Dixon v. Toyota Motor Credit Corporation et al

Filing 18

ORDER denying 13 Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Injunction. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 1/8/13. (sek, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
CIVIL ACTION
LANDRY DIXON
VERSUS

NO: 12-2150

TOYOTA MOTOR CREDIT
CORPORATION, ET AL.

SECTION: "J”(1)

ORDER
Before the Court is a “Motion for Temporary Injunction”
(Rec. Doc. 13) filed by pro se Plaintiff, Landry Dixon.1
Defendants, Toyota Motor Credit Corporation (“Toyota”), and Troy
Campise (“Mr. Campise”), have opposed Plaintiff’s motion. (Rec.
Docs. 15, 16) The motion was set for hearing without oral
argument on January 2, 2013. Having considered the motion, the
parties’ briefing, the record, and the applicable law, the Court
finds for the reasons expressed more fully below, that
Plaintiff’s motion should be DENIED.
On August 27, 2012, Plaintiff filed the instant action

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This pro se Plaintiff’s decision to style his motion as a “motion for
temporary injunction” begs the question whether Plaintiff’s motion should be
construed as a motion for temporary restraining order or a motion for
preliminary injunction. The Court construes Plaintiff’s motion as a motion for
preliminary injunction.

against Toyota and Mr. Campise, a Lakeside Toyota Sales Manager,
alleging that the named Defendants defrauded him and his
corporation, DELF, Inc. (“DELF”) in violation of state and
federal law.2 (Pl.’s Compl., Rec. Doc. 1, p. 1) In the instant
motion, Plaintiff seeks an order enjoining the Defendants from:
(1) continuing to maintain derogatory credit entries against
Plaintiff and DELF, and (2) periodically transmitting notices of
debt-default and collection notices to Plaintiff and DELF over
the disputed debt, pending the litigation of the instant matter.
(Pl.’s Mot., Rec. Doc. 13, ¶¶ 15-16)
To obtain a preliminary injunction, the movant bears the
burden of establishing: “‘(1) a substantial likelihood of success
on the merits; (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury if
the injunction is not issued; (3) that the threatened injury to
the movant outweighs any damage the injunction might cause to the
opponent; and (4) that the injunction will not disserve the
public interest.’” Enterprise Int’l Inc. v. Corporacion Estatal
Petrolera Ecuatoriana, 762 F.2d 464, 471(5th Cir. 1985)
(citations omitted). “In considering whether to grant or deny
preliminary injunctive relief, the district court ‘must remember

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Plaintiff filed a typed complaint entitled “Fruadulent [sic] Lease
Agreement,” and the typed caption named Delf, Inc. and Landry Dixon as
Plaintiffs. (Pl.’s Compl., Rec. Doc. 1) However, Plaintiff used a pen to
strike through the reference to Delf, Inc. in the caption of his complaint and
to strike through most of the other references to DELF, Inc. throughout the
remainder of the complaint rendering it unclear whether DELF, Inc. is or is
not an additional Plaintiff in this action. (Pl.’s Compl., Rec. Doc. 1)

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that a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic
remedy,’ and that ‘[t]he movant has a heavy burden of persuading
the district court that all four elements are satisfied.’” Id. at
472.
The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to carry his heavy
burden of persuading the Court that he is entitled to a
preliminary injunction. With respect to Mr. Campise, Plaintiff
has failed to clearly articulate, in either his complaint or his
motion, how Mr. Campise participated in the events surrounding
the lease of the vehicle at issue or caused him any harm. Thus,
for this reason, Plaintiff has failed to establish that he has
any likelihood of success on the merits, much less a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits, of his claims against Mr.
Campise.
In addition, Plaintiff bears the burden of proving a
substantial threat of irreparable harm if an injunction does not
issue. Assuming without deciding that Plaintiff has standing to
seek a preliminary injunction on DELF’s behalf, despite his
handwritten strike-outs of all references to DELF in the
complaint, Plaintiff has failed to clearly articulate the harm
that he will suffer if the Court declines to issue a preliminary
injunction. Plaintiff has only alleged by implication that
Defendants’ alleged notices of default or collection letters have
somehow hindered DELF from conducting business. Plaintiff has not

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explained what business DELF is engaged in or what harm DELF has
incurred in the past or will incur in the future.3 Thus, the
Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to satisfy his heavy burden
of persuading the Court that he is entitled to this form of
extraordinary relief.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for “Temporary
Injunction” (Rec. Doc. 13) is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 8th day of January, 2013.

CARL J. BARBIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Plaintiff asserts that the notices of debt-default and collection
letters that Defendants allegedly transmitted “have managed to stifle and
strangle all attempts by plaintiff and plaintiff nonprofit to service the
identified needs of the populations being served.” He further states that the
issuance of an order enjoining defendants from continued maintenance of
derogatory credit entries against Plaintiff and DELF “will allow plaintiff and
plaintiff nonprofit to resume a modicum of services to those communal entities
and individuals who are in-anticipation [sic] of these services,” and that the
issuance of the preliminary injunction “will reduce the chronic distress that
attends to the critical and therapeutic services that DELF, Inc. provides to
the disadvantaged, the elderly, the incarcerated, and the challenged among our
youth and delinquent population.” (Pl.’s Mot., Rec. Doc. 13, ¶¶ 14-16) While
these excerpts may constitute a vague explanation of why the issuance of a
preliminary injunction would benefit Plaintiff and DELF, they do not explain
how failure to issue a preliminary injunction would pose a substantial threat
of irreparable injury.

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