Ukudi v. McMoRan Oil and Gas, L.L.C.
Filing
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ORDER & REASONS granting 55 Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff's claims against Defendant are dismissed with prejudice. Signed by Judge Kurt D. Engelhardt on 2/10/2014. (mmm)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
CYPRIAN UKUDI
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 12-3020
MCMORAN OIL AND GAS, LLC
SECTION "N" (1)
ORDER AND REASONS
Presently before the Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant
McMoRan Oil and Gas, LLC (Rec. Doc. 55). Having carefully considered the parties’ supporting
and opposing submissions, and applicable law, IT IS ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED
and that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s claims arise from an injury that he suffered, in October 2011, while
working for Alliance Oilfield Service (“Alliance”) on a plug and abandonment project on a Gulf of
Mexico platform owned by Defendant. On the night in question, the Alliance crew was removing
the wellhead, or “Christmas tree” assembly, from the platform, and the tubing from the well itself.
The parties’ submissions reveal that this task usually is accomplished by using a wrench to loosen
vertical bolts connecting the Christmas tree casing to the platform such that the tree and tubing can
be removed as one unit. In this instance, however, rust on the bolts made removal problematic and
eventually stalled the crew’s progress. After several hours without success, the crew proposed using
a cutting torch to simply cut the bolts. Defendant’s on-site “company man”, Kruse Gribble,
however, advised the Alliance crew that, because of safety concerns, a cutting torch could not be
used. Thus, the crew instead proceeded to attempt to “back out” (loosen) hanger pins holding the
tubing in place to allow the removal of the Christmas tree followed by the tubing hanger and tubing.
Plaintiff loosened four of the hanger pins without problem. As he backed the fifth
pin away from the tubing hanger assembly, however, the pin and the packing gland suddenly
ejected, because of unexpected pressure in the void of the wellhead, and struck Plaintiff’s shin.
This lawsuit followed.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
I. Summary Judgment Standard
Pursuant to Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment
shall be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The materiality of
facts is determined by the substantive law's identification of which facts are critical and which facts
are irrelevant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.
Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is material if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law." Id.
If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of
proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its summary judgment burden by merely pointing out
that the evidence in the record contains insufficient proof concerning an essential element of the
nonmoving party's claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325,
106 S. Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986); see also Lavespere v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 910
F.2d 167, 178 (5th Cir. 1990). Once the moving party carries its burden pursuant to Rule 56(a), the
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nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by the 'depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate 'specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S. Ct. 2553; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L. Ed.2d 538 (1986);
Auguster v. Vermillion Parish School Bd., 249 F.3d 400, 402 (5th Cir. 2001).
When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the evidence in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Gillis v. Louisiana, 294 F.3d 755, 758 (5th Cir.
2002), and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. Hunt v. Rapides Healthcare
System, L.L.C., 277 F.3d 757, 764 (2001). Factual controversies are to be resolved in favor of the
nonmoving party, "but only when there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have
submitted evidence of contradictory facts." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th
Cir.1994) (citations omitted). The Court will not, "in the absence of any proof, assume that the
nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts." See id. (emphasis in original) (citing
Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3188, 111 L. Ed.2d 695 (1990)).
Although the Court is to consider the full record in ruling on a motion for summary
judgment, Rule 56 does not obligate it to search for evidence to support a party's opposition to
summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3)("court need consider only the cited materials");
Malacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393, 405 (5th Cir. 2003)("When evidence exists in the summary
judgment record but the nonmovant fails even to refer to it in the response to the motion for
summary judgment, that evidence is not properly before the district court."). Thus, the nonmoving
party should "identify specific evidence in the record, and articulate" precisely how that evidence
supports his claims. Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 871, 115
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S. Ct. 195 (1994).
The nonmovant's burden of demonstrating a genuine issue is not satisfied merely by
creating "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," "by conclusory allegations," by
"unsubstantiated assertions," or "by only a scintilla of evidence." Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. Rather,
a factual dispute precludes a grant of summary judgment only if the evidence is sufficient to permit
a reasonable trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. Smith v. Amedisys, 298 F.3d 434, 440 (5th
Cir. 2002).
II. Application of Legal Principles
Applying the foregoing legal principles here, the Court finds that Defendant has met
its burden, under Rule 56(a) and (c), of demonstrating that the submitted record evidence contains
insufficient proof of Plaintiff’ claims, and that Defendant is entitled to judgment as matter of law
as to those claims. On the other hand, Plaintiff has not satisfied his burden, under Rule 56(c), of
citing to particular record documents demonstrating the existence of a genuine dispute as to material
facts.
Specifically, Plaintiff, with the benefit of hindsight, points to various things that
Defendant could have done differently, which either alone or together may have prevented
Plaintiff’s injury.1 For instance, Plaintiff contends that Defendant could have required contractors,
including Alliance, to utilize two-men crews or a “two wrench method” for backing out hangar pins,
and/or required the use of a “void-bleeder” tool, as well as tools for checking for pressure in the
voids of “Christmas trees.” Significantly, however, Plaintiff does not demonstrate a triable issue
1
As Defendant argues, evidence of subsequent remedial measures is not admissible
to prove negligence. See Fed. R. Evid. 407.
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relative to whether Defendant’s failure to so act was legally unreasonable, at the time in question,
based on the information of which it was aware, or, in the exercise of due care, should have been
aware. Further, in so arguing, Plaintiff ignores that Defendant contracted with Plaintiff’s employer,
Alliance, acting as an independent contractor, to safely perform the plug and abandonment services
at issue, including the provision of “all labor, supervision and training, machinery, equipment,
materials, and supplies necessary to properly perform,” using “qualified, competent and, where
necessary, licensed personnel.”2
Nor does Plaintiff put forth evidence reasonably suggesting that Defendant acted
negligently in selecting Alliance, or either of the two individuals serving as its on-site “company
men,” for the project. The same is true of Plaintiff’s unsupported suggestion that Alliance’s access
to Defendant’s well file, reflecting the previous changes to the Christmas tree’s valve system, was
inadequate.3 Additionally, although emphasizing Defendant’s prohibition (for safety reasons) of
Alliance employees’ use of a torch to cut the bolts securing the tree to the platform,4 Plaintiff puts
forth no evidence demonstrating that Defendant controlled or dictated the particulars of the means
and method utilized by Plaintiff in loosening the hanger pins.
2
See Rec. Doc. 55-7, §§ 2.1-2.3.
3
Defendant’s submission reveals that Alliance employee Eric Berger, who worked “in
house” at Defendant’s Houston facility prior to the commencement of the plug and abandonment
job, had access to the well file. See Rec. Doc. 76, at p. 5.
4
The parties’ submissions reflect that Defendant was concerned that using a cutting
torch, given the presence of an active pipeline on the platform, might result in a fire or explosion.
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For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds Defendant’s motion for summary judgment
meritorious. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant are dismissed with prejudice.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 10th day of February 2014.
_________________________________
KURT D. ENGELHARDT
United States District Judge
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