Mumfrey-Martin et al v. Stolthaven New Orleans, LLC
Filing
52
ORDER AND REASONS Granting 37 Motion to Remand to State Court with respect to cases 12-2543 and 12-2546, and be Denied with respect to case 12-2539. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle. (Reference: all cases)(ijg, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DONNA MUMFREY-MARTIN, ET AL.
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 12-2539 c/w
12-2543,12-2546
Pertains to All Cases
STOLTHAVEN NEW ORLEANS, L.L.C.,
& PHILIP WATT
SECTION "B"(2)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before
Plaintiffs'
Defendants
the
Joint
Court
in
Motion
Stolthaven
this
to
New
consolidated
Remand
Orleans,
and
LLC
matter
supporting
and
are
the
memoranda,
Phillip
Watt's
Opposition, Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum, and Defendants' Sur-Reply
Memorandum.(Rec. Docs. No. 37, 37-1, 40, 43, & 50).
Accordingly,
and for the reasons articulated below,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Remand be GRANTED with
respect to cases 12-2543 and 12-2546, and be DENIED with respect to
case 12-2539.
Procedural History and Facts of the Case:
This case arises from a chemical spill caused during Hurricane
Isaac.
Stolthaven New Orleans, LLC, ("Stolthaven") stores toxic
chemicals at its Braithwaite facility in Plaquemine Parish. (Rec.
Doc. No. 1-1). Shortly after Isaac hit land on or about August 29,
2012, levees allegedly maintained by Defendant Plaquemine Parish
failed to withstand the surge, causing the release of thousands of
gallons of toxic chemicals from the Braithwaite Facility into
surrounding commercial and residential neighborhoods. (Rec. Doc.
No. 1-1; Case No. 12-2543, Rec. Doc. No. 1-1; Case No. 12-2546,
Rec. Doc. No. 1-1).
On September 14, 2013, Plaintiffs Jesse Shaffer III, Suzane
Lafrance
Shaffer,
Amanda
"Shaffer
Plaintiffs")
Shaffer,
brought
a
and
class
Jesse
Shaffer
action
suit
II
(the
against
Stolthaven in the 25th Judicial District Court Plaquemines Parish,
asserting claims of negligence, strict liability, nuisance, and
groundwater contamination. (Rec. Doc. No. 9-3; Case No. 12-2543,
Rec. Doc. No. 1-1). Ten days later the Shaffer Plaintiffs asserted
similar claims against Phillip Watt ("Watt"), Stolthaven's terminal
manager, in a Supplemental Petition for Damages. (Case No. 12-2543,
Rec. Doc. No. 1-1).
On September 4, 2013, in a separate suit in the same court,
Plaintiffs Gregory Duhy, Gwen Duhy, Catherine Duhy, Jennifer Duhy,
Michelle Duhy, and Amber Ducote (the "Duhy Plaintiffs") brought
claims for negligence and gross negligence against Stolthaven, the
Plaquemine Parish Government, "Norfolk Railroad," and several
fictitious liability insurance companies. (Case No. 12-2546 Rec.
Doc. No. 1-1).
On October 10, 2012, in yet another suit in the same court,
2
Plaintiffs Donna Mumfrey-Martin, Michael Martin, Michael Jiles, and
Pamela Jiles (the "Martin Plaintiffs") brought class action claims
against
Stolthaven
for
negligence,
seeking
compensatory
and
exemplary damages for loss of property, loss of income, devaluation
of
real
property,
inconvenience,
evacuation
expenses,
stigma
damages, despair, remediation costs, loss of business opportunity,
and other damages to be shown at trial. (Rec. Doc. No. 1-1). The
Martin Plaintiffs named no other defendants besides Stolthaven.
On October 18, 2012, Defendant Stolthaven removed each case to
this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446, contending that
this Court had original diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a). (Rec. Doc. No. 1; Case No. 12-2543, Rec. Doc. No. 1; Case
No. 12-2546, Rec. Doc. No. 1).
The Court consolidated all three
matters on October 29, 2012. (Rec. Doc. No. 8). All plaintiffs1
jointly filed the instant Motion to Remand on June 14, 2012. (Rec.
Doc. No. 37).
Stolthaven
is
a
limited
liability
company
organized
and
existing under Louisiana law. (Rec. Doc. No. 1-1). Stolthaven's
sole member is Stolt-Nielsen USA Inc., a Delaware corporation with
a principal place of business in Connecticut. (Rec. Doc. No. 40-1).
Watt is a domiciliary of the State of Louisiana, as are all
named consolidated plaintiffs. (Rec. Doc. No. 1-1; Case No. 12-
1
Where convenient, the Martin, the Duhy, and the Shaffer Plaintiffs will be
referred to collectively as the "Plaintiffs."
3
2543, Rec. Doc. No. 1-1; Case No. 12-2546, Rec. Doc. No. 1-1).
Law and Analysis:
A. Standard for Remand
A defendant may remove a civil action pending in state court
if the federal court has original jurisdiction over the action. 28
U.S.C. § 1441(a). However, once challenged, the removing defendant
has the burden of establishing facts that would show federal
jurisdiction. Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1335 (5th
Cir.1995). The removing defendant bears the burden of demonstrating
that federal jurisdiction exists and that removal was proper.
Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir.2001). The
removal statute should be strictly construed in favor of remand and
any ambiguities should be construed against removal. Manguno v.
Prudential
Prop.
And
Cas.
Ins.
Co.,
276
F.3d
720,
723
(5th
Cir.2002).
Diversity jurisdiction exists when “the matter in controversy
exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interests and
costs, and is between citizens of different states.” See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332. Where matters have been consolidated, as is the case here,
the Court must separately determine whether jurisdiction lies for
each of the underlying cases. McKenzie v. United States, 678 F.2d
571, 574 (5th Cir. 1982). Accordingly, the issues of diversity and
4
amount
in
controversy
are
addressed
separately,
as
to
each
underlying case, below.
B. Diversity of Parties
Where
jurisdiction
is
sought
under
§1332(a),
"complete
diversity" is required between all plaintiffs and defendants.
McLaughlin v. Mississippi Power Co., 376 F.3d 344, 353 (5th
Cir.2004). In determining diversity, the courts must consider the
citizenship of all defendants, served and unserved, in determining
whether diversity jurisdiction exists. New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Deshotel, 142 F.3d 873, 883-84 (5th Cir.1998). For the purposes of
§
1332(a),
the
citizenship
of
a
LLC
is
determined
by
the
citizenship of all of its members. Harvey v. Grey Wolf Drilling
Co., 542 F.3d 1077, 1080 (5th Cir. 2008). For the same purposes,
local governments are considered citizens of the state in which
they lie. Moor v. Alameda Cnty., 411 U.S. 693, 717 (1973).
1. CITIZENSHIP OF STOLTHAVEN
All Plaintiffs assert claims against Stolthaven, a limited
liability company. In their joint motion to remand, Plaintiffs
argue that Stolthaven is properly considered a citizen of Louisiana
under 28 U.S.C § 1332(d)(10). (Rec. Doc. No. 37-1 at 4-8). In
essence, Plaintiffs claim that the Class Action Fairness Act
("CAFA"),Pub.L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered
5
sections of Title 28, United States Code), requires that limited
liability companies be treated as corporations for determining
diversity in all class actions removed from state court. That is,
Plaintiffs contend that Stolthaven is a citizen of Louisiana, the
state in which it is was formed and has its principal place of
business.(Rec. Doc. No. 37-1 at 4-8). This view misreads the
jurisdictional statute and is without legal support.
It is well-settled that to have "traditional" or "complete"
diversity jurisdiction under § 1332(a), "all persons on one side of
the controversy [must] be citizens of different states than all
persons on the other side." McLaughlin, 376 F.3d at 353.
It is
also well-settled that a limited liability company shares the
citizenship of its members for the purpose of determining diversity
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Harvey v. Grey Wolf Drilling Co., 542 F.3d
1077 (5th Cir. 2008).
CAFA did nothing to alter these well-settled rules. While CAFA
did indeed alter determinations of citizenship of LLC's in certain
circumstances, it did not do so in abrogation of Harvey.
Codified
in part at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), CAFA grants original federal
jurisdiction for all class action claims "in which the matter in
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000" and where "any
member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different
from any defendant." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). In this way, CAFA
lessened diversity requirements and increased amount in controversy
6
requirements for class action suits. And, as Plaintiffs point out,
CAFA deems an unincorporated association a citizen of the state
where it has a principal place of business and under whose laws it
is
organized,
but
this
is
only
for
the
"purposes
of
this
subsection [1332(d)]," and not subsection § 1332(a). 28 U.S.C. §
1332(d)(10)(emphasis added).
Harvey,
like
McLaughlin, states
requirements for jurisdiction under § 1332(a) and not § 1332(d).
Accordingly, where defendants remove under § 1332(a), as Stolthaven
has here, parties must be completely diverse and the citizenship of
a limited liability corporation is determined by the citizenship of
its members.
2. CASE 12-2539
The Martin Plaintiffs name only Stolthaven as a defendant.
Stolthaven is a limited liability company organized and existing
under Louisiana law. (Rec. Doc. No. 1-1). Stolthaven's sole member
is Stolt-Nielsen USA Inc., a Delaware corporation with a principal
place of business in Connecticut. (Rec. Doc. No. 40-1). Stolthaven
is thus a citizen of Delaware and Connecticut for purposes of
diversity. Since all plaintiffs are Louisiana residents(Rec. Doc.
No. 1-1), complete diversity exists in Case No. 12-2539.
3. CASES 12-2546 & 12-2543
As to each the Duhy Plaintiffs and the Shaffer Plaintiffs,
7
Defendants contend that the parties putatively defeating complete
diversity
(Defendants
improperly joined.
Plaquemine
Parish
and
Watt)
have
been
(Rec. Doc. No. 40 at 11-27).
The doctrine of improper joinder "entitle[s] a defendant to
remove to a federal forum unless an in-state defendant has been
properly joined." Smallwood v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 385 F.3d
568, 573 (5th Cir. 2004). Because the doctrine of improper joinder
is a narrow exception to the rule of complete diversity, the burden
of demonstrating improper joinder is a heavy one, belonging to the
removing party. In re 1994 Exxon Chemical Fire, 558 F.3d 378 (5th
Cir. 2009)
Improper joinder can be established in two ways: (1) actual
fraud in the pleading of jurisdictional facts, or (2) a plaintiff's
inability
to
establish
a
viable
claim
against
the
in-state
defendant in state court. Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 573. Defendants do
not dispute that Watt is a Louisiana resident. Accordingly, this
Court need only address the second.
The
Court
may
use
two
different
methods
to
assess
the
viability of plaintiffs' claims against in-state defendants. Id.
First, the Court "may conduct a Rule 12(b)(6)-type analysis,
looking initially at the allegations of the complaint to determine
whether the complaint states a claim under state law against the
in-state defendant." Id. Second, where a plaintiff misstates or
omits discrete facts, the district court may, in its discretion,
8
pierce the pleadings and conduct a summary judgment type inquiry.
Id. This court need not pierce the pleadings, and should decide the
matter by Plaintiffs' ability to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6)
in each underlying case.
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits
a complaint to be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombley, 550 U.S. 544,
552 (2007). In determining a party's ability to state a claim, the
court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and
view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996).
Baker v.
In other words, in order
for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, it must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for
relief that is plausible on its face. Gonzales v. Kay, 577 F.3d
600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009). For a court to determine the plausibility
of a claim, a court is required to draw on its common sense and
experience in a context specific manner.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Here, as to Case No. 12-2543, Defendants contend that the
Shaffer Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against Watt under
Canter v. Koehring Canter v. Koehring Co., 283 So.2d 716 (La.
1973). Under Canter, an employee, "like all persons, has a general
duty to exercise due care so as to avoid injuries to third
persons."
Ford
v.
Elsbury,
32
9
F.3d
931,
935-36
(5th
Cir.
1994)(citing Canter, 283 So.2d at 721(La. 1973)). An employee may
be personally liable for breaching a duty that arises solely from
an employment relationship when (1) the employer owes a duty of
care to the plaintiff, (2) that duty is delegated to the employee,
and (3) the employee breaches that duty through personal fault. Id.
at 936. With regard to personal fault, liability cannot be imposed
on
an
employee
simply
because
of
"general
administrative
responsibility for performance of some function of the employment."
Id. Rather, the employee must breach a distinct, delegated duty,
and that breach must specifically cause plaintiffs' damages. Id.
In the instant case, that Stolthaven owed all Plaintiffs a
duty to safeguard hazardous chemicals stored at the Braithwaite
Facility is not disputed. Defendants contend, however, that the
Shaffer Plaintiffs fail to allege that Watt was delegated a
personal duty and seek to recover only for Watt's failure to
perform "general administrative responsibilities. (Rec. Doc. No. 40
at 13-14).
Contrary
to
these
contentions,
the
Shaffer
Plaintiffs
specifically allege that Stolthaven delegated a personal duty to
Watt and that Watt failed to perform that duty. For instance, the
plaintiffs allege that Watt was "charged with the responsibility
for securing the Stotlhaven Braithwaite facility in preparation for
the approaching hurricane..." (Case No. 12-2543, Rec. Doc. No. 1-1
at 21-22). They further allege that Watt breached this duty
10
personally
implement
by
failing
protective
to
safeguard,
measures
as
to
evacuate,
the
and
hazardous
otherwise
chemicals,
thereby causing the plaintiffs' assorted damages. Id.
Contrary to the
Defendants' claim, these allegations are not
legal conclusions, but assertions of fact. The Shaffer Plaintiffs
make allegations as to each factual issue required by Canter.
Liberally
construed
in
favor
of
Plaintiffs,
these
factual
assertions sufficiently state a claim against Watt.
In support of their argument, Defendants rely on Hornsby v.
Allied Signal Inc., 961 F.Supp 923 (M.D. La. 1997). In that case,
involving similar claims arising from chemical leak at a plant in
Baton Rouge, the court held that the plant manager in question was
improperly joined for failure to state a claim under Canter.
Hornsby,
961
F.Supp
at
927-29.
Hornsby,
however,
should
be
distinguished on two grounds. First, the Hornsby court saw fit to
"pierce the pleadings" and consider evidence of jurisdictional
facts, See id. at 928 (discussing lack of evidence supporting
jurisdiction), which would be an unnecessary exercise here. Second,
and more to the point, the plaintiffs in Hornsby merely alleged
that the plant manager failed to perform his general administrative
responsibilities. See id. at 929 (plaintiff's claim that the plant
manager was "charged with the duty to ensure that all employees
conduct facility operations and activities in the safest possible
manner" amounted to claim of breach of general administrative
11
duties.) Here, in contrast, the Shaffer Plaintiffs allege more than
general responsibility; they accuse Watt of failing to perform the
specific, personal, and delegated duty of instituting hurricane
preparedness plans for hazardous materials.
Accordingly, Watt, a Louisiana citizen, is properly joined by
the Shaffer Plaintiffs. Defendants have failed satisfy the burden
of proving complete diversity. This court has no subject matter
jurisdiction
for
lack
of
diversity
and
it
is
ORDERED
that
Plaintiffs' motion to remand be GRANTED with respect to case 122543.
In
Case
No.
12-2546,
the
Duhy
Plaintiffs
allege
that
Plaquemine Parish was grossly negligent in failing to properly
maintain
levies
Plaintiffs
adjacent
allege
that
to
the
their
home.
Parish
In
allowed
short,
the
said
levee
Duhy
to
deteriorate, failed to bring the levee to federal and state
standards, and used inappropriate materials and practice that
weakened the levee's ability to withstand Isaac's pressures. (Case
No. 12-2546, Rec. Doc. No. 1-1 at 4-5).
Defendants argue that these allegations fail to state a claim
on the grounds that Plaquemine Parish enjoys immunity under La.
R.S. 9:2798.1(B). (Rec. Doc. No. 40 at 24). That statute provides:
"Liability shall not be imposed on public entities or
their officers or employees based upon the exercise or
performance or the failure to exercise or perform their
12
policymaking or discretionary acts when such acts are
within the course and scope of their lawful powers and
duties."
Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co. v. Grinnell Corp., 280 F.3d 566, 571
(5th Cir. 2002)quoting La. R.S. 9:2798.1(B).
The immunity conferred by R.S. 9:2798.1 is "essentially the
same" as the immunity conferred on the federal government by the
"Discretionary Function Exception" to the Federal Tort Claims Act
("FTCA"). Roberts v. City of Shreveport, 397 F.3d 287, 296 (5th
Cir. 2005). Thus, a public entity is immune under La. R.S. 9:2798.1
when the challenged action is "grounded in political, economic, or
social policy." Id at 296.
Conversely, a public entity enjoys no
immunity when "a state law, regulation, or policy specifically
prescribed the challenged course of action." Id.
Finally, the immunity provided by R.S. 9:2798.1 must be
asserted as an affirmative defense, with defendants bearing the
burden. See, e.g., Batton v. Georgia Gulf, 261 F.Supp.2d 575 (M.D.
La. 2003)(removing party failed to meet its burden of showing that
any policy-based discretion was exercised by the public entity in
question.); Johnson v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 975 So.2d 698,
710 ("Defendants raised the 'discretionary function' immunity as an
affirmative defense in their answers and pleadings. As such, the
defendants had the burden of proof...");
Here, Defendants satisfied neither the burden imposed by the
13
jurisdictional
statute
nor
that
imposed
by
R.S.
9:2798.1.
Defendants essentially make two arguments. First, without citation
to legal authority, Defendants simply assert that Parish decisions
to fund, elevate and otherwise maintain levees involve policy
considerations sufficient to establish immunity under R.S. 9:2798.1
(Rec. Doc. No. 40 at 24-26). Next, Defendants rely on In Re Katrina
Canal Breaches Litigation, 696 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. 2012), for the
proposition that the decision to delay levee fortification is
immune under the FTCA.(Rec. Doc. No. 40 at 24-26). However, in that
case, involving claims against the Army Corps of Engineers for
Damage caused by Hurricane Katrina, the court considered "ample
record evidence" indicating the public policy character of the Army
Corps of Engineers' decisions before finding the Corps immune under
the FTCA. In Re Katrina, 696 F.3d at 451.
In contrast, questions of fact and law remain here as to
whether Plaquemine Parish or its employees acted within its policymaking or discretionary authority. In short, at the pleading stage,
absent "ample record evidence," the possibility exists that the
R.S. 9:2798.1 grant of immunity does not attach to Parish decisions
regarding the levee in question.
Plaquemine
Parish
is
thus
properly
joined
by
the
Duhy
Plaintiffs. Defendants have failed to establish Diversity. This
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and it is therefore ORDERED
that Plaintiffs' motion to remand should be GRANTED with respect to
14
case 12-2546.
B. Amount in Controversy
Since the parties in Case No. 12-2539 are completely diverse,
the Court must still decide whether the Martin Plaintiffs' claims
exceed $75,000.
Under La.Code Civ. P. art. 893(A)(1), plaintiffs in Louisiana
are not allowed to plead a specific amount of damages.
When a case
in which the plaintiff has alleged an indeterminate amount of
damages
is
removed,
the
removing
party
bears
the
burden
of
establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in
controversy
exceeds
$75,000
and,
therefore,
that
federal
jurisdiction exists and removal was proper. Manguno v. Prudential
Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir.2002); See Allen
v. R & H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1335 (5th Cir.1995). A
defendant may satisfy its burden by either: (1) showing that it is
facially apparent that the claim is likely to exceed $75,000, or
(2) setting forth "summary judgment type evidence" of facts in
controversy that support a finding of the jurisdictional amount.
Manguno, 276 F.3d at 723; Allen, 63 F.3d at 1335. Courts should not
engage in summary-type review of the evidence of the amount in
controversy unless the same is not apparent from the face of the
complaint. Allen, 63 F.3d at 1336 n. 16.
15
"To determine whether jurisdiction is present for removal,
[the court must] consider the claims in the state court petition as
they existed at the time of removal." Manguno, 276 F.3d at 723. If
a
defendant
satisfies
its
burden,
the
district
court
has
jurisdiction unless the plaintiff can show with "legal certainty"
that his claim is actually for an amount of $75,000 or less. De
Aguilar v. Boeing Company, 47 F.3d 1404, 1412. A plaintiff may
establish such legal certainty "by filing a binding stipulation"
that limits recovery to less than $75,000. Manguno, 276 F.3d at
724; see also De Aguilar, 47 F.3d at 1412. A binding stipulation
would contain language that the plaintiff will not accept damages
in excess of $75,000 and that the affidavit is also binding on
plaintiff’s representatives, assigns, and heirs, and would be
signed by plaintiff and plaintiff’s counsel. Hamilton v. Mosaic
Co., 09-3356, 2009 WL 2870215 at *3 (E.D. La. 8/27/09). Plaintiffs
can meet this burden by filing a binding stipulation or affidavit
with their complaints. De Aguilar, 47 F.3d at 1412 (5th Cir.1995).
However, post-removal affidavits or stipulations may be considered
only where the amount in controversy is ambiguous at the time of
removal. Gebbia, 233 F.3d at 883. “[I]f it is facially apparent
from the petition that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 at
the time of removal, post-removal affidavits, stipulations, and
amendments reducing the amount do not deprive the district court of
jurisdiction.” Id. (citing St. Paul Mercury Indem., 303 U.S. 283,
16
292, 58 S.Ct. 586, 82 L.Ed. 845 (1938)).
Here, it is apparent on the face of the Martin Plaintiffs'
complaint the amount in controversy likely exceeds $75,000. The
complaint seeks both compensatory and exemplary damages for the
negligent release of thousands of gallons of toxic chemicals-including chemicals banned in the United States--for nine distinct
types of loss: loss of property, loss of income, devaluation of
real property, inconvenience, evacuation expenses, stigma damages,
emotional
distress,
remediation
costs,
and
loss
of
business
opportunity. (Rec. Doc. No. 1-1 at 4-16).
As such, the burden has shifted to Plaintiff to show to a
legal certainty that the amount in controversy does not exceed
$75,000.
Here, each of the Martin Plaintiffs submitted affidavits
with their reply brief stating that they "agree" that their
respective claims against Stolthaven are worth less than $75,000.
(Rec. Docs. No. 43-5 & 43-6). Since these affidavits are neither
binding nor filed with the underlying complaints, the Martin
Plaintiffs have failed to show to a legal certainty that the amount
in controversy does not exceed $75,000.
Accordingly, removal was proper as to the Martin Plaintiffs'
claims. This court has subject matter jurisdiction over those
claims alone and it is therefore ORDERED that Plaintiffs' motion to
remand be DENIED with respect to case 12-2539.
17
Conclusion
The Court finds that Defendants Watt and Plaquemine Parish
were properly joined in cases 12-2543 and 12-2546, respectively,
and
that
complete
diversity
is
therefore
lacking
in
those
instances. In case 12-2539, the Court finds that complete diversity
exists and that the jurisdictional amount is satisfied.
Therefore, in summary:
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Remand be GRANTED with
respect to cases 12-2543 and 12-2546 and be DENIED with respect to
case 12-2539.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 10th day of September, 2013.
______________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
18
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