Boada et al v. Young et al

Filing 57

ORDER AND REASONS denying 40 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle on 10/22/2013. (Reference: all cases)(ijg, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

WILLIAM H. BOADA, ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 12-3008
C/W 13-243
Pertains to:
ALL CASES

JOHN YOUNG, ET AL.

SECTION: “B”(5)
ORDER AND REASONS

Nature of Motion and Relief Sought:
Before the Court is Defendants' 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss
for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (Rec. Doc. No. 40). In
response, Plaintiffs filed an Opposition to Defendants' Motion.
(Rec. Doc. No. 42). Oral arguments were heard by the Court on May
29, 2013. (Rec. Doc. No. 48). Parties then submitted Supplemental
Memorandums. (Rec. Doc. No. 49 and 50).
Defendants make four primary arguments as to why the Court
is deprived of jurisdiction to hear this case. First, they argue
that the substance of Plaintiffs' claims do not give rise to
Constitutional violations, necessitating dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). (Rec.
Doc. No. 50 at 7-8).

Second, Defendants argue Plaintiffs lack

standing to assert claims on behalf of public housing tenants.
Third, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive

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relief are moot.

Fourth, Defendants argue that the Court should

abstain from judgement because "difficult questions of state law"
are at issue. (Rec. Doc. No. 50 at 4) (citing Burford v. Sun Oil
Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943)). Accordingly, and for the reasons
articulated below,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc.
No. 40) is DENIED without prejudice to reurge in the context of a
summary judgement motion on all outstanding claims, with
supportive documentation.

Cause of Action and Facts of the Case:
Plaintiffs' are former members of the Jefferson Parish
Housing Authority (JPHA). They allege that Defendants, members of
the Jefferson Parish Counsel, improperly removed them from their
positions as JPHA members. They claim violations of the United
States Constitution and the Louisiana State Constitution, and
seek injunctive and monetary relief.
The procedural history in the case thus far is extensive,
and does not bear heavily on the instant motion. Thus, it is only
recounted briefly here. Plaintiffs instituted the instant case on
December 19, 2012 following their removal by Parish President
John Young from their positions as JHPA Commissioners. (Rec. Doc.
No. 1). As the matter was pending before this Court, on January
27th, 2013, the Parish of Jefferson filed a temporary restraining

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order in the 24th Judicial District Court of the Parish of
Jefferson to enjoin Plaintiffs from participating in JPHA
meetings or acting as JPHA Commissioners. (CA 13-243, Rec. Doc.
No. 1-2). On February 7, 2013, Defendants filed a Notice of
Removal for the state court action based on supplemental
jurisdiction of the already pending action before this Court. On
February 21, 2013, the two pending Federal actions were
consolidated. (Rec. Doc. No. 17). Also on February 21, 2013, this
Court granted a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the
Commissioners from appearing at JPHA Board Meetings until March
1, 2013 - the date on which a hearing was to be held before the
Jefferson Parish Council on whether the removal of Plaintiffs
from their offices was proper. (Rec. Doc. No. 18) (citing La.
R.S. 40:537).
On March 1st and 4th, 2013, the Jefferson Parish Council
held a hearing on Plaintiffs' appeal. (Rec. Doc. No. 25 at 2).
At the conclusion of that hearing, the Defendants voted to uphold
Parish President John Young's removal of Plaintiffs for neglect
of duty. (Rec. Doc. No. 25 at 3). Subsequently, on March 14,
2013, the former commissioners brought a Motion for a Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction before this Court
alleging that the Council made the decision in an illegal
executive session that was in violation of the Louisiana Open
Meetings Law. (Id.). Plaintiffs further requested that the

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Defendants be restrained from: (1) appointing any Commissioners
on the JPHA Board to replace Plaintiffs, or (2) interfering with
Plaintiffs' performance of their functions as duly-appointed
Commissioners of the JPHA Board at regularly scheduled meetings.
(Rec. Doc. No. 25). This Court denied the motion. (Rec. Doc. No.
28). New commissioners were then appointed and the JPHA elected
an acting chairman and acting vice chairman at its monthly
meeting. (Rec. Doc. No. 40-1 at 4).
On April 16, 2013, Defendants filed this Motion to Dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Rec. Doc. No. 40).
Subsequently, Plaintiff Boada requested dismissal from the case,
which was granted (Rec. Doc. No. 56). All other Plaintiffs'
claims remain before the Court.
Law and Analysis:
I. 12(b)(1) Motion To Dismiss
A 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction questions the authority of a federal court to hear
the action before it. Chatham Condo. Associations v. Century
Vill., Inc., 597 F.2d 1002, 1012 (5th Cir. 1979). In order to
ensure the court does not pass judgement on issues it has no
jurisdiction over, the court must make an initial inquiry into
the facts of a case to determine if it has authority over the
matters to be litigated. Moran v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 27
F.3d 169, 172 (5th Cir. 1994).

At the onset of this inquiry,
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"[t]he burden of proof . . . is on the party asserting
jurisdiction." Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th
Cir. 2001) and the jurisdictional facts pled are entitled to no
presumption of truthfulness if challenged. Chatham Condo.
Associations v. Century Vill., Inc., 597 F.2d 1002, 1012 (5th
Cir. 1979). However, this is not to suggest that the burden to
establish jurisdiction is demanding. In cases where "issues of
fact are central both to subject matter jurisdiction and the
claims on the merits . . . the trial court must assume
jurisdiction and proceed to the merits." Montez v. Dep't of Navy,
392 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2004); see also

Steel Co. v. Citizens for

a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (stating "[i]t is firmly
established in our cases that the absence of a valid (as opposed
to arguable) cause of action does not implicate subject-matter
jurisdiction . . .”).

Ultimately, "[a] Rule 12(b)(1) motion

should be granted only 'if it appears certain that the plaintiff
cannot prove a plausible set of facts that establish subjectmatter jurisdiction.'" Davis v. United States, 597 F.3d 646, 649
(5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Castro v. United States, 560 F.3d 381,
386 (5th Cir. 2009)).
Challenges to subject matter jurisdiction brought under
12(b)(1) are to be distinguished from challenges under 12(b)(6)
for failure to state a claim. Under 12(b)(6), the Court must
determine "whether a cognizable legal claim has been stated." 5B

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Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 1350 (3d ed.)

A motion under 12(b)(1), by contrast,

only requires a determination as to "whether the plaintiff has a
right to be in the particular court." Id. Thus, when a "challenge
to the court's jurisdiction is also a challenge to the existence
of a federal cause of action, the proper course of action . . .
is to find that jurisdiction exists and deal with the objections
as a direct attack on the merits . . . under either Rule 12(b)(6)
or Rule 56." Montez, 392 F.3d at 150 (quoting Williamson v.
Tucker , 645 F.2d 404, 415 (5th Cir. 1981)). To proceed otherwise
would allow a party to "indirectly" challenge the merits of a
case, and fail to provide "protection[s] to the plaintiff who in
truth is facing a challenge to the validity of his claim."
Williamson, 645 at 415; see also Oneida Indian Nation of N. Y.
State v. Oneida Cnty., New York, 414 U.S. 661, 666-67 (1974)
(dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction improper when
plaintiff's "assertion that they had a federal right . . . cannot
be said to be so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior
decisions . . . or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to
involve a federal controversy . . .").
Here, Plaintiffs' have pled sufficient facts to meet their
burden of establishing federal subject matter jurisdiction. Their
complaint alleges several federal causes of action, including
depravation of a number of Constitutional rights. (Rec. Doc. No.

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1 at 19-23). The claims plausibly assert a basis for invoking the
Court's subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, Defendants' 12(b)(1)
motion must be denied. Davis, 597 F.3d at 649.
However, the Court does note that facts at this stage of the
case do not appear contested. Both parties agree that the JPHA
members were removed from office, and largely agree on what
process was used to removed them. The only questions remaining
are issues of law – whether Plaintiffs were protected by certain
Constitutional guarantee and whether Defendants acted to deny
them any Constitutional rights. Therefore, Defendants should
reurge their request to dismiss the instant case in the context
of a summary judgement motion, with supportive documentation.
This will allow the Court to determine what, if any, judgement as
a matter of law is appropriate. Montez, 392 F.3d at 150.
II. Standing to Assert the Claims of Public Housing Tenants
Defendants aver that the Plaintiffs have improperly
attempted to assert the rights of public housing tenants in their
complaint. (Rec. Doc. No. 12). The Court is unclear as to
Defendants' contentions in this regard. In reviewing Plaintiffs'
complaint, it is apparent that the allegations brought by
Plaintiffs assert their own constitutional rights, not the rights
of third-parties. See (Rec. Doc. No. 1 at 19-23). Claims 1 and 3
contend Defendants violated Plaintiffs' 1st and 14th Amendment
rights; Claim 2 contends Defendants' deprived Plaintiffs of

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property interests guaranteed them by the 5th and 14th Amendments;
and Claim 4 alleges Defendants violated Plaintiffs' Equal
Protection rights. (Id.). None of these claims assert the rights
of parties not before the Court. Thus, the Court will make no
determination on Defendants' ability to raise the claims of
housing tenants at this time.
III. Mootness of Injunctive Relief Claims
Defendants next contend that Plaintiffs' claims for
injunctive relief are moot. Specifically, they state that
Plaintiffs' demand that Defendants cease interference with the
exercise of their duties is impossible, because Plaintiffs have
since been removed from their positions. (Rec. Doc. No. 12). This
is unpersuasive. Plaintiffs' case rests on establishing
unconstitutional action by Defendants in preventing Plaintiffs
from carrying out their appointed duties. If Plaintiffs are
successful on the merits, their claims to enjoin the alleged
unconstitutional practices will continue to be a live case and
controversy – eliminating any mootness concerns. See
art. III, § 2, cl. 1;

U.S. Const.

Knox v. Serv. Employees Int'l Union, Local

1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2287 (2012) ("A case becomes moot only
when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief
whatever to the prevailing party.") (emphasis added) (internal
citations omitted).
IV. Burford Abstention
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In general, federal courts must hear those cases which
Congress has given them authority to hear. Cohens v. Virginia, 6
Wheat. 264, 404 (1821) (federal courts "have no more right to
decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to
usurp that which is not"). That being said, the Burford
abstention doctrine holds that where sufficient state-court
review is available, federal courts will not interfere with the
work of state administrative agencies:
(1) when there are "difficult questions of state law bearing
on policy problems of substantial public import whose
importance transcends the result in the case then at bar";
or (2) where the "exercise of federal review of the question
in a case and in similar cases would be disruptive of state
efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a
matter of substantial public concern."
New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of
491 U.S. 350, 361 (1989) (quoting Colorado
Conservation Dist. v. U. S., 424 U.S. 800,
Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S.

City of New Orleans,
River Water
814 (1976)); see also
706, 730 (1996).

Although Burford abstention allows for federal courts to
avoid intruding on state matters, the Supreme Court has cautioned
against its overuse. In McNeese v. Bd. of Ed., the Court refused
to abstain in a challenge to a segregated school system, despite
the fact that a state administrative remedy was available. 373
U.S. 668, 674 (1963). The Court found the plaintiffs had alleged
a federal cause of action that was not "entangled in a skein of
state law that must be untangled before the federal case can
proceed" thus making it "immaterial whether [defendants's]

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conduct is legal or illegal as a matter of state law." Id. The
Court further clarified the doctrine in New Orleans Pub. Serv.,
Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, noting "[w]hile Burford
is concerned with protecting complex state administrative
processes from undue federal interference, it does not require
abstention whenever there exists such a process . . ." 491 U.S.
350, 362 (1989).
The Fifth Circuit has recognized five factors for a court to
weigh in determining whether abstention is appropriate:
(1) whether the cause of action arises under federal or
state law (finding abstention inappropriate where the case
did not involve a state-law claim); (2) whether the case
requires inquiry into unsettled issues of state law, or into
local facts; (3) the importance of the state interest
involved; (4) the state's need for a coherent policy in that
area; and (5) the presence of a special state forum for
judicial review.
Sierra Club, Inc. v. Sandy Creek Energy Associates, L.P., 627
F.3d 134, 144 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Wilson v. Valley Elec.
Membership Corp., 8 F.3d 311, 313 (5th Cir. 1993)).
Here, the factors decidedly point away from abstention. The
causes of action predominately arise under federal law – 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and various Constitutional provisions. Although
true that Plaintiffs contend violations state law, see (Rec Doc.
No. 1 at 21-22) (alleging violations of the Louisiana State
Constitution and Louisiana Housing Authority Laws), the primary
relief sought is for violations of federal law.

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Further, there are no unsettled issues of state law present.
On this point, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs had a right to
appeal their removal to a state court. Defendants contend this is
enough to force abstention. However, the fact that a state court
may have authority to review a state based claim does not remove
jurisdiction from federal courts asked to decide issues of
federal constitutional law. McNeese, 373 U.S. at 674. Defendants
do not contend that there are any undecided issues of state law
this Court would be required to resolve in the instant case, thus
this factor dose not counsel in favor of abstention.
Similarly, the state interest involved appears slight from
an abstention standpoint. Unlike the majority of cases where
abstention has been approved, the instant case does not involve a
state regulatory agency charged with overseeing a major portion
of a state's economy. See, e.g., Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S.
315, 320 (1943) (approving abstention where state commission was
in place and where natural resources making up a substantial
portion of state economic revenue was at issue);

Alabama Pub.

Serv. Comm'n v. S. Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 349 (1951) (abstention
proper where state regulatory structure was in place to regulate
railroad passenger service in the state). Any decision from the
Court in the instant case will not disturb important local
necessities or disrupt the state's interest in maintaining

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coherent policies. Thus, is abstention improper.
Accordingly, and for the reasons articulated above,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc.
No. 40) is DENIED without prejudice to reurge in the context of a
summary judgement motion on all outstanding claims, with
supportive documentation.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 22nd day of October, 2013.

_______________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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