Dixon v. Toyota Motor Credit Corporation et al

Filing 64

ORDER & REASONS: ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 7/17/13.(sek, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
CIVIL ACTION
LANDRY DIXON
VERSUS

NO: 12-2150

TOYOTA MOTOR CREDIT
CORPORATION, ET AL.

SECTION: "J”(1)

ORDER AND REASONS
This matter is before the Court sua sponte to consider whether
the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this lawsuit, filed
by Plaintiff, Landry Dixon ("Mr. Dixon") against Defendants, Troy
Campise

("Mr.

Campise")

and

Toyota

Motor

Credit

Corporation

("TMCC"). Although the parties have engaged in motion practice
without raising subject matter jurisdiction, a Court must raise
lack of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte once discovered, and
may do so at any stage of the litigation. Giles v. NYLCare Health
Plans, Inc., 172 F.3d 332, 336 (5th Cir. 1999). Having considered
the record and the applicable law, the Court finds that it lacks
subject matter over this dispute, and that the parties' claims
should be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND FACTS
On August 27, 2012, Mr. Dixon, proceeding pro se and in forma
pauperis,1 filed the instant action alleging that the Defendants
defrauded him and his corporation, DELF Inc., in connection with an
automobile lease, thereby violating state and federal law.2 (Rec.
Doc. 1, p. 1) Plaintiff alleges that he is the registered agent and
chief executive officer of DELF Inc., and that DELF Inc. is
501(c)(3)

nonprofit

corporation

registered

in

the

state

of

Louisiana as a behavioral healthcare education and service-delivery
agency.3 (Rec. Doc. 1, pp. 1-2) Plaintiff further alleges that on

1

(Rec. Docs. 2-3)

2
Plaintiff filed a typed complaint entitled “Fruadulent [sic] Lease
Agreement,” and the typed caption named both Delf, Inc. and Landry Dixon as
Plaintiffs. (Rec. Doc. 1) However, Plaintiff used a pen to strike through the
reference to Delf, Inc. in the caption of his complaint and to strike through
most of the other references to DELF, Inc. throughout the remainder of the
complaint rendering much of his complaint incomprehensible. (Rec. Doc. 1) For
example, the Complaint provides:

Plaintiff avers that he entered into a 60-month automotive lease
agreement, on behalf of DELF, Inc., with the defendant’s agent, at
Lakeside Toyota, on December 1, 2010; plaintiff agreed to lease
one 2010 Toyota Corolla passenger vehicle...
(Rec. Doc. 1, p. 2)
3

Presumably to support his contention that DELF is a 501(c)(3)
nonprofit corporation, Plaintiff attached to his Complaint a letter from the
IRS to DELF, which states, among other things:
based on the information supplied, and assuming your operations will
be as stated in your application for recognition of exemption, we
have determined you are exempt from federal income tax under section
501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code as an organization described in
section 501(c)(3).
(Rec. Doc. 1, pp. 8-10). The letter is dated February 21, 2001, nearly
nine years before December of 2010, the time when Mr. Dixon claims the
parties confected the automobile lease at issue.

2

December 1, 2010, he entered into a 60-month automotive lease for
a Toyota Corolla, at a rate of $312.91 per month, with the Lakeside
Toyota dealership in Metairie, Louisiana. (Rec. Doc. 1, p. 2)
Plaintiff alleges that he entered the lease on behalf of DELF.4
(Rec. Doc.1, p. 2; Rec. Doc. 13, p. 1) Plaintiff attached a copy of
the purported lease to his complaint. (Rec. Doc. 1, p. 5) It is an
unsigned document that is dated December 1, 2010 and states (a)
that Lakeside Toyota is the lessor, (b) that DELF Inc. is the
lessee, (c) that Mr. Dixon is the co-lessee, and (d) that the
monthly lease payment is $ 312.91. (Rec. Doc. 1, p. 5)
Plaintiff claims that he was promised "tax-exempt status
recognition" by all parties present at Lakeside Toyota on December
1, 2010, including the "sales/lease manager, salesman, and other
auto lease agreement officials of the Lakeside Toyota dealership."
4

Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court has construed the
additional factual allegations that Plaintiff made in his Ex Parte Motion for
a Temporary Injunction (Rec. Doc. 13), his Motion for Reconsideration (Rec.
Doc. 24), and his Opposition to Mr. Campise's Motion for Dismissal (Rec. Doc.
22), as motions to amend his complaint, which the Court grants. See Smith v.
Lonestar Constr. Co., Inc., 456 F. App'x 475, 476 (5th Cir. 2011) (courts must
"liberally construe the briefs of pro se litigants and apply less stringent
standards to parties proceeding pro se than to parties represented by
counsel."); Johnson v. Atkins, 999 F.2d 99, 100 (5th Cir. 1993) ("A pro se
complaint is to be construed liberally . . . "); Riley v. Sch. Bd. Union
Parish, 379 F. App'x. 335, 341 (5th Cir. 2010) ("Under our precedent, when a
claim is raised for the first time in response to a summary judgment motion,
the district court should construe that claim as a motion to amend the
complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) . . . . this is
particularly true where, as here, the litigant is pro se and has not yet made
any amendments to her complaint.") (citations omitted). Thus, the summary of
Plaintiff’s complaint includes all of the factual allegations he made in these
filings. See McClinton v. Sam's East, Inc., No. 11-2156, 2012 WL 4483492, at
*1 (W.D. La. Sept. 28, 2012) (considering facts alleged in pro se plaintiff's
complaints and oppositions in ruling on 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss); Dean v.
City of New Orleans, No. 11-2209, 2012 WL 2564954, at *1 (E.D. La. July 2,
2012) (considering pro se litigant's written opposition in ruling on Rule
12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings).

3

(Rec. Doc. 13, p. 1, ¶ 4) He states that he learned that DELF,
Inc.'s Louisiana corporate certificate had expired and that he
renewed it, and that he "was mandated to produce documentation
certifying DELF, Inc. to be a federally-recognized 501c3 tax-exempt
non-profit," which he did. (Rec. Doc. 13, pp. 1-2, ¶¶ 5,6) He also
asserts that he "recalls that he signed many documents [on the
night of December 1, 2010], and that it was getting late," that he
"was given a two-paged legal document that was identified to him as
the automotive lease agreement, which stipulated a monthly monetary
obligation of $312.91 for 60 months," and that three weeks later,
he learned via fax and telephone that the "lease agreement"
provided to him on December 1, 2010 was not the "'official'
automotive lease agreement." (Rec. Doc. 13, p. 2, ¶ 9) Plaintiff
further alleges that on December 22, 2010, TMCC faxed a document to
DELF, Inc.'s telephone number "which reflected that plaintiff had
signed and initialed a similar-resembling lease agreement5 . . .
which indicated a monthly-installment obligation of $341.07 for 60
months."6 (Rec. Doc. 13, p. 2, ¶ 10) Plaintiff claims that he later
learned that Toyota Financial Services and the Lakeside Toyota
dealership are “very selective as to which of their corporate

5

Plaintiff refers to the "similar-resembling lease agreement" as "the
switch." (Rec. Doc. 13, p. 2, ¶ 10)
6

In his original complaint, Plaintiff claimed that on December 22,
2010, members of the Toyota Financial Services Office in Carol Stream,
Illinois informed him that DELF, Inc. did not qualify as a tax-exempt
corporate customer and that an additional $28.16 was being added to the
monthly payment. (Pl.’s Compl., Rec. Doc. 1, p. 2)

4

clients are allowed to claim-and-receive tax-exempt consideration
and recognition.” (Rec. Doc. 1, p. 2) Plaintiff alleges that he
made numerous efforts to demonstrate "that plaintiff and plaintiff
corporation had met every 501c3 tax exempt prerequisites in this
corporate- to-corporate automotive lease agreement transaction,"
and that his efforts were ignored. (Rec. Doc. 1, p. 2; Rec. Doc.
13, p. 2, ¶ 11)
Plaintiff alleges that he thereafter communicated to the
Lakeside Toyota dealership and TMCC that he and DELF, Inc. "were
going abide by the deal that was agreed to in REAL-TIME and in GOOD
FAITH, with a supportive document on the night of 12/01/2012 [sic],
notwithstanding the absence of defendant dealership's concurring
signature." (Rec. Doc. 13, p.3, ¶ 12) Plaintiff claims that he has
been making payments of $312.91 on the lease (Rec. Doc. 13, p. 3,
¶ 13) and that Defendants "harassed" him and DELF, Inc. and placed
derogatory credit entries against him and DELF, Inc. that have
adversely impacted their credit. (Rec. Doc. 1, p. 3; Rec. Doc. 13,
p. 3, ¶ 14) Plaintiff further states that on August 10, 2012, he
received a debt collection letter from counsel for TMCC asking him
to either pay the delinquent taxes for the lease agreement or to
dispute them. (Rec. Doc. 1, p. 3) Plaintiff attached this letter to
his complaint. (Rec. Doc. 1, p. 7)
Plaintiff asserts that he filed suit due "persistent fiscal
injustice, harassment, and corporate marginalization of DELF, Inc.

5

by [TMCC]." (Rec. Doc. 1, p. 3) He alleges that Mr. Campise is the
"Chief Executive" of Lakeside Toyota and that the lease agreement
was drafted and finalized on the premises of Lakeside Toyota, which
is under Mr. Campise's "supervisory and managerial directorship."
(Rec. Doc. 22, pp. 1-2, ¶¶ 1, 6) Plaintiff also alleges that Mr.
Campise is involved in the day to day operation of Lakeside Toyota
and

refused

to

"authenticate"

the

purported

lease

agreement

reflecting a monthly payment of $312.91, instead dismissing it as
non-binding. (Rec. Doc. 22, pp. 1-3, ¶¶ 1,8,9)
Plaintiff

alleges

that

as

a

result

of

the

“mean

and

insensitive dynamics of this mammoth corporate defendant and its
abusive surrogates and representatives,” DELF, Inc. has suffered
“aggregately-grave fiscal and name-recognition humiliation.” (Rec.
Doc. 1, p. 3) Plaintiff requests that the Court: (1) either enjoin
the “defendant”7 from further communication with DELF, Inc. or Mr.
Dixon or limit the scope of permissible communications, (2) compel
defendant to demonstrate that the lease agreement entered on
December 1, 2010 is not excessively unfair according to the fairmarket valuation of the leasing of a 2010 Toyota Corolla for 60
months, (3) compel TMCC to remove all derogatory credit entries
against DELF, Inc. and Mr. Dixon related to the lease, (4) compel
defendant to pay Mr. Dixon and DELF, Inc. compensatory damages at

7

Plaintiff's complaint is ambiguous with regard to which Defendant he
seeks the requested relief against.

6

the rate of $1,000.00 per day since December 22, 2010 (5) compel
defendant to pay Mr. Dixon and DELF punitive damages at the rate of
$1,000.00 per day since December 22, 2010, (6) compel Toyota to
accept

return

of

the

leased

vehicle

without

any

further

consideration from DELF or Mr. Dixon, and (7) dissolve the lease.
(Rec. Doc. 1, pp. 3-4)
On November 12, 2012, TMCC filed its First Amended Answer and
Counterclaim asserting that the parties did not agree to the terms
in the unsigned document Plaintiff attached to his complaint. (Rec.
Doc. 6) TMCC also asserted a counterclaim against Mr. Dixon for
breach of contract and sanctions, claiming that the Court has
supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. (Rec. Doc. 6, pp.
3-6) On December 9, 2012, Mr. Campise filed his answer. (Rec. Doc.
9) On December 12, 2012, Plaintiff filed a "Motion for Temporary
Injunction." (Rec. Doc. 13) The Court denied Plaintiff's "Motion
for Temporary Injunction" on January 8, 2013. (Rec. Doc. 18) On
March 4, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration of that
Order (Rec. Doc. 24), which was opposed by Mr. Campise (Rec. Doc.
33) and denied by the Court on June 19, 2013. (Rec. Doc. 55) On May
7, 2013, TMCC filed a Motion to Dismiss and for Sanctions (Rec.
Doc. 36), and a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 37)
on its counterclaim against Mr. Dixon for breach of the lease. On
May 15, Mr. Campise filed a memorandum in support of TMCC's Motion
to Dismiss and for Sanctions. (Rec. Doc. 41) On June 19, 2013, the

7

Court issued short orders (a) granting Mr. Campise's Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings (Rec. Doc. 54), (b) granting in part and
denying in part TMCC's Motion to Dismiss and For Sanctions8 (Rec.
Doc. 56), and (c) granting TMCC's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on its counterclaim. (Rec. Doc. 57) The Court issued these
short orders without written reasons and indicated that it would
issue its written reasons at a later date. (Rec. Docs. 54, 56, 57)
Given that the Court has sua sponte noticed jurisdictional defects
that render its prior orders void, the Court will now dismiss this
action without rendering written reasons for its prior orders.
DISCUSSION
The party invoking the jurisdiction of a federal court has the
burden of proving that jurisdiction is proper. Boudreau v. United
States, 53 F.3d 81, 82 (5th Cir. 1995). "Unless otherwise provided
by statute, federal district courts have jurisdiction over: (1)
federal questions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States; and (2) civil actions between citizens of
different states or foreign nations where the amount in controversy
exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs." Tanner v.
Davidson, (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1332(a)). Rule 8(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires plaintiffs to plead,
inter alia, a short and plain statement of the grounds for the

8

The Court granted TMCC's motion to the extent it sought to dismiss
Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim and denied it to the
extent it sought sanctions and attorneys' fees. (Rec. Doc. 56)

8

court's jurisdiction. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(A). "Unless a federal court
possesses subject matter jurisdiction over a dispute . . . any
order it makes (other than an order of dismissal or remand) is
void." Shirley v. Maxicare Texas, Inc., 921 F.2d 565, 568 (5th Cir.
1991) (alterations and emphasis added). Thus, if this Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction, the previous orders in this case
addressing the parties' various motions are void, and the Court
must dismiss this lawsuit. Id.; Giannakos v. M/V Bravo Trader, 762
F.2d 1295, 1297 (5th Cir. 1985) ("Unless a dispute falls within the
confines of the jurisdiction conferred by Congress, such courts do
not have the authority to issue orders regarding its resolution.")
A district court "has the power to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction on any one of three separate bases: (1) the
complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts
evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by
undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts."
Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981).
A. Federal Question Jurisdiction
"In

general,

questions

concerning

federal

question

jurisdiction are resolved by application of the 'well-pleaded
complaint' rule." Hart v. Bayer Corp., 199 F.3d 239, 243 (5th Cir.
2000). "The rule provides that the plaintiff's properly pleaded
complaint governs the jurisdictional inquiry," and that "[i]f, on
its face, the plaintiff's complaint raises no issue of federal law,

9

federal question jurisdiction is lacking." Id. at 243-44 (citing
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983)).
Here,

Plaintiff's

complaint

raises

no

issue

of

federal

Plaintiff vaguely refers in his complaint to "violations of

law.
. . .

federal law relative to a retail lease agreement transaction," and
makes no specific reference to any federal statute or law. He
claims that Defendants defrauded him, harassed him, and used
defamatory tactics in connection with the lease of a vehicle. (Rec.
Doc. 1, p. 1) Thus, Plaintiff's complaint raises state law claims
for fraud and possibly defamation, but fails to present any federal
questions.
Nevertheless, on June 20, 2013, two days after the Court
granted Defendants' motions9 and effectively dismissed all of Mr.
Dixon's claims (Rec. Docs. 54, 56, 57), Mr. Dixon filed a "Motion
for Resicion [sic] of Dismissal Order," (Rec. Doc. 60), in which he
essentially seeks to amend his complaint to assert claims against
Defendants under the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1691
("TILA") and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA"), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1691-1691f. (Rec. Doc. 60) However, the Court declines to allow
Plaintiff to amend his complaint, because (a) Plaintiff has had
several months to amend his complaint to identify the federal law
providing the grounds for relief, and (b) Plaintiff's proposed
amendments will only create federal claims that are immaterial or

9

See supra "PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND FACTS."

10

insubstantial, and thus, insufficient to create federal question
jurisdiction. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1945) (A dismissal for
failure to state a claim is a dismissal on the merits rather than
a jurisdictional dismissal, unless the "alleged claim under the
Constitution or federal statutes clearly appears to be immaterial
and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or where
such a claim is wholly insubstantial and frivolous."); Williamson,
645 F.2d at 416 (The general rule that a claim cannot be dismissed
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because of the absence of
a federal cause of action is subject to an exception for cases in
which the federal claim is clearly immaterial or insubstantial.")
Here, Plaintiff's purported TILA claim is insubstantial and
frivolous as it is apparent from Plaintiff's complaint and its
attachments that the transaction at issue is outside of TILA's
scope. Congress's stated purpose in enacting TILA was to assure
meaningful disclosure of the "terms of leases of personal property
for personal, family, or household purposes." 15 U.S.C. § 1601.
Consistent with Congress's limited purpose to assure disclosure of
the "terms of leases of personal property for personal, family, or
household

purposes,"

TILA

identifies

certain

categories

of

transactions that are exempt from its disclosure requirements,
including, inter alia, "[c]redit transactions involving extensions
of credit primarily for business, commercial, or agricultural
purposes,

or

to

government

or

11

governmental

agencies

or

instrumentalities, or to organizations." Id. § 1603(1) (emphasis
added). The pertinent TILA provisions in this case are in Part E,
which requires "lessors" to make certain disclosures in connection
with "consumer leases," and provides that "[a]ny lessor who fails
to comply with any requirement imposed under section 1667a or 1667b
of this title with respect to any person is liable to such person
as provided in section 1640 of this title." Id. §§ 1667a(1)-(11),
1667d(a). However, the term "consumer lease" in Part E is also
defined to specifically exclude a lease to an "organization." Id.
§ 1667(1). The statute defines the term "organization" as "a
corporation, government or governmental subdivision or agency,
trust, estate, partnership, cooperative, or association." Id. §
1602(c)(emphasis added).
Here, it is evident from Plaintiff's complaint and attachments
that the lease was exempt from TILA's disclosure requirements,
because (1) it the was not for personal, family, or household use
and (2) it constituted a lease to an "organization" within the
meaning TILA Sections 1667(1) and 1603(1). Plaintiff's repeated
allegations that he entered the lease on behalf of his non-profit
corporation, DELF, Inc. and that the transaction should have been
tax-exempt, because DELF, Inc. is a 501(c)(3) non-profit are
inconsistent

with

TILA's

requirement

that

the

lease

be

for

personal, family, or household purposes. Moreover, it is clear from
(a) Plaintiff's allegations and (b) the document Plaintiff attached

12

to his original complaint that DELF, Inc., an "organization" within
the meaning of Sections 1667(1) and 1603(1), was a lessee, and that
the

transaction

at

issue

was,

therefore,

a

lease

to

an

"organization," which falls outside of the scope of TILA. In
addition, the document that Plaintiff attached to his complaint
states that the vehicle was primarily to be used for "business,
agricultural or commercial" purposes (Rec. Doc. 1, p. 5), placing
the transaction squarely outside of TILA's scope.
Second,

Plaintiff's

ECOA

claim

that

the

Defendants

discriminated against him on the basis of race, age, and religion
is frivolous. "The ECOA prohibits discrimination against credit
applicants 'on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin,
sex or marital status . . .'" Bhandari v. First Nat. Bank of
Commerce, 808 F.2d 1082, 1100 (5th Cir. 1987). "To establish a
prima facie case of discrimination under the ECOA, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) that
he applied for and was qualified for a loan/credit; (3) despite his
qualifications,

plaintiff's

loan

application

was

denied

or

plaintiff was denied credit; (4) the lender continued to approve
loans for applicants with qualifications similar to those of the
plaintiff. Curley v. JP Morgan Chase Bank NA., No. 05-1304, 2007 WL
1343793, at *4 (W.D. La. May 7, 2007) (citations omitted). Given
that Plaintiff does not allege that he was denied credit, as
required

under

the

third

element,

13

his

attempt

to

amend

his

complaint to state an ECOA claim would be futile. Thus, for the
foregoing reasons, the Court finds (a) that Plaintiff should not be
permitted to amend his complaint to attempt to state federal
claims, and (b) that it lacks federal question jurisdiction over
this action.
B. Diversity of Citizenship
Plaintiff

has

not

satisfied

his

burden

of

establishing

complete diversity. Over the past several months, he failed to
plead

the

citizenship

of

any

of

the

parties

to

the

action.

Moreover, Plaintiff has provided the Court with two New Orleans
addresses, asserts that the transaction at issue occurred at the
Lakeside Toyota dealership located in Metairie, Louisiana, and
named Mr. Campise, the General Manager of the Lakeside Toyota
dealership
likely

that

as a Defendant. Considering these facts, it is highly
Plaintiff

and

Mr.

Campise

are

both

citizens

of

Louisiana for diversity purposes and that complete diversity is
lacking. Moreover, the Court notes with respect to the amount in
controversy, that Plaintiff has requested compensatory damages at
the rate of $1,000.00 per day and punitive damages at the rate of
$1,000.00 per day, since December 22, 2010. (Rec. Doc. 1, p. 4)
Thus, Plaintiff claims he is entitled to an ever-increasing amount
of damages that is, at present, in excess of one million dollars.
In spite of Plaintiff's fanciful damages claim, it appears
that the amount in controversy is well below the jurisdictional

14

threshold of $75,000.00, given that (a) Plaintiff is proceeding pro
se and has not incurred any attorneys' fees; (b) the parties'
dispute centers around a sales and use tax that constitutes
$1,689.90 of an approximately $20,000.00 Toyota Corolla lease, and
(c) Plaintiff has failed to identify any Louisiana statute under
which he is entitled to punitive damages. Ricard v. State, 390 So.
2d 882 (La. 1980) (Under Louisiana law, punitive damages are only
available if specifically provided for by statute). Thus, the Court
finds that Plaintiff has failed to adequately plead subject matter
jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-captioned action is
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 17th day of July, 2013.

CARL J. BARBIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

15