Clark v. Watson et al
Filing
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ORDER granting in part and denying in part 27 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Jay C. Zainey. (jrc, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
RUDELL CLARK
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO: 12-1976
JEFF WATSON & GREG CHAMPAGNE
SECTION: "A" (3)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary (Rec. Doc. 27) filed by defendants,
St. Charles Parish Sheriff Greg Champagne and Jeff Watson. Plaintiff Rudell Clark has filed
his opposition (Rec. Doc. 28) to the motion. The motion, noticed for submission on July 17,
2013, is before the Court on the briefs without oral argument. For the reasons that follow,
the motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Rudell Clark filed this § 1983 excessive force action for injuries that he
claims to have sustained in conjunction with an arrest at his home on August 1, 2011.
Defendant Jeff Waston was the deputy sheriff who arrested Clark. Greg Champagne was the
duly elected and serving Sheriff of St. Charles Parish at the time of the incident. Both
defendants are sued in their personal and official capacities.1
Clark alleges that on August 1, 2011, Watson came to his home in Ama, Louisiana, to
investigate a complaint about dogs. (Rec. Doc. 1, Complaint at ¶ 7). According to the
In his opposition memorandum Clark states that he does not contest dismissal of the
federal claims against Sheriff Champagne. (Rec. Doc. 28, Plaintiff’s Opposition at 11). Clark does
intend to pursue his state law claims against Sheriff Champagne. Champagne was not personally
involved in any aspect of the incident giving rise to this action. Therefore, Clark’s state law
claims against Champagne are official capacity claims based on the theory of respondeat
superior.
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complaint, Watson then pushed his way into the residence and threatened to arrest Plaintiff
if he did not tell Watson the name of the resident across the street. (Id.). Watson then
arrested Plaintiff based on an outstanding warrant and “dragged him down the steps of his
residence and slammed him into the side of a parked vehicle,” thereby breaking a medical
stent in Plaintiff’s gall bladder. (Id.). Clark spent four days in the St. Charles Parish Jail.
(Id.).
Clark filed the instant federal complaint alleging that the foregoing conduct on
Watson’s part violated Clark’s constitutional rights to be free from illegal detention and
imprisonment and from excessive force.2 (Rec. Doc. 1, Complaint at ¶ 9). In addition to his §
1983 claim, Clark has alleged state law claims of assault and battery against Watson.
Champagne is a defendant on the state law claims under a theory of respondeat superior.
(Id. ¶ 18).
Watson moves for summary judgment on the federal claim arguing that Clark cannot
maintain an excessive force claim because he cannot establish significant or serious injury.
Alternatively, Watson moves for summary judgment on his defense of qualified immunity
arguing that his conduct in carrying out the arrest was objectively reasonable.
Clark responds in opposition that there is no dispute as to the fact that Watson used
some amount of force to push Clark into the parked car—the question is how much force was
The only parts of the Constitution named in the complaint are the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. But Clark’s claim is clearly an excessive force claim so the Court assumes that the
reference to the Fifth Amendment was made in error. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395
(1989) (holding that a claim that a law enforcement officer has used excessive force during the
course of an arrest is to be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard).
Clark does not mention a claim for illegal detention in his opposition. The Court assumes
that Clark has abandoned this claim because Watson arrested him pursuant to a valid
outstanding warrant. In this circuit an otherwise valid arrest is not actionable based on the
manner in which it was carried out. See Flores v. City of Palacios, 381 F.3d 391, 403 (5th Cir.
2004). Therefore, the sole federal claim being asserted is for a Fourth Amendment excessive
force violation.
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used and whether that amount of force was excessive to the need. Clark points out that after
Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130 S. Ct. 1175 (2010), the Fifth Circuit has had to change the way in
which it considers excessive force cases, now focusing on the nature of the force rather than
the extent of the injury. Regarding qualified immunity, Clark contends that it was simply not
objectively reasonable to shove or push him into the hood of the parked vehicle while
handcuffed.
II.
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is appropriate only if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," when viewed in
the light most favorable to the non-movant, "show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact." TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick James, 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986)). A dispute about a material
fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
non-moving party. Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). The court must draw all justifiable
inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). Once the
moving party has initially shown "that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's cause," Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986), the non-movant
must come forward with "specific facts" showing a genuine factual issue for trial. Id. (citing
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
Conclusional allegations and denials, speculation, improbable inferences, unsubstantiated
assertions, and legalistic argumentation do not adequately substitute for specific facts
showing a genuine issue for trial. Id. (citing SEC v. Recile, 10 F.3d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir.
1993)).
In Harper v. Harris County, the Fifth Circuit abandoned the requirement that a
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plaintiff claiming excessive force must prove significant injury. 21 F.3d 597, 600 (5th Cir.
1994) (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992)). In the aftermath of Harper, the Fifth
Circuit nonetheless continued to require “at least some injury” to support an excessive force
claim. See Flores, 381 F.3d at 396 (quoting Jackson v. R.E. Culbertson, 984 F.2d 699, 700
(5th Cir. 1993)). The court recognized, however, that certain injuries are so slight that they
will never satisfy the injury element. Id. (citing Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 315 (5th
Cir. 2001) (holding that “handcuffing too tightly, without more, does not amount to
excessive force”)).
In Wilkins v. Gaddy, the Supreme Court reiterated the principles that it had
espoused in Hudson, supra, when it rejected this circuit’s prior requirement of significant or
serious injury. 559 U.S. 34 (2010). The Wilkins Court explained that Hudson required that
excessive force claims be decided on the nature of the force used rather than on the extent of
the injury sustained. Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 34. But Wilkins did not suggest that the
requirement of “at least some injury” was no longer an element of an excessive force claim.
To the contrary, the Wilkins Court specifically explained that while “serious injury” is not
required, its absence is nonetheless not irrelevant. Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37 (quoting Hudson,
503 U.S. at 9). The absence of serious injury is relevant because “the extent of injury suffered
. . . is one factor that may suggest ‘whether the use of force could plausibly have been
thought necessary’ in a particular situation.” Id. The extent of injury may also provide some
indication of the amount of force applied. Id. Not “every malevolent touch” gives rise to a
federal cause of action for excessive force. See id. Consistent with Wilkins, the Fifth Circuit
continues to require injury as an element of a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim. See,
e.g., Brown v. Lynch, No. 12-30042, 2013 WL 1611464, at *8 (5th Cir. Apr. 16, 2013)
(unpublished); Aguilar v. Robertson, 512 Fed. Appx. 444, 449 (5th Cir. 2013). Thus, the
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elements of an excessive force claim are 1) an injury, 2) which resulted directly and only
from a use of force that was clearly excessive, and 3) the excessiveness of which was clearly
unreasonable. Brown, 2013 WL 1611464, at *8 (citing Tarver v. City of Edna, 410 F.3d 745,
751 (5th Cir. 2005)).
Recognizing then that injury is an essential element of Clark’s excessive force claim
the Court now turns it attention to the injuries at issue in this case. In his complaint, Clark
alleged that the force with which Watson “slammed him into the side of a parked vehicle”
broke a medical stent in Clark’s gall bladder. (Rec. Doc. 1, Complaint ¶ 7). Certainly, if this
were the case then Clark would satisfy the more onerous, yet obsolete requirement of
significant injury. But the evidence does not support Clark’s pleaded allegations regarding
the injuries that he claims to have sustained during the arrest.
The parties have submitted evidence from three witnesses who were at the scene
during the arrest—notably Clark is not among them. Shawn Palmisano was the parish
Animal Control Officer who had been called out to investigate the complaint that Clark was
keeping malnourished dogs on his premises. (Rec. Doc. 27-2). Palmisano observed the
emaciated dogs on the scene but she was at the back of the residence taking photos when
Watson effected the arrest. Palmisano saw Clark after the arrest and she stated that she saw
no visible signs of injury, pain, or limping from Clark but he was yelling and cursing about
being arrested. (Id. at ¶ 9).
Watson testified that Clark began to struggle while being placed under arrest, making
movements perhaps suggestive of fleeing, and that Clark was later charged with resisting
arrest. (Rec .Doc. 27-4 at 20; Rec. Doc. 28-2 at 24). Watson admits that he pushed Clark
against a Ford pickup truck that was parked in front of the residence and he contends that
he did this in order to calm Clark down. (Id. at 17). When questioned about how much force
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he used, Watson answered that he used only “[a]s much force as it takes to open the door” or
to push it closed. (Id. at 18, 19).
Watson testified that while in route to the jail Clark said that he was in pain and
needed to go to the hospital. (Rec. Doc. 28-2 at 21-22). Watson was going to take Clark to St.
Charles Hospital but Clark wanted to go to West Jefferson. Clark then declined to go to the
hospital when Watson told him that he would have to go to St. Charles Hospital. (Rec. Doc.
28-2 at 22).
Laverne Lorio witnessed the arrest. When asked to describe the push against the car,
Ms. Lorio said that it was a “forceful push.”3 (Rec. Doc. 28-1 at 26). Lorio noticed that Clark
was very upset about the arrest but not trying to punch, kick, or push the officer.
The parties have submitted evidence from two medical witnesses. Bridgette Oubre is
a nurse employed at Nelson Coleman Correctional Center and she performed the initial
assessment of Clark when he arrived at the facility following the arrest. (Rec. Doc. 27-3).
According to Oubre, Clark’s medical history was taken and his medications were listed. Clark
made not complaints about his condition at that time and there were no visible signs of
injury when Oubre examined Clark on August 1, 2011.
The parties deposed Dr. Gary Reiss, Clark’s treating gastroenterologist. According to
Dr. Reiss, Clark had a stent surgically placed in his gall bladder in June of 2011. Clark’s last
visit to Dr. Reiss prior to the arrest had been on June 17, 2011. (Rec .Doc. 28-3 at 13). Clark
visited Dr. Reiss on August 19, 2011, which was after the arrest, complaining of right upper
quadrant abdominal pain, which was the same pain that Clark had complained about in
Ms. Lorio was asked at her deposition whether “the cops were pushing [Clark] into the
police car a little harder than they needed to,” Ms. Lorio answered, “Yes.” (Rec. Doc. 28-1 at 29).
But Clark’s excessive force claim is grounded on the force that he claims that Watson used in
pushing him up against a parked truck at the scene. Clark has never claimed that Watson used
excessive force and injured him while placing him in the police car.
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prior visits. (Id.). Clark told the doctor about the incident with arrest but Dr. Reiss believed
that the pain that Clark described was from gall stones, and that the back pain that Clark
complained about was chronic. (Id. at 14). Dr. Reiss ultimately removed the stent on
February 10, 2012, but the stent was in position and looked fine. (Rec. Doc. 27-4 at 14-15).
Dr. Reiss believed it “incredibly unlikely” that a stent like Clark’s would be impacted by
being slammed against a vehicle. (Id. at 31). The doctor didn’t believe that an incident like
the one that Clark had described would affect the stent one way or the other, even if Clark
had been slammed into the vehicle with a tremendous amount of force. (Id. at 35).
The evidence of record fails to create an issue of fact as to the injury element of
Clark’s excessive force cause of action. Clark claimed when he filed this action that he had
sustained a ruptured stent during the arrest. The medical testimony of Clark’s own treating
physician belies this assertion because Dr. Reiss confirmed that the stent was in place and in
tact when he removed it several months after the arrest. Moreover, according to Dr. Reiss,
the pain that Clark complained about on his first visit after the arrest is the same type of
pain that Clark had complained about before the arrest. The affidavit of Nurse Oubre, who
examined Clark in the immediate aftermath of the arrest, confirms that Clark had no
ostensible injuries after the arrest, and that he didn’t even complain to her about injuries
that he was claiming as a result of the arrest. Clark has submitted no evidence whatsoever to
support his contention that he sustained any type of injury, physical or psychological, during
the August 1, 2011 arrest.
Clark’s excessive force claim also suffers from a lack of evidence from which a jury
could infer that the amount of force that Watson used was excessive. Watson and Lorio were
the only two witnesses who testified for the record regarding the amount of force used
during the arrest. Lorio described the amount of force that Watson used to push Clark up
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against the parked truck as “forceful” but that description does not create an issue of fact as
to excessiveness. This is particularly true when one considers that Clark sustained no
injuries during the arrest. The complete absence of any injury sustained during the arrest
indicates that the “forceful” force that Watson used was not excessive to the need.
The motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to the federal claims asserted
against Watson. The motion is likewise GRANTED as to the federal claims asserted against
Champagne. (See the explanation at note 1, supra).
Finally, both sides request that the Court decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the state law claims if the federal claims should be dismissed (Rec. Doc. 271, Defendants’ Memorandum at 17;Rec. Doc. 28, Plaintiff’s Opposition at 11).
The motion is therefore DENIED as to the state law claims, which the Court will
dismiss without prejudice.
Accordingly, and for the foregoing reasons;
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Summary (Rec. Doc. 27) filed by
defendants, St. Charles Parish Sheriff Greg Champagne and Jeff Watson is GRANTED IN
PART AND DENIED IN PART. The motion is GRANTED as to all federal claims
asserted against Champagne and Watson in their official and individual capacities and those
claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The motion is DENIED as to all state law
claims against both defendants and those claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
July 31, 2013
JAY C. ZAINEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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