge of what happened and set out facts that would
be admissible into evidence at trial in the form of his own
testimony.
Thus, under the logic of In re Sunset Bay Associates,
it is a reasonable exercise of the Court's discretion to consider
Thompson's incomplete, unsigned deposition as though it were a
sworn affidavit.
Accordingly, the Court will consider Thompson's
deposition testimony in deciding this motion.
B.
State Law Negligence Claim Against Defendant Thompson
Plaintiffs
assert
claims
under
negligence statute, La. C.C. art. 2315.
Louisiana's
general
Louisiana courts conduct
a duty-risk analysis to determine whether to impose liability
under Article 2315.
Lemann v. Essen Lane Daiquiris, Inc., 923
So. 2d 627, 632-633 (La. 2006).
Under Louisiana law, "[t]he
duty-risk analysis is the standard negligence analysis employed
in determining whether to impose liability."
Audler v. CBC
Innovis Inc., 519 F.3d 239, 249 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Lemann,
923
So.
2d
at
633).
A
plaintiff
must
prove
each
of
five
elements: (1) the defendant had a duty to conform his conduct to
a
specific
standard
of
care
(the
duty
element);
(2)
the
defendant's conduct failed to conform to the appropriate standard
of care (the breach element); (3) the defendant's substandard
conduct was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injuries (the
cause-in-fact element); (4) the defendant's substandard conduct
was a legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries (the scope-of-duty
12
element); and (5) actual damages (the damages element).
See S.J.
v. Lafayette Parish Sch. Bd., 41 So. 3d 1119, 1125 (La. 2010);
see also Knight v. Kellogg Brown & Root Inc., 333 F. App'x 1, 6
(5th Cir. 2009) (applying Louisiana law).
A plaintiff's failure
to prove any one of these elements results in a determination of
no liability.
Knight, 333 F. App'x at 6.
1. Duty
The first element is duty.
Under Louisiana law,
“a sheriff
. . . owes a general duty to a prisoner to save him from harm and
the
officer
is
liable
for
the
prisoner's
resulting from a violation of such a duty.”
injury
or
death
Manuel v. City of
Jeanerette, 702 So. 2d 709, 712 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (citing
Barlow v. City of New Orleans, 241 So. 2d 501, 504 (La. 1970)).
This
duty
injury.”
“extends
to
protecting
inmates
from
self-inflicted
Misenheimer v. W. Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff's Office,
677 So. 2d 159, 161 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Scott v. State,
618 So. 2d 1053 (La. Ct. App. 1993)).
Specifically, "prison
authorities owe a duty to use reasonable care to protect inmates
from harm" including "self-inflicted injury."
at 1059.
Scott, 618 So. 2d
"This duty is not absolute, but depends upon the
circumstances of the particular case."
Id.; see also Manuel, 702
So. 2d at 712 (citing Griffis v. Travelers Ins. Co., 273 So. 2d
523, 526 (La. 1973)) ("[T]he . . . officer must only do what is
reasonable under the circumstances[.]").
13
Here, it is undisputed that prison authorities, including
Thompson, were aware that Mr. Goetzee was a suicide risk.
Mr.
Goetzee arrived at OPP as a result of his own suicide attempt,
and he was on suicide watch at the time of his death.47
In
addition, during his deposition, Thompson explicitly agreed that
he "knew that Mr. Goetzee was at substantial risk of hurting or
killing
himself
if
allowed."48
Thus,
under
Louisiana
law,
Thompson had a duty to "take reasonable measures" to protect Mr.
Goetzee from self-inflicted harm, including death.
Scott, 618
So. 2d at 1058.
2. Breach
"[B]reach of a duty is the failure to exercise reasonable
care under the circumstances."
D.C. v. St. Landry Parish Sch.
Bd., 802 So. 2d 19, 22 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Frank L.
Maraist & Thomas C. Galligan, Louisiana Tort Law § 6-1, at 139
(1996)).
In order to determine if a prison officer breached his
duty to use reasonable care to protect an inmate from harm, the
officer's
actions
circumstances
negligence."
that
must
be
existed
evaluated
at
the
"in
time
Scott, 618 So. 2d at 1059.
light
of
of
the
the
alleged
Plaintiffs can prove
breach by proving that "the operators of the facility knew or
47
R. Doc. 66-2 at ¶ 33.
R. Doc. 68-4 at 221 (Pls.' Ex. 26: Excerpts from
Thompson Deposition).
48
14
should
have
known
of
[a]
risk"
measures to prevent the harm."
and
"failed
take
reasonable
Id. at 1058.
In Manuel, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal
approved the trial court's conclusion that a prison officer's
"failure to provide adequate, and indeed any, observation" of a
prisoner who committed suicide while unobserved constituted a
"breach of the duty owed to the prisoner."
702 So. 2d at 713.
Here, it is undisputed that Thompson repeatedly abandoned his
post for long periods of time on the day of Mr. Goetzee's death,
when he was assigned to continuously observe Mr. Goetzee.
Like
the officer in Manuel, he "fail[ed] to provide adequate, . . .
indeed any, observation" of Mr. Goetzee during those times.
Reasonable
minds
could
not
differ
that
he
failed
to
Id.
take
reasonable measures to protect Mr. Goetzee from harm during the
long periods of time in which he was not observing Mr. Goetzee at
all.
It was during one of these absences that Mr. Goetzee
committed suicide, the very harm that Thompson's assignment was
designed to prevent.
Thus, the Court concludes that a reasonable
fact-finder could only find that here, as in Manuel, Thompson's
failure to observe Mr. Goetzee constitutes a clear breach of his
duty to Mr. Goetzee.
When Thompson abandoned his post and left
Mr. Goetzee unobserved for hours at a time, Thompson did not take
reasonable care to protect Mr. Goetzee from a known risk of harm.
Accordingly, the element of breach is met.
15
3. Cause-in-Fact
Louisiana case law is clear that cause-in-fact is usually a
"but for" inquiry, "which tests whether the accident would or
would
not
conduct."
2001).
have
happened
but
for
the
defendant's
substandard
Perkins v. Entergy Corp., 782 So. 2d 606, 611 (La.
The
"substantial
factor"
test
is
applied
as
an
alternative to the but-for test "[w]hen there are concurrent
causes of an accident which nevertheless would have occurred in
the absence of one of the causes."
Boykin v. Louisiana Transit
Co., 707 So. 2d 1225, 1232 n.10 (La. 1998).
"some other test is needed."
In such a situation,
LeJeune v. Allstate Ins. Co., 365
So. 2d 471, 477 (La. 1978).
The substantial factor test is
"similar to the but-for test," except that when more than one
party's negligence would have caused the injury in the absence of
another party's negligence, "all are held to be causative."
Id.
Plaintiffs
Mr.
contend
that
there
are
"multiple
causes"
for
Goetzee's death, but they do not specify what they mean by this,
nor do they explain how this case fits the mold of a concurrent
causes case.
Thus, the Court concludes that the but-for test is
the appropriate test.
The but-for inquiry "focuses on the conduct of the defendant
alleged to constitute a breach of duty" and asks "whether the
accident would or would not have happened but for the defendant's
substandard conduct."
Boykin, 707 So. 2d at 1230.
16
Thus, the
but-for inquiry here is whether Mr. Goetzee's death would not
have
occurred
but
for
Thompson's
failure
to
remain
assigned post observing Mr. Goetzee on suicide watch.
at
his
Plaintiffs
are entitled to summary judgment if no reasonable jury could find
that even had Thompson stayed at his post in order to observe Mr.
Goetzee as assigned, more likely than not Mr. Goetzee would still
have died.
Cf. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
254 (1986) ("[I]n ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the
judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of the
substantive evidentiary burden.").
Plaintiffs' present circumstantial evidence in support of
their
summary
judgment
motion--none
of
which
is
disputed
by
defendants--to show that Thompson's abandonment of his post was a
cause-in-fact
of
Mr.
Goetzee's
death.
First,
plaintiffs'
evidence shows that Mr. Goetzee was suffering from psychosis and
was suicidal while in the custody of OPP.
Second, the evidence
shows that Mr. Goetzee was placed on suicide watch and that
OPSO's suicide watch policies and training materials explicitly
required officers to continuously monitor detainees on suicide
watch
and
to
document
that
they
had
done
so.49
Third,
plaintiffs' evidence establishes that Thompson, although fully
aware that Mr. Goetzee was suicidal and that suicidal detainees
49
See R. Doc. 68-4 at 274 (Pls.' Ex. 32: Office of the
Criminal Sheriff Interoffice Memo re: Observation of Suicidal
Inmates, October 15, 2007).
17
required constant monitoring, nevertheless chose to abandon his
post at least three times on August 7, 2011.
Fourth, plaintiffs'
evidence shows that it was during one of Thompson's extended
absences, when Mr. Goetzee was not under observation by any OPSO
staff, that Mr. Goetzee succeeded in killing himself.
plaintiffs
argue
that
they
have
shown
through
Therefore,
circumstantial
evidence that Thompson's substandard conduct was a cause-in-fact
of the harm to Mr. Goetzee.
Plaintiffs point out that OPSO's own
mental health director, Dr. Higgins, in his analysis of the
events surrounding Mr. Goetzee's suicide, arrived at an identical
theory of causation: "security failed to provide . . . continuous
observation allowing Mr. Goetzee to kill himself."50
After reviewing the evidence on summary judgment, the Court
concludes that no reasonable jury could find it more probable
than not that even if Thompson had remained at his post in order
to observe Mr. Goetzee as assigned, Mr. Goetzee would still have
committed suicide.
In addition to the circumstantial argument
outlined by plaintiffs, the evidence also shows that when Mr.
Goetzee was autopsied, the coroner found toilet paper in at least
four
locations
in
Mr.
Goetzee's
body.51
Specifically,
the
coroner recovered a "bolus of toilet paper" that obstructed Mr.
50
See R. Doc. 68-4 at 186 (Pls.' Ex. 23: OPSO Medical
Department, Psychological Autopsy).
51
See R. Doc. 68-4 at 2, 6 (Pls.' Ex. 1: Coroner's
Report).
18
Goetzee's
airway
and
"residual
masticated
Goetzee's mouth, esophagus, and stomach.52
paper"
from
Mr.
Although items may
move quickly from one's mouth to one's stomach, the presence of
toilet paper separately in Mr. Goetzee's mouth and esophagus and
stomach and trachea indicates that he did not simply ingest one
piece of toilet paper at one discrete moment in time.
To the
contrary, the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from
these facts is that Mr. Goetzee ingested the toilet paper across
a period of time: enough time to chew and swallow, to chew some
more, and then, at some point, to direct some of the toilet paper
toward his trachea.
Presented with these facts, no reasonable
jury could conclude that had Thompson remained at his observation
post, he could have missed seeing Mr. Goetzee ingesting the
toilet paper, which Mr. Goetzee could have ingested only in
multiple pieces and over a period of time.
Thus, the Court
concludes that the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the
facts in the record is that, had Thompson been at his post and
continuously observing Mr. Goetzee as assigned, he would have
seen
Mr.
Goetzee
with
the
toilet
paper
and
thus
could
have
intervened to stop Mr. Goetzee before he ingested enough paper to
seriously harm himself.
In opposition, defendants appear to argue that even had
Thompson
52
remained
at
his
post
Id.
19
and
maintained
continuous
observation
of
Mr.
Goetzee,
Thompson
still
might
not
have
intervened to stop Mr. Goetzee from swallowing toilet paper,
which they characterize as "a seemingly harmless act."53
a strange argument.
This is
Surely defendants are not suggesting that
there would be no breach if Thompson had sat and watched without
taking any action as Mr. Goetzee repeatedly ingested pieces of
toilet paper.
In any event, the predicate for this argument is wrong.
According
to
defendants,
Thompson's
deposition
testimony
indicates that Thompson "knew . . . Goetzee was chewing toilet
paper
throughout
the
day,
possibly
for
a
period
hours," and nevertheless did nothing to intervene.54
deposition testimony indicates precisely the opposite.
of
several
Thompson's
The Court
reproduces the relevant testimony here:
Q: Okay. So at least during the times when you saw Mr.
Goetzee on the day he died, you didn't see him with
toilet paper?
A: No.55
Thompson confirmed again that he had not seen Mr. Goetzee with
toilet paper during the day:
A: . . . I don't -- I don't think he was chewing it
throughout the day. That's what I'm saying.
53
R. Doc. 76 at 4.
Id.
55
R. Doc. 79-4 at 5 (Pls.' Ex. 33: Excerpts from Thompson
Deposition).
54
20
Q: Okay. You think it was a period -- it may have been
a period of hours, but it wasn't throughout the day?
A: Yes.56
Finally, Thompson testified that he believed that it was during
one of the times when he was away from his post that Mr. Goetzee
killed himself:
Q: . . . it's your belief that it was during that hour
and a half when Mr. Goetzee swallowed a roll of toilet
paper and killed himself?
A: Yes.57
Thus, Thompson's own deposition testimony explicitly indicates
that Thompson never saw Mr. Goetzee with toilet paper at any of
the times when he was at his post and observing Mr. Goetzee as
assigned.
Moreover,
nothing
in
Thompson's
testimony
supports
defendants' suggestion that Thompson might not have sought to
intervene had he in fact seen Mr. Goetzee with toilet paper.
To
the contrary, Thompson agreed during his deposition that he knew
"from training and common sense" that one way a person could kill
themself was by "swallowing bad things."58
He further testified
that he had not provided Mr. Goetzee with any toilet paper that
day and that he would not have been permitted to provide him with
56
R. Doc. 68-4 at 219 (Pls.' Ex. 26: Excerpts from
Thompson Deposition).
57
R. Doc. 79-4 at 6.
58
Id. at 9.
21
toilet
paper
provides
no
either.59
support
Accordingly,
for
defendants'
Thompson's
strained
testimony
suggestion
that
Thompson might have done nothing to intervene even if he had
remained at his post the entire time.
Defendants are entitled to
have all reasonable inferences drawn in their favor on summary
judgment.
Nevertheless, the limit is reasonable inferences.
No
reasonable jury could draw the inference defendants seek from
these facts.
Second, defendants argue that plaintiffs have not introduced
evidence showing that "the paper which caused his self-inflicted
asphyxiation could have been removed, nor that . . . Goetzee
could have regained consciousness or survived" had Thompson been
present the entire time.60
This argument misses the point: the
only reasonable inference to be drawn from the facts in the
record is that had Thompson remained at his post to observe Mr.
Goetzee as assigned, Mr. Goetzee either would not have obtained
the toilet paper in the first place, or if he had, Thompson would
have
seen
him
with
it
and
could
have
intervened
Goetzee had the chance to cause himself serious harm.
before
Mr.
Thus, the
Court need not inquire into how quickly the prison could have
responded after discovering an unconscious inmate, or how quickly
a medical team would have needed to arrive to save someone from
59
60
See id. at 7.
Id.
22
asphyxiating who had already ingested enough toilet paper to
cause serious harm.
In sum, the Court finds that the but-for test is satisfied
here.
in
the
The only reasonable inference to be drawn from the facts
record
is
that,
had
Thompson
been
at
his
post
and
continuously observing Mr. Goetzee as assigned, he could have
prevented Mr. Goetzee from obtaining and swallowing enough toilet
paper to harm himself.
Accordingly, the cause-in-fact element is
met.
4. Scope of Duty
The fourth element, scope of duty (sometimes called "legal
cause"), asks whether the plaintiff's injury was one of the risks
encompassed by the rule of law that imposed the duty. See Fowler
v. Roberts, 556 So. 2d 1, 6 (La. 1989). As the Louisiana Supreme
Court has explained:
The scope of the duty inquiry is ultimately a question
of policy as to whether the particular risk falls
within the scope of the duty. Rules of conduct are
designed
to
protect
some
persons
under
some
circumstances against some risks. The scope of
protection inquiry asks whether the enunciated rule
extends to or is intended to protect this plaintiff
from this type of harm arising in this manner. In
determining the limitation to be placed on liability
for defendant's substandard conduct, the proper inquiry
is often how easily the risk of injury to plaintiff can
be associated with the duty sought to be enforced.
Faucheaux v. Terrebonne Consol. Gov't, 615 So. 2d 289, 293-94
(La. 1993) (citations omitted).
23
Seizing
Louisiana
upon
test,
the
"in
defendants
this
argue
manner"
that
established the scope of duty element.
language
from
the
plaintiffs
have
not
They contend that the
test for scope of duty is foreseeability, and that Thompson's
duty did not extend to the precise harm that befell Mr. Goetzee,
as plaintiffs have not provided evidence "that this risk of
suicide . . . could be reasonably foreseen to occur in this
manner;
specifically,
by
ingestion
of
toilet
paper."61
Defendants have misunderstood the relevant inquiry for scope of
duty.
Foreseeability "is neither always reliable nor the only
criterion for comparing the relationship between a duty and a
risk."
Todd v. State Through Dep't of Soc. Servs., Office of
Cmty. Servs., 699 So. 2d 35, 39 (La. 1997).
"The ease of
association of the injury with the rule of conduct that is urged
. . . is the proper inquiry."
Id.
Here, the association between the duty imposed by law on the
prison authorities, including Thompson, and the injury sustained
by Mr. Goetzee is straightforward.
Louisiana law establishes a
duty owed by prison authorities "to a prisoner to save him from
harm."
Manuel, 702 So. 2d at 712.
Louisiana courts have held
that as a matter of law, this duty "extends to protecting inmates
from self-inflicted injury."
Misenheimer, 677 So. 2d at 161.
"This duty is not absolute, but depends upon the circumstances of
61
R. Doc. 76 at 6 (emphasis in original).
24
the particular case."
Scott, 618 So. 2d at 1059.
Specifically,
the duty to protect a prisoner from harm only extends to selfharm when the "facility knew or should have known of the risk."
Id.
at
1058.
including
Here,
Thompson,
suicide risk.
it
were
is
undisputed
well
aware
that
that
OPP
Mr.
authorities,
Goetzee
was
a
They needed only to be aware that he was at risk
of self-harm; they did not need to contemplate the precise form
that self-harm might take.
See Cay v. State, Dep't of Transp. &
Dev., 631 So. 2d 393, 399 (La. 1994).
Thus, under the undisputed
facts before the Court, the duty to protect Mr. Goetzee from harm
extended to the risk that he would come to harm as a result of
his own actions.
Accordingly, the scope-of-duty element is met.
5. Damages
Finally,
suicide.
it
is
uncontested
that
Mr.
Goetzee
committed
Thus, plaintiffs have demonstrated actual damages.
Cf.
Berg v. Zummo, 786 So. 2d 708, 710, 716 (La. 2001) (concluding
that "actual damages were proven" when plaintiff had suffered
"serious bodily injury").
6. Conclusion
For the forgoing reasons, plaintiffs are entitled to summary
judgment on their negligence claim against Defendant Thompson.
C.
Vicarious Liability Against Defendant Gusman
Plaintiffs also move for summary judgment on their vicarious
liability
claim
against
Sheriff
25
Gusman.
The
principle
of
vicarious
liability
or
respondeat
Louisiana Civil Code article 2320.
superior
is
codified
in
This article provides that an
employer is liable for the tortious acts of its employees "in the
exercise of the functions in which they are employed."
issue
for
the
Court
is
whether
Thompson's
alleged
Thus, the
tortious
conduct against Mr. Goetzee was sufficiently employment-related
that vicarious liability should attach.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has outlined the parameters of
the test for vicarious liability as follows:
While the course of employment test refers to time and
place, the scope of employment test examines the
employment-related risk of injury. The inquiry requires
the trier of fact to determine whether the employee's
tortious conduct was “so closely connected in time,
place and causation to his employment-duties as to be
regarded a risk of harm fairly attributable to the
employer's business, as compared with conduct motivated
by purely personal considerations entirely extraneous
to the employer's interests.”
Russell v. Noullet, 721 So. 2d 868, 871 (La. 1998) (quoting
LeBrane v. Lewis, 292 So. 2d 216, 218 (La. 1974)).
the
Louisiana
Supreme
Court
identified
four
In Lebrane,
factors
to
be
considered in determining vicarious liability: (1) whether the
tortious act was primarily employment rooted; (2) whether the
tortious act was reasonably incidental to the performance of the
employee's duties; (3) whether the act occurred on the employer's
premises;
and
employment.
(4)
whether
it
occurred
during
the
hours
of
LeBrane, 292 So. 2d at 218; see also Baumeister v.
26
Plunkett, 673 So. 2d 994, 996 (La. 1996).
It is not necessary
that all four Lebrane factors be met in order to find vicarious
liability.
See Bates v. Caruso, 881 So. 2d 758, 762 (La. Ct.
App. 2004).
Each
case
must
be
decided
on
its
specific
facts.
Id.
Generally, an employee's actions are within the course and scope
of his employment if "the conduct is of the kind that he is
employed to perform, occurs substantially within the authorized
limits of time and space, and is activated at least in part by a
purpose to serve the employer."
224, 226–27 (La. 1994).
Orgeron v. McDonald, 639 So. 2d
That the primary motive of the employee
is to benefit himself does not prevent the tortious act of the
employee from falling within the scope of his employment.
Ermert
v. Hartford Ins. Co., 559 So. 2d 467, 477 (La. 1990).
If the
purpose of serving the employer's business actuates the employee
to any appreciable extent, the employer is liable.
Hall, 874 So. 2d 131, 137-38 (La. 2004).
Richard v.
In addition, "[t]he
scope of risks attributable to an employer increases with the
amount of authority and freedom of action granted to the servant
in performing his assigned tasks."
Id. at 139.
In negligence
cases, the focus is on the employee's general activity at the
time of the incident, not on the specific alleged negligent act.
Ermert,
559
Importantly,
So.
"that
2d
at
the
478;
act
Richard,
is
27
874
proscribed
or
So.
2d
at
performed
139.
in
a
forbidden
manner
employment."
does
not
remove
the
act
from
the
scope
of
Price v. La. Dept. Of Transp. and Development, 608
So. 2d 203, 210 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992) (citing Lebrane, 292 So.
2d 216).
Defendants' primary argument against holding Sheriff Gusman
vicariously liable is that plaintiffs have not established that
Thompson acted tortiously.
Notably, their brief does not argue
that Thompson was not acting within the course and scope of his
employment at the time of his allegedly tortious conduct.
Applying the LeBrane factors to the facts of this case, the
Court finds that Thompson's allegedly tortious conduct occurred
in
the
workplace
during
the
hours
of
Thompson's
employment.
Thus, the third and fourth factors set forth in LeBrane are met.
The Court must therefore determine if the alleged acts were
primarily employment rooted and/or reasonably incidental to the
performance of Thompson's duties.
A tortious act will be deemed primarily employment rooted if
"serving the employer's business actuates the employee to any
appreciable extent."
Baumeister, 673 So. 2d at 999.
Defendants
do not dispute that Thompson's regular duties and assignments at
OPP
included
"monitoring
the
tiers
for
inmate
staff
safety,
directly supervising inmates placed on suicide watch, assisting
other jail staff, [and] distributing meals to inmates ('feed
28
up')."62
On August 7, 2011, the day of Mr. Goetzee's suicide, it
was within Thompson's duties to conduct direct supervision of Mr.
Goetzee.63
That day, he took three breaks: one to help another
employee distribute meals, one to use the restroom, and one to go
to the nurses' station.64
Thus, one of his absences from his
post
a
was
to
assist
distribute meals.
with
separate
work
duty:
helping
to
It is clear that "serving the employer's
business actuate[d]" his conduct to an appreciable extent during
that absence.
Id.
The other absences, during which he used the restroom and
took a break, are the sorts of behaviors that an employer could
anticipate as being "reasonably incidental" to the performance of
an employee's duties.
LeBrane, 292 So. 2d at 218.
That Thompson
was not authorized to take these breaks does not affect the
analysis, which does not turn on whether "the act is proscribed
or performed in a forbidden manner."
Price, 608 So. 2d at 210
(citing
Accordingly, the
Lebrane, 292 So. 2d 216).
LeBrane
factors support the conclusion that Thompson was acting within
the scope and course of his duties when he abandoned his post.
Thus,
his
employer,
Sheriff
liable for his conduct.
Gusman,
may
be
held
vicariously
Because Thompson was acting within the
course and scope of his employment at the time of his tortious
62
63
64
68-2 at ¶ 38.
Id. at ¶ 42.
Id. at ¶¶ 44-47.
29
conduct, the Court finds that plaintiffs are entitled to summary
judgment on vicarious liability against Sheriff Gusman.
D.
Section 1983 Claim Against Thompson
Plaintiffs also move for summary judgment on their 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 claim against Thompson for violating Mr. Goetzee’s rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The elements of a § 1983 cause
of action are: (1) a deprivation of rights secured by federal law
(2) that occurred under color of state law, and (3) was caused by
a state actor.
See Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 482
(5th Cir. 2004).
1.
Deprivation of Constitutional Right
"The State's exercise of its power to hold detainees . . .
brings with it a responsibility under the U.S. Constitution to
tend to essentials of their well-being."
Hare v. City of Corinth
(Hare
Cir.
III),
74
F.3d
633,
638-39
(5th
1996)
(en
banc).
Accordingly, pretrial detainees have a right to "constitutional
essentials" such as safety and medical care.
Jacobs v. West
Feliciana Sheriff's Dep't, 228 F.3d 388, 393 (5th Cir. 2000).
"Unlike
convicted
prisoners,
whose
rights
to
constitutional
essentials like medical care and safety are guaranteed by the
Eighth Amendment, pretrial detainees look to the procedural and
substantive due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to
ensure provision of these same basic needs."
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)).
30
Id.
(citing Bell
"The failure to provide pre-
trial
detainees
with
adequate
protection
from
suicidal impulses is actionable under § 1983."
Marlin,
986
F.2d
104,
107
(5th
Cir.
1993)
their
known
Evans v. City of
(citing
Rhyne
v.
Henderson Cty., 973 F.2d 386, 391 (5th Cir. 1992)).
Here, plaintiffs argue that Thompson's repeated decision to
abandon his post on August 7, 2011, when he admittedly knew Mr.
Goetzee was at risk for suicide, violated Mr. Goetzee's right to
adequate protection from his known suicidal impulses.
When a
detainee alleges that a government official's episodic act or
omission violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process right to
basic human needs, plaintiffs must demonstrate that the official
exhibited "deliberate indifference" under Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825 (1994). See Hare III, 74 F.3d at 636, 648–49 (applying
Farmer's
Eighth
Amendment
pretrial
detainee's
deliberate
Fourteenth
indifference
Amendment
due
test
process
to
claim
against state officials); cf. Doe v. Robertson, 751 F.3d 383, 387
(5th Cir. 2014) (applying Farmer's Eighth Amendment deliberate
indifference
test
to
pretrial
detainee's
Fifth
Amendment
due
process claim against federal official).
A
prison
official
acts
with
indifference when he (1) "knew of" and
subjective
deliberate
(2) "disregarded an
excessive risk to the [detainee's] health or safety."
Brumfield
v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322, 331 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Gibbs v.
Grimmette, 254 F.3d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 2001)) (alteration in
31
original).
The law is clearly established that "jailers must
take measures to prevent inmate suicides once they know of [a]
suicide risk."
Jacobs, 228 F.3d at 394-95 (citing Hare III, 135
F.3d at 328–29).
Nevertheless, "negligent inaction by a jail
officer does not violate the due process rights of a person
lawfully
held
"Accordingly,
in
to
custody
be
of
the
considered
State."
deliberately
Id.
at
indifferent
395.
to
a
known suicide risk, an officer's acts must constitute at least
more than a mere 'oversight.'"
Id.
The officer must be "aware
of a substantial and significant risk" that the prisoner will
commit suicide and "effectively disregard[] it."
Id.; see also
Vinson v. Clarke Cnty., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1302 (S.D. Ala.
1998) (failure of prison personnel to take steps to prevent
inmate from committing suicide in the face of actual knowledge of
suicide risk can satisfy deliberate indifference) (citing Greason
v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 835–36 (11th Cir. 1990)).
The record before the Court on summary judgment establishes
that Thompson had actual knowledge of the suicide risk to Mr.
Goetzee.
During
the
entirety
of
Thompson's
shift,
assigned to monitor Mr. Goetzee on suicide watch.65
he
was
In addition,
Thompson explicitly admitted in his deposition that he "knew that
Mr. Goetzee was at substantial risk of hurting or killing himself
65
R. Doc. 66-6 at ¶ 33.
32
if allowed."66
A reasonable jury could not find other than that
Thompson
actual
had
knowledge
that
Mr.
Goetzee
substantial and significant risk" of suicide.
faced
"a
Id.
Likewise, reasonable minds could only conclude that Thompson
"effectively disregarded" the risk to Mr. Goetzee.
Id.
Thompson
admitted that he knew OPSO's suicide watch policies explicitly
required officers to continuously monitor detainees on suicide
watch
and
to
acknowledged
document
that
that
OPSO's
they
policies
had
done
provided
so.67
that
He
the
also
reason
suicidal detainees must be continuously monitored is because "the
few moments required to successfully commit suicide necessitates
continuous,
detainees
direct
on
themselves.69
observation."68
suicide
watch
had
He
admitted
the
that
potential
he
to
knew
kill
And yet Thompson, although fully aware both that
Mr. Goetzee was suicidal and that suicidal detainees required
constant monitoring, chose to abandon his post at least three
times on August 7, 2011, leaving Mr. Goetzee unobserved each
time.70
These three absences meant Mr. Goetzee went unobserved
66
R. Doc. 68-4 at 221 (Pls.' Ex. 26: Excerpts from
Thompson Deposition).
67
Id. at 213-15.
68
See R. Doc. 68-4 at 274 (Pls.' Ex. 32: Office of the
Criminal Sheriff Interoffice Memo re: Observation of Suicidal
Inmates, October 15, 2007).
69
Id. at 219 (Pls.' Ex. 26).
70
See id. at 196-98 (Pls.' Ex. 24: Transcript of Boykin
Examination Hearing in State of Louisiana v. William Thompson,
Case No. 510-225).
33
for
an
hour
and
respectively.71
a
half,
fifteen
minutes,
and
two
hours
Again, the law is settled that "jailers must
take measures to prevent inmate suicides once they know of [a]
suicide risk."
Id. at 394-95.
Here, there can be no question
that during the times when Thompson left his post he took no
measures to protect Mr. Goetzee from harm.
Thus, plaintiffs have
established that Thompson "effectively disregarded" the risk to
Mr. Goetzee.
Id. at 395.
The Court's conclusion is buttressed by Thompson's guilty
plea to Malfeasance in Office under La. Rev. Stat. § 14:134 in
connection with these events.
section
14:134,
the
state
To sustain a conviction under
must
prove
"the
existence
of
an
affirmative duty delineated by statute or law upon the defendant
public officer and that the defendant intentionally performed
that duty in an unlawful manner."
State v. Davis, 634 So. 2d
1168, 1170 (La. 1994) (emphasis added).
A defendant must know
"exactly what conduct [was] expected of him in his official
capacity."
office,
Id.
Thus, by pleading guilty to malfeasance in
Thompson
affirmed
that
responsibilities was intentional.
Mr.
Goetzee's
needs
may
be
his
disregard
of
his
Accordingly, his disregard for
easily
distinguished
from
the
"negligent inaction" or "mere oversight" that will not satisfy
deliberate indifference.
71
Jacobs, 228 F.3d at 394-95.
See id. at 196.
34
2.
Under Color of State Law
Second, there is no question that Thompson acted under color
of
state
law
at
the
time
of
the
alleged
violation
Goetzee's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.
employee
acts
under
official
capacity
color
or
while
pursuant to state law."
Thompson
was
Sheriff's
a
Office
violation.
of
state
exercising
while
his
Mr.
"[A] public
acting
in
his
responsibilities
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 50 (1988).
commissioned
and
law
of
on
deputy
duty
at
of
the
the
time
Orleans
of
the
Parish
alleged
Therefore, the under color of state law prong of
plaintiffs' § 1983 claim is satisfied.
3.
Causation
The third element of plaintiffs' § 1983 claim is a proximate
cause requirement.
(5th Cir.).
his
See Lamb v. Mendoza, 478 F. App'x 854, 856
"Without proof of causation, a plaintiff cannot meet
constitutional
burden."
Id.
Section
1983
proximate
causation "is evaluated under the common law standard" and is
interpreted against the "background of tort liability that makes
a person liable for the natural consequences of his actions."
Murray v. Earle, 405 F.3d 278, 290 (5th Cir. 2005).
the
same
reasons
that
the
Court
concludes
Thus, for
plaintiffs
have
established the cause-in-fact and scope-of-duty elements of their
tort claim against Thompson, the Court concludes that they have
established the proximate cause element of their § 1983 claim.
35
4.
Conclusion
Because plaintiffs have established that there is no issue
of material fact for each essential element of their § 1983 claim
against Thompson, the Court grants summary judgment in their
favor on the issue of Thompson's liability in his individual
capacity under § 1983.
E.
Predicate Constitutional Violation
Monell Claim Against Sheriff Gusman
for
Plaintiffs'
A suit against a government official such as Sheriff Gusman
in his official capacity is the same as a suit against the
government entity of which the official is an agent, and victory
in
such
a
represents.
suit
imposes
liability
on
the
entity
that
he
See Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452,
468 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing McMillian v. Monroe Cty., Ala., 520
U.S. 781, 785 n.2 (1997)). Here, that entity is Orleans Parish.
Municipal
liability
under
§
1983
requires
proof
of
three
elements: "(1) an official policy (or custom), of which (2) a
policymaker can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge,
and (3) a constitutional violation whose 'moving force' is that
policy or custom."
Pineda v. City of Hous., 291 F.3d 325, 328
(5th Cir. 2002) (citing Piotrowski v. City of Hous., 237 F.3d
567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001)).
partial
summary
judgment
At this time, plaintiffs move for
on
the
36
"constitutional
violation"
component of the third element of their intended Monell claim
against Sheriff Gusman.
The only argument defendants raise in opposition is that "it
is improper" to grant partial summary judgment on a "portion" of
a
"prong"
of
a
test.72
Federal
directly contradicts this position.
Rule
of
Civil
Procedure
56
It provides that a party may
move for summary judgment "identifying the claim . . . or the
part of each claim . . . on which summary judgment is sought."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (emphasis added).
Thus, it is proper for
plaintiffs to move for summary judgment on the constitutional
violation component of their Monell claim.
As discussed in the
section addressing plaintiffs' § 1983 claim against Thompson in
his individual capacity, supra, plaintiffs have established that
Thompson violated Mr. Goetzee's Fourteenth Amendment due process
rights.
Accordingly,
they
are
entitled
to
partial
summary
judgment on the "constitutional violation" component of the third
element of their intended Monell claim against Sheriff Gusman.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, the Court GRANTS summary judgment
in
favor
of
plaintiffs
on
their
state
law
negligence
claim
against Thompson and their state law vicarious liability claim
against Sheriff Gusman.
72
R. Doc. 76 at 8.
37
The Court also GRANTS summary judgment on plaintiffs' § 1983
claim against Thompson.
In addition, the Court GRANTS partial
summary judgment on the "constitutional violation" component of
the
third
element
of
plaintiffs'
§
1983
claim
under
Monell
against Sheriff Gusman.
In light of the Court's grant of summary judgment against
Defendant Thompson, plaintiffs' motion for a default judgment
against Defendant Thompson is moot.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 17th day of November, 2014.
__
_________________________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
38
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?