Landry v. Social Security Administration

Filing 24

ORDER & REASONS re: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 21 . ORDERED that the Magistrate's 21 Report and Recommendations is ADOPTED and MODIFIED as set forth in document. FURTHER ORDERED that the Commissioner's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED and that the plaintiff's complaint be and is hereby DISMISSED. Signed by Judge Helen G. Berrigan on 10/11/13.(plh, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAUREN LANDRY

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 12-2489

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

SECTION “C” (3)

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation [Rec. Doc. 21], on
the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment [Rec. Docs. 16, 20]. Having considered the
petition, the record, the applicable law, the Report and Recommendation, and the plaintiff's
objections thereto [Rec. Doc. 22], the Court hereby approves the Magistrate Judge's Findings and
Recommendation and adopts it as its opinion, as added to and modified below.
The plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge's alleged failure to consider and order
appropriate relief based on a report submitted by Dr. Daren Parsa [Rec. Doc. 16-2, p. 1-5]. The
Magistrate Judge correctly noted that the report, created well after the Administrative Law Judge
["ALJ"] rendered his benefits determination, could only warrant a remand for additional findings
of fact. The Magistrate Judge further noted correctly that the standard for remand in review of
adverse benefit determinations is the presentation of new, material evidence, with good cause shown
for failure to incorporate the evidence into the record of the prior proceeding. Leggett v. Chater, 67

F.3d 558, 567 (5th Cir. 1995). Materiality has a timing element, which requires that the new
evidence relate to the time period for which benefits were denied. Latham v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 482,
483 (5th Cir. 1994); Johnson v. Heckler, 767 F.2d 180, 183 (5th Cir.1985). In this case, the ALJ
denied benefits for the period beginning at the claimed date of onset, November 1, 1992, and ending
on the date of its decision, August 5, 2011. Rec. Doc. 11, p. 22.
The Magistrate Judge concluded that Dr. Parsa's report failed to meet the timing requirement
because, "although the report does not indicate when Parsa began his treatment of plaintiff, it lists
December 10, 2012 as the most recent treatment date - approximately 16 months after the date of
the ALJ's decision." Rec. Doc. 21, p. 9. The Plaintiff argues that this determination was erroneous
because record documents indicate that Dr. Parsa had already begun treatment of the plaintiff on
June 9, 2011 - within the period for which benefits were denied. Rec. Doc. 22, p. 2.
The plaintiff nevertheless fails to satisfy the requirements for remand. The record document
that shows that Dr. Parsa began treatment while plaintiff's benefits application was pending is a letter
by Dr. Parsa listing diagnoses - mood disorder not otherwise specified, impulse control disorder not
otherwise specified, and borderline intellectual functioning - and treatment regimen - prescription
medicine and counseling. Rec. Doc. 11, p. 315. The ALJ had access to this information in reaching
his decisions and elicited information from the plaintiff and her mother about her medication and
care under Dr. Parsa. Rec. Doc. 11, p. 362. Moreover, the Appeals Council reviewed additional
records relating to the plaintiff's care under Dr. Parsa, dating back to before the ALJ reached a
decision, and determined that the records did not "provide a basis for changing the [ALJ's] decision."
Rec. Doc. 11, p. 7.
The plaintiff now argues that Dr. Parsa's December 10, 2012 evaluation [Rec. Doc. 16-2]

constitutes new, material evidence, the omission of which was justified by good cause. However,
to the extent that the evaluation provides new information about the plaintiff's condition, it lends
itself to the interpretation that the symptoms referred to are "the result of the deterioration of a
condition that was not previously disabling." Leggett, 67 F.3d at 567. Dr. Parsa's diagnoses
expanded from what was listed in his June 9, 2011 letter, to include bipolar disorder not otherwise
specified. The plaintiff's drug treatment regimen also changed to include 200 mg of Seroquel daily.
The plaintiff's counseling regimen also changed and/or intensified.
In light of the foregoing, the ALJ cannot be blamed for his failure to consider a synergy of
psychiatric conditions that include bipolar disorder in determining whether the plaintiff was
disabled. There was no bipolar diagnosis for the ALJ to consider. This fact forecloses any merit to
the plaintiff's claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 405(G).
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation [Rec. Doc. 21] is
ADOPTED and MODIFIED as described above.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Commissioner's Motion for Summary Judgment is
GRANTED, the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED and that the plaintiff's
complaint be and is hereby DISMISSED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 11th day October, 2013.

_________________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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