Dixon v. Toyota Motor Credit Corporation et al

Filing 87

ORDER & REASONS: granting 83 Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) (Civil Action No. 12-2150, Rec. Doc. 83) is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all of Plaintiffs' claims against Toyota are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 4/10/14. (Reference: 14-07)(sek)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DIXON

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 12-2150
c/w 14-7

TOYOTA MOTOR CREDIT
CORPORATION, ET AL

SECTION: J

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6)

filed

by

Defendant

Toyota

Motor

Credit

Corporation

("Toyota") (Civil Action No. 12-2150, Rec. Doc. 83), as well as an
Opposition filed by Plaintiff Landry Dixon ("Dixon") (Rec. Doc.
85). Having considered the motion, the parties’ submissions, the
record, and the applicable law, the Court finds, for the reasons
expressed below, that the Motion to Dismiss should be GRANTED.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

1

On August 27, 2012, in Civil Action No. 12-2150, Dixon filed
suit against Toyota and Troy Campise, a sales manager at Toyota,
alleging that they defrauded him and his corporation, DELF, Inc.
("DELF"), in connection with an automobile lease, thereby violating
state and federal law. Dixon has repeatedly claimed that he entered
into the automobile lease on behalf of DELF as its registered agent

1

For a complete recitation of the facts of this case, see the Court's
Order and Reasons of July 17, 2013 (Civil Action No. 12-2150, Rec. Doc. 64).

1

and chief executive officer.
The Court raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction sua
sponte and dismissed Dixon's complaint with prejudice for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. (Civil Action No. 12-2150, Rec. Doc.
64). Specifically, the Court found that there was no basis for
federal question jurisdiction under the Truth in Lending Act
(TILA)because the lease was not for personal, family, or household
use and because it constituted a lease to an organization, and
therefore the requirements of TILA were not met.2 The Court entered
a final judgment in favor of Toyota and against Dixon. (Civil
Action No. 12-2150, Rec. Doc. 65).
On January 6, 2014, in Civil Action No. 14-7, Dixon filed a
second complaint against Toyota, making substantially the same
allegations

and

alleging

a

violation

of

the

Consumer

Credit

Protection Act, found in 15 U.S.C. § 1667, et seq. This newly-filed
action was consolidated with Civil Action No. 12-2150 (Civil Action
No. 12-2150, Rec. Doc. 76), and Toyota filed the instant motion to
dismiss on March 18, 2014.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal
where a plaintiff fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.”

FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).

2

When considering a motion to

Additionally, the Court found that Plaintiff failed to state a federal
claim under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) and also failed to establish
diversity jurisdiction.

2

dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept all wellpled facts as true and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor
of the plaintiff.

Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228,

232-33 (5th Cir. 2009); Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir.
1996).

The Court is not bound, however, to accept as true legal

conclusions couched as factual allegations.

Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff
must plead enough facts “to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

A claim is facially

plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts that allow the court to
“draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.”

Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

In order to be deemed legally sufficient, a complaint must
establish more than a “sheer possibility” that the plaintiff's
claims are true.

Id.

The complaint must contain enough factual

allegations to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will
reveal evidence of each element of the plaintiff's claim. Lormand,
565 F.3d at 255-57.

If there are insufficient factual allegations

to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, or if it is
apparent

from

the

face

of

the

complaint

that

there

is

an

insuperable bar to relief, however, the claim must be dismissed.
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555;
3

Carbe v. Lappin, 492 F.3d 325, 328 n.9 (5th Cir. 2007).
DISCUSSION
The Court finds that Dixon has failed to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted under 15 U.S.C. § 1667, et seq. These
sections explicitly apply only to "consumer leases," which are
leases

for

the

use

of

personal

property

by

natural

people,

primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. 15 U.S.C. §
1667(1)

(2010).

automobile

lease

This
at

Court
issue

has
was

already
not

for

determined
personal,

that

the

family,

or

household use and that it was a lease to an organization, not a
natural person. Therefore, Dixon has failed to state a claim under
15 U.S.C. § 1667, et seq., and his complaint should be dismissed
with prejudice.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6) (Civil Action No. 12-2150, Rec. Doc. 83) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all of Plaintiffs' claims against
Toyota are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 10th day of April, 2014.

________________________________
CARL J. BARBIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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