Nagle et al v. Gusman et al

Filing 298

ORDER AND REASONS denying Dr. Higgins's MOTION 236 248 for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 2/26/15. (jjs) Modified on 2/26/2016 (jjs).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MARGARET GOETZEE NAGLE and
JOHN ERIC GOETZEE

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 12-1910

SHERIFF MARLIN GUSMAN, ET AL.

SECTION "R" (2)

ORDER AND REASONS
This action arises out of the August 7, 2011 suicide of William Goetzee,
an inmate of Orleans Parish Prison (“OPP”). Following Goetzee’s death, his
siblings, Margaret Goetzee Nagle and John Eric Goetzee, filed this section
1983 civil rights and state-law suit against numerous employees of the
Orleans Parish Sheriff’s Office, including defendant Dr. Charles “Mike”
Higgins.1
Goetzee was a commander in the United States Coast Guard Reserve
and a civilian employee of the Coast Guard. Goetzee committed suicide while
being held as a pretrial detainee on the mental health tier of the House of
Detention at OPP on charges related to a suicide attempt five days earlier.
On the day of Goetzee’s death, OPP Deputy William Thompson was assigned
to maintain “suicide watch” of Goetzee. Thompson repeatedly left his suicide

1

R. Doc. 1.

watch post, and it was during one of these absences that Goetzee committed
suicide.
Dr. Higgins was the Chief of Psychiatry at OPP when Goetzee died.
Plaintiffs contend that not only did Dr. Higgins help to develop OPP’s
approach to mental health care and suicide prevention, but also that Dr.
Higgins was directly involved in Goetzee’s psychiatric treatment at OPP.
According to plaintiffs, OPP’s suicide prevention practices were grossly
inadequate, and Dr. Higgins condoned a de facto policy of allowing deputies
and nurses to leave suicidal inmates unwatched. For this reason, plaintiffs
argue, Thompson was derelict in his duties as the deputy assigned to conduct
direct observation of Goetzee, leading to Goetzee’s death.
Dr. Higgins now moves the Court for summary judgment on plaintiffs’
section 1983 and state-law claims. 2 For the following reasons, the Court
denies the motion.

Dr. Higgins filed two separate motions for summary judgment – one
addressing plaintiffs’ substantive claims, and one addressing plaintiffs’
claim for punitive damages. See R. Doc. 236; R. Doc. 248. Dr. Higgins
relies on the same arguments in both motions, so the Court resolves both
motions in this order.
2

I.

BACKGROUND
A.

Goetzee’s Arrest, Incarceration, and Suicide

On the morning of August 2, 2011, Goetzee approached a marked
Federal Protective Services vehicle occupied by a uniformed law enforcement
officer. Goetzee opened the front passenger door, entered the vehicle, and
seated himself in the front passenger seat. Goetzee lunged for the officer’s
weapon, exclaiming, “I want to kill myself, give me your gun.”3 Federal
agents arrested Goetzee and transported him to OPP later that day. 4
The next day, on August 3, prison officials brought Goetzee to federal
court for his initial appearance on charges related to his conflict with the
federal officer during his suicide attempt the day before. While at court,
Goetzee behaved strangely in the presence of attorneys, federal officers, and
the judge. A representative for Goetzee informed the court that he was
“obviously having mental issues.”5 Back at OPP, a nurse alerted Dr. Higgins
to Goetzee’s behavior, and Dr. Higgins ordered that Goetzee be transported
to University Hospital to “rule out delirium.”6 Two days later, on August 5,
3

R. Doc. 266, Exhibit AA.

4

R. Doc. 248-1 ¶ 6; R. Doc. 265-1 ¶ 68.

5

See R. Doc. 266, Exhibit ZZ.

6

R. Doc. 266, Exhibit I.

University Hospital discharged Goetzee back to OPP with a diagnosis of
psychosis.7 On August 6, Dr. Higgins conducted an “Initial Psychiatric
Evaluation” of Goetzee. From this evaluation, Dr. Higgins ordered that
Goetzee be housed on OPP’s mental health tier and placed on direct
observation. 8 Dr. Higgins’s “direct observation” order required a Sheriff’s
Office employee to “maintain direct and constant observation” of Goetzee at
all times, i.e., “suicide watch.”9
Goetzee was under suicide watch on August 6 and 7, 2011. On the
morning of August 7, Deputy William Thompson was assigned to maintain
supervision of Goetzee. During his suicide watch shift, Thompson left his
post at least three times, leaving Goetzee unobserved each time. During
these absences, Goetzee went unobserved for an hour and a half, fifteen
minutes, and two hours, respectively. During Thompson’s final absence, an
inmate notified another on-duty officer that Goetzee was lying on the floor
of his cell, unresponsive. Apparently, Goetzee had repeatedly swallowed

7

R. Doc. 248-1 ¶ 11; R. Doc. 265-1 ¶ 73.

8

R. Doc. 266, Exhibit J.

9

See, e.g., R. Doc. 266, Exhibits D-E.

wads of toilet paper and asphyxiated himself while Thompson was not
monitoring him.10
As a result of these events, Thompson pleaded guilty to the crime of
malfeasance in office. While under oath, and as part of his plea, Thompson
accepted the state’s factual basis for the charge. The factual basis specified
that Thompson was assigned to continuously monitor Goetzee; that he left
his post three times for one and one-half hours, fifteen minutes, and two
hours, respectively; that another inmate discovered Goetzee unconscious
while Thompson was not monitoring him; and that Thompson had
fraudulently submitted an observation checklist for August 7, 2011, because
the checklist indicated that he had continuously monitored Goetzee all day
when in fact Thompson had not done so. 11
The Court has already granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs
on their section 1983 and state-law claims against Thompson. The Court has
also granted summary judgment against Sheriff Gusman on plaintiffs’ statelaw vicarious liability claims and partial summary judgment on plaintiffs’
section 1983 claims. 12
10

See R. Doc. 266, Exhibit AA at OPSO 12531.

11

See generally R. Doc. 248, Exhibit E.

12

R. Doc. 113.

B.

Dr. Higgins’s Alleged Involvement and Responsibility
for Goetzee’s Suicide

As Director of Psychiatry at OPP, Dr. Higgins was responsible for
“overseeing psychiatric services” within the prison and “integrating
psychiatric services with medical and security functions.”13

His

responsibilities also included supervising daily operations on OPP’s mental
health tier where Goetzee was housed. 14
While Goetzee was incarcerated, OPP undoubtedly maintained a
written suicide prevention policy founded upon direct observation of suicidal
inmates. Specifically, the written policy required that “all inmates with active
suicidal ideation . . . be directly observed by the Security staff at all times.”15
The written policy further provided that “periodic monitoring [was] a
suboptimal solution [because] the few moments required to successfully
commit suicide necessitates continuous, direct observation.”16
According to plaintiffs, despite OPP’s written policy, the observation
that suicidal inmates actually received was intermittent or periodic at best,

13

R. Doc. 248-2 at 20-21.

14

See id. at 21.

15

R. Doc. 266, Exhibit D.

16

Id.

and Dr. Higgins knew about it. For example, the general layout of OPP’s
mental health tier, where Goetzee was housed, was not conducive to direct,
continuous observation. According to plaintiffs, regardless of where a direct
observation deputy sat or stood on the mental health tier to conduct suicide
watch, the deputy was physically unable to view the entirety of the three cells
that held suicidal inmates.17 Additionally, nurses and deputies who worked
on the tier testified at their depositions that Dr. Higgins was aware that
suicidal inmates often frequently went unobserved for long periods of time.18
According to Deputy William Thompson, there was “no question that Dr.
Higgins knew” that suicidal inmates were left unobserved. 19 According to
Nurse David Schaible, he regularly complained about the direct observation
deputies, but eventually gave up because “nothing changed.” 20 Schaible also
stated that “Dr. Higgins was well aware that it was a problem.” 21

17

R. Doc. 266, Exhibit A at 163-64; R. Doc. 266, Exhibit DD at 62-63.

See, e.g., R. Doc. 266, Exhibit A at 155-56; R. Doc. 266, Exhibit DD at
50-52, 102-110; R. Doc. 266, Exhibit GGG at 144, 153.

18

19

R. Doc. 266, Exhibit A at 160.

20

R. Doc. 266, Exhibit DD at 206-07.

21

Id. at 211-12.

According to plaintiffs, Dr. Higgins’s role as Chief of Psychiatry
empowered him to enforce OPP’s written direct observation policy, but Dr.
Higgins failed to do so. Dr. Higgins admitted that, as Chief of Psychiatry, he
regarded suicide prevention as his “highest priority” and that he had an
ethical obligation to “address [OPP’s] suicide prevention practices.” 22
Further, Sheriff Gusman expected OPP’s security and medical staff to work
together to ensure compliance with any direct observation orders.23
According to OPP Sergeant Nicole Harris, the security and medical staff
“worked seamlessly together” on the mental health tier, including with
regard to direct observation inmates. 24
Although Dr. Higgins suggests that he had no authority to “control
security” after issuing a direct observation order,25 OPP Deputy Tyrone
Williams regarded Dr. Higgins as “in charge” on the mental health tier. 26
Williams explained that if Dr. Higgins gave a deputy an order, “it got

22

R. Doc. 266, Exhibit Z at 79, 200.

23

R. Doc. 266, Exhibit MM at 84-86, 341-42.

24

R. Doc. 266, Exhibit LL at 194-95.

25

R. Doc. 248-2 at 19.

26

R. Doc. 266, Exhibit GGG at 31.

followed.”27 According to Williams, Dr. Higgins never expressed any concern
about the way deputies carried out direct observation, but if he had, Williams
“would have done whatever Dr. Higgins told [Williams] to do.”28
Based on the foregoing evidence, plaintiffs argue that Dr. Higgins was
deliberately indifferent to Goetzee’s mental health needs and known risk of
suicide. For this, plaintiffs seek to hold Dr. Higgins liable under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and Louisiana tort law.
C.

Dr. Higgins’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Dr. Higgins now moves for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ claims.
Dr. Higgins argues that plaintiffs undisputedly cannot prevail on their
section 1983 claims because, according to Dr. Higgins, plaintiffs cannot show
that Dr. Higgins violated Goetzee’s constitutional rights. Dr. Higgins also
argues that plaintiffs cannot satisfy the burden required to sustain a claim
for punitive damages under section 1983. 29 Finally, Dr. Higgins argues that
plaintiffs cannot prevail on their state-law negligence claims.

27

See id. at 32.

28

Id. at 98.

Dr. Higgins also argues that plaintiffs cannot prevail on their claim
for punitive damages under Louisiana law, but plaintiffs do not appear to
seek punitive damages on their Louisiana negligence claims. See generally
Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 89 So. 3d 307, 317 (La. 2015) (noting
29

II.

LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is warranted when “the movant shows that there

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069,
1075 (5th Cir. 1994). When assessing whether a dispute as to any material
fact exists, the Court considers “all of the evidence in the record but refrain[s]
from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.” Delta &
Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398-99
(5th Cir. 2008).

All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the

nonmoving party, but “unsupported allegations or affidavits setting forth
‘ultimate or conclusory facts and conclusions of law’ are insufficient to either
support or defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Galindo v. Precision
Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Little, 37 F.3d at
1075. “No genuine dispute of fact exists if the record taken as a whole could
not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” EEOC v.
Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 481 (5th Cir. 2014).

the Louisiana Legislature generally disallowed punitive damages, except in
specific situations). Accordingly, the Court will not address this argument.

III. DISCUSSION
As noted, plaintiffs seek to hold Dr. Higgins liable for compensatory
and punitive damages under section 1983 and for compensatory damages
under Louisiana tort law. The Court addresses each theory in turn.
A.

Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 Claims

The elements of a section 1983 cause of action are: (1) a deprivation of
rights secured by federal law (2) that occurred under color of state law, and
(3) was caused by a state actor. See Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475,
482 (5th Cir. 2004).
As the Court explained in an earlier summary judgment order, 30 “[t]he
State's exercise of its power to hold detainees . . . brings with it a
responsibility under the U.S. Constitution to tend to essentials of their wellbeing.” Hare v. City of Corinth (Hare III), 74 F.3d 633, 638–39 (5th Cir.
1996) (en banc). Accordingly, pretrial detainees, like Goetzee, have a right to
“constitutional essentials” such as safety and medical care, including
protection against the risk of self-harm. Jacobs v. West Feliciana Sheriff's
Dep't, 228 F.3d 388, 393 (5th Cir. 2000). “Unlike convicted prisoners,
whose rights to constitutional essentials like medical care and safety are

30

See R. Doc. 113.

guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment, pretrial detainees look to the
procedural and substantive due process guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment to ensure provision of these same basic needs.” Id. (citing Bell
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)). “The failure to provide pre-trial detainees
with adequate protection from their known suicidal impulses is actionable
under § 1983.” Evans v. City of Marlin, 986 F.2d 104, 107 (5th Cir. 1993)
(citing Rhyne v. Henderson Cty., 973 F.2d 386, 391 (5th Cir.1992)).
Here, plaintiffs sued Dr. Higgins under section 1983 in both his
individual capacity and official capacity. Plaintiffs also proceed on two
alternative theories: first, that Dr. Higgins is liable for an “episodic act or
omission” that deprived Goetzee of his constitutional rights and second, that
Dr. Higgins is responsible for a general “condition of confinement” that
deprived Goetzee of his constitutional rights. 31
In his motion for summary judgment, Dr. Higgins argues that plaintiffs
cannot prevail on their section 1983 claims under the Seventh Circuit’s
application of the Eighth Amendment, which does not apply here.

In

addition, Dr. Higgins addresses only plaintiffs’ episodic-act-or-omission
claim.

31

Because the standard applicable to a Fourteenth Amendment

See R. Doc. 265 at 20.

episodic-act-or-omission claim by a pretrial detainee is similar to the
standard applicable to an Eighth Amendment claim by a convicted prisoner,
the Court will nonetheless address Dr. Higgins’s arguments on this point.
See Ard v. Rushing, 597 F. App’x 213, 218-19 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Hare v.
City of Corinth (Hare III), 74 F.3d 633, 638-39 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc)).
With an episodic-act-or-omission claim, “the complained-of harm is a
particular act or omission of one or more officials.” Scott v. Moore, 114 F.3d
51, 53 (1997) (en banc). A plaintiff in an episodic-act-or-omission case
“complains first of a particular act of, or omission by, the actor and then
points derivatively to a policy, custom, or rule (or lack thereof) of the
municipality that permitted or caused the act or omission.” Id.
To impose liability on a defendant in his individual capacity in an
episodic-act-or-omission case, a pretrial detainee must establish that the
defendant acted with subjective deliberate indifference. Id. A person acts
with subjective indifference if (1) “he knows that an inmate faces a
substantial risk of serious bodily harm,” and (2) “he disregards that risk by
failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Anderson v. Dallas Cty.,
Tex., 286 F. App’x 850, 860 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Gobert v. Caldwell, 463
F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006)). In inmate suicide cases, the defendant must
be aware of a substantial and significant risk that the inmate will commit

suicide and “effectively disregard[] it.” Jacobs v. W. Feliciana Sheriff’s Dep’t,
228 F.3d 388, 395 (5th Cir. 2000). Although “the law is clearly established
that jailers must take measures to prevent inmate suicides once they know of
the suicide risk,” it is not clearly established “as to what those measures must
be.” Id.
To impose liability on a defendant in his official capacity, and thus hold
a municipality accountable for the constitutional violation, the detainee
“must show that the municipal employee’s act resulted from a municipal
policy or custom adopted or maintained with objective deliberate
indifference to the detainee’s constitutional rights.” Scott, 114 F.3d at 54; see
also Sibley v. Lemaire, 184 F.3d 481, 488 (5th Cir. 1999) (requiring plaintiff
to show objective deliberate indifference “[t]o hold superiors liable”).
Objective indifference “considers not only what the policy maker actually
knew, but what he should have known, given the facts and circumstances
surrounding the official policy and its impact on the plaintiff’s rights.”
Corley v. Prator, 290 F. App’x 749, 750 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Lawson v.
Dallas Cty., 286 F.3d 257, 264 (5th Cir. 2002)).
As to plaintiffs’ individual capacity claim, Dr. Higgins admits that he
“was aware of Goetzee’s suicidal tendencies [and] knew he was at risk [of

committing suicide.]”32 Therefore, the only issue for the Court is whether
plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence of Dr. Higgins “disregard[ing]
that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” See Anderson,
286 F. App’x at 860. Dr. Higgins argues that once he determined Goetzee
required direct observation, “security step[ped] in . . . and [Dr. Higgins] did
not have authority to control security.”33 Similarly, Dr. Higgins argues that
aside from ordering direct observation, there was nothing he could do to
prevent Goetzee’s suicide. 34
Plaintiffs present sufficient evidence to withstand summary judgment
here. Dr. Higgins testified at his deposition that, as Chief of Psychiatry,
suicide prevention at OPP was his “highest priority” and that he had an
ethical obligation as a psychiatrist to “address [OPP’s] suicide prevention
practices.”35 Certain evidence also shows that Dr. Higgins knew that the
direct observation deputies often eschewed their responsibilities. First, the
layout of OPP’s mental health tier physically precluded a direct observation
deputy from constantly monitoring every suicidal inmate, as required by
32

R. Doc. 248-2 at 15.

33

Id. at 16.

34

Id. at 22.

35

R. Doc. 266, Exhibit Z at 79, 100.

OPP’s written suicide prevention policy. No matter where a deputy sat or
stood on the mental health tier, he or she could not simultaneously observe
all three cells where the suicidal inmates were housed. 36 See Jacobs, 228
F.3d at 396 (explaining that detaining a suicidal inmate in a cell with a “blind
spot” and other hazards was “obviously inadequate”).
Additionally, nurses and deputies alike testified that the medical
supervisors, including Dr. Higgins, were aware that suicidal inmates were
often ignored for long periods of time.37 Deputy William Thompson testified
that there was “no question that Dr. Higgins knew” that suicidal inmates
were left unobserved.38 Nurse David Schaible similarly testified that he
complained about deputies not properly conducting direct observation, but
stopped voicing his concerns after a few months because “nothing
changed.”39 According to Schaible, “[Dr. Higgins] was well aware that it was
a problem.”40 See Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752,

36

R. Doc. 266, Exhibit A at 163-64; R. Doc. 266, Exhibit DD at 62-63.

See, e.g., R. Doc. 266, Exhibit A at 155-56; R. Doc. 266, Exhibit DD at
50-52, 102-110; R. Doc. 266, Exhibit GGG at 144, 153.

37

38

R. Doc. 266, Exhibit A at 160.

39

R. Doc. 266, Exhibit DD at 206-07.

40

Id. at 211-12.

756 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting that “ignor[ing] complaints” may amount to
deliberate indifference).
Plaintiffs argue that the evidence also shows that despite Dr. Higgins’s
knowledge of the frequent lapses in direct observation, he did nothing to
remedy the problem. Sheriff Gusman testified at his deposition that he
expected both security staff and medical staff, which included Dr. Higgins,
to ensure compliance with direct observation orders. 41 Sergeant Nicole
Harris similarly explained that security and medical staff “worked seamlessly
together” on the mental health tier, including with regard to direct
observation inmates.42
At least one deputy testified at his deposition that “Dr. Higgins was . . .
in charge” on OPP’s mental health tier.43 According to Deputy Tyrone
Williams, if Dr. Higgins gave a deputy an order, “it got followed.”44 Williams
also explained that Dr. Higgins never told him that he was concerned about
deputies failing to follow direct observation orders; had Dr. Higgins
expressed any concern, Williams “would have done whatever Dr. Higgins
41

See R. Doc. 266, Exhibit MM at 84-86, 341-42.

42

R. Doc. 266, Exhibit LL at 194-95.

43

R. Doc. 266, Exhibit GGG at 31.

44

Id. at 32.

told [Williams] to do.”45 Thus, according to plaintiffs, because Dr. Higgins
knew about the significant lapses in direct observation, but did nothing to
ensure his direct observation orders were properly carried out, Dr. Higgins
effectively disregarded Goetzee’s known suicide risk by subjecting Goetzee to
mental health care that Dr. Higgins knew to be “obviously inadequate.” See
Jacobs v. W. Feliciana Sheriff’s Dep’t, 228 F.3d 388, 397 (5th Cir. 2000)
(denying sheriff qualified immunity because he may have acted with
deliberate indifference by “plac[ing] [a suicidal inmate] in conditions he
knew to be obviously inadequate”); Lewis v. Parish of Terrebonne, 894 F.2d
142, 146 (5th Cir. 1990) (“[A] detainee with suicidal tendencies . . . requires
[] protective action in that the detainee presents a risk of damage to himself
and other inmates.”). Accordingly, summary judgment is not warranted on
plaintiffs’ episodic-act-or omission claim against Dr. Higgins in his
individual capacity.
Although Dr. Higgins’s motion for summary judgment appears to
address plaintiffs’ section 1983 claim against him in his official capacity, he
merely repeats his argument that there is no evidence that Dr. Higgins

45

Id. at 98.

disregarded Goetzee’s risk of suicide.46 Dr. Higgins fails to address the
elements of an official capacity claim. Therefore, for the same reasons the
Court denies summary judgment on plaintiffs’ individual capacity claim, the
Court also denies summary judgment on plaintiffs’ official capacity claim.
B.

Plaintiffs’ Claim for Punitive Damages Under Section
1983

Under section 1983, plaintiffs also seek punitive damages for Dr.
Higgins’s alleged constitutional violation.
Punitive damages may be awarded in a section 1983 action “only when
the defendant’s conduct is motivated by evil intent or demonstrates reckless
or callous indifference to a person’s constitutional rights.” Williams v.
Kaufman Cty., 352 F.3d 994, 1015 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Smith v. Wade, 461
U.S. 30, 56 (1983)). The “reckless or callous indifference” standard requires
“recklessness in its subjective form”—that is, “a subjective consciousness of
a risk of injury or illegality and a criminal indifference to civil obligations.”
Id. In the Fifth Circuit, it is “fair to say that acting or failing to act with
deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner is
the equivalent of recklessly disregarding that risk.” Campbell v. Miles, 228

Indeed, Dr. Higgins appears to have simply copied-and-pasted
substantial portions of his arguments into the separate subsections of his
brief. See R. Doc. 248-2.
46

F.3d 409, 2000 WL 1056131, at *3 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Sibley v.
Lemaire, 184 F.3d 481, 489 (5th Cir. 1999)).
Because plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence to withstand
summary judgment on their deliberate indifference claim, plaintiffs also
survive summary judgment on their claim for punitive damages. Even if
plaintiffs bore a higher burden of proof to recover punitive damages, there is
enough evidence in the record for a jury to find that Dr. Higgins acted with
reckless or callous indifference as well.
C.

Plaintiffs’ State-Law Claim for Negligence

Finally, Dr. Higgins argues that plaintiffs cannot prevail on their claim
of negligence or medical malpractice under Louisiana law. As Dr. Higgins
correctly points out, deliberate indifference is a much higher standard than
negligence or medical malpractice.47 See Hood v. Montgomery Cty., Tex.,
584 F. App’x 238, 238-39 (5th Cir. 2014) (noting deliberate indifference
requires a showing of intent that is unnecessary to sustain a claim for
negligence or medical malpractice).

Accordingly, because summary

judgment is not warranted on plaintiffs’ deliberate indifference claim,

47

Id. at 22-23.

neither is summary judgment warranted on their state-law claim for
negligence or malpractice.

IV.

CONCLUSION
After reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, the

Court finds that there are sufficient facts for plaintiffs to proceed to trial
against Dr. Higgins. For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Dr.
Higgins’s motions for summary judgment. 48

26th
New Orleans, Louisiana, this ___ day of February, 2016.

____________________________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

48

R. Doc. 236; R. Doc. 248.