Reyes v. Julia Place Condominiums Homeowners Association, Inc. et al

Filing 529

ORDER AND REASONS granting in part and denying in part 351 Motion to Certify Class as to the usury class. Signed by Judge Helen G. Berrigan on 8/20/2015. (kac)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
NICOLE REYES, ET AL

CIVIL ACTION

v.

No. 12-2043

JULIA PLACE CONDOMINIUMS, ET AL

Section “C”

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are memoranda filed by the parties pursuant the Court’s previous Order
and Reasons requiring supplemental briefing on whether proposed class members from whom
late fees and interest were not collected have Article III standing. Rec. Doc. 464 at 24. Having
considered the law, the record, and the arguments of the parties, the Court hereby GRANTS IN
PART and DENIES IN PART the Motion for Class Certification (Rec. Doc. 351) as it pertains to
certifying a class of individuals claiming harm from violations of Louisiana’s usury law.
I.

Factual and Procedural Background
The Court has recited the background of this case in its previously issued Order and

Reasons. Rec. Doc. 464. In brief, plaintiffs Nicole Reyes and Mike Sobel have brought a class
action lawsuit on behalf of condominium owners at several properties located in New Orleans,
Louisiana against their condominium associations as well as Steeg Law, LLC (“Steeg”).
Plaintiffs allege that the defendants have engaged in debt collection practices that violate state
and federal law. Rec. Doc. 1.
On May 23, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a motion to certify three classes of condominium
owners consisting of those who had been subject to alleged violations of the Fair Debt Collection

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Practices Act (“FDCPA class”); those who had allegedly been charged fees that violated
Louisiana’s usury law (“usury class”); and those who were charged late fees allegedly in
violation of the Louisiana Condominium Act (“LCA class”). Rec. Doc. 351. On December 18,
2014, the Court issued Order and Reasons certifying a narrowed version of the FDCPA class and
denying certification of the LCA class. The Court also deferred ruling on whether certification
was appropriate for the proposed usury class because a portion of the proposed class had not
actually paid the late fees that had been charged to them, though the outstanding fees had been
charged to them. The Court ordered that the parties brief the issue of whether proposed members
of the usury class who had not paid late fees had standing to bring a claim. Rec. Doc. 464.
II.

Law and Analysis

a. Standing
Before reaching whether certification is warranted, the Court will examine whether
individuals must have paid usurious interest in order to have standing under Louisiana’s usury
law. To have standing to bring an action, a plaintiff must adequately establish (1) an injury in
fact; (2) causation; and (3) redressability. Spring Communications Co., L.P. v. APCC Services,
Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 273 (2008).
1. Injury in fact
The defendants contend that the proposed class members have not suffered an injury in
fact because Louisiana’s usury law does not authorize a remedy for injuries other than remittance
of the usurious interest. Rec. Doc. 472 at 3. Defendants argue that because these members have
not paid interest, the sole remedy of remittal is unavailable to them and they have not suffered an
injury cognizable under the usury law. Id. Plaintiffs argue that a factual inquiry into standing is
premature under the tests set forth by various circuit courts for adjudicating class certification.

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Rec. Doc. 476 at 2-4. Plaintiffs further argue that even if such an inquiry is necessary at this
stage, that Reyes and other similarly situated members have suffered an injury in fact by being
“threatened, coerced and/or forced to pay excessive interest and late fees.” Rec. Doc. 476 at 6.
The Fifth Circuit has explored the issue of Article III standing in the context of class
certification in its opinion, In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790 (5th Cir. 2014). As the Fifth
Circuit discussed, several circuit courts have adopted an approach that allows courts to “ignore
the absent class members entirely,” instead inquiring solely into whether the named plaintiffs
possess standing. In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d at 799-800 (citing Lewis, 518 U.S. at 39596). On the other hand, other circuits have held that while trial courts need not require each
member of a proposed class to submit evidence of personal standing, the “class must. . . be
defined in such a way that anyone within it would have standing.” Id. at 801 (quoting Denney v.
Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 263-64 (2d Cir. 2006). The Fifth Circuit declined to choose
which of these tests to apply to class action lawsuits in this jurisdiction, instead finding that the
plaintiffs in In re Deepwater Horizon satisfied the requirements for standing under both tests. Id.
at 802.
This Court likewise finds that under both tests, the proposed class possesses Article III
standing. Under the first test, the Court looks solely to whether the named plaintiffs, Sobel and
Reyes, possess standing to bring suit under the usury law. Plaintiffs have shown evidence that
Sobel paid at least a portion of the allegedly usurious late fees charged by The Lofts
Condominiums in 2011. Rec. Doc. 168-2. Thus, he has suffered an injury in fact and may bring
suit under La R. S. 9:3500(C)(2). In addition, the Court finds that Reyes has suffered an injury in
fact. Reyes has alleged payment of $246.09 in overcharges, an amount in excess of what a legal

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interest rate would have required her to pay on her monthly assessments. Rec. Doc. 1 at 16-17.
Therefore, both named plaintiffs have shown standing to recover under La R. S. § 9:3500(C)(2).
The Court also finds that a narrowed version of the proposed class has standing under the
second test, which requires the Court to judge standing based on plaintiffs’ class definition.
Plaintiffs define the usury class as:
… unit owners at each respective condominium association whose Declarations and ByLaws violate the cap on legal interest of 12% and excessive fees that also exceed 12% of
the principal. The usury class includes unit owners who have been threatened, coerced
and/or forced to pay excessive interest and late fees within the two years before suit was
filed.
Rec. Doc. 476 at 6, citing Rec. Doc. 351-1. Certainly, those members who have paid the interest
and late fees have standing to pursue restitution under La. R.S. § 9:3500(C)(2).
Furthermore, the Court finds that those who have been “threatened” and “coerced” to pay
such fees have suffered an injury in fact, even if these members did not make actual payment. An
injury in fact is “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Statutes may create a legally protected interest the
invasion of which confers standing. Such standing “is satisfied when the injury asserted by a
plaintiff arguably falls within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute in
question.” Federal Election Com’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20 (1998) (internal quotations and
citations omitted). Louisiana Revised Statute § 9:3501 provides that “any contract for the
payment of interest in excess of that authorized by law shall result in the forfeiture of the entire
interest so contracted.” The Court finds that this provision creates a legally protected interest in
being free from being charged usurious fees, not simply the right to recover payments that had
already been wrongfully paid. Indeed, the Louisiana Supreme Court has also spoken on the issue,
finding:
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Both the trial and the intermediate court held that the unambiguous meaning of the statute
is to cause the forfeiture of all interest due on the contract, not just the usurious portion of
it and not just during the period that usurious charges were exacted. They were correct in
so doing.
Thrift Funds of Baton Rouge, Inc. v. Jones, 274 So. 2d 150, 155 (La. 1973) (emphasis added).
The state supreme court’s reasoning persuades the Court that the scope of the usury statute is not
limited to compensating debtors after they have already paid usurious fees, but includes putting
an end to the potential for future payments of usurious interest.
Defendants urge that the holding of Huddleston v. Bossier Bank & Trust Company, 463
So. 2d 1336 (La. Ct. App. 1984) requires that plaintiffs to have paid usurious interest in order to
have standing to bring a claim under the usury law. Rec. Doc. 472 at 4. The Court disagrees.
Although in Huddleston, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Appeals Court remarked that it believed
the “Supreme Court intended that [the usury] statute to apply to a situation where usurious
interest was actually collected,” the actual holding of the case is more limited. The court stated:
“[W]e hold that where the note became usurious on its face by virtue of a clerical error, and
where the holder neither collected nor intended to collect usurious interest, nor attempted to
collect usurious interest, there is no forfeiture of the legal interest collected.” Huddleston, 463
So. 2d at 1340 (emphasis added). As this Court has previously remarked, numerous facts
distinguish the behavior of the lenders in Huddleston from the actions of the condominium
associations. Here, the condominium associations’ late fees are not a result of a mere clerical
error, and the condominium associations made attempts to collect these payments from the
named plaintiffs in the form of letters, liens, and charges recorded on unit owners’ ledgers.
Moreover, although the Huddleston opinion argues that the Louisiana Supreme Court’s later
decision in Paulat v. Pirello, 353 So.2d 1307 (La. 1977) modifies Thrift Funds, this Court finds

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nothing in the Paulat opinion to repudiate the state supreme court’s interpretation of the usury
statute to provide a remedy to prevent future payments of usurious interest. 1
However, the Court declines to resolve the question of whether actual payment is a
prerequisite for bringing suit under La R. S. 9:3501. As will be discussed below, the class must
exclude those who did not actually make payments on late fees because they lack commonality
with the other members of the proposed class. Thus, the Court need not reach whether these
members possess standing.
b. Standing to pursue injunctive relief
Defendants also argue that the proposed class’s claims for injunctive relief are moot. To
have standing to sue for injunctive relief, in addition to meeting the normal requirements of
Article III standing, a party must “demonstrate either continuing harm or a real and immediate
threat of repeated injury in the future.” Funeral Consumers Alliance, Inc. v. Service Corp. Intern.
695 F.3d 330, 342 (5th Cir. 2012). The defendants claim that there is no continuing harm or
immediate threat of future injury because none of the condominium association boards are
currently charging late fees or interest. The defendants have provided affidavits and declarations
from each of the condominium associations in support. See, e.g., Rec. Docs. 472-1, 472-2, 472-4,
472-5, 472-7. Plaintiffs rebut that despite the associations’ declarations, none have actually
changed their governing documents, and thus they retain the discretion to enforce the fees and
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The Court notes that it previously granted summary judgment in favor of defendant, Rotunda Condominiums
Homeowners Association, Inc., based on the fact that plaintiffs had not demonstrated that Rotunda collected any late
fees in the prior two years. Rec. Doc. 275. However, the Court’s ruling was limited to the remedy of repayment
provided by La. R. S. 9:3500(C)(2), and did not touch upon possible forfeiture of future interest due under La. R. S.
9:3501. The earlier Order and Reasons stated:
The Court finds that Rotunda has demonstrated that it did not collect any late fees during the two-year
period at issue here under Louisiana Revised Statute 9:3500(C)(2). Rec. Doc. 227 at 6; Rec. Doc. 153 at
15-16. Therefore, the Court grants Rotunda’s motion for summary judgment on this issue only.

Rec. Doc. 275 at 7 (emphasis added).

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interests at a future date. In addition, plaintiffs have presented ledgers and other records that
reflect that various condominium associations continue to record amounts owed for late fees,
despite the associations’ claims otherwise. Rec. Doc. 476-1, 476-3, 476-4, 476-5. The Court also
notes that several of the documents provided by defendants do not unequivocally state that all
potentially usurious fees are no longer being collected. For example, the affidavit of William J.
Cox establishes that during his tenure as president of his association, he has never charged late
penalties above what owners may be required to pay “in accordance with the ‘Condominium
Documents.” Rec. Doc. 425-3 at 3. However, the propriety of the fees that are allowed by the
condominium documents is precisely what is at issue in this litigation.
The Court finds that there are issues of fact as to whether the condominium associations
are continuing to charge usurious late fees. Moreover, even if such a showing had been made,
allowing defendants to moot class claims by electing, at their discretion, to not pursue fees and
interests which are still permitted under the associations’ bylaws and declarations would still be
inappropriate. Allowing such provisions to remain in the associational documents leaves
plaintiffs and the proposed class vulnerable to the threat of future charges.
Furthermore, defendants’ reliance on the reasoning in Funeral Consumers Alliance is
unavailing. The relationship between the class and the defendants in that case was of consumers
making a one-time purchase, as opposed to property owners in an ongoing binding contractual
relationship. The court in Funeral Consumers Alliance reasoned that for a future injury, the
plaintiffs would have to purchase a specific type of casket from one of two funeral home
operators, an outcome that could easily be avoided because the plaintiffs could simply choose to
purchase a different kind of casket from a different funeral home operator. 695 F.3d at 343. Here,
Reyes and the proposed class continue to own condominiums governed by the defendants and

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continue to be legally bound to abide by the provisions of the declarations and bylaws that allow
for allegedly usurious fees. Though they may currently be free from accruing new late charges,
the associations may resume enforcement of the fees when they choose. Thus, the Court finds
that there is a real threat of repeated injury in the future sufficient to bestow standing upon Reyes
and the proposed class. While the Court agrees that Sobel, who no longer owns a unit, may lack
standing, the Court need not reach this issue because as will be discussed below, he is an
inadequate class representative for pursuing injunctive relief.
c. Rule 23(a)
As the Court recited in its earlier Order and Reasons, the plaintiffs bear the burden of
proof of showing that the four prerequisites of Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 23(a) are met. Rec. Doc. 464.
These requirements are, briefly: (1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) typicality, and (4)
adequacy. In addition, plaintiffs must demonstrate that the proposed class satisfies at least one of
the requirements of Rule 23(b).
1. Numerosity
Rule 23(a)(1) requires plaintiffs to show that the proposed class is so numerous that
joinder is impractical. The “proper focus” is on whether joinder “is practicable in view of the
numerosity of the class and all other relevant factors.” Phillips v. Joint Legislative Committee on
Performance and Expenditure of the State of Mississippi, 637 F.2d 1014, 1022 (5th Cir. 1981).
Plaintiffs claim that more than sixty proposed class members have paid usurious fees to the
condominium associations. Rec. Doc. 489 at 5. They have attached the accounts and ledgers for
these proposed class members in support, some of which have been presented to the Court for in
camera review in order to protect the class members’ identities. See, e.g., Rec. Doc. 476-4 at 7,
11, 20, 25; 476-5. Having reviewed the tenant ledgers, the Court is satisfied that a sufficient

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number of condominium owners have made payments on allegedly usurious fees to meet the
numerosity requirement. The Court is further persuaded by the fact that many of these proposed
class members stand to recover relatively small amounts if they prevail, and that several maintain
out-of-state addresses, significantly reducing the likelihood that they would find it feasible to
pursue these claims individually. Zeidman V. J. Ray McDermott & Co., Inc., 651 F.2d 1030,
1038 (5th Cir. 1981) (Geographic dispersion of the proposed class members and size of each
plaintiff’s claims are relevant to the numerosity determination). Thus, the Court finds that the
proposed class is sufficiently numerous to satisfy Rule 23(a)(1).
2. Commonality
Under Rule 23(a)(2), the proposed class must also share common issues of law or fact.
Commonality requires that plaintiffs “demonstrate that the class members have suffered the same
injury,” not “merely that they have all suffered a violation of the same provision of law.” WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011). The Court finds that the class members
who are eligible to seek monetary relief for payments made on usurious interest rates satisfy the
commonality requirement. They have all suffered the same injury because they allege having
suffered economic harm by being forced to make payments on late fees above the amount legally
allowed. Defendants object that the usury class should not be certified because the Louisiana
Condominium Act may permit a higher rate of 30% to be charged for late fees. Rec. Doc. 425 at
35. However, this argument actually serves to bolster commonality, as this legal issue is one that
is common to all proposed class members and its resolution would either move forward or
dispose of all their claims at once.
As for the class members who have not made payments, the Court finds that plaintiffs
have not identified common issues of fact or law whose resolution would “resolve an issue that is

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central to the validity of each one of the [class members’] claims in one stroke.” M.D. ex rel
Stukenberg v. Perry, 675 F.3d 832, 840 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Dukes, 131 S.Ct. at 2551).
Plaintiffs have defined the usury class as “unit owners who have been threatened, coerced and/or
forced to pay excessive interest and late fees within the two years before suit was filed.” Rec.
Doc. 476 at 6. Apart from alleging the harm of being forced to pay usurious fees, this definition
does not describe the specific threatening or coercive tactics defendants have undertaken.
Although plaintiffs allege that many of the members have received harassing communications
and have had liens filed on their property, the definition does not limit class membership to those
who have suffered these specific forms of harms. Thus, the Court finds that beyond those who
have actually paid usurious fees and interest, plaintiffs have not identified common issues of law
and fact shared by class members. Therefore, the requirements of commonality are met for those
members who have made payments on usurious fees only. The Court notes that members within
this narrowed class maintain the ability to pursue the injunctive relief sought by the plaintiffs.
3. Typicality
The Court now turns to whether plaintiffs have shown typicality under Rule 23(a)(3) in
the proposed class. To satisfy the typicality requirement, plaintiffs must demonstrate that their
legal and remedial theories are similar to those of whom they propose to represent. In re Ford
Motor Co. Bronco II Product Liability Litigation, 177 F.R.D. 360, 366 (E.D. La. 1997). The
Court finds that Sobel and Reyes’ claims are typical of the proposed class. Like the proposed
class members, they were charged allegedly usurious fees for failing to make timely payment of
their condominium fees, actually paid those fees, and now seek to recover those payments.
Furthermore, as current condominium owners, Reyes and the proposed class members will
pursue similar legal theories in seeking injunctive relief to have the existing bylaws and

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declarations allowing usurious fees to be invalidated. Although Sobel is not a current
condominium owner, the Court finds that he is still able to represent the class insofar as it seeks
monetary compensation.
Defendants assert that the “juridical link doctrine” should not apply to the instant action
in order to bring in condominium associations with whom the named plaintiffs do not have a
direct relationship. Rec. Doc. 425 at 38. The Fifth Circuit has described the juridical link
doctrine as providing that if a class as a whole:
suffered an identical injury at the hands of several parties related by way of a conspiracy
or concerted scheme, or otherwise “juridically related in a manner that suggests a single
resolution of the dispute would be expeditious,” the claim could go forward.
Audler v. CBC Innovis, Inc., 519 F.3d 239, 248 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting La Mar v. H & B
Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461, 466 (9th Cir. 1973). The Fifth Circuit declined to reach the
question of whether the juridical link doctrine is recognized in this jurisdiction. Id. This Court
has already held that the juridical link doctrine may be applicable after Rule 23 certification
because plaintiffs have alleged that the “condominium associations have engaged in a scheme or
conspired with Steeg and Glass to set their respective Condominium Declarations to charge
usurious interest upon its members” and “for Steeg and Glass to send form collection letters on
behalf of Rotunda and the other named condominium associations.” Rec. Doc. 153 at 6-7. The
Court declines to reconsider its prior ruling at this juncture.
Defendants also argue that even accepting that a scheme or conspiracy between Steeg and
the condominium associations adequately establishes standing under the juridical link doctrine,
Carondelet Place and Julia Place should not be brought into the class action because Steeg did
not draft their bylaws. Rec. Doc. 425 at 35. Defendants do not cite to evidence to prove this
assertion. Nevertheless, even if true, Julia Place would still be properly included in the action

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because Reyes has a direct claim upon it as an owner of a condominium at Julia Place. The
Court’s task is now to determine the appropriateness of class certification, and not to prematurely
adjudicate the viability of the class’s claims as to each defendant. However, the Court agrees that
if Carondelet Place did not use Steeg’s services in drafting its declarations and bylaws, then
those who own condominiums at Carondelet Place must be excluded from the proposed class. If
such a showing can be made, then the class will be winnowed accordingly.
4. Adequacy
Under Rule 23(a)(4), the representative parties must fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class. Defendants assert that the adequacy requirement is not met because of
intraclass conflict. Specifically, they assert that because the class seeks relief from associations
of which they themselves are members, the members may ultimately be financially responsible
for a judgment against the associations, creating what defendants maintain is an irreconcilable
intraclass conflict. Rec. Doc. 425 at 41.
In support of their contention, the defendants point to Langbecker v. Electronic Data
Systems Corp., 476 F.3d 299 (5th Cir. 2007). However, the Court interprets Langbecker
differently. In that case, the Fifth Circuit remarked that intraclass conflicts may negate adequacy
under Rule 23(a)(4). Id. at 315. The court considered a class action suit where current and former
employees proposed to represent a class of participants in a company’s 401(k) retirement plan in
recovering monetary damages and pursuing injunctive relief to restructure the plan. Id. at 304.
As in this case, any damages sought through the lawsuit would eventually be allocated among
the accounts of plan participants. Id. The Fifth Circuit found that substantial conflicts existed
among the roughly 85,000 class members. First, forty-four thousand plan participants maintained
investments in the stock at issue in the litigation, undermining the plaintiffs’ claim that the stock

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fund was an imprudent investment that should not have been offered in the first place. Id at 315.
Next, the court found that the participants were affected by a drop in the stock’s price in
“dramatically different ways,” with some making money on their investments while others lost
money. Id. Even amongst those who lost money, the court pointed out that the determination of
the date on which the stock became an imprudent investment would affect how much these
members stood to recover in different ways. Id. Because of these differing interests and facts,
“different legitimate theories. . . [would] have different consequences for class members’
recovery.” Id. While the Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded the trial court’s granting of class
certification, it remarked that certifying subclasses could potentially remedy these conflicting
interests. Id. at 316. Thus, contrary to defendants’ interpretation of Langbecker, the Court reads
this case to stand for the proposition that class actions can be instituted even when monetary
recovery will ultimately be borne by the class members—provided that the theories of recovery
that are in the class’s best interest are not in conflict with one another.
Taking the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Langbecker to heart, the Court finds that Sobel
cannot adequately represent the class’s interests. Because he no longer owns a condominium, he
does not share the proposed class’s priorities in protecting the members’ ownership interest in
the condominium. Unlike current owners, Sobel’s interest in seeking injunctive relief against the
condominium associations will not be tempered by an ongoing financial stake in the properties
that the associations govern and manage. Thus, the Court finds that Sobel is not an adequate
representative of the class for seeking injunctive relief.
However, this holding does not affect Sobel’s ability to represent the class in seeking
monetary relief. The usury statute sets clear parameters on the extent of monetary damages,
allowing plaintiffs to reclaim only those amounts actually paid in the two years’ prior to the

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lawsuit’s filing. Thus, the Court does not anticipate a risk of conflicting theories of recovery for
seeking monetary relief. Moreover, as a current unit owner, Reyes can adequately represent the
proposed class in seeking injunctive relief. Therefore, the Court finds that the potential
conflicting interests of the proposed class can be resolved by dividing the usury class into two
subclasses, one seeking monetary relief and one seeking injunctive relief. Both Sobel and Reyes
are adequate representatives of the former class, while Reyes is an adequate representative of the
latter class. The Court notes that if, as defendants claim, Julia Place did not draft its governing
documents with the aid of Steeg’s legal advice, then the “juridical link” between Julia Place and
the other defendants is lost for the purposes of seeking injunctive relief, and the injunctive relief
class will be limited to members owning units at Julia Place.
d. Rule 23(b)
As the Court discussed in its previous Order and Reasons, Rule 23(b) requires the
proposed class to fulfill the requirements of one of the four categories set forth in the rule. Rec.
Doc. 464 at 21. The Court finds that the proposed class does not fit the requirements of Rule
23(b)(1)(B) because the class does not seek to recover from a “limited fund.” The Court finds
that certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is appropriate for the injunctive relief class because it seeks
an order from the Court declaring the existing bylaws and declarations of the condominium
associations to be in violation of the usury law and mandating revision accordingly.
In addition, the Court finds that the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) are met for the
monetary relief class. Certification under this provision is appropriate when “questions of law or
fact common to members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members” and a class action is the superior method for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy. Red.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3). The common question of law is whether the late fees

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charged to the proposed class members violate Lousiana’s usury law, and whether the existing
provisions of the condominium associations governing documents violate the same law.
Although the resolution of the class’s claims undoubtedly require individualized determinations
of whether the fees were charged and the amount of the fees in relation to the past-due
condominium fees, these factual determinations are straightforward, involving the review of
ledgers over a finite period of time and simple mathematical calculations to determine the
percentage interest that the late fees exacted. Moreover, plaintiffs have shown that the bylaws
and declarations of the condominium associations, while varying somewhat, are substantially
similar in their provisioning of harsh penalties for late payment of condominium fees and were
drafted with the legal advice of Steeg. The Court is convinced that the common issues
predominate over the individualized determinations in this case. Thus, the proposed class may be
certified under Rule 23(b)(3) as well as Rule 23(b)(2).
Having found that the proposed class satisfies the requirements of both Rule 23(a) and
Rule 23(b), the Court hereby GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the motion for class
certification. A class of condominium owners, both past and present, who have paid allegedly
usurious late fees and now seek monetary and injunctive relief, shall be certified. This class shall
be divided into two subclasses—one seeking monetary relief and another seeking injunctive
relief for purported violations of the usury law.
e. Other issues
Both Steeg and Rotunda have filed memoranda requesting that the Court dismiss them
from the action. Rec. Docs. 473, 475. However, the Court explicitly asked for briefing as to the
issue of standing for the purpose of determining the appropriateness of certifying a usury class,
and these requests go beyond the purview of class certification. Dismissal is properly raised in

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separate motions to be noticed for hearing and with proper opportunity for the plaintiffs to
respond. Thus, the Court declines to reach whether these parties should be dismissed.

III.

Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, IT IS ORDERED that the motion for class certification

is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as to the usury class. The Court certifies a class
of past and present condominium owners who have paid allegedly usurious late fees. The class
shall be divided into two subclasses, one seeking monetary relief and another seeking injunctive
relief for purported violations of the usury law.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 20th day of August, 2015.

_____________________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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