Williams v. Cardinal Health 200 L.L.C.

Filing 52

ORDER & REASONS: denying 48 Motion for New Trial. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 8/7/13. (sek, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

WILLIAMS

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 12-2935

CARDINAL HEALTH 200, LLC

SECTION: "J” (2)

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial (Rec.
Doc.

48)

and

Defendant's

opposition

thereto

(Rec.

Doc.

50).

Plaintiff's motion is set for hearing, on the briefs, on July 31,
2013. The Court, having considered the motions and memoranda of
counsel,

the

record,

and

the

applicable

law,

finds

that

Plaintiff's motion should be DENIED for the reasons set forth
more fully below.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND FACTS
This suit arises out of claims of race discrimination, sexual
harassment, and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq., and
race and gender discrimination in violation of Louisiana Revised
1

Statute § 23:332. The full set of facts leading up to this case
was recently summarized by the Court in its Order and Reasons
issued on May 31, 2013 (Rec. Doc. 46); therefore, it is not
necessary to re-summarize the entirety of the facts.1

The facts

relevant to the instant motion are as follows:
In September 2011, while Natasha Williams ("Plaintiff") was
employed by Cardinal Health 200, LLC ("Defendant"), she alleges
that her husband engaged in a fist fight with one of her coworkers at an off-site restaurant during her dinner break. After
the altercation, Defendant placed Plaintiff on paid leave pending
an

investigation,

but

allegedly

notified

her

that

she

could

return to work on September 19, 2011. The day before Plaintiff
was scheduled to return to work, Plaintiff's husband revealed
that he fought her co-worker because the co-worker, unbeknownst
to Plaintiff, had sent allegedly inappropriate text messages to
Plaintiff's phone. Plaintiff alleges that she reported the text
messages

to

her

supervisors

on

September

returned to work, and that one week later,

19,

2011

when

she

on September 26,

2011, Defendant terminated her employment. Plaintiff contends
that her termination was in retaliation for her report of the

1
For a full recitation of the facts, see Williams v. Cardinal Health 200,
LLC, 12-cv-2935, 2013 WL 2404802, *1 (E.D. La. May 31, 2013).

2

text messages and/or due to her race or gender.
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on April 17, 2013. (Rec.
Doc.

25)

While

the

motion

was

pending,

Plaintiff

filed

two

amended complaints on April 18, 2013 and April 26, 2013. (Rec.
Docs. 27, 35) Defendant filed a second motion to dismiss on May
10,

2013.

Defendant

(Rec.

Doc.

argued

administrative

that

remedies

Employment

Opportunity

Commission

on

Human

42)

In

its

first

Plaintiff
by

filing

Commission

Rights

motion

did
a

charge

("EEOC")

("LCHR")

not

within

to

exhaust

with

or
300

dismiss,

the

the

her
Equal

Louisiana

days

of

her

termination, as is required to state a claim under Title VII. In
its second motion to dismiss, Defendant claimed that Plaintiff's
state law claims were prescribed.

The Court granted both motions

in its order and reasons issued on May 31, 2013, holding that
Plaintiff's EEOC Intake Questionnaire could not be treated as a
Notice of Charge for the purposes of satisfying Title VII's
administrative exhaustion requirement, and that Plaintiff's state
law claim had prescribed. (Rec. Doc. 46) The Court therefore
entered a judgment dismissing Plaintiff's claims with prejudice
on June 11, 2013. (Rec. Doc. 47) Plaintiff filed the instant
motion for a new trial on June 27, 2013. (Rec. Doc. 48) Defendant
filed its opposition on July 15, 2013. (Rec. Doc. 50)

3

PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS
Citing Coutrade v. Harrah's Operaton Company, Inc., 10-4036,
2011 WL 121939 (E.D. La., Jan. 10, 2011) (Wilkinson, Mag. J.),
Plaintiff

asserts

"correct

manifest

that

she

errors

must

and

be

to

afforded

prevent

a

new

manifest

trial

to

injustice."

Plaintiff advances three errors: (1) that the Court disregarded
Plaintiff's Intake Questionnaire that was submitted to the EEOC
on July 11, 2012, (2) that the Court held Plaintiff responsible
for

the

EEOC's

determined

that

errors,

and

Defendant

(3)

did

that

not

the

have

Court

adequate

improperly
notice

of

Plaintiff's claims. Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that, if the
Court

grants

her

motion

on

the

grounds

laid

out

above,

the

prescription issues with Plaintiff's state law claim will be
cured.
Defendant

asserts

that

Plaintiff's

motion

is

improperly

captioned and should be treated as a motion to amend or alter
judgment under FEDERAL RULE

OF

CIVIL PROCEDURE 59(e).

Defendants cite

to Celtic Marine Corporation. v. James C. Justice Companies,
Inc., 11-3005, 2013 WL 2390018 (E.D. La. May 30, 2013) (Barbier,
J.) to argue that a motion under Rule 59(e) may only be granted
if there is a manifest error in law or fact, an intervening

4

change in the law, or newly discovered evidence that could not
have been previously found. Defendant argues that Plaintiff does
not meet this standard for several reasons.
First,

Defendant

asserts

that,

in

arguing

that

the

Court

ignored the Intake Questionnaire from July 11, 2012, Plaintiff
"ignores the fact that a charge must be verified [and that the
questionnaire was not]" and

merely "rehashes her reliance on"

Price v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 687 F.2d 74 (5th Cir.
1982) despite the fact that the Court distinguished the case and
declined to rely on it.
Next,
claimed

Defendant
by

(Rec. Doc. 50, p .3)

argues

Plaintiff

that

was

the

"bureaucratic

exacerbated

or

blundering"

even

caused

by

Plaintiff's and Plaintiff's counsel's errors, thus is not grounds
to find that the Intake Questionnaire alone was sufficient to
satisfy

Title

Defendant's

VII's

knowledge

administrative
of

the

exhaustion

claim,

remedy.

Defendant

As

notes

to

that

Plaintiff has never provided any legal support for her contention
"that an employer's general knowledge that a former employee is
displeased with the termination of her employment is sufficient
to waive the employee's obligation to timely file a perfected
charge." (Rec. Doc. 50, p. 5)
Finally,

Defendant

asserts

5

that

prescription

ran

on

Plaintiff's state law claims because there was no administrative
investigation to toll the prescriptive period.
the

submission

investigation,

of
it

was

the

Intake

only

as

Further, even if

Questionnaire
to

the

began

retaliation

an

claim.

Moreover, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's state law claims must
be dismissed for "failure to comply with La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
23:303(c), which requires the Plaintiff to provide written notice
of employment discrimination claims at least thirty (30) days in
advance of an court action," which Plaintiff did not do. (Rec.
Doc. 50, p. 7)
LEGAL STANDARD AND DISCUSSION
A

motion

judgment

and

for
that

new

trial

that

is

filed

within

substantively
twenty-eight

challenges
days2

of

a
the

judgment of dismissal is treated as a motion to alter or amend
the judgment under FEDERAL RULE

OF

CIVIL PROCEDURE 59(e). Forsythe v.

Saudi Arabian Airlines Corp., 885 F.2d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 1989);
see also, Harcon Barge Co. v. D & G Boat Rentals, Inc., 784 F.2d
665,

669–70

(5th

Cir.

1986)

(“[A]ny

motion

that

draws

into

question the correctness of a judgment is functionally a motion
under Civil Rule 59(e), whatever its label." (internal citation

2

In Forsythe, the court states that the motion must be filed within ten
days.
The time to file the motion has since been changed from ten days to
twenty-eight days, however. See 2009 Amendments FED. R. CIV. PRO. 59(e) (West
2012).

6

omitted)).
This

Court

recently

discussed

the

standard

under

which

to

analyze a motion to alter or amend under Rule 59(e) in Celtic
Marine Corp.. There, the Court stated that:
Altering or amending a judgment under Rule 59(e) is an
“extraordinary remedy” used “sparingly” by the courts.
Templet v. Hydrochem, Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 479 (5th Cir.
2004). A motion to alter or amend calls into question
the correctness of a judgment and is permitted only in
narrow situations, “primarily to correct manifest
errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered
evidence.” Id.; see also Schiller v. Physicians Res.
Grp. Inc., 342 F.3d 563, 567 (5th Cir. 2003). Manifest
error is defined as “‘[e]vident to the senses,
especially to the sight, obvious to the understanding,
evident to the mind, not obscure or hidden, and is
synonymous with open, clear, visible, unmistakable,
indubitable,
indisputable,
evidence,
and
self-evidence.’” In Re Energy Partners, Ltd., 2009 WL
2970393, at *6 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Sept. 15, 2009)
(citations omitted); see also Pechon v. La. Dep't of
Health & Hosp., No. 08-0664, 2009 WL 2046766, at *4
(E.D. La. July 14, 2009) (manifest error is one that
“‘is plain and indisputable, and that amounts to a
complete disregard of the controlling law’”) (citations
omitted).
The Fifth Circuit has noted that “such a motion is
not the proper vehicle for rehashing evidence, legal
theories, or arguments that could have been offered or
raised before entry of judgment.” Templet, 367 F.3d at
478-79. Nor should it be used to “re-litigate prior
matters that ... simply have been resolved to the
movant’s
dissatisfaction.”
Voisin
v.
Tetra
Technologies, Inc., 2010 WL 3943522, at *2 (E.D. La.
Oct. 6, 2010). Thus, to prevail on a motion under Rule
59(e), the movant must clearly establish at least one
of three factors: (1) an intervening change in the
controlling law, (2) the availability of new evidence
not previously available, or (3) a manifest error in
law or fact. Schiller, 342 F.3d at 567; Ross v.
7

Marshall, 426 F.3d 745, 763 (5th Cir. 2005) (to win a
Rule 59(e) motion, the movant “must clearly establish
either a manifest error of law or fact or must present
newly discovered evidence”).

Celtic Marine Corp., 2013 WL 2390018 at *1.
In her motion, Plaintiff does not assert that there was an
intervening change in controlling law, nor does she present new
evidence that was not previously available.

Therefore, Plaintiff

must establish that there was a manifest error in law or fact.
Plaintiff asserts three grounds on which to grant her motion: (1)
that the Court failed to examine the Intake Questionnaire, (2)
that the Court held Plaintiff responsible for the EEOC's errors,
and (3) that Defendant had sufficient notice of the charge. The
Court finds no merit in these arguments for the reasons that
follow.
Plaintiff

argues

that

"the

Court

did

not

examine

the

information contained in the July 11, 2012 submission" to the
EEOC. Rec. Doc. 48-1, p. 2. This allegation is baseless because
the Court discussed the Intake Questionnaire for over two pages
before it merely disagreed with Plaintiff's reliance on Price.
Rec. Doc. 46.

Plaintiff presents no new arguments and repeats

verbatim much of her opposition to Defendant's motion to dismiss.
Because it is clear that Plaintiff merely seeks to re-litigate

8

previous matters, her motion may not be granted on this ground.
Plaintiff

also

argues

that

"the

Court

held

the

plaintiff

responsible for the EEOC's actions" when it concluded that "the
plaintiff's failure to respond to the July 17, 2012 letter derailed the EEOC's administrative process." Rec. Doc. 48-1, p.7.
Plaintiff

contends

that

counsel

for

the

Plaintiff

was

not

included in correspondence from the EEOC to Plaintiff, and that
the

Court

mistakenly

determined

that

Plaintiff's

failure

to

respond to the letter asking for more information ended the
investigation.

Again,

the

Court

clearly

addressed

the

letter

requesting more information in its May 31st Order, stating that
the Intake Questionnaire did not describe the alleged
discriminatory conduct in enough detail to enable the
EEOC to issue an official notice of charge to
Plaintiff's
employer,
nor
did
it
initiate
the
administrative process. Moreover, the letter mailed to
Plaintiff specifically informed Plaintiff that if she
did not respond within thirty days (which she did not)
the EEOC would assume that she did not want to file a
charge. This language makes it plainly clear that as of
July 17, 2012, the EEOC did not consider that Plaintiff
had filed a charge of discrimination. Likewise,
Plaintiff's failure to respond to the EEOC's letter
further confirms that as of August 16, 2012, as per the
EEOC's letter, no charge had been filed. As such, the
Court finds that Price is distinguishable from the
instant case and does not support Plaintiff's argument
that the Intake Questionnaire constituted an EEOC
charge.
Id.

at

*6

(internal

citations

9

omitted).

As

with

the

prior

challenge, Plaintiff's allegations of error merely reflect her
dissatisfaction with this ruling, and thus do not constitute
grounds to reverse the judgment.
Finally,
notice

of

Plaintiff
the

insists

claims

on

that

Defendant

September

26,

had

2011

sufficient

(the

day

of

Plaintiff's termination) and on October 1, 2012 when the EEOC
sent

to

Moreover,

Defendant
Plaintiff

the

Notice

argues

of

that

Charge
the

of

EEOC

Discrimination.

had

all

of

the

information that it needed to notify Defendant on July 11, 2012,
but failed to do so.

Both of these contentions are either

meritless or have already been treated by this Court. The Court
determined on original hearing that the notice on October 1, 2012
occurred after the 300 day period to file a charge. Additionally,
the EEOC clearly determined that it

did not

have sufficient

information with which to notify Defendant about a charge of
discrimination, as evidenced by the letter to Plaintiff asking
for more information before a charge was filed. Finally, there is
simply no evidence or legal authority to support the allegation
that the Defendant should have been on notice that a legal claim
of discrimination would be filed on the day that it terminated
Plaintiff.

Such

a

rule

would

create

a

world

in

which

an

employee's rightful disappointment with being terminated would

10

create automatic and implied notice of the intent to file an
official complaint.
The Court finds that Plaintiff has not presented any evidence
that there was a manifest error in law or fact. Plaintiff's
contention

that

"the

Court

on

original

hearing

came

to

the

erroneous conclusion that the plaintiff never filed a charge with
the EEOC" does not constitute manifest error, but rather only
asserts that Plaintiff disagrees with the Court. (Rec. Doc. 48-1,
p. 2.)

A Rule 59(e) motion is not the mechanism by which to re-

hash foreclosed arguments and express dissatisfaction with an
order of this Court. Because the Court finds that Plaintiff's
motion should be denied as to the EEOC charge claims, Plaintiff's
argument "that if the new trial is granted with respect to the
Title VII claim, the effect would be to cure the prescription
issue on the state law claim" also fails. (Rec. Doc. 48-1, p.
10.)
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial (Rec. Doc.
48) is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 7th day of August, 2013.

CARL J. BARBIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

11