GlobalSantaFe Drilling Company v. Quinn
Filing
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ORDER & REASONS granting 4 MOTION to Dismiss Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Damages filed by Charles Quinn. Signed by Judge Martin L.C. Feldman on 9/24/2012.(caa, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
GLOBALSANTAFE DRILLING COMPANY
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 12-1987
CHARLES QUINN
SECTION “F”
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Charles Quinn’s motion to dismiss his
employer’s, GlobalSantaFe Drilling Company, complaint for
declaratory judgment.
For the reasons that follow, the motion is
GRANTED.
Background
This case involves personal injuries that were allegedly
sustained while working on board a vessel and the employer’s
obligation for maintenance and cure.
Charles Quinn was employed by GlobalSantaFe Drilling Company
as a member of the crew of the mobile offshore drilling unit
DEVELOPMENT DRILLER II when, on or about May 19, 2012, Mr. Quinn
was allegedly injured while working.
Mr. Quinn claimed to have
lower back pain and was subsequently seen by several medical
professionals in the greater New Orleans area.1
1
GlobalSantaFe
Mr. Quinn was first seen by a doctor on the rig. On May 22,
2012, he was flown to Houma, Louisiana, where further examination
revealed a mass on his right kidney. One day later, Mr. Quinn
went to another doctor at the Southern Brain and Spine Center in
Metairie, Louisiana. He was then seen by a doctor at Ochsner
Hospital in New Orleans on May 24, 2012, for the mass found on
his kidney. It is believed, but not confirmed, that Mr. Quinn
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began paying maintenance and cure and voluntary supplemental
benefits.
On July 30, 2012, counsel for Mr. Quinn faxed a letter to
the insurance adjuster for GlobalSantaFe stating (1) Mr. Quinn
was represented by counsel, (2) Mr. Quinn wanted to see medical
specialists of his choosing, and (3) Mr. Quinn would not attend
the medical appointments GlobalSantaFe scheduled for him in New
Orleans the following day.
GlobalSantaFe terminated the
voluntary supplemental benefits when Mr. Quinn did not attend the
scheduled medical examinations but still pays maintenance and
cure.
Mr. Quinn has not yet instituted legal action regarding
the alleged injury that arose on May 19, 2012.
On August 1, 2012, two days after Mr. Quinn’s fax,
GlobalSantaFe filed a complaint in this Court seeking declaratory
judgment on its obligation to pay maintenance and cure benefits
to Mr. Quinn.
GlobalSantaFe also requests that the Court order
Mr. Quinn to pay damages for his failure to cooperate in the
investigation of his maintenance and cure claim, including the
expenses associated with his failure to appear for scheduled
appointments.
Mr. Quinn now moves to dismiss GlobalSantaFe’s
complaint for declaratory judgment.
had his kidney removed because of the mass. On June 20, 2012,
Mr. Quinn went back to the doctor at the Southern Brain and Spine
Center, who recommended Mr. Quinn participate in physical therapy
and remain on light duty at work until the therapy was completed.
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Standard for Dismissal of a Declaratory Judgment Action
For claims brought pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2006), a district court must engage in a threestep inquiry when determining whether to retain or dismiss a
complaint for declaratory relief.
The district court must
consider (1) whether the action is justiciable, (2) whether the
court has the authority to grant declaratory relief, and (3)
whether to exercise its discretion to decide or dismiss a
declaratory judgment action.
See Orix Credit Alliance, Inc. v.
Wolfe, 212 F.3d 891, 895 (5th Cir. 2000).
It is well established that a district court has broad
discretion in determining whether to dismiss a declaratory
action.
See St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Trejo, 39 F.3d 585, 590 (5th
Cir. 1994); Mission Ins. Co. v. Puritan Fashions Corp., 706 F.2d
599, 601 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting how the Declaratory Judgment Act
provides the district court with a choice to hear a declaratory
action, not a command).
The Fifth Circuit has articulated seven
non-exclusive factors for a district court to consider in
determining whether dismissal is appropriate.
These factors are:
1. whether there is a pending state action in which all
of the matters in controversy may be fully litigated;
2. whether the plaintiff filed suit in anticipation of a
lawsuit filed by the defendant;
3. whether the plaintiff engaged in forum shopping in
bringing the suit;
4. whether possible inequities in allowing the
declaratory plaintiff to gain precedence in time or to
change forums exist;
5. whether the federal court is a convenient forum for
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the parties and witnesses;
6. whether retaining the lawsuit would serve the purposes
of judicial economy; and
7. whether the federal court is being called on to
construe a state judicial decree involving the same
parties and entered by the court before whom the parallel
state suit between the same parties is pending.
Trejo, 39 F.3d at 590-91; see also Vulcan Materials Co. v. City
of Tehuacana, 238 F.3d 382, 390 (5th Cir. 2001); Travelers Ins.
Co. v. La. Farm Bureau Fed’n, Inc., 996 F.2d 774, 778 (5th Cir.
1993).
Notably, “none of these factors take precedence over the
others, and the district court has discretion to consider as many
of the variables as it wishes.”
In re Complaint of Pride
Offshore, Inc., No. 00-2489, 2001 WL 13336, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan.
5, 2001) (citing Torch Inc. v. LeBlanc, 847 F.2d 193, 195 (5th
Cir. 1991)).
I.
Discussion
Defendant submits that the Court should dismiss the
complaint for declaratory judgment.
The Court agrees.
The first two prongs of the three-part inquiry as to whether
to dismiss an action for declaratory relief are not at issue
here.2
As a result, the Court’s analysis focuses solely on its
2
First, this action is justiciable because a substantial
controversy presently exists between two adverse parties. See
Orix Credit Alliance, 212 F.3d at 896 (citing Middle S. Energy,
Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 800 F.2d 488, 490 (5th Cir. 1986)).
Mr. Quinn complains of an injury he allegedly obtained while
working for the plaintiff, GlobalSantaFe. Therefore, the Court
finds the justiciability requirement met. Second, the Court has
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discretion to decide or dismiss this action, which requires
examining the seven non-exclusive Trejo factors.
A.
The first and seventh Trejo factors address “the proper
allocation of decision-making between state and federal courts.”
Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Holmes Cnty., 343 F.3d 383, 390 (5th Cir.
2003).
Here, the seventh factor is not implicated given the
facts of the case, because the Court is not being called on to
construe a state judicial decree.
The first factor, however,
requires the Court to consider any “pending state action in which
all of the matters in controversy may be fully litigated.”
Trejo, 39 F.3d at 590-91.
Mr. Quinn has not yet initiated a
lawsuit regarding the disputed incident on May 19, 2012.
The
fact that Mr. Quinn has not yet sued in state court, however, is
not dispositive.
The Fifth Circuit has expressly stated that
“[t]he lack of a pending parallel state proceeding should not
automatically require a district court to decide a declaratory
judgment action.”
Sherwin-Williams, 343 F.3d at 394; see also
Offshore Liftboats, LLC v. Bodden, No. 12-700, 2012 WL 2064496,
at *2 (E.D. La. June 7, 2012) (noting that the absence of a
pending parallel state proceeding does not require the district
court to retain a declaratory action).
Accordingly, the first
authority in this case to grant declaratory relief because it has
jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to §§ 28 U.S.C. 1331, 1333
(2006). Thus, the second requirement is met.
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Trejo factor is neutral.
B.
The second, third, and fourth Trejo factors address
“fairness” concerns relating to forum selection.
Williams, 343 F.3d at 391.
See Sherwin-
These factors weigh slightly in favor
of dismissal.
Regarding the second factor, it is clear that GlobalSantaFe
filed its complaint two days after learning that Mr. Quinn had
hired a lawyer.
GlobalSantaFe contends that it was unable to
properly investigate Mr. Quinn’s claim for maintenance and cure
because Mr. Quinn was stubborn and uncommunicative.
The record,
however, indicates that Mr. Quinn went to all medical
examinations except for the July 31, 2012 appointment, which he
did not attend because he requested through counsel to see
medical professionals of his own choosing.
Considering the
timing of the filing of this declaratory action, it appears that
GlobalSantaFe filed in anticipation of a lawsuit by Mr. Quinn as
a preemptive strike.3
3
After this declaratory action was filed, GlobalSantaFe contends
that Mr. Quinn has been uncooperative because Mr. Quinn’s counsel
has not responded to GlobalSantaFe’s requests. Mr. Quinn’s
counsel, however, is communicating with GlobalSantaFe, albeit not
to GlobalSantaFe’s liking. See Offshore Liftboats, 2012 WL
2064496, at *3 (“[R]esolving the issues raised in this
declaratory judgment action ultimately may be unnecessary. . . .
if counsel for the parties would confer and negotiate with one
another regarding [seaman’s] complaints.”).
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As to the third factor and fourth factor, whether the
plaintiff engaged in forum shopping in bringing the suit and
whether possible inequities exist in allowing the declaratory
plaintiff to gain precedence in time or to change forums, the
Court considers them together.
GlobalSantaFe denies that it engaged in forum shopping by
bringing this action in the Eastern District of Louisiana,
because Mr. Quinn received his medical treatment in the greater
New Orleans area.
Mr. Quinn responds that GlobalSantaFe’s suit
is a preemptive strike to deprive him of his right to seek a jury
trial.
That is a characterization that seems difficult to avoid.
The law is clear that a Jones Act seaman has the right to
have a jury decide his maintenance and cure claim when it is
joined with a Jones Act claim.
Fitzgerald v. U.S. Lines Co., 374
U.S. 16, 21 (1963) (“[A] maintenance and cure claim joined with a
Jones Act claim must be submitted to the jury when both arise out
of one set of facts.); Luera v. M/V Alberta, 635 F.3d 181, 191-92
(5th Cir. 2011); Rowan Cos., Inc. v. Blanton, 764 F. Supp. 1090,
1092 (E.D. La. 1991).
Mr. Quinn informs the Court that he
intends to file a claim for maintenance and cure, along with his
Jones Act personal injury claim, in state court.
Therefore, Mr.
Quinn asserts that GlobalSantaFe’s declaratory action
preemptively deprives him of his preferred legal forum, and
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inequities exist if this Court decides his maintenance and cure
issue.
It cannot be disputed that Mr. Quinn has a right to a jury
trial under the Jones Act; but also that GlobalSantaFe cannot be
barred from investigating claims made by its employees for
maintenance and cure.
The company argues that under Mr. Quinn’s
reasoning (that GlobalSantaFe was trying to usurp his right to a
jury trial), an employer would be forced to take no action for up
to three years while waiting for a potential claimant to come
forward with a suit.
Under the facts of this case, however, the
Court finds this argument unpersuasive.
GlobalSantaFe filed suit
a mere two days after Mr. Quinn announced he was represented by
counsel.
This appears to the Court to be a classic example of a
race to the courthouse.
Courts within this circuit have
repeatedly warned against forcing Jones Act seamen into a race to
the courthouse to “preserve their choice of forum and their right
to a jury, matters which are highly esteemed.”
Offshore
Liftboats, 2012 WL 2064496, at *3 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (noting that because the seaman had yet to bring legal
action, retaining the declaratory action would only further
encourage seamen to race to the courthouse); see also Aries
Marine Corp. v. Lolly, 2006 WL 681184, at *3 (W.D. La. Mar. 15,
2006); Rowan, 764 F. Supp. at 1092.
Consequently, factors three
and four counsel dismissal of the declaratory action.
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C.
The fifth and sixth Trejo factors address judicial
efficiency considerations.
391-92.
See Sherwin-Williams, 343 F.3d at
The fifth factor asks whether the federal court is a
convenient forum for the parties and witnesses.
GlobalSantaFe
contends that the Eastern District of Louisiana is convenient
because Mr. Quinn obtained nearly all of his medical care in the
greater New Orleans area.
located in New Orleans.
Moreover, counsel for both parties are
Mr. Quinn, however, is domiciled in
Mississippi and GlobalSantaFe is a Delaware corporation with its
principal place of business in Texas.
Mr. Quinn also represents
that he plans to file his lawsuit in a state court either in
Mississippi, East Baton Rouge Parish, or Texas.
It does not
appear that the Eastern District of Louisiana is any more
convenient or less convenient of a forum; the parties are located
outside the state but the witnesses are located within.
Compare
Hercules Liftboat Co. v. Jones, No. 07-1236, 2007 WL 4355045, at
*3 (W.D. La. Nov. 15, 2007) (noting that a convenient forum would
be where the treating physicians are located), with Aries Marine
Corp., 2006 WL 681184, at *4 (noting that federal court in
Louisiana is presumably inconvenient to the seaman because he
lives out of state).
Therefore, this factor is neutral.
Regarding the sixth Trejo factor, whether retaining the suit
in federal court would serve the purposes of judicial economy,
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the Court finds this factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
If Mr.
Quinn were to file a Jones Act lawsuit, as he represents he will
do, the maintenance and cure issue would also be in focus in that
lawsuit.
See Offshore Liftboats, 2012 WL 2064496, at *3 (noting
that even though the seaman had yet to file a lawsuit, judicial
economy would still not be served by retaining the declaratory
action, because were the seaman to bring suit, the maintenance
and cure issue would be decided in that action); see also Rowan,
764 F. Supp. at 1092.
Accordingly, the Court finds that judicial
economy is better served by one court hearing all the matters
arising out of one set of facts.
The Trejo balance leads the Court to conclude that dismissal
of GlobalSantaFe’s declaratory action is the better result on
this record.
Moreover, the Court’s decision is in accord with
the “well-established practice that courts in this district
dismiss preemptive declaratory judgment actions in maritime
personal injury cases.” Chet Morrison Offshore, L.L.C. v. Heyden,
No. 06-8282, 2007 WL 1428697, at *2 (E.D. La. May 10, 2007); see,
e.g., Torch, Inc. v. LeBlanc, 947 F.2d 193, 195 (5th Cir. 1991);
Offshore Liftboats, 2012 WL 2064496, at *2; Eldridge v. Magnolia
Marine Transp. Co., No. 06-10744, 2008 WL 148310, at *3 (E.D. La.
Jan. 11, 2008); Specialty Diving of La., Inc. v. Mahoney, No. 051202, 2006 WL 4101325, at *3 (E.D. La. Jan. 31, 2006); R&B Falcon
Drilling USA, Inc. v. Crosby, No. 02-2059, 2003 WL 145532, at *2
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(E.D. La. Jan. 17, 2003).
Accordingly, Charles Quinn’s motion to
dismiss is GRANTED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, September 24, 2012
___________________________
MARTIN L. C. FELDMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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