Nola Spice Designs, LLC v. Haydel Enterprises, Inc.
Filing
102
ORDER & REASONS granting Nola Spice Designs, LLC and Raquel Duarte's 80 Motion in Limine. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 8/12/2013. (gbw, )
Nola Spice Designs, LLC v. Haydel Enterprises, Inc.
Doc. 102
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
NOLA SPICE DESIGNS, LLC
CIVIL ACTION
NO: 12-2515
versus
HAYDEL ENTERPRISES d/b/a
HAYDEL'S BAKERY
SECTION: āJā (2)
ORDER & REASONS
Before the Court is Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant Nola
Spice Design, LLC and Third Party Defendant Raquel Duarte's Motion
in Limine (Rec. Doc. 80) and Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff
Haydel Enterprises d/b/a Haydel's Bakery's opposition thereto (Rec.
Doc. 94).
This motion is set for hearing, with oral argument, on
August 14, 2013; however, the Court determined that the motion can
be decided on the briefs in anticipation of the upcoming oral
argument on other pending motions in this matter. After considering
the
motions
and
memoranda
of
counsel,
the
record,
and
the
applicable law, the Court finds that the motion should be GRANTED
for the reasons set forth more fully below.
This matter arises from claims of trademark and copyright
infringement stemming from the creation and sale of "Bead Dog"
merchandise. After receiving a cease-and-desist letter from Haydel
Enterprises ("Haydel"), Nola Spice Design, LLC
("Nola Spice")
filed for a declaratory judgment that it was not infringing on the
trademarks of Haydel, among other claims. Haydel answered the
Dockets.Justia.com
complaint by asserting counterclaims of copyright and trademark
infringement, along with other claims, against Nola Spice and Third
Party Defendant Raquel Duarte ("Duarte"), the sole member of Nola
Spice. The trial of this matter is set for October 7, 2013 with a
jury.
In the present motion in limine, Nola Spice and Duarte seek to
exclude the expert testimony of Molly Buck Richard ("Ms. Richard"),
expert for Haydel. Nola Spice and Duarte argue that Ms. Richard's
testimony should be excluded because it is not based on anything
other than an attorney's review of the evidence. Nola Spice and
Duarte contend that such expert testimony offers no aid to the
factfinder and merely states legal conclusions that a jury could
come to, and should come to, on their own.
Even though Federal Rule of Evidence 704(a) states that
"testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise
admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate
issue to be decided by the trier of fact, "the rule does not allow
a witness to give legal conclusions." Pichon v. Murphy Oil, U.S.A.,
Inc., 00-2355, 2002 WL 31761556 (E.D. La. Dec. 6, 2002) (citing
FED. R. EV. 704(a) and Owen v. Kerr McGee Corp., 698 F.2d 236, 240
(5th Cir.1983)). Further, expert opinions that speak to "issues
within the common knowledge, experience, and understanding of the
average lay juror" are unhelpful to the factfinder. Araujo v.
Treasure Chest Casino, 97-3043, 1999 WL 219771 (E.D. La. Apr. 14,
1999) (holding that, in a Jones Act case, an expert's "opinions are
doubly objectionable because he draws legal conclusions and even
uses terms such as 'negligence,' 'unseaworthiness,' and 'seaman.'")
If an expert's opinion will "bring to the jury no more than the
lawyers can offer in argument and through presentation of fact
witnesses," it should be excluded. Id.; see also Pichon, 2002 WL
31761556 (excluding expert opinion that "would supply the jury with
no information other than the expert's view of how its verdict
should read."); see also Radiofone, Inc. v. Pricecellular Corp.,
91-4306, 1992 WL 395207 (E.D. La. Dec. 11, 1992) (holding that,
where the ultimate question is whether a contract was formed,
"testimony
cannot
include
any
comment
or
opinion
on
the
requirements of contract formation under Louisiana law or the
application of Louisiana law to the facts of this case").
Haydel opposes this motion, citing to cases wherein attorneys
were allowed to offer expert opinions and arguing that such
opinions and legal conclusions are admissible when they can aid the
factfinder, especially when the issues are in a specialized area of
law. The Court does not find Haydel's argument persuasive.
C.P. Interests, Inc. v. California Pools, Inc., 238 F.3d 690,
698 (5th Cir. 2001), cited by Haydel, is not directly on point with
the current matter.
While it is true that, in that case, the court
allowed a trademark attorney to testify as an expert, the court's
decision was not as cut-and-dry as Haydel suggests. In that case,
the court held that, though the expert arguably testified to legal
conclusions, any possible error in allowing the testimony was
tempered by the facts that (a) much of the other evidence proved
the same conclusions, and (b) that the jury interrogatories were
phrased in a way that would prevent "a jury [from leaping] to the
same conclusions advanced by [the expert]." C.P. Interests, Inc. v.
California Pools, Inc., 238 F.3d 690, 698 (5th Cir. 2001).
The same set of facts are not present in the instant case. Ms.
Richard's testimony reads as a nearly verbatim recital of trademark
and copyright issues in this case and could potentially lead a
factfinder to adopt her conclusions. Moreover, Ms. Richard's report
does not simply support the evidence presented in this case, but
rather uses the evidence to render opinions (a)that are directly in
line with Haydel's position, and (b)that the factfinder will be
perfectly capable of making.
In Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 552 (5th Cir.
1981) aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 459 U.S. 375 (1983), also
relied on by Haydel, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision to allow a securities attorney to testify that
specific language on a prospectus was boilerplate language because
his testimony "was based on technical knowledge that would assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
issue."
Id.
This
testimony
was
allowed
to
help
lay
jurors
understand that, even though the language on the prospectus at
issue indicated a high level of risk in the securities, it was
standard industry practice to include it, and therefore did not
make the securities unique from others of the same type.
Without
this language, the jury may have afforded the language too much
weight. In contrast, in the present matter, there are not any
issues that could confuse the jury in such a way. In fact, much of
the analysis in the instant matter requires an inquiry into how the
public perceives the bead dogs, not how an intellectual property
attorney perceives the bead dogs.
Therefore, the Court finds that the expert testimony of Ms.
Richard should be excluded. Her expert report does not include any
opinions that the average lay person could not come to on his or
her own and does not offer any information beyond what the parties
can offer through legal argument and fact witnesses.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Nola Spice Designs, LLC and Raquel Duarte's
Motion in Limine (Rec. Doc. 80) is GRANTED.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 12th day of August, 2013.
____________________________
CARL J. BARBIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
5
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