Hebert vs. State of Louisiana, et al

Filing 17

ORDER granting 10 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; granting 11 Motion to Dismiss Party; granting 11 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction; granting 12 Motion to Dismiss Party. Signed by Judge Jay C. Zainey. (jrc, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LENWARD P. HEBERT

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 12-2116

STATE OF LOUISIANA, ET AL.

SECTION: "A" (3)

ORDER AND REASONS
The following motions are before the Court:

Motion to

Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 10) filed by defendants the State of Louisiana
and Trooper Damian LaFonta; Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 11)
filed by Second Parish Court of the Parish of Jefferson, Judge
Roy M. Cascio, and Adrian Adams; Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 12)
filed by Jefferson Parish Assistant District Attorney John
Messina.

Plaintiff Lenward P. Hebert opposes the motions.

The

motions, scheduled for submission on January 16, 2013, are before
the Court on the briefs without oral argument.

For the reasons

that follow, the motions are GRANTED.
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit pro se and he continues to

represent himself.

Plaintiff received a speeding ticket in

Jefferson Parish and he was subsequently convicted on that
charge.

Plaintiff’s prolix complaint and his opposition to the

motions are not paragons of clarity and organization.

But the

Court interprets Plaintiff’s submissions to suggest that he is a
sovereign unto himself, that he has an absolute right to travel

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unimpeded on the roadways, that the State of Louisiana is not a
sovereign, having giving up that right when it joined the Union
and ratified the Constitution, and therefore lacks jurisdiction
to prosecute him.
The following facts form the basis of the complaint.
Louisiana State Trooper Damian LaFonta pulled Plaintiff over for
speeding on August 25, 2010, on Highway 90.
Complaint ¶ 22).

(Rec. Doc. 1,

Plaintiff describes LaFonta as a road pirate,1

operating a vehicle “specially outfitted for the purpose of
piracy in armed ambush and attack on land,” (the Court assumes
that this is a reference to LaFonta’s police car), lying in wait
on the side of the road and concealed from view.

(Id.).

Plaintiff complains that he was stopped unlawfully, although he
does not allege that LaFonta lacked probable cause, and that he
was “held captive” for “several minutes” without a warrant.
¶ 23).

(Id.

Plaintiff then contends that he was forced under duress

to sign a traffic citation, and that this constituted a type of
contractual adhesion.

(Rec. Doc. 1, Complaint ¶ 25).

Plaintiff has sued Trooper LaFonta and the State of
Louisiana contending that the foregoing conduct was a violation
of his civil rights (unlawful arrest, unlawful search and
seizure).

Plaintiff seeks approximately $36 million in damages

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The complaint contains several references to piracy. The
Court has surmised that the repeated references to admiralty
jurisdiction in the complaint are related to the characterization
of Defendants’ conduct as piracy of some sort.

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from LaFonta and $170 million from the State, and he seeks to
have LaFonta captured, arrested, and prosecuted.

(Id. at 40, 47-

48).
Plaintiff’s claims against defendants Second Parish Court,
Judge Roy M. Cascio, Adrian Adams, and ADA John Messina arise out
of the prosecution on the speeding charge.

Plaintiff claims that

on two occasions, including on November 11, 2010, he went to the
clerk’s office at Second Parish Court and attempted to file a
motion to dismiss but the Clerk refused to accept the motion and
told Plaintiff to give it directly to the judge.
Complaint ¶¶ 26).

(Rec. Doc. 1,

Then on January 26, 2011, Plaintiff presented

his motion to dismiss to Hearing Officer Adrian Adams, who then
scheduled the matter for trial.

(Id. ¶ 27).

Plaintiff later

filed a motion challenging the jurisdiction of the court and on
August 2, 2011, Judge Roy M. Cascio denied the motion, which
Plaintiff believes to have been in error.

(Id. ¶ 28).

Plaintiff alleges that on November 9, 2011, he appeared once
again at Second Parish Court for his trial.

Judge Cascio

presided, “clothed in the apparel of a judge’s robe,” and John
Messina prosecuted the case for the State.

Plaintiff claims that

he was tried without a jury and in the absence of a charging
instrument, in violation of the Constitution.

(Id. ¶¶ 31, 33).

Plaintiff was convicted and he states that Judge Cascio ordered
him to pay “a ransom” of $216.25.

(Id. ¶ 35).

Plaintiff refused

to sign “the conviction sheet” and an attachment was issued for

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his arrest.2

(Id. ¶ 36).

On November 15, 2011, Plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus
from the state appellate court but the petition was dismissed
without consideration.

(Id. ¶ 37).

Plaintiffs seeks $46-$56 million in damages from each of
Second Parish Court, Judge Cascio, ADA Messina, and Hearing
Officer Adams.
Defendants now move to dismiss the complaint raising various
defenses and argument which the Court addresses below.
II.

DISCUSSION
In the context of a motion to dismiss the Court must accept

all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.

Lormand v. US

Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Tellabs,
Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007); Scheuer
v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Lovick v. Ritemoney, Ltd.,
378 F.3d 433, 437 (5th Cir. 2004)).

However, the foregoing tenet

is inapplicable to legal conclusions.
Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.

Thread-bare recitals of the elements of a

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.

Id. (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550, U.S.

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The public records of Jefferson Parish indicate that the
attachment issued because Plaintiff left the court without paying
the fine, and without making arrangements for payment. As far as
the Court can tell from the public records, the fine remains
unpaid.

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544, 555 (2007)).
The central issue in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is
whether, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the
complaint states a valid claim for relief.

Gentilello v. Rege,

627 F.3d 540, 544 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Doe v. MySpace, Inc.,
528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008)).

To avoid dismissal, a

plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to “state a claim for
relief that is plausible on its face.”
S. Ct. at 1949).

Id. (quoting Iqbal, 129

“A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.”

Id.

The Court does not accept as true

“conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal
conclusions.”

Id. (quoting Plotkin v. IP Axess, Inc., 407 F.3d

690, 696 (5th Cir. 2005)).
factual allegations.

Legal conclusions must be supported by

Id. (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950).

Trooper LaFonta and the State of Louisiana
Trooper LaFonta argues inter alia that any claims against
him are prescribed.

The State argues that state sovereign

immunity shields the State from the claims that Plaintiff has
brought in federal court.
According to the complaint, LaFonta executed the traffic
stop on August 25, 2010.

(Rec. Doc. 1, Complaint ¶ 22).

Plaintiff filed his complaint in this Court on August 17, 2012,

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which was nearly two years later.

Federal civil rights claims

are subject to the forum state’s personal injury limitations
period.

Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 1994).

In

Louisiana, delictual actions are subject to a one year
limitations period. La. Civ. Code art. 3492.
Trooper LaFonta are prescribed.

The claims against

Moreover, the complaint fails to

state a claim against LaFonta because there is no allegation that
LaFonta executed the traffic stop without probable cause.
LaFonta is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all claims
brought against him personally.
All claims against Trooper LaFonta in his official capacity
and all claims against the State of Louisiana arising out his
conduct are barred by state sovereign immunity.

See Nelson v.

Univ. of Tex., 535 F.3d 318, 320 (5th Cir. 2008).

The motion to

dismiss filed by the State of Louisiana and Trooper Damian
LaFonta is therefore GRANTED.
Second Parish Court, Judge Cascio, and Adrian Adams
Aside from the fact that Plaintiff fails to allege any facts
to state a claim against these defendants, Cascio and Adams are
immune from § 1983 liability.
(1983).

See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325

Plaintiff is clearly attempting to hold them liable for

actions taken in their roles as judicial officers.

The Second

Parish Court is not an entity capable of being sued under § 1983.
Johnson v. LeBlanc, No. 10-1735, 2011 WL 1654266, at *2 (E.D. la.

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Apr. 6, 2011).

Any claims against the State that arise out of

the conduct of the judicial defendants are barred by sovereign
immunity.

Second Parish Court of the Parish of Jefferson, Judge

Roy M. Cascio, and Adrian Adams are entitled to judgment as a
matter of law and their motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
ADA John Messina
Defendant John Messina is entitled to prosecutorial immunity
because Plaintiff is attempting to hold Messina liable for
prosecuting the traffic ticket.
555 U.S. 335 (2009).

See Van de Kamp v. Goldstein,

Plaintiff alleges no facts whatsoever that

state a claim against Messina, much less impugn the immunity that
he is entitled to as a matter of law.

Messina is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law and his motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
Accordingly, and for the foregoing reasons;
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 10)
filed by defendants State of Louisiana and Trooper Damian
LaFonta; Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 11) filed by Second Parish
Court of the Parish of Jefferson, Judge Roy M. Cascio, and Adrian
Adams; Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 12) filed by Jefferson Parish
Assistant District Attorney John Messina are GRANTED.
Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice.
January 29, 2013
JAY C. ZAINEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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