Warrior Energy Services Corporation et al v. ATP TITAN M/V et al

Filing 40

ORDER AND REASONS granting defendants' motion 16 to dismiss both defendants. Because the Court has found that it cannot exercise in rem jurisdiction over the ATP TITAN, plaintiffs' motions 5 6 12 are moot. Signed by Chief Judge Sarah S. Vance on 4/22/13. (jjs, ) Modified on 4/22/2013 (jjs, ).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
WARRIOR ENERGY SERVICES
CORPORATION ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 12-2297

ATP TITAN, in rem, AND ATP
TITAN, LLC, in personam

SECTION: R

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction.1 Also before the Court are plaintiffs’ motions
to deem in rem jurisdiction perfected2 or, in the alternative, to
issue a warrant for arrest3 and to appoint a consent guardian.4
For the following reasons, the Court grants defendants’ motion to
dismiss and denies plaintiffs’ motions as moot.

I.

BACKGROUND
This dispute stems from fees allegedly owed to plaintiffs

for tools and services provided to the ATP TITAN, a floating
production facility moored approximately 65 miles offshore of
Louisiana in a production field owned by ATP Oil and Gas. Six
plaintiffs, Warrior Energy Services Corporation, Fastorq LLC;

1

R. Doc. 16.

2

R. Doc. 12.

3

R. Doc. 5.

4

R. Doc. 6.

Stabil Drill Specialties LLC, Workstrings International LLC, and
Superior Energy Services, LLC d/b/a Superior Completion Services,
contend that they provided supplies and services to the ATP
TITAN, the costs of which have not been paid by ATP Titan, a
limited liability company that owns the platform.5 Plaintiffs
filed suit on September 17, 2012, asserting maritime liens
against the ATP TITAN and state law privileges in the alternative
against ATP Titan, in personam, and the ATP TITAN, in rem.6
Plaintiffs do not assert claims against ATP Oil and Gas, the
company that operates the platform and contracted with plaintiffs
for supplies and services. ATP Oil and Gas is presently in
bankruptcy proceedings. Plaintiffs also seek a declaratory
judgment that the ATP TITAN is a vessel and that they have valid
liens in the amount of $2,189,424.86, in addition to pre-judgment
and post-judgment interest.7
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction on the grounds that the ATP TITAN is not a vessel
but a floating production platform, thus depriving the Court of
in rem jurisdiction over the ATP TITAN.8 The parties then moved
for an extension of deadlines to permit plaintiffs to conduct

5

R. Doc. 1.

6

R. Doc. 1 at 8.

7

Id. at 9.

8

R. Doc. 16.
2

limited jurisdictional discovery on the issue of whether the ATP
TITAN is a vessel.9 The Court heard oral argument on defendants'
motion to dismiss on March 26, 2013.

II.

IN REM JURISDICTION
A. Standard
The first issue before the Court is whether the ATP TITAN is

a vessel. Unless it is, plaintiffs have no maritime liens for the
provision of necessaries to the ATP TITAN, and seizure of the ATP
TITAN is not a basis for maritime in rem jurisdiction. Under 46
U.S.C.A. § 31342(a), "a person providing necessaries to a vessel
on the owner’s order or on the order of an authorized person . .
. has a maritime lien on the vessel." Further, Rule C of the
Supplemental Rules for Admiralty and Maritime Claims provides
that an action in rem may be brought to enforce a maritime lien
by the arrest of a vessel. Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. C(1)(a).
Therefore, absent vessel status, plaintiffs have no maritime
claims against the ATP TITAN that can support the exercise of in
rem jurisdiction in admiralty. See Effjohn Int'l Cruise Holdings,
Inc. v. A&L Sales, Inc., 346 F.3d 552, 556 (5th Cir. 2003)
("Non-maritime claims are not within admiralty jurisdiction and
may not be enforced in an in rem proceeding."); Maritrend, Inc.
v. M/V Sebes, No. 96-3140, 1997 WL 660614, at *2 (E.D. La. Oct.
9

R. Doc. 19.
3

23, 1997). (Maritime Lien Act permits civil action against vessel
based on "fiction that the vessel is a distinct entity that is
statutorily liable for its own debts”).
B.

Characteristics of the ATP TITAN

The ATP TITAN is a triple-column, deep-draft, floating
production facility.10 It is moored in over 4000 feet of water in
a production field owned by ATP Oil and Gas.11 The ATP TITAN
serves as a production hub for the fields nearby, and several
wells are connected by top-tensioned production risers and
surface trees at the surface of the facility.12 In November 2009,
the ATP TITAN was floated out and wet towed on its side and was
fully installed by March 2010.13 Its hull floats at a draft of
430 feet on three columns.14 The ATP TITAN has features such as a
wave-rider hull, navigational lights, life boats, crew quarters,
and an onboard generator and drinking-water plant.15 It also has
hydrocarbon processing equipment to separate oil, gas and water,
pumps to transport oil production into an oil export line, and

10

R. Doc. 16-2 at 2.

11

Id. at 1-2.

12

Id. at 2

13

R. Doc. 16-2 at 3.

14

Id. at 2.

15

R. Doc. 26-33 at 21-25.
4

gas compressors to transport gas production.16 At one time, the
ATP TITAN had aboard the Nabors 202 drilling rig, owned by a
third party.17 The ATP TITAN is classified by the American Bureau
of Shipping as an "A1 Floating Offshore Installation" and as an
"Industrial Vessel" by the Coast Guard, which performs
inspections of the structure.18 The design of the ATP TITAN is
subject to a patent in which the structure is described as "a
deep draft partially submersible and buoyant floating vessel
comprised of at least three independent vertical columns."19
Although it is buoyant, the ATP TITAN is securely moored to
the floor of the Outer Continental Shelf by twelve moorings
connected to mooring piles that are embedded over 205 feet into
the sea floor and weigh over 170 tons each.20 The structure is
also stabilized by flowlines, umbilicals, and pipeline systems.21
It has no means of self-propulsion but can reposition itself over
wells by manipulating its mooring lines.22 The ATP TITAN has not
been moved since 2010, and ATP Oil and Gas states that it will

16

R. Doc. 16

17

R. Doc. 30-1 at 17.

18

Id. at 9; R. Doc 30-5 at 3.

19

R. Doc. 26-14.

20

R. Doc. 16-2 at 3.

21

Id at 4.

22

Id.; R. Doc. 30-12.
5

not be moved until the surrounding fields are no longer
productive, estimated to be in five to eight years.23 The
structure has an expected life of roughly 40 years.24 To move the
ATP TITAN to a new location will take approximately 15-29 weeks
after 12 months of preparation and will cost between $70 and $80
million.25 Before being towed, the ATP TITAN will have to be
decommissioned and its moorings, well risers, pipelines,
umbilicals, and production infrastructure disconnected.26
B.

Vessel status of offshore structures

The statutory definition of a vessel includes “every
description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used,
or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water.”
1 U.S.C. § 3. Within this general definition, courts have
analyzed the vessel status of various types of offshore
structures. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has addressed the
distinction between vessels and other facilities used in offshore
oil and gas operations on more than one occasion.27 In Fields v.

23

R. Doc. 16-2 at 4.

24

R. Doc. 26-5.

25

R. Doc. 16-2 at 4-5; R. Doc. 30-2 (report estimating
decommissioning and redeployment costs at $ 78.5 million).
26

R. Doc. 16-2 at 4.

27

Although most of the cases concerned claims under the
Jones Act, the Court finds that the analysis of whether a
structure is a vessel is applicable in the context of maritime
liens. See, e.g, Crimson Yachts v. Betty Lyn II Motor Yacht, 603
6

Pool Offshore, Inc., for example, the Fifth Circuit set forth
criteria by which to determine the vessel status of a spar,
namely whether the structure was constructed to serve primarily
as a work platform, is moored, and its transportation function
does not go “beyond theoretical mobility and occasional
incidental movement.” 182 F.3d 353, 358 (5th Cir. 1999). The
court held that the spar at issue, which was elaborately secured
to the ocean floor, had a range of motion limited to 250 feet in
any direction, and would not be moved until the field it
supported was no longer productive, qualified as a work platform
rather than a vessel. Id.
The Fifth Circuit recently revisited the issue of which
offshore structures constitute vessels in Mendez v. Anadarko
Petroleum Corporation. 466 Fed. Appx. 316, 318 (5th Cir. 2012),
cert. denied, No. 11-1525, 2013 WL 215501 (Jan. 22, 2013). In
assessing whether the Red Hawk, a floating gas-production spar,
was a vessel, the Fifth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's
holding in Stewart v. Dutra Construction Co., 543 U.S. 481
(2005), that a vessel is “any watercraft practically capable of
maritime transportation, regardless of its primary purpose or
state of transit at a particular moment.” Id. at 318. The court
found that because the Red Hawk was permanently affixed to the
sea floor and could be moved only at great cost after detaching

F.3d 864, 872 (11th Cir. 2010).
7

its moorings and severing its pipelines, the spar was
"theoretically capable of maritime transport but not practically
capable." Id. at 319. Accordingly, the court held that the Red
Hawk was not a vessel. Id. at 318-19.
The ATP TITAN and the Red Hawk share many of the same
features. For example, like the ATP TITAN, the Red Hawk was
identified as an industrial vessel on its Coast Guard Certificate
of Inspection, which also listed the number of "seamen" on
board.28

The Coast Guard's inspection of a structure does not

establish that it is a vessel, since the Coast Guard has
jurisdiction to inspect Outer Continental Shelf facilities and
mobile offshore drilling units, in addition to vessels.29
Further, although the ATP TITAN has maritime design elements,
such as buoyancy, life boats, navigational lights, a wave-rider
hull, an onboard generator, and crew quarters, the Fifth Circuit
noted in Mendez that the shape of the Red Hawk’s hull could
facilitate movement, id. at 317; and the district court noted
maritime features such as life boats, No. CIV.A. H-10-1755, 2010
WL 4644049, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 9, 2010). Both courts found
that such characteristics were “consistent with a fixed structure
permanently moored far offshore, not merely with vessel status.”
466 Fed. Appx. 316, 317; 2010 WL 4644049, at *3. The Court

28

R. Doc. 30-5 at 1, 3.

29

R. Doc. 30-10 at 2.
8

similarly finds that these features of the ATP TITAN do not
require a determination that it is a vessel. Rather, these
characteristics reflect the platform’s inaccessibility and need
for self-sufficiency, as well as its position in thousands of
feet of water.
The ATP TITAN does differ from the Red Hawk in its ability
to move laterally and in its design. The Red Hawk could not move
laterally because its mooring lines were permanently taut.
Mendez, 466 Appx. at 317. Conversely, the ATP TITAN can
reposition itself over the wells it sits on up to 200 feet from
its center location by using its anchor lines, although the ATP
TITAN has never been repositioned more than 130 feet.30

Further,

the ATP TITAN has been described as a “first-of-its-kind floating
drilling and production platform that combines the mobility of a
semi-submersible with the stability of a three-column spar.”31 It
is considered a hybrid semi-submersible/spar.32 Semi-submersible
drilling rigs are generally considered vessels, unlike production
platforms or spars. See, e.g., Case v. Omega Natchiqu, Inc., H08-0835, 2008 WL 2714124 (S.D. Tex. July 10, 2008) (holding ATP
Innovator, previously a semi-submersible drilling rig, to be a
non-vessel once it was moored indefinitely).

30

R. Doc. 30-12.

31

R. Doc. 26-6 at 1.

32

R. Doc. 16-2 at 2.
9

In considering the effect of the ATP TITAN's status as a
hybrid semi-submersible/spar, the Court first rejects the notion
that the structure qualifies as a semi-submersible drilling rig
or modular offshore drilling unit. Although the ATP TITAN has
been involved in drilling activities, it does not have a built-in
capacity to drill but rather served as a platform for a drilling
rig at one time.33 That it once had a modular drilling rig, the
Nabors 202, aboard does not convert the entire ATP TITAN into a
semi-submersible drilling rig and therefore a vessel. Moreover,
in characterizing drilling rigs as vessels, the Fifth Circuit has
emphasized the use of the rigs on many different sites in a short
period rather than their drilling functions. See, e.g., Manuel v.
P.A.W. Drilling & Well Serv., Inc., 125 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 1998)
(rig that worked in 19 locations in two years was a vessel);
Blanchard v. Engine & Gas Compressor Svcs. Inc., 575 F.2d 1140,
1143 (5th Cir. 1978) (structure not a vessel that had been moved
from another site but was secured in a way that suggested it
would not be moved on a regular basis like a rig).
Therefore, the relevant inquiry is not whether the ATP TITAN
has drilled but whether its capacity for movement distinguishes
it from the Red Hawk and other structures designated as spars. In
Stewart v. Dutra, which the Fifth Circuit relied on in Mendez,
the Supreme Court held that a non-self-propelled dredge Super

33

R. Doc. 30-4 at 38.
10

Scoop was a vessel. 543 U.S. 481 (2005). The Super Scoop was a
floating platform from which a bucket was suspended beneath the
water to remove silt from the ocean floor. It had a captain,
crew, and navigational lights. Id. at 484-85. Using a limited
means of self-propulsion through its anchors and cables, the
structure moved over water “every couple of hours.” Id. at 485.
The Super Scoop was towed by tugboat for longer distances and was
towed from California to Boston to work on the project at issue.
Id. As discussed above, the Supreme Court held that a watercraft
need not be used primarily for transportation on water to be a
vessel, but its use in this area must be a practical possibility
rather than a merely theoretical one. Id. at 496. The Court
stated that “dredges served a waterborne transportation function,
since in performing their work they carried machinery, equipment,
and crew over water.” Id. at 492. The Super Scoop was stationary
only temporarily and was not permanently anchored during its work
in Boston Harbor. Id. at 496.
By contrast, the ATP TITAN is moored to the floor of the
Outer Continental Shelf by twelve moorings, each of which is
embedded 205 feet into the sea floor and weighs over 170 tons.34
Further, oil and gas are exported from the ATP TITAN through
pipelines, which also stabilize the structure.35 The ATP TITAN

34

R. Doc. 16-2 at 3.

35

Id. at 4; R. Doc. 30-12.
11

has no self-propulsion system, despite its ability to move
laterally using its mooring lines.36 The ATP TITAN is designed to
be floated to its next location,37 and defendants estimate that
it will be relocated in five to eight years when the fields it
supports are exhausted. This endeavor will take approximately 1529 weeks after 12 months of preparation and will cost between $70
and $80 million.38 Conversely, the estimate of moving the Red
Hawk, which its owners did not undertake, was only $42 million.
Mendez, 466 Appx at 317.
Despite the structure’s design allowing it to shift
laterally and to be moved, the Court finds that the ATP TITAN
does not serve a waterborne transportation function in any
practical sense. The dredge at issue in Super Scoop was moved
much more frequently and easily. That the ATP TITAN can be moved
does not qualify it as a vessel, given the enormous expense
associated with its relocation and the extent to which it is
securely attached to the floor of the Outer Continental Shelf in
its role as a production facility. Further, there is no evidence
that the ATP TITAN frequently uses its mooring lines to shift
itself, and in any event, the Fifth Circuit held in Fields that

36

Id. at 4; R. Doc. 30-12.

37

R. Doc. 30-1 at 14.

38

R. Doc. 16-2 at 4-5; R. Doc. 30-2 (report estimating
decommissioning and redeployment costs at $ 78.5 million).
12

the spar at issue was not a vessel, despite its ability to move
up to 250 feet by tightening and slackening its lines. 182 F.3d
at 359; see also Richardson v. Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas Corp., No.
08-1074, 2011 WL 2565315, at *3 (E.D. La. June 28, 2011) (holding
that Stewart did not vitiate the test set forth in Fields, since
a platform’s ability to move 250 feet in the middle of the ocean
does not constitute transportation). Thus, the ATP TITAN
resembles much more closely the spars previously found by courts
in this circuit to be non-vessels than it does the Super Scoop
dredge.39 See, e.g., Mendez, 466 Fed. Appx. at 318-19; Fields,
182 F.3d at 358; Channel v. Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc., No. 01682, 2001 WL 515220 (E.D. La. May 14, 2001) (spar designed to act
as work platform not a vessel).
C.

Impact of Lozman v. City of Riviera

Plaintiffs question the precedential value of the Fifth
Circuit cases cited here in light of the recent Supreme Court
case, Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 133 S. Ct. 735
(2013). In Lozman, the Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh
Circuit's holding that a floating home constituted a vessel,
stating that "a structure does not fall within the scope of this
statutory phrase unless a reasonable observer, looking to the
[structure]’s physical characteristics and activities, would
39

See R. Doc. 28-8 (chart comparing the features of the
ATP TITAN to other structures held not to be vessels by courts
within the Fifth Circuit).
13

consider it designed to a practical degree for carrying people or
things over water.” Id. at 741. Defendants argue that the Lozman
decision is inapplicable here given the clear precedent of the
Fifth Circuit, since the Supreme Court stated that its decision
would assist courts in "borderline cases where 'capacity' to
transport over water is in doubt." Id. at 745.

In any event, the

Court finds that the holding of Lozman supports its conclusion
that the ATP TITAN is not a vessel.
In holding that the floating home did not qualify as a
vessel, the Court emphasized that a vessel must be practically,
not just theoretically, capable of carrying people or things over
water. Id. at 741. In considering the characteristics of the
floating home, the Court stated:
But for the fact that it floats, nothing about Lozman's
home suggests that it was designed to any practical
degree to transport persons or things over water. It
had no rudder or other steering mechanism. Its hull was
unraked, and it had a rectangular bottom 10 inches
below the water . . . . Prior to its arrest, that
home's travel by tow over water took place on only four
occasions over a period of seven years. And when the
home was towed a significant distance in 2006, the
towing company had a second boat follow behind to
prevent the home from swinging dangerously from side to
side.
Id. at 741 (citations omitted).
The ATP TITAN has not moved locations since it was fully
installed in March 2010, and its eventual relocation will require

14

a massive expenditure of money and manpower.40 It is true that
the Court in Lozman cited the lateral movement of the Super Scoop
in distinguishing the floating home's capacity for movement. Id.
at 742. Yet, not only was the Super Scoop much more mobile that
the ATP TITAN in moving from site to site, but it also moved
around on its moorings every few hours, activity noted by the
Court in Lozman. Id. (quoting Stewart, 543 U.S. at 485).
Conversely, there is no evidence in the record that the ATP TITAN
makes such frequent use of its mooring lines to reposition itself
over the wells on which it sits.
Further, the Lozman decision reflects the Supreme Court's
rejection of the "anything that floats" approach in an effort to
cabin the definition of a vessel. See Mooney v. W & T Offshore,
No. 12-969, 2013 WL 828308, at *4 (E.D. La. March 6, 2013)
(quoting Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Great. Am. Ins. Co. of N.Y.,
No. 10-1653, 2013 WL 311084, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25,
2013)("Lozman sent a shot across the bow' of those lower courts
whose opinions [could] be read as endorsing the anything floats
approach to determining vessel status."). For this reason, the
Court finds it to be unlikely that the Supreme Court's opinion
would have the effect of invalidating Fifth Circuit precedent
establishing that floating production platforms are not vessels.
The Fifth Circuit opinion that the Supreme Court criticized as

40

R. Doc. 16-2 at 4.
15

endorsing an inappropriate approach is Holmes v. Atlantic
Sounding Company,

437 F.3d 441 (5th Cir. 2006), in which the

Fifth Circuit held that a barge that housed workers was a vessel.
133 S. Ct. at 743. Moreover, after issuing its decision in
Lozman, the Supreme Court denied certiorari to the appellant in
Mendez v. Anadarko Petroleum Corporation, discussed supra, who
sought to overturn the Fifth Circuit's determination that the Red
Hawk was not a vessel. 133 S.Ct. 979 (Jan. 22, 2013).

The denial

of the writ does not establish the Supreme Court's endorsement of
the holding in Mendez. Nevertheless, it is worth noting since the
Supreme Court, that same day, cited Lozman in vacating a judgment
concerning the vessel status of a casino boat. 133 S.Ct 979 (Jan.
22, 2013) (remanding Lemelle v. St. Charles Gaming Company, Inc.,
No. 11-255, 2012 WL 130351 (La. Ct. App. Jan. 4, 2012) (holding
that riverboat casino was not a vessel)). The Court therefore
finds that the Supreme Court has given no indication that its
decision in Lozman disturbed Fifth Circuit precedent and analysis
concerning floating platforms.
Another court in the Eastern District of Louisiana reached a
similar conclusion in Mooney v. W & T Offshore Inc. 2013 WL
828308, at *3-5. The court cited Stewart, Lozman, and Mendez in
holding that the Matterhorn Seastar does not qualify as a vessel.
Id. at *5. The Matterhorn Seastar is a production platform that
has been secured in the same position on the Outer Continental
16

Shelf for ten years. Id. Like the ATP TITAN, it is securely
attached to the seafloor and is not intended to be moved, except
for its positioning within the block on the Outer Continental
Shelf and at the end of the life of the reservoirs it serves. The
court held that its capacity to "be used in maritime
transportation is nothing more than a 'theoretical possibility."
Id. at *6. In analyzing the status of the Mattherhorn Seastar
using the criteria set forth in Lozman, the court noted that its
conclusion was supported by the holding of Mendez and other
district court cases within the Fifth Circuit. Id.
In fact, rather than casting doubt on the ATP TITAN's nonvessel status, Lozman and its emphasis on the impressions of a
reasonable observer reinforce the Court's determination that the
ATP TITAN is not a vessel.41 A reasonable observer, in
considering the infrastructure affixing the ATP TITAN to its
present location, its function as a production platform, the way
in which it was brought to its current location, and the enormous
expense anticipated if it is moved, would likely find that the
ATP TITAN is not practically capable of carrying people or things

41

The Court rejects plaintiffs’ contention that because
earlier cases within the Fifth Circuit assessed structural design
and thus considered in part the subjective intent of the
structures’ owners, the cases are no longer persuasive authority.
In any event, the Court does not base its conclusion on any one
such case but rather the body of precedent, in addition to the
Supreme Court decisions discussed in depth.
17

over water.42 That a manual exists detailing how the ATP TITAN
can be moved in an emergency is consistent with this
conclusion,43 for if a structure will be moved only in an
emergency or in several years when there are no longer
surrounding activities to support, it does not serve as a means
of transportation over water. Further, defendants’ relocation
manual, which discusses how the platform would be moved and
states that crew would be present during the eventual tow, is
insufficient to show that the ATP TITAN will perform marine
transport functions in any practical sense.44
The Court thus finds that the ATP TITAN does not qualify as
a vessel. Accordingly, plaintiffs have not met their burden in
demonstrating that the Court may exercise in rem admiralty
jurisdiction over the ATP TITAN. See Lozman, 133 S.Ct. at 745.
(“A court’s jurisdiction, e.g., admiralty jurisdiction, may turn
on application of the term ‘vessel.’”).

The Maritime Lien Act,

under which a civil action may be brought against a vessel is
“premised on the fiction that the vessel is a distinct entity
that is statutorily liable for its own debts.” Maritrend, Inc. v.
M/V Sebes, No. 96-3140, 1997 WL 660614, at *2 (E.D. La. Oct. 23,

42

See, e.g., R. Docs. 26-6; 26-7; 30-3 (images depicting
the ATP TITAN's structure and the way in which it was towed to
its present location).
43

R. Doc. 26-23.

44

R. Doc. 26-22.
18

1997). Because plaintiffs point to no other law that would allow
the Court to exercise jurisdiction over the ATP TITAN as a
defendant, the Court finds that the ATP TITAN must be dismissed
from the case.

III. MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AGAINST ATP
TITAN, LLC
A. Standard
When a defendant attacks the complaint because it fails to
state a legally cognizable claim, Rule 12(b)(6) provides the
appropriate challenge. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss, the plaintiff must plead enough facts “to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129
S.Ct. 1937, 1960 (2009)(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when the
plaintiff pleads facts that allow the court to “draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. at 1949. A court must accept all wellpleaded facts as true and must draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the plaintiff. Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d
228, 239 (5th Cir. 2009); Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th
Cir. 1996). But the Court is not bound to accept as true legal
conclusions couched as factual allegations. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at
1949.
19

B. Discussion
Defendant ATP Titan, LLC does not argue that it is not
subject to the Court’s jurisdiction. Rather, it asserts that
plaintiffs have failed to state a claim on which relief may be
granted. Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that the ATP
TITAN is a vessel and that they have valid maritime liens against
the vessel.45 Such relief is barred by the Court’s determination
that the ATP TITAN is not a vessel. Further, although plaintiffs
provided supplies and services to the platform, which ATP Titan,
LLC owns, plaintiffs executed contracts for this work with ATP
Oil and Gas, not ATP Titan, LLC.46 In fact, during the oral
argument held on March 26, 2013, plaintiffs' counsel conceded
that if the Court finds that the ATP TITAN is not a vessel,
plaintiffs have no remaining claims against defendants.
Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiffs have failed to state
a claim against ATP Titan, LLC.

IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendants’

motion to dismiss both defendants. Because the Court has found
that it cannot exercise in rem jurisdiction over the ATP TITAN,

45

R. Doc. 1 at 9.

46

R. Doc. 16-3.
20

plaintiffs’ motions to deem in rem jurisdiction perfected and to
issue an arrest warrant are moot.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this22nd day of April, 2013.
__

_________________________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

21