Reyes v. Julia Place Condominiums Homeowners Association, Inc. et al
Filing
622
ORDER & REASONS: granting 595 Second Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant The Rotunda Condominiums Homeowners Association Inc. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 6/7/16. (Reference: both cases)(sek)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
NICOLE REYES ET AL.
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO: 12-2043
JULIA PLACE CONDOMINIUMS
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION
INC. ET AL.
SECTION: “J”(3)
ORDER & REASONS
Before the Court is a Second Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec.
Doc. 595) filed by Defendant The Rotunda Condominiums Homeowners
Association Inc. (“Rotunda”), an opposition thereto (Rec. Doc.
597) filed by Plaintiffs Nicole Reyes and Mike Sobel as class
representatives for a certified usury class, and Rotunda’s reply
(Rec. Doc. 600). Having considered the motion and legal memoranda,
the record, and the applicable law, the Court finds that the motion
should be GRANTED.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The facts of this case are set forth in detail in previously
issued Orders and Reasons (see, e.g., Rec. Doc. 464); therefore,
the Court will only briefly recount them here. This is a class
action lawsuit brought by Plaintiffs Nicole Reyes and Mike Sobel
on behalf of themselves and other condominium owners at various
properties
throughout
New
Orleans
against
their
respective
condominium associations as well as Steeg Law LLC (“Steeg”).
Plaintiffs
allege
that
the
Defendants
have
engaged
in
debt
collection practices that violate state and federal law.
On May 23, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a motion to certify three
classes of condominium owners. (Rec. Doc. 351.) The first class
consists of condominium owners who had been subject to alleged
violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”).
Plaintiff allege that Steeg utilizes a standard form collection
letter that violates the FDCPA on its face by demanding payment of
unpaid assessments within seven days, and that Steeg violated the
FDCPA by filing excessive liens on condominium owners’ properties.
The second class consist of condominium owners who had been charged
excessive late fees and interest rates for delinquent payment of
assessments that allegedly violated Louisiana’s usury laws. The
third class consists of those who were charged late fees allegedly
in violation of the Louisiana Condominium Act (“LCA”).
On December 18, 2014, the Court certified a FDCPA class
limited to claims for monetary relief against Steeg. The Court
defined the FDCPA monetary relief class narrowly as “consisting of
unit
owners
who
received
letters
identical
or
substantially
similar to those attached as Exhibits “A” and “D” of the original
complaint during the year prior to the filing of the action.” (Rec.
Doc. 464, at 16.) The Court denied certification of an FDCPA class
for
injunction
relief
and
denied
certification
of
the
FDCPA
monetary relief class for claims against the various condominium
2
associations. Id. at 6, 15. The Court also denied certification of
the LCA class and deferred ruling on whether certification was
appropriate for the proposed usury class because a portion of the
proposed class had not actually paid the late fees that had been
charged to them.
On August 20, 2015, the Court certified a narrowed version of
the usury class, divided into two subclasses. Specifically, the
Court certified “a class of past and present condominium owners
who have paid allegedly usurious late fees. The class shall be
divided into two subclasses, one seeking monetary relief and
another seeking injunctive relief for purported violations of the
usury law.” (Rec. Doc. 529, at 16.) The Court did not reach whether
members who had not actually paid late fees possess standing
because it held that the usury class “must exclude those who did
not
actually
make
payments
on
late
fees
because
they
lack
commonality with the other members of the proposed class.” Id. at
6, 9-10.
Furthermore, the Court held that both Sobel and Reyes were
adequate
representatives
of
the
usury
class
seeking
monetary
relief. Id. at 10-14. The Court also found Reyes to be an adequate
representative of the class seeking injunctive relief, because
Reyes is a current condominium owner. Id. However, because Sobel
is not a current condominium owner, the Court found that Sobel is
not an adequate representative of the class seeking injunctive
3
relief. Id. Plaintiffs subsequently filed their Fourth Amended
Complaint
(Rec.
Doc.
553),
which
adds
Patrick
Anders
as
an
additional named plaintiff and a purported class representative
for the usury class.
On January 8, 2016, this case was temporarily realloted and
randomly assigned to this section of the court for all purposes.
Since that time, the parties have filed several motions. Rotunda
filed the instant Second Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc.
595) on April 12, 2016. Plaintiffs opposed the motion on April 26,
2016, and Rotunda filed a reply. The motion is now before the Court
on the briefs.
PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS
Rotunda
moves
for
summary
judgment,
seeking
a
full
and
complete dismissal from the suit. Rotunda contends that the Court’s
previous orders have eliminated all possible avenues for recovery
against it. According to Rotunda, the only class-wide claim against
the condominium associations is the usury claim. Rotunda asserts
that the Court previously granted Rotunda summary judgment on
Plaintiffs’ usury claim for monetary relief, based on its finding
that Rotunda did not collect any allegedly usurious fees within
two years before suit. Rotunda argues that the Court’s previous
finding forecloses any class claims against it under usury law.
Further, because Plaintiffs have no direct claims against it,
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Rotunda argues that the Court should dismiss Rotunda from this
lawsuit entirely.
Plaintiffs
oppose
Rotunda’s
motion
for
summary
judgment.
First, Plaintiffs argue that the “juridical link” doctrine gives
the
class
representatives
standing
to
bring
claims
against
Rotunda. Second, although the Court has already granted Rotunda
summary judgment on whether it collected usurious fees, Plaintiffs
argue that an affidavit of an owner of a condominium at Rotunda
shows that Rotunda coerced and received late fees from the owner,
and therefore the usury class may pursue injunctive and monetary
relief against Rotunda. Third, Plaintiffs also argue that Rotunda
cannot moot class claims for injunctive relief by amending its
bylaws and declarations to delete the portions that allegedly
violate usury law. Lastly, Plaintiffs argue that factual questions
exist as to when usurious amounts were collected by Rotunda.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, the
discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (citing Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c)); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075
(5th Cir. 1994). When assessing whether a dispute as to any
material fact exists, a court considers “all of the evidence in
5
the record but refrains from making credibility determinations or
weighing
the
evidence.”
Delta
&
Pine
Land
Co.
v.
Nationwide
Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 2008). All
reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party,
but
a
party
cannot
defeat
summary
judgment
with
conclusory
allegations or unsubstantiated assertions. Little, 37 F.3d at
1075. A court ultimately must be satisfied that “a reasonable jury
could not return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Delta, 530
F.3d at 399.
If the dispositive issue is one on which the moving party
will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party “must
come forward with evidence which would ‘entitle it to a directed
verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.’” Int'l
Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th Cir.
1991). The nonmoving party can then defeat the motion by either
countering with sufficient evidence of its own, or “showing that
the moving party’s evidence is so sheer that it may not persuade
the reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in favor of the
moving party.” Id. at 1265.
If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party
will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may
satisfy its burden by merely pointing out that the evidence in the
record is insufficient with respect to an essential element of the
nonmoving party’s claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The burden
6
then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, by submitting or
referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a
genuine issue exists. See id. at 324. The nonmovant may not rest
upon the pleadings, but must identify specific facts that establish
a genuine issue for trial. See, e.g., id. at 325; Little, 37 F.3d
at 1075.
DISCUSSION
The issue before the Court is whether, considering the Court’s
previous rulings, Rotunda is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law dismissing the putative class claims asserted against it. For
the following reasons, the Court finds that Rotunda’s motion for
summary judgment should be granted, and all claims against it in
this litigation are dismissed.
Plaintiffs brought claims under the FDCPA, Louisiana usury
law, and LCA alleging that Rotunda engaged in an unlawful scheme
with the help of Steeg to collect usurious late fees. Because none
of the named Plaintiffs owned or rented a condominium unit at
Rotunda,
Plaintiffs
have
no
direct
claims
against
Rotunda.
Instead, Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of condominium unit
owners at the Rotunda who paid usurious fees or received form
letters from Steeg which violate the FDCPA.
As Rotunda correctly asserts, the previous orders issued in
this case have eliminated all possible avenues of recovery and
relief against Rotunda. First, in the December 18, 2014 Order and
7
Reasons, the Court denied certification of the FDCPA injunctive
relief
monetary
class
altogether,
relief
class
denied
for
certification
claims
against
of
the
the
FDCPA
condominium
associations, and denied certification of the LCA class. (Rec.
Doc. 464, at 6, 15, 17.) Accordingly, Plaintiffs have no direct or
class claims under the FDCPA or LCA against Rotunda.
Second, in the August 20, 2015 Order and Reasons, the Court
certified a narrow version of the usury class, limited to “past
and present condominium owners who have paid allegedly usurious
late
fees.”
(Rec.
Doc.
529,
at
16.)
Specifically,
the
Court
explained that the requirements of commonality are met for “those
members who have made payments on usurious fees only.” Id. at 10.
The requirement of commonality, and therefore the requirement that
class members have actually paid allegedly usurious fees, applies
to both subclasses of the usury class, regardless of whether the
relief sought is monetary or injunctive. 1
In short, Plaintiffs’ usury claims against Rotunda depend on
whether
any
condominium
unit
owners
actually
paid
Rotunda
allegedly usurious late fees. It is beyond cavil that this Court
has already granted Rotunda summary judgment on this issue. In the
September 11, 2013 Order and Reasons, the Court found that Rotunda
1
“[T]he requirements of commonality are met for those members who have made
payments on usurious fees only. . . . [M]embers within this narrow class maintain
the ability to pursue the injunctive relief sought by the plaintiffs.” (Rec.
Doc. 529, at 10.)
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had demonstrated that it did not collect any allegedly usurious
late fees during the two-year period at issue. (Rec. Doc. 275, at
7.) The Court explained that Rotunda had argued and submitted
evidence that there was no genuine issue of material fact that it
did not collect any late fees within two years before Plaintiffs
filed this suit. Id. Plaintiffs did not rebut that evidence. Id.
Nearly three years have passed since the Court’s grant of summary
judgment to Rotunda on that issue, and Plaintiffs have not moved
for reconsideration. The Court will not now entertain Plaintiffs’
arguments that factual questions exist. Because those who did not
actually make payments on late fees have been excluded from the
usury class entirely, Plaintiffs have no direct or class claims
under usury law against Rotunda. 2
In conclusion, all claims against Rotunda asserted in this
lawsuit
have
been
eliminated.
The
Court’s
class
definitions
exclude Rotunda completely based on the Court’s previous finding
that Rotunda did not collect usurious fees within the two-year
period. In addition, the Court’s previous rulings eliminated the
claims against Rotunda under the FDCPA and LCA. Thus, no claims
against
Rotunda
remain.
Accordingly,
Rotunda
is
entitled
to
summary judgment.
2 The “juridical link” doctrine has no application to this issue. As discussed
above, there is no genuine issue of fact that no class members exist with causes
of action against Rotunda.
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CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Rotunda’s Second Motion
for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 595) is GRANTED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 7th day of June, 2016.
CARL J. BARBIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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