BCR Safeguard Holding, L.L.C. et al v. Morgan Stanley Real Estate Advisor, Inc. et al

Filing 240

ORDER granting 186 Motion to Dismiss; granting 188 Motion to Dismiss; granting in part and denying in part 229 Motion to Dissolve Injunction. Signed by Judge Nannette Jolivette Brown. (jjl)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
BCR SAFEGUARD HOLDING, L.L.C., et al.

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 13-0066

MORGAN STANLEY REAL ESTATE ADVISOR,
INC., et al.

SECTION: “G”(1)

ORDER AND REASONS
This litigation concerns a limited liability company that for approximately four years was
jointly owned by Plaintiffs and one of the Defendants. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants engaged in
a series of fraudulent actions designed to suppress the LLC’s recovery of insurance proceeds after
Hurricane Katrina and to wrest ownership of the LLC from Plaintiffs. Three pending motions are
before the Court.
First, Plaintiffs BCR Safeguard Holding, L.L.C., JAC Safeguard Holding, L.L.C., and
Safeguard Development Group II, L.L.C. have filed a “Motion to Dissolve Injunction.”1 In this
motion, Plaintiffs urge that developments in a related state-court proceeding have altered the
reasoning articulated in the Court’s August 15, 2013 and December 12, 2013 orders enjoining
Plaintiffs’ use of certain privileged documents. Having considered the pending motion, the
memoranda in support, the memoranda in opposition, the record, and the applicable law, the Court
will grant the motion in part and deny the motion in part.
The two other pending motions are Defendants Morgan Stanley Real Estate Advisor, Inc.’s,
PPF Safeguard, L.L.C.’s, and Scott Allen Brown’s “Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint”2 and
Defendant Lloyd’s Underwriters’ “Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint for Damages.”3 Having

1

Rec. Doc. 229.

2

Rec. Doc. 186.

3

Rec. Doc. 188.

considered the pending motions, the memoranda in support, the memoranda in opposition, the
amended complaint, and the applicable law, and having taken judicial notice—where
appropriate—of matters of public record, the Court will grant both motions.
I. Background
A.

Relationships Among the Parties
Plaintiffs in this action are BCR Safeguard Holding, L.L.C. (“BCR”), JAC Safeguard

Holding, L.L.C. (“JAC”), and Safeguard Development Group II, L.L.C. (“SDG”) (collectively,
“Plaintiffs”). Plaintiffs were formed by Bruce C. Roch, Jr. (“Roch”) and Jack A. Chaney
(“Chaney”) in order to own and operate Safeguard Storage Properties, LLC (“Safeguard”).4
Safeguard operates self-storage facilities in several states, including Louisiana.5
In 2005, Morgan Stanley became an investor in Safeguard through its affiliated company
Defendant PPF Safeguard, L.L.C. (“PPF”).6 PPF is controlled by another Morgan Stanley affiliate,
Defendant Morgan Stanley Real Estate Advisor, Inc. (“MSREA”).7 Pursuant to the Amended and
Restated Limited Liability Company Agreement of Safeguard Storage Properties, LLC (the “LLC
Agreement”), effective May 31, 2005, PPF became a member of Safeguard along with BCR, JAC,
and SDG.8 Under the LLC Agreement, PPF owned 94% of Safeguard; however, BCR was
designated the “Administrative Member” in charge of day-to-day operations.9 “Major Decisions,”
including the decision to bring suit on matters in excess of $250,000, required the unanimous

4

Rec. Doc. 161 at p. 1.

5

Id. at pp. 1–2, ¶ 10.

6

Id. at pp. 1–2.

7

Id. at ¶ 11.

8

Id. at p. 2.

9

Id.

2

approval of a four-person Management Committee, which included Defendant Scott Brown
(“Brown”; collectively with PPF and MSREA, the “Morgan Stanley Defendants”), a Morgan
Stanley employee.10
From May 31, 2005 until at least May 31, 2009, Roch and Chaney were senior executives
at Safeguard and were responsible for the day-to-day management of the business. Roch was CEO
and President throughout this period, and Chaney was COO until May 31, 2008 when he resigned.11
On May 14, 2009, PPF invoked a provision of the LLC Agreement that enabled it to offer
to buy BCR’s, JAC’s, and SDG’s interests in Safeguard,12 and on July 31, 2009, PPF acquired 100%
ownership of Safeguard.13
B.

Hurricane Katrina Insurance Dispute
Plaintiffs allege that after the execution of the LLC Agreement, Morgan Stanley had the

responsibility of placing Safeguard under its insurance program, which involved multiple insurers,
including Defendant Lloyd’s of London (“Lloyds”).14 According to Plaintiffs, after Hurricane
Katrina hit, Safeguard should have pursued business interruption claims of approximately $350
million from its insurers.15 However, Plaintiffs aver that PPF and MSREA did not fully pursue
Safeguard’s claims in order to maintain Morgan Stanley’s relationships with its insurers.16 Although
Safeguard filed suit against its insurers on August 27, 2007 (the “Insurance Litigation” or “Katrina

10

Id.

11

Rec. Doc. 26-1 at p. 3. Roch may have served as Chief Development Officer thereafter. See id.

12

Rec. Doc. 161 at ¶ 80.

13

Id. at ¶ 10.

14

Id. at p. 2.

15

Id. at pp. 2–3.

16

Id. at p. 3.

3

Litigation”),17 Plaintiffs contend that Morgan Stanley took actions to “undermine and devalue
Safeguard’s claims in the Insurance Litigation” and to “delay the resolution of that litigation” until
Plaintiff’s interest in Safeguard had been bought out.18 According to Plaintiffs, the Insurance
Litigation settled in October 2012.19
C.

State Court Litigation
On May 7, 2009, BCR, JAC, and SDG sued PPF and MSREA in the Civil District Court for

the Parish of Orleans (“CDC Litigation”).20 While Plaintiffs amended their state court petition
multiple times, essentially, they sought damages for PPF’s and MSREA’s actions in the Insurance
Litigation as well as their actions in the buyout of Plaintiffs’ interests in Safeguard.21 Additionally,
on May 14, 2009 and July 6, 2009, PPF filed two suits against BCR, JAC, SGR, and Roch, seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief that would affirm the buyout, in Delaware Chancery Court
(collectively, “Delaware Litigation”).22
A major issue in the CDC Litigation and the Delaware Litigation was Plaintiffs’ access to
and use of documents concerning the Insurance Litigation and the buyout, which, according to
Defendants, are protected by attorney-client and work-product privilege. On September 4, 2009, the
judge in the CDC Litigation entered a “Protective Order” governing discovery of purportedly
confidential materials.23 On February 10, 2010, that court entered an additional “Joint Protective

17

Id. at ¶ 47.

18

Id. at ¶ 102.

19

Id. at ¶ 17.

20

Id. at ¶ 91.

21

Id. at ¶¶ 91–97.

22

Id. at ¶¶ 82–83.

23

Rec. Doc. 52-2, “Protective Order,” entered September 4, 2009 by the Civil District Court for the Parish
of Orleans, Judge Hebert A. Cade, Case No. 2009-4705, at pp. 131–39.

4

Order,” governing discovery of privileged materials; this order applied to both the CDC and
Delaware Litigation.24
On July 29, 2010, the court in the CDC Litigation dismissed all but one cause of action,
finding that Plaintiffs’ claims would not accrue until the resolution of the Insurance Litigation.25 As
of March 14, 2011, the Delaware Litigation had also concluded.26 With respect to the suit filed on
May 14, 2009 (“Delaware I Litigation”), the Delaware court entered a Stipulated Judgment
determining that “[PPF’s] invocation of the Buy/Sell provision of the LLC Agreement on May 14,
2009 was proper” and “[PPF] acted appropriately in setting the Total Purchase Price in the Buy/Sell
Transaction.”27 In the July 6, 2009 suit (“Delaware II Litigation”), the Delaware court dismissed the
action pursuant to a mandatory forum selection clause.28
D.

Federal Court Action and Injunction Preventing Use of Privileged Communications
On January 11, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a Redacted Complaint in the above-captioned matter,29

wherein Plaintiffs asserted eleven causes of action, including violations of the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) and Louisiana’s anti-racketeering statute, breach of
fiduciary duty, and tortious interference with contract.30 Plaintiffs also sought to file an Unredacted

24

Rec. Doc. 52-2, “Joint Protective Order,” entered February 10, 2010 by the Civil District Court for the
Parish of Orleans, Judge Herbert A. Cade, Case No. 2009-4705, at pp.140–43.
25

Rec. Doc. 161 at ¶ 97.

26

Id. at ¶¶ 98–99.

27

Id. at ¶ 99 (alternations in original).

28

Id. at ¶ 98.

29

Rec. Doc. 1.

30

Id. at pp. 31–59.

5

Complaint into the record under seal,31 and the Court granted the unopposed motion.32 However,
Defendants requested that the Court place the Redacted Complaint under seal as well, claiming that
it also contained numerous references to ten privileged documents that had been produced in the
CDC litigation.33 Plaintiffs opposed the motion to seal the Redacted Complaint.34 The Court
immediately placed the Redacted Complaint under seal while it considered that pending motion.35
On January 25, 2013, the Court denied the motion to place the Redacted Complaint under seal
because Defendants had “declined to identify the specific portions of the redacted complaint they
f[ound] objectionable nor [did] Defendants argue[] in sufficient detail how disclosure of this
information would negatively impact their interests.”36
On January 28, 2013, Defendants filed a “Motion for Reconsideration of Motion to Seal
Complaint and Motion for a Preliminary and Permanent Injunction Against the Improper Use or
Disclosure of Privileged Material.”37 In light of that motion, the Court ordered that the Redacted
Complaint remain under seal until it ruled upon the motion for reconsideration.38
On August 15, 2013, the Court entered an Order denying Defendants’ motion in part and
granting it in part.39 The Court denied Defendants’ request for reconsideration as moot as the

31

Rec. Doc. 9.

32

Rec. Doc. 15.

33

Rec. Doc. 11.

34

Rec. Doc. 19.

35

Rec. Doc. 20.

36

Rec. Doc. 24 at pp. 4–5 (internal quotation marks omitted).

37

Rec. Doc. 26.

38

Rec. Doc. 30.

39

Rec. Doc. 147.

6

Redacted Complaint had already been placed under seal.40 The Court granted Defendants’ requests
for a preliminary injunction and a permanent injunction, enjoining Plaintiffs “from making any
further use or disclosure in this litigation of the privileged communications identified by
Defendants . . . .”41
On August 22, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration.42 The Court denied
Plaintiffs’ motion on December 12, 2013, but in its Order, clarified the basis for imposing the
injunction on each of the ten documents.43 The Court explained that five of the ten documents in
question had been produced during the CDC Litigation and designated “privileged.”44 For these five
documents, the Court determined that “Plaintiffs must obtain approval from the judge in the CDC
Litigation who effected the February 2010 protective order” prior to making any further use or
disclosure of these documents in the above-captioned matter.45 Next, the Court explained that one
of the ten documents in question had been produced during the CDC Litigation and designated
“confidential.”46 For this document, the Court concluded that “Plaintiffs must obtain approval from
the judge in the CDC Litigation who effected the September 2009 protective order.”47 Finally, the
Court observed that four of the ten documents in question had not been produced in the CDC
Litigation.48 With respect to these four documents, the Court determined that “approval from the

40

Id. at p. 44.

41

Id.

42

Rec. Doc. 148.

43

Rec. Doc. 160.

44

Id. at p. 22.

45

Id.

46

Id.

47

Id. at p. 23.

48

Id.

7

judge in the CDC Litigation is not required,” but that “[n]evertheless, these communications are still
subject to attorney-client privilege.”49 Thus, the Court enjoined Plaintiffs from making any further
use of disclosure of these four documents in the above-captioned matter.50
E.

Pending Motions to Dismiss
On December 23, 2013, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, removing references to the

documents subject to the Court’s injunction.51 On February 5, 2014, the Morgan Stanley Defendants
filed their pending “Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint.”52 Also on February 5, 2014, Lloyd’s
filed its pending “Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint for Damages.”53 On February 28, 2014,
Plaintiffs filed an “Omnibus Memorandum in Opposition.”54 With leave of the Court, the Morgan
Stanley Defendants and Lloyd’s filed replies on March 21, 2014.55 Oral argument was heard on
April 2, 2014.56 Following oral argument, Plaintiffs filed a supplemental memorandum on April 7,
2014,57 to which the Morgan Stanley Defendants replied on April 11, 2014.58
F.

Subsequent State Court Proceedings
On January 13, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a “Motion to Amend Protective Orders, or, in the

Alternative, Grant Permission for Use of Documents in Federal Court Lawsuit” in the CDC

49

Id.

50

Id. at p. 27.

51

Rec. Doc. 161.

52

Rec. Doc. 186.

53

Rec. Doc. 188.

54

Rec. Doc. 209.

55

Rec. Doc. 214 (Lloyd’s); Rec. Doc. 216 (Morgan Stanley Defendants).

56

Rec. Doc. 222.

57

Rec. Doc. 225.

58

Rec. Doc. 228.

8

Litigation.59 On June 4, 2014, the CDC judge granted Plaintiffs’ motion in part and denied in part.60
Specifically, the CDC judge amended the September 2009 and the February 2010 Protective Orders
“to include a narrow exception declaring that communications involving Safeguard, PPF, and
Morgan Stanley that may demonstrate a direct conflict of interest among the parties are not subject
to their shared common legal interest privilege.”61 Further, the CDC judge reviewed the ten
documents sought to be used by Plaintiffs in the above-captioned matter and determined that these
ten communications “fall within the narrow exception of being outside the zone of common legal
interest and are not subject to either the September 2009 Protective Order or the February 2010
Protective Order.’”62 Finally, the CDC judge “pretermit[ted] ruling on the BCR parties’ alternative
Motion for Permission to Use Documents in the Federal Court Lawsuit.”63 In its reasons for
judgment, the CDC judge explained that it “expresses no opinion regarding the use or disclosure of
the ten challenged communications in the federal action as that determination is reserved for the
judge presiding over the federal litigation.”64
Following the CDC judge’s amendment of the Protective Orders, on June 25, 2014, Plaintiffs
filed the pending “Motion to Dissolve Injunction” in the above-captioned matter.65 According to
Plaintiffs, “due to the change in circumstances occasioned by the amendment of the underlying
protective order language, the Morgan Stanley defendants will be unable to sustain their showing

59
Rec. Doc. 229-4, “Judgment,” entered June 4, 2014 by the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans,
Judge Paula A. Brown, Case No. 2009-4705, at p. 2.
60

Id.

61

Id.

62

Id. at p. 3.

63

Id.

64

Rec. Doc. 229-4, “Reasons for Judgment,” entered June 4, 2014 by the Civil District Court for the
Parish of Orleans, Judge Paula A. Brown, Case No. 2009-4705, at p. 13.
65

Rec. Doc. 229.

9

of the likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, or the balance of comparative harms,”
and thus “the Morgan Stanley defendants will no longer be able to sustain their required showing
for an injunction.”66
On July 15, 2014, the Morgan Stanley Defendants filed an opposition.67 In part, the Morgan
Stanley Defendants argued that they were in the process of appealing the CDC judge’s ruling and
that dissolving the injunction would thus be premature:
The Morgan Stanley Parties have filed an appeal challenging the CDC’s decision on
multiple legal and factual bases, which is still pending. Thus, if the court does not
choose at this stage to deny Plaintiffs’ motion on the merits, it should deny the
motion as premature without prejudice to Plaintiffs resubmitting the motion after the
CDC’s ruling is final and not subject to appellate review.68
With leave of the Court, Plaintiffs filed a reply on July 24, 2014.69
On August 18, 2014, the Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit entered its
decision regarding the Morgan Stanley Defendants’ appeal of the CDC judge’s ruling, determining:
We are satisfied, like the trial court, that two of the ten communications at issue are
not privileged communications, subject to the article 506 attorney-client privilege,
in the context of this case, specifically the 12 May 2009 inter-party communication
and the 19 May 2009 email thread. Therefore, we find no error or abuse of discretion
of the trial court in ordering those communications produced/disclosed/used, and
therefore deny the defendants/relators’ writ application in that regard only.
Contrariwise, we grant the defendants/relators’ writ application in part, finding the
remaining eight communications are presently subject to the attorney-client privilege
of La. C.E. art. 506.70

On August 22, 2014, with leave of the Court, the Morgan Stanley Defendants filed a copy

66

Rec. Roc. 229-3 at p. 8.

67

Rec. Doc. 233.

68

Id. at p. 6.

69

Rec. Doc. 236.

70

Rec. Doc. 237-1, Case No. 2014-C-0694, BCR Safeguard Holdings, LLC v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter
Inv. Mgmt., Inc. (La. App. 4th Cir. Aug. 22, 2014).

10

of the Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit’s decision into the record of this case, and
noted that “the Fourth Circuit found that, under state law, eight of the ten challenged
communications were privileged.”71 Also on August 22, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a response,
“disagree[ing] with the Morgan Stanley defendants’ interpretation of that ruling’s effect on the
Motion to Dissolve Injunction.”72
II. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Dissolve Injunction
As noted above, in its June 4, 2014 ruling, the CDC judge made two key amendments to the
September 2009 and February 2010 Protective Orders: (1) the judge included “a narrow exception
declaring that communications involving Safeguard, PPF, and Morgan Stanley that may demonstrate
a direct conflict of interest among the parties are not subject to their shared common legal interest
privilege”; and (2) the judge determined that the ten communications in question fell within this new
exception.73 These amendments by the CDC judge potentially altered the foundation of this Court’s
injunction in the above-captioned matter with respect to the five documents that this Court
determined were covered by the February 2010 protective order and the one document that this
Court determined was covered by the September 2009 order. The amendments would not have
affected the four documents that were not produced subject to the September 2009 or February 2010
protective orders; for these documents, this Court independently concluded that the communications
were protected by attorney-client privilege.
The Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit has now ruled that eight of the
communications are in fact subject to attorney-client privilege. Thus these eight documents no

71

Rec. Doc. 237 at p. 2.

72

Rec. Doc. 238.

73

Rec. Doc. 229-4, “Judgment,” entered June 4, 2014 by the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans,
Judge Paula A. Brown, Case No. 2009-4705, at pp. 2–3.

11

longer fall within the narrow exception articulated in the CDC judge’s June 4, 2014 order, and they
still come within the ambit of the protective orders. The question becomes whether Plaintiffs should
still be enjoined from using the two documents no longer subject to the protective orders.
The first document that is no longer considered privileged in the CDC Litigation is the “12
May 2009 inter-party communication.”74 The Court notes that originally the parties represented that
this document was one of the four documents that was not produced in the CDC Litigation,75 and
thus, the Court enjoined Plaintiff’s use of this document after independently determining that it was
subject to attorney-client privilege. Accordingly, with respect to this document, no change to the
injunction based on subsequent developments in the CDC litigation is warranted.
The second document that is no longer considered privileged in the CDC Litigation is the
“19 May 2009 email thread.” This document was produced pursuant to the September 2009
protective order.76 In granting the Morgan Stanley Defendants’ request for an injunction, the Court
“enjoined [Plaintiffs] from making any further use or disclosure in this litigation of the privileged
communications

disclosed

in

the

CDC

Litigation—either

as

“privileged”

or

as

‘confidential’—without prior approval from the judge in the CDC Litigation that effected the
protective orders.”77 Now, the CDC judge has amended the September 2009 protective order to
include “a narrow exception declaring that communications involving Safeguard, PPF, and Morgan
Stanley that may demonstrate a direct conflict of interest among the parties are not subject to their

74

Rec. Doc. 237-1, Case No. 2014-C-0694, BCR Safeguard Holdings, LLC v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter
Inv. Mgmt., Inc. (La. App. 4th Cir. Aug. 22, 2014), at p. 6.
75

Rec. Doc. 52-3 at p. 4.

76

Id.

77

Rec. Doc. 160 at p. 27.

12

shared common legal interest privilege.”78 Further, both the CDC judge and the Louisiana appellate
court have determined that the May 19, 2009 email thread falls within this exception. Accordingly,
this document is no longer subject to the Court’s injunction in the above-captioned matter, and
Plaintiffs are permitted to use the May 19, 2009 email thread.
The Court notes that Plaintiffs referenced the May 19, 2009 email thread in their unredacted
complaint filed on January 16, 2013 at paragraphs 78, 79, and 134(r).79 However, following the
Court’s injunction, Plaintiffs removed all references to the May 19, 2009 email thread in their
amended complaint, which is the subject of the pending motions to dismiss.80 To the extent that
allegations concerning the May 19, 2009 email thread may bear on the Court’s evaluation of the
pending motions to dismiss, the Court will consider the references to the May 19, 2009 email thread
found in Plaintiff’s original unredacted complaint in determining the pending motions to dismiss.
III. Morgan Stanley Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
In their “Motion to Dismiss,” the Morgan Stanley Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’
complaint should be dismissed because “(i) Plaintiffs have no standing, (ii) the Court has no
personal jurisdiction over the Morgan Stanley Parties, and (iii) each of Plaintiffs’ nine causes of
action fails to state a claim for relief.”81 The Court first addresses the parties’ arguments regarding
standing.

78

Rec. Doc. 229-4, “Judgment,” entered June 4, 2014 by the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans,
Judge Paula A. Brown, Case No. 2009-4705, at p. 2.
79

Rec. Doc. 16 at ¶¶ 78, 79, and 134(r).

80

Rec. Doc. 161.

81

Rec. Doc. 186 at p. 3.

13

A.

Parties’ Arguments Regarding Standing
1.

Morgan Stanley Defendants’ Arguments in Support

First, the Morgan Stanley Defendants assert that Plaintiffs lack standing to sue because the
harms alleged in the complaint are derivative, rather than direct, claims, and because Plaintiff no
longer hold an interest in Safeguard:
Plaintiffs have no standing to sue because all of the alleged harms identified in the
Amended Complaint—which arise from the alleged loss, diminution or delay of
insurance proceeds—could only have been suffered by Safeguard, and not by
Plaintiffs. Thus, Plaintiffs’ claims are derivative of those belonging to Safeguard.
Plaintiffs are no longer members of Safeguard, and in fact expressly relinquished any
and all rights in Safeguard as of the closing of the July 2009 sale of their interest to
PPF. Thus, they do not have standing to sue.82
According to the Morgan Stanley Defendants, Delaware law determines whether Plaintiffs’ claim
are direct or directive.83 They aver that the Delaware standard is “based solely on the following
questions: Who suffered the alleged harm—the corporation or the suing stockholder
individually—and who would receive the benefit of the recovery or other remedy?”84 If a claim is
derivative, the Morgan Stanley Defendants contend, then “to bring ‘a derivative action, the plaintiff
must be a member or an assignee of a limited liability company interest at the time of bringing the
action.’”85
In this case, the Morgan Stanley Defendants argue that “Plaintiffs’ allegation that they—as
opposed to Safeguard—were harmed because they were deprived of distributions they allegedly
would have received from Safeguard do not confer standing on Plaintiffs or make their claims

82

Rec. Doc. 186-1 at pp. 23–24 (internal citations omitted).

83

Id. at p. 24 (citing Smith v. Waste Mgmt., Inc. 407 F.3d 381, 384 n.1 (5th Cir. 2005)).

84

Id. (quoting Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1035 (Del. 2004)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
85

Id. at p. 26 (emphasis in original) (quoting Del. code tit. 6, § 18-1002).

14

against the Morgan Stanley parties direct, as opposed to derivative.”86 According to the Morgan
Stanley Defendants, “where a plaintiff alleges nothing more than a diminution of the value of its
interest in an LLC, that injury is derivative as opposing to direct.”87 The Morgan Stanley Defendants
assert that “[p]erhaps recognizing this fundamental flaw in their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs
appear to take the position that the circumstances surrounding the 2009 Buy/Sell transaction were
somehow improper and thus either serve as an independent source of injury and/or wrongfully
deprived Plaintiffs of some otherwise legitimate standing to assert claims for the insurance-related
injury to Safeguard.”88 However, according to the Morgan Stanley Defendants, “any such theory
must fail given the absolutely clear and preclusive order from the Delaware court that PPF acted
entirely appropriately and legally in conducting the Buy/Sell transaction and setting the Buy/Sell
price.”89
Second, the Morgan Stanley Defendants argue that “Plaintiffs have no standing because any
alleged harm to them is speculative and contingent on Safeguard having distributed any insurance
proceeds it may have recovered to Plaintiffs.”90 Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Clapper v.
Amnesty International USA,91 the Morgan Stanley Defendants contend that “Plaintiffs’ allegation
that they would have received as much as $350 million in lost insurance proceeds allegedly owed
to Safeguard (but never proven at trial in the Insurance Litigation) is too ‘speculative’ to establish

86

Id. at p. 25.

87

Id. (citing Metro Comm’n Corp. BVI v. Advanced Mobilecomm Technologies, Inc., 854 A.2d 121, 168–69
(Del. Ch. 2004)).
88

Id. at p. 26.

89

Id.

90

Id. at p. 27.

91

133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013).

15

their standing.”92 Specifically, they assert that “[l]itigation is, of course, inherently unpredictable.
And, even assuming Safeguard had a strong claim against the Insurers, there was never a guarantee
that it would prevail in court, much less at the full value of any claim it might have.”93 Further, the
Morgan Stanley Defendants aver that “it is speculative to assume that Safeguard would have
distributed the insurance proceeds to its members, including Plaintiffs” as “[t]he Amended
Complaint points to no provision of the LLC Agreement that mandated Safeguard distribute the
proceeds of any insurance recovery to its members—much less a ‘disproportionately high’
percentage of it to Plaintiffs.”94
Finally, the Morgan Stanley Defendants contend that “Plaintiffs have no standing because
they have already admitted in a stipulated judgment that the payment they received from PPF for
their 6-percent interest in Safeguard was appropriately set.”95 According to the Morgan Stanley
Defendants, “as an alternative theory of damages, Plaintiffs allege that because the Insurance
Litigation was not resolved by July 2009, the value of Safeguard’s insurance claim was not included
in the purchase price that PPF paid for Plaintiffs’ six-percent interest in Safeguard; and, thus, the
Morgan Stanley Parties alleged misconduct in invoking that transaction denied Plaintiffs the full
value of their investment in Safeguard.”96 The Morgan Stanley Defendants counter that Plaintiffs
“are judicially estopped by the Delaware judgment from contending in this action that the price that
PPF paid for Plaintiffs’ interest in Safeguard was anything other than perfectly legal and

92

Rec. Doc. 186-1 at p. 27.

93

Id. at pp. 27–28.

94

Id. at p. 28.

95

Id. at p. 29.

96

Id.

16

‘appropriately’ set.”97 The Morgan Stanley Defendants state that in the Delaware Litigation, the
parties agreed to a Stipulated Judgment, which provided that “‘[PPF’s] invocation of the Buy/Sell
provision of the LLC Agreement on May 14, 2009 was proper’ and ‘[PPF] acted appropriately in
setting the Total Purchase Price in the Buy/Sell transaction.’”98 According to the Morgan Stanley
Defendants, “[t]he Total Purchase Price that was ‘appropriately’ set by PPF necessarily included the
then present value of the Insurance Litigation to Safeguard—which, under basic valuation
procedures, would have been discounted from a full recovery.”99
2.

Plaintiffs’ Arguments in Opposition

In opposition to the Morgan Stanley Defendants’ “Motion to Dismiss,” Plaintiffs contend
that their claims are direct, not derivative.100 Although Plaintiffs agree that Delaware law applies,101
they argue that “[i]n determining whether claims are direct or derivative in the context of a limited
liability company or any other alternative business entity, there are distinct differences under
Delaware law between the claim standards applicable to LLCs and partnerships, on the one hand,
and corporations, on the other.”102 According to Plaintiffs, “Morgan Stanley’s reliance on
corporation-based precedent is therefore misplaced.”103 Plaintiffs aver that instead “Delaware limited
partnership law is the relevant proxy for questions regarding the direct or derivative nature of claims
related to LLCs, as the Delaware LLC Act is based on the Delaware LP Act; decisional authorities

97

Id.

98

Id. (emphasis and alternations in original) (quoting Rec. Doc. 161 at ¶ 99).

99

Id.

100

Rec. Doc. 209 at p. 24.

101

Id. (“Whether the BCR parties’ claims are derivative or direct is a question of Delaware law because
Safeguard is a Delaware LLC.”).
102

Id. at pp. 24–25.

103

Id. at p. 25.

17

applicable to LPs also apply to LLCs.”104 “Contrary to the Morgan Stanley defendants’ corporationlaw-based argument,” Plaintiffs assert that their claims are direct because (1) “Safeguard is a passthrough entity”; (2) “the harm [Plaintiffs] suffered as a result of the defendants’ actions was not
suffered in accordance with the BCR parties’ pro rata membership interest in Safeguard, but through
their contractual entitlement to a disproportionate share of Safeguard’s mandatory quarterly
distribution”; and (3) “the Morgan Stanley defendants’ misconduct was integral to their effort to
eliminate the BCR parties’ membership in Safeguard.”105
In support of their argument that their claims are direct because Safeguard is a pass-through
entity, Plaintiffs cite the Delaware Court of Chancery’s opinion in Angelo American Security Fund,
L.P. v. S.R. Global International Fund, L.P.106 Quoting Angelo American, Plaintiffs aver that the
“purposes underlying the classification as derivative” are “(1) to ensure that any remedy accrues to
the entity that sustained the injury but does not confer benefits on wrongdoers nor provide windfalls
to the uninjured and (2) to provide a gatekeeping function that will both promote corporate
resolution of internal problems and deter strike suits.”107 According to Plaintiffs, the court in Angelo
American “determined that diminution in value claims were direct for a number of reasons relating
to the pass-through structure of the limited partnership at issue, causing a ‘fleeting injury to the
Fund, one that is immediately and irrevocably passed through to the partners.’”108 Thus, Plaintiffs
assert that “[a]s a matter of Delaware law, application of derivative rules to pass-through entities
‘makes no sense’ because the result would be ‘antithetical’ to the purpose of preventing windfalls

104

Id. (citing Achaian, Inc. v. Leemon Family, LLC, 25 A.3d 800, 803 n.10 (Del. Ch. 2011)).

105

Id. at pp. 25–26.

106

829 A.2d 143 (Del. Ch. 2003).

107

Rec. Doc. 209 at p. 26 (quoting Angelo Am. Sec. Fund, L.P., 829 A.2d at 152) (internal quotation marks

omitted).
108

Id. (quoting Angelo Am. Sec. Fund, L.P., 829 A.2d at 152–53).

18

and does little to further the gatekeeping function.”109 In the above-captioned matter, Plaintiffs
contend that “[w]ith only two classes of members (the BCR parties and PPF) and a contractual
waterfall provision that requires quarterly distributions of all net profits, the members of Safeguard
felt the impact of gains and losses almost immediately.”110 Additionally, they assert that “because
of the waterfall, dismissing the BCR parties’ claims for lack of standing would, rather than
preventing windfalls to undeserving plaintiffs, have the effect of creating a windfall for PPF.”111
Plaintiffs’ second argument is that their claims are direct because “[u]nder the LLC
Agreement, any recovery by the BCR parties will be distributed in accordance with the agreed-upon
waterfall distribution provisions rather than in proportion to the BCR parties’ member interests.”112
Citing a footnote in the Delaware Court of Chancery’s unpublished decision in Kelly v. Blum,113
Plaintiffs maintain that “[a] claim is direct when injury is suffered disproportionate to a member’s
pro rata ownership interest.”114 Thus, according to Plaintiffs, “the BCR parties are plainly alleging
more than a diminution of the value of their interest in an LLC. The BCR parties’ claims are based,
among other things, on the fact that they were entitled to receive more than merely their
proportionate, pro rata share (calculated based on their interest in Safeguard) of the proceeds of the
Katrina Litigation.”115
Third, Plaintiffs maintain that “[t]he Morgan Stanley Defendants’ efforts to seize control of

109

Id. at p. 27 (quoting Angelo Am. Sec. Fund, L.P., 829 A.2d at 153).

110

Id.

111

Id.

112

Id.

113

No. 4516, 2010 WL 629850 (Del Ch. Feb. 24, 2010).

114

Id. (citing Kelly, 2010 WL 629850 at *9 n.63).

115

Id. at p. 28.

19

Safeguard through the misconduct alleged in the amended complaint renders the BCR parties’
claims direct.”116 In support of this position, Plaintiffs first cite the Delaware Court of Chancery’s
decision in Brinckerhoff v. Texas Eastern products Pipeline Company, LLC117 for the proposition
that “[a]s a matter of Delaware law, when a limited partnership is involved in a merger, there is
effectively no distinction between direct and derivative claims by the limited partners.”118 Plaintiffs
further contend that in Kelly v. Blum, the Delaware Court of Chancery held that “(1) controlling
members in an LLC owe minority members ‘the additional fiduciary duties that controlling
shareholders owe minority shareholders,’ including ‘the duty not to cause the corporation to effect
a transaction that would benefit the fiduciary at the expense of the minority stockholders,’ and that
(2) facts stating a claim that a controlling stockholder with the aid of appointed managers effected
a merger to benefit itself allege a direct claim.”119 According to Plaintiffs, “PPF was a controlling
member of Safeguard, notwithstanding that it was not a ‘manager,’ because (1) PPF owned a
majority of the equity interest in the LLC; and (2) PPF in conjunction with Morgan Stanley
controlled a sufficient number of votes on the Management Committee to exert control over any
decision by Safeguard to enter into significant litigation.”120 Thus, Plaintiffs conclude that “[b]ecause
the Morgan Stanley defendants’ misconduct related to the Insurance Litigation was inextricably
intertwined with their scheme to take full control of Safeguard, and because the Insurance Litigation
and events surrounding it specifically led to the abusive use of the Buy/Sell provision, PPF’s
exercise of the Buy/Sell [provision] is precisely the type of self-dealing conduct by a controlling

116

Id.

117

986 A.2d 370 (Del. Ch. 2010).

118

Rec. Doc. 209 at p. 29.

119

Id. at p. 29 (quoting Kelly, 2010 WL 629850, at *12–13).

120

Id.

20

member of an LLC that gives rise to a Blum-type direct claim.”121
With respect to the Morgan Stanley Defendants’ argument that the stipulated judgment in
the Delaware litigation precludes Plaintiffs’ claims, Plaintiffs contend that “[t]he Delaware I
judgment cannot preclude the claims here because the narrow factual issues resolved through the
stipulated judgment were not the same questions of fact underlying the BCR parties’ claims here.”122
According to Plaintiffs, the Delaware judgment “only determined whether the invocation of and
application of the Buy/Sell were mechanically carried out in accordance with the terms of the
Buy/Sell provision (§ 11.03) of the LLC Agreement.”123 They maintain that “[t]he parties there did
not litigate any issues beyond whether PPF complied with the express terms of § 11.03 of the LLC
Agreement.”124 Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that in the Delaware case, the parties “did not litigate
whether the Morgan Stanley defendants and Lloyd’s engaged in a criminal racketeering conspiracy,
breached their fiduciary duties to the BCR parties, or engaged in any otherwise tortious activity.”125
3.

Morgan Stanley Defendants’ Reply

In response to Plaintiffs’ opposition, the Morgan Stanley Defendants contend that “[i]t is
well established in Delaware that the rules governing derivative actions apply to pass-through
entities like LLCs and limited partnerships.”126 According to the Morgan Stanley Defendants, “Anglo
American did not establish any categorical rule regarding the applicability of Delaware derivative
action restrictions to pass-through entities. Rather, the Anglo American court declined to apply the

121

Id.

122

Id. at p. 23.

123

Id.

124

Id.

125

Id.

126

Rec. Doc. 216 at p. 8 (citing, e.g., Kelly, 2010 WL 629850, at *9; Anglo Am. Sec. Fund, L.P., 892 A.2d

at 149).

21

derivative action requirements where doing so would lead to a windfall for new investors and
prevent the plaintiffs from obtaining a recovery for losses that they had ‘immediately’ suffered when
the partnership had suffered its losses.”127 The Morgan Stanley Defendants maintain that in this case,
“Safeguard has taken on no new members . . . . There is thus no risk that new investors will achieve
a windfall if the Court holds that Plaintiffs’ claims are derivative.”128
Second, the Morgan Stanley Defendants note that they “dispute that Plaintiffs would have
received the lion’s share of any insurance recovery.”129 However, assuming that proceeds would
have been distributed disproportionately to Plaintiffs, the Morgan Stanley Defendants argue that
“[e]ven if a member’s interest in an LLC’s profits is greater than its ownership stake in the company,
the harm that the member suffers because of injury to the company is still derivative of the injury
suffered by the company.”130
Next, the Morgan Stanley Defendants contend that they did not exercise control over
Safeguard. According to the Morgan Stanley Defendants, “Plaintiffs’ position directly contradicts
the allegations in the Amended Complaint” that “Plaintiff BCR was the ‘managing Member’ of
Safeguard and had the ‘sole and exclusive right, power, authority and discretion to conduct the
business and affairs of the Company.’”131 The Morgan Stanley Defendants additionally point out that
Bruce C. Roch, Jr. and Jack A. Chaney were CEO and COO of Safeguard, respectively, and that
Plaintiffs had the right to appoint two members of Safeguard’s Management Committee.132

127

Id. at p. 9.

128

Id.

129

Id. at p. 10 n.3.

130

Id. at pp. 10–11.

131

Id. at p. 11 (quoting Rec. Doc. 161 at ¶¶ 25, 27).

132

Id.

22

Third, the Morgan Stanley Defendants reiterate their position that Plaintiffs do not have
standing because their claims are speculative.133
Finally, with respect to Plaintiffs’ argument that “the Delaware judgment has no preclusive
effect because it did not decide whether the Morgan Stanley Parties engaged in criminal
racketeering, breached their fiduciary duties or otherwise engaged in tortious actions,”134 defendants
aver that they are “asserting issue preclusion, not claim preclusion.”135 Further, the Morgan Stanley
Defendants assert that the Stipulated Judgment “means that Plaintiffs have already received full
compensation for their interest in Safeguard, and consequently also for any interest they had in
Safeguard’s insurance recovery. Because Plaintiffs have suffered no injury they have no standing
and all of the claims in the Amended Complaint fail as a matter of law.”136 According to the Morgan
Stanley Defendants,
Given that Plaintiffs’ entire lawsuit turns on the allegation that Plaintiffs were denied
their fair share of the insurance proceeds through PPF’s allegedly improper
invocation of the Buy/Sell Provision, all of Plaintiffs’ claims fail as a matter of law
if Plaintiffs are collaterally estopped from contending that PPF acted improperly in
invoking the Buy/Sell Provision or that PPF inappropriately set the Buy/Sell Price.137
4.

Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Briefing

Following oral argument, Plaintiffs submitted a supplemental brief “regarding the scope of
the Stipulated Judgment in the matter referred to by the parties as ‘Delaware 1.’”138 According to
Plaintiffs, “PPF intended to craft its cause of action and its prayer for relief in Delaware 1

133

See id. at pp. 12–13.

134

Id. at p. 13.

135

Id.

136

Id. at 13.

137

Id.

138

Rec. Doc. 225 at p. 1.

23

narrowly.”139 In support, Plaintiffs quote from a pleading filed by PPF in the Delaware litigation, in
which PPF argued that the Delaware proceedings should not be stayed pending the resolution of the
CDC Litigation:
[T]he only issue involved in this [the Delaware] action is whether the Buy/Sell
transaction was properly noticed and closed, including the timing of the Offer Notice
and the Total Purchase Price set forth therein. Limited discovery is needed, and this
matter can be resolved promptly on dispositive motions from the parties or a simple
trial.
By contrast, the Louisiana Action will require resolution of far more complicated,
yet unrelated claims and issues that concern PPF and Morgan Stanley’s conduct in
obtaining insurance payment from Safeguard’s insurers. Resolution of the Louisiana
Action thus likely will require more extensive discovery of the issues and claims.140
“Accordingly,” Plaintiffs maintain, “in Delaware I PPF was requesting narrow relief regarding
compliance with the terms of ‘the Buy/Sell Provision of the LLC Agreement,’ which [PPF]
conceded was ‘unrelated’ to the ‘far more complicated’ issues in the Louisiana Action (and which
are still at issue in this litigation).”141 Plaintiffs contend that the Delaware judgment “cannot be
construed as providing PPF any more than what it requested, a declaration that ‘[PPF’s] invocation
of the Buy/Sell provision of the LLC Agreement on May 14, 2009 was proper,’ and a declaration
that ‘[PPF] acted appropriately in setting the Total Purchase Price in the Buy/Sell transaction.’”142
5.

Morgan Stanley Defendants’ Supplemental Briefing

In response to Plaintiffs’ supplemental brief, the Morgan Stanley Defendants contend that
the language of the Delaware judgment is “unambiguous” and “the Court need look no further than
the plain words of the Stipulated Judgment to conclude that the breadth of that judgment forecloses

139

Id. at p. 3.

140

Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Rec. Doc. 225-1, “Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss or Stay,” filed December 8, 2009 in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware, Case No. 4594, at pp.
53–54).
141

Id. at p. 4.

142

Id.

24

Plaintiffs’ claims in this lawsuit.”143 Further, they aver that in the amended complaint in the
Delaware Litigation, “PPF explained that it sought declaratory relief regarding its proper invocation
of the Buy/Sell Provision because Plaintiffs had ‘embarked on a course of conduct designed to
frustrate’ PPF’s right to purchase Plaintiffs’ 6% interest in Safeguard through this pre-negotiated
mechanism.”144 Quoting from PPF’s complaint in the Delaware litigation, the Morgan Stanley
Defendants argue that “[t]his was because ‘Defendants [Plaintiffs in the above-captioned matter]
have, through their words, deeds and actions, express and implied, threatened PPF that they deem
such invocation and closing a contractual and fiduciary breach and will pursue a claim for damages
as a result.’”145
B.

Applicable Law
1.

Standard on a Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) challenges a
federal district court’s subject matter jurisdiction. In determining its subject matter jurisdiction, a
district court may consider: “(1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed
facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s
resolution of disputed facts.”146
“A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the

143

Rec. Doc. 228 at pp. 1–2.

144

Id. at p. 2 (quoting Rec. Doc. 225-1, “Verified First Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief,” filed
December 8, 2009 in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware, Case No. 4594, at p. 2).
145

Id. (quoting Rec. Doc. 225-1, “Verified First Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief,” filed
December 8, 2009 in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware, Case No. 4594, at p. 2).
146

Rodriguez v. Christus Spohn Health Sys. Corp., 628 F.3d 731, 734 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ramming v.
United States, 281 F.3d 158, 162 (5th Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

25

statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.”147 Article III of the United States
Constitution establishes as an “irreducible minimum,” that in order to invoke the judicial power of
the United States, there must be a “case or controversy” between the parties.148 “One element of the
case-or-controversy requirement is that [plaintiffs], based on their complaint, must establish that
they have standing to sue.”149 In essence, “[t]he standing inquiry focuses on whether the plaintiff is
the proper party to bring this suit”;150 said differently, “the question of standing is whether the
litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.”151 As the
Supreme Court has recognized, “standing is perhaps the most important of the jurisdictional
doctrines.”152
To have standing, a plaintiff must have suffered an injury that is “concrete, particularized,
and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable
ruling.”153 The requirement of imminence “ensure[s] that the alleged injury is not too speculative
for Article III purposes—that the injury is certainly impending.”154 The party seeking to invoke
federal jurisdiction has the burden of establishing that it has standing to bring its claims.155

147

Krim v. pcOrder.com, Inc., 402 F.3d 489, 494 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Home Builders Ass’n of Miss.,
Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Cornerstone Christian Sch. v. Univ. Interscholastic League, 563 F.3d 127, 133 (assessing whether plaintiffs had
standing under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
148

United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742–43 (1995)

149

Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997).

150

Id.

151

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).

152

Hays, 515 U.S. at 742 (1995) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

153

Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010).

154

Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 565 n.2 (1992) (emphasis in original)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
155

Grant ex rel. Family Eldercare v. Gilbert, 324 F.3d 838, 387 (2003).

26

2.

Direct Versus Derivative Suits

A claim brought by a member against a limited liability company can be either direct or
derivative. Both Plaintiffs and Morgan Stanley Defendants agree that because Safeguard is a
Delaware LLC, the Court must apply Delaware law to determine whether Plaintiffs’ claims are
direct or derivative.156 However, the parties disagree on whether the standard for distinguishing
direct and directive claims in the general corporate context is applicable in the LLC context. Citing
the Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision in CML V, LLC v. Bax,157 Plaintiffs contend that “there
are distinct differences under Delaware law between the claim standards applicable to LLCs and
partnerships, on the one hand, and corporations, on the other,” and that “Morgan Stanley’s reliance
on corporation-based precedent is therefore misplaced.”158
Despite Plaintiffs’ assertion to the contrary, Delaware caselaw has consistently recognized
that the same standard applies to corporations, LLCs, and partnerships. For example, in Kelly v.
Blum, a case Plaintiffs cite frequently throughout their brief, the Delaware Court of Chancery stated
that “‘case law governing corporate derivative suits is equally applicable to suits on behalf of an
LLC,’ and I look to corporate case law to determine the proper method for distinguishing between
derivative actions brought on behalf of [the LLC] and [Plaintiff’s] direct claims.”159 Similarly, in
Anglo American Security Fund, L.P. v. S.R. Global International Fund, L.P., another case relied
upon by Plaintiffs, the Delaware Court of Chancery explained that “[t]he test for distinguishing
direct from derivative claims in the context of a limited partnership is substantially the same as that

156

See, e.g., Smith v. Waste Mgmt, Inc., 407 F.3d 381, 384 (5th Cir. 2005) (“This Court looks to Delaware
law, including the Delaware Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Tooley, to decide whether Smith’s claims are direct
or derivative.”).
157

6 A.3d 238 (Del. Ch. 2010).

158

Rec. Doc. 209 at p. 25 (citing CML V, LLC, 6 A.3d at 250)).

159

Kelly v. Blum, Case No. 4516, 2010 WL 629850, at *9 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 2010).

27

used when the underlying entity is a corporation.”160
Furthermore, CML V, LLC does not instruct differently. In CML V, LLC, a creditor of an
insolvent LLC attempted to bring a derivative action against the LLC’s board of managers;
defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that an LLC’s creditor does not have standing to bring a
derivative suit.161 The creditor countered that because a creditor of an insolvent corporation has
standing to maintain derivative claims against the corporation’s directors, then a creditor of an
insolvent LLC must have a similar ability.162 The Delaware Court of Chancery, however, observed
that the Delaware LLC Act explicitly provides that “[i]n a derivative action, the plaintiff must be
a member or an assignee of a limited liability company interest at the time of bringing the action.”163
The court determined that “the plain language of the LLC Act controls,” and thus rejected the
creditor’s analogy to the corporate context.164 CML V, LLC does not address the standard for
determining whether a claim is direct or derivative; rather it held, as matter of statutory
interpretation, that a creditor of an insolvent LLC does not have standing to bring a derivative action.
The Court will not rely on CML V, LLC outside its proper context.
Pursuant to the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin &
Jenrette, Inc., the determination of whether a claim is direct or derivative depends “solely on the
following questions: (1) who suffered the alleged harm (the corporation or the stockholder
individually); and (2) who would receive the benefit of any recovery or other remedy (the

160

Anglo Am. Sec. Fund, L.P. v. S.R. Global Int’l Fund, L.P., 829 A.2d 143, 149 (Del. Ch. 2003).

161

CML V, LLC, 6 A.3d at 239.

162

Id. at 240.

163

Id. at 241 (citing Del. Code tit. 6, § 18-1002).

164

Id. at 239.

28

corporation or the stockholders, individually)?”165 For a claim to be direct, the court must find that
the defendants’ actions “directly and individually harmed the stockholders, without injuring the
corporation.”166 In other words, to bring a direct claim, the plaintiff “must demonstrate that the duty
breached was owed to the stockholder and that he or she can prevail without showing an injury to
the corporation.”167 In determining whether the plaintiff has made this showing, the court looks
beyond plaintiff’s characterization of the claims to the specific facts alleged in the complaint.168
In this case, whether Plaintiffs’ claims are direct or derivative bears on whether Plaintiffs
have standing. Under the Delaware LLC Act, to have standing to bring a derivative action,
[T]he plaintiff must be a member or an assignee of a limited liability company
interest at the time of bringing the action and:
(1)
(2)

C.

At the time of the transaction of which the plaintiff complains; or
The plaintiff’s status as a member or an assignee or a limited liability
company interest had devolved upon the plaintiff by operation of law or
pursuant to the terms of a limited liability company agreement from a person
who was a member or an assignee of a limited liability company interest at
the time of the transaction.169

Analysis
1.

Identifying Plaintiffs’ Alleged Injuries

As discussed above, whether a claim is direct or derivative turns on (1) who suffered the
alleged harm, and (2) who would receive the benefit of the remedy. Thus, in order to determine

165
Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jennrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1033 (Del. 2004); see also Smith, 407
F.3d at 384 (citing the Tooley standard).
166

Tooley, 845 A.2d at 1039.

167

Id.

168

See Dietrich v. Harrer, 857 A.2d 1017, 1027 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“Even after Tooley, a claim is not ‘direct’
simply because it is pleaded that way . . . . Instead, the court must look to all the facts of the complaint.”); In re
Syncor Int’l Corp. Shareholders Litig., 857 A.2d 994, 997 (Del. Ch. 2004) (explaining that court applying Tooley
“look at the nature of the wrong alleged, not merely at the form of the words in the complaint.”).
169

Del. Code tit. 6, § 18-1002.

29

whether Plaintiffs’ claims against the Morgan Stanley Defendants are direct or derivative, the Court
must first carefully evaluate Plaintiffs’ lengthy complaint to clearly identify what specific harms
Plaintiffs allege and what remedies Plaintiffs seek.
First, Plaintiffs bring a claim against MSREA pursuant to the Racketeer Influence and
Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), alleging that “Defendant Morgan Stanley170 violated RICO,
specifically 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(b) and (c), as a person employed by or associated with an enterprise
that both (a) attempted to maintain and expand its control over Safeguard through a pattern of
racketeering activity; and (b) also conducted the affairs of Safeguard through a pattern of
racketeering activity from December 2005–October 2012.”171 The complaint elaborates, stating:
In sum and substance, the pattern of racketeering activity proceeded as follows.
Morgan Stanley was aware that the Insurers had significant exposure as a result of
the devastating effects of Hurricane Katrina on Safeguard’s business. Morgan
Stanley made numerous false representations and promises to the BCR parties
beginning in or about December 2005 in which Morgan Stanley indicated that it
would pursue the Katrina-related insurance claims in good faith while the BCR
parties continued to work to rejuvenate Safeguard’s business. In reality, however,
Morgan Stanley used the authority delegated to it to advance its interest at the
expense of the BCR parties. In effect, Morgan Stanley acted as a saboteur as it
sought to minimize the Katrina-related insurance claim that it represented it would
vigorously pursue.172
In describing the specific injury that MSREA allegedly caused, Plaintiffs assert:
The damages thus suffered by the BCR parties include, without limitation, the loss
of financial benefits that the BCR parties would have received from a resolution of
the Insurance Litigation but for the delay and corruption of that litigation caused by
Morgan Stanley’s misconduct, the incurring of additional costs (including capital
investments) as a result of that delay and interference, and the financial losses the
BCR parties suffered as a result of the bad faith actions taken by Morgan Stanley in
connection with the Buy/Sell provision.173

170

In Plaintiffs’ complaint, “Morgan Stanley” refers to MSREA.

171

Rec. Doc. 161 at ¶ 104.

172

Id. at ¶ 113.

173

Id. at ¶ 126.

30

Second, Plaintiffs bring a claim against all defendants pursuant to the Louisiana Racketeering
Act, codified at Louisiana Revised Statute § 15:1351, et seq.174 This claim is based on the same
allegations as Plaintiffs’ federal RICO claim.175
Third, Plaintiffs bring a claim against MSREA and Brown for breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing.176 According to the complaint, MSREA
. . . breached its duties by causing PPF to invoke the Buy/Sell, and by creating
circumstances that prevented the BCR parties from becoming ‘Purchasing Members’
under the Buy/Sell provision, for the purpose of removing the BCR parties from
Safeguard, gaining control over the Insurance Litigation and excluding the BCR
parties from any participation in the future proceeds of Safeguard, including but not
limited to proceeds from recovery in the Insurance Litigation.177
The complaint further alleges that MSREA failed “to make reasonable efforts to settle with the
Insurers for an amount that would compensate Safeguard and its members for damages incurred as
a result of Hurricane Katrina,”178 and that MSREA shared its litigation strategy with Lloyd’s. As a
result, Plaintiffs allege that they suffered the following injuries:
loss of the financial benefits that the BCR parties would have received from a
resolution of the Insurance Litigation as quarterly distributions but for the delay and
corruption of that litigation caused by the defendants’ misconduct, and the incurring
of additional costs (including capital investments) as a result of that delay and
interference, and the financial losses the BCR parties suffered as a result of the bad
faith actions taken by Morgan Stanley and Mr. Brown in connection with the
invocation of the Buy/Sell provision.179
Next, Plaintiffs assert a cause of action against MSREA for tortious inference with

174

Id. at ¶ 135.

175

See id. at ¶¶ 134–38.

176

Id. at ¶¶ 139–53.

177

Id. at ¶ 141.

178

Id. at ¶ 145.

179

Id. at ¶ 152.

31

contract.180 According to the complaint, MSREA “induced PPF and Mr. Brown to breach the LLC
Agreement by creating circumstances that prevented the BCR parties from

becoming

‘Purchasing Members’”181 and “by failing for self-interested and disloyal reasons to make reasonable
efforts to settle with the Insurers for an amount that would compensate Safeguard and its members
for damages incurred as a result of Hurricane Katrina.”182 Again, Plaintiffs assert that their injuries
include:
loss of the financial benefits that the BCR parties would have received from a
resolution of the Insurance Litigation as quarterly distributions but for the delay and
corruption of that litigation caused by the defendants’ misconduct, and the incurring
of additional costs (including capital investments) as a result of that delay and
interference, and the financial losses the BCR parties suffered as a result of the bad
faith actions taken by Morgan Stanley in connection with the invocation of the
Buy/Sell provision.183
Fifth, Plaintiffs bring claims for breach of fiduciary duty against PPF, MSREA and
Brown.184 According to Plaintiffs, MSREA breached its fiduciary duties by failing to make
reasonable efforts to settle with the Insurers, delaying the Insurance Litigation, and by sharing its
litigation strategy with Lloyd’s.185 Plaintiffs allege that Brown breached his fiduciary duties by
“acting to preserve Morgan Stanley’s interests at the expense of the BCR parties’ interests, by
misrepresenting the intentions of Morgan Stanley and PPF regarding the potential for a buy/sell
transaction, by causing PPF to take actions rendering impossible the BCR parties’ ability to act as
a ‘Purchasing Member,’ and otherwise.”186 In terms of their injuries, Plaintiffs contend:
180

Id. at ¶¶ 154–61.

181

Id. at¶ 156.

182

Id. at ¶ 157.

183

Id. at ¶ 152.

184

Id. at ¶¶ 162–76.

185

Id. at ¶¶ 168–69.

186

Id. at ¶ 172.

32

. . . the BCR parties have uniquely suffered the loss of millions of dollars, in a
specific amount to be determined at trial, due to the undermining of Safeguard’s
settlement and litigation position in the Insurance Litigation through, inter alia, the
sharing of confidential litigation information, the refusal to seek bad faith damages
against all of the Insurers, the initial concealment of the availability of expansive
business-interruption coverage, the delay in and failure to seek the full value of
Safeguard’s claims, and the stripping of control over the litigation from the BCR
parties.187
Further, Plaintiffs urge:
the BCR parties have suffered the loss of control over and ownership interest in
Safeguard, proximately caused by the breach of fiduciary duty by Morgan Stanley,
Mr. Brown, and PPF, resulting from the loss of the BCR parties’ ability to be a
‘Purchasing Member’ of Safeguard Storage, and the loss of all future proceeds from
Safeguard, including but not limited to the proceeds of the Insurance Litigation.188
Sixth, Plaintiffs bring a claim against MSREA for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary
duty.189 They allege that MSREA “directed PPF and knowingly participated in, and wrongfully aided
and abetted, PPF’s breach of fiduciary duties under the Safeguard Storage LLC Agreement and the
implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”190
Next, Plaintiffs assert a claim for civil conspiracy,191 alleging that MSREA acted in concert
with Lloyd’s
. . . to undermine the value of the recovery in the Insurance Litigation, and to
wrongfully dislodge the BCR parties from any control over or ownership interest in
Safeguard, to wrongfully disable the BCR parties from becoming “Purchasing
Members” of Safeguard, and/or to wrongfully thwart the BCR parties from receiving
any profits from Safeguard, including but not limited to proceeds of the Insurance
Litigation, much less the highest amount of proceeds possible from the Insurers to
compensate Safeguard’s members for damages incurred as a result of Hurricane

187

Id. at ¶ 175.

188

Id. at ¶ 176.

189

Id. at ¶¶ 177–82.

190

Id. at ¶ 180.

191

Id. at ¶¶ 183–89.

33

Katrina.192
Eighth, Plaintiffs bring a claim for detrimental reliance against MSREA and Brown.193
According Plaintiffs, MSREA and Brown “represented to the BCR parties that Morgan Stanley
would not cause PPF to invoke the Buy/Sell provision, and encouraged the BCR parties to maintain
their focus on developing and pursuing the Insurance Litigation rather than exerting efforts to
respond to any imminent Buy/Sell offer.”194 With respect to their injuries, Plaintiffs contend that
[a]s a result of the BCR parties’ reasonable reliance on Morgan Stanley’s
representations, when Morgan Stanley took actions to invoke the Buy/Sell provision
the BCR parties, did not receive the proceeds from the insurance litigation as
quarterly distributions, were unable to respond by electing to be “Purchasing
Members,” and the BCR parties lost all control over or ownership interest in
Safeguard, including any interest in future profits of Safeguard, including but not
limited to proceeds from the Insurance Litigation.195
Ninth, Plaintiffs assert a claim for unjust enrichment against MSREA and PPF.196 Plaintiffs
maintain that MSREA and PPF unjustly enriched themselves by receiving the settlement proceeds
of the Insurance Litigation, by maintaining their investment banking relationships with the Insurers,
by obtaining insurance for MSREA’s other businesses at lower rates, and by creating circumstances
that prevent the BCR parties from becoming “Purchasing Members” under the Buy/Sell provision.197
Finally, Plaintiffs bring a claim against all defendants under the Louisiana Unfair Trade
Practices and Consumer Protection Law.198 According to Plaintiffs, as a result of defendants’ unfair
trade practices, “the BCR parties have been and continue to be damaged, including through loss of
192

Id. at ¶ 184.

193

Id. at ¶¶ 190–95.

194

Id. at ¶ 191.

195

Id. at ¶ 194.

196

Id. at ¶¶ 196–201.

197

Id. at ¶¶ 197–99.

198

Id. at ¶¶ 202–06.

34

control over or ownership interest in Safeguard, with the attendant loss of revenues and profits from
Safeguard, including but not limited to proceeds from the Insurance Litigation.”199
As evident from the breakdown of Plaintiffs’ claims, although Plaintiffs assert ten causes of
action against the Morgan Stanley Defendants, Plaintiffs allege only a few underlying harms in this
litigation. First, Plaintiffs contend that they where harmed because the Morgan Stanley Defendants
undermined Safeguard’s recovery in the Insurance Litigation; thus, Plaintiffs never received the
distributions from the Insurance Litigation to which they were entitled. Second, Plaintiffs aver that
they were harmed because the Morgan Stanley Defendants invoked the Buy/Sell provision in bad
faith, prevented Plaintiffs from becoming “Purchasing Members,” and seized control of Safeguard;
thus, Plaintiffs were deprived of their future profit interest in Safeguard. The Court now turns to
whether claims based on these two harms are direct or derivative.
2.

Harm Related to the Insurance Litigation

As just discussed, Plaintiffs first contend that they where harmed because the Morgan
Stanley Defendants undermined Safeguard’s recovery in the Insurance Litigation, and thus, Plaintiffs
never received the distributions from the Insurance Litigation to which they were entitled. To
determine whether Plaintiffs’ claims based on this injury are direct or derivative, the Court evaluates
“(1) who suffered the alleged harm (the corporation or the stockholder individually) and (2) who
would receive the benefit of any recovery or other remedy (the corporation or the stockholders,
individually)?”200 For a claim to be direct, the Court must find that the Morgan Stanley Defendants’
actions “directly and individually harmed the stockholders, without injuring the corporation,”201 (or,
in this case, the LLC). As the Delaware Court of Chancery observed in Anglo American (a case

199

Id. at ¶ 205.

200

Tooley, 845 A.2d at 1033.

201

Id. at 1039 (emphasis added).

35

repeatedly cited by Plaintiffs), “Delaware corporate and limited partnership cases have agreed that
a diminution of the value of a business entity is classically derivative in nature.”202 In this case,
Plaintiffs essentially make a diminution in value claim—that is, they allege that the conduct of the
Morgan Stanley Defendants reduced or delayed Safeguard’s recovery in the Insurance Litigation.
This situation is similar to facts faced by Delaware Court of Chancery in Metro
Communication Corp. BVI v. Advanced Mobilecomm Technologies.203 In Metro Communication,
three entities—Metro Communication Corp., BVI (“Metro”), Advanced MobileComm Technologies
(“Advanced”), and Boston Ventures Limited Partnership V (“Boston Ventures”)—formed the
limited liability corporation Fidelity Ventures Brazil, LLC (“Fidelity Brazil”) in 1998 to invest
venture capital in the South American telecommunications market.204 Advanced held 52% of Fidelity
Brazil; Boston Ventures held 40%; and Metro held 8%.205 By 2000, Fidelity Brazil had became
engulfed in scandal, as a news agency revealed that Fidelity Brazil employees had bribed local
officials to obtain permits in Brazil.206 The scandal dashed Metro’s hopes that Fidelity Brazil would
have a lucrative IPO.207 Following the scandal, Metro sued Advanced, Boston Ventures, Fidelity
Brazil, and various managers, asserting that they either participated in the bribery or failed to be
202

Anglo Am. Sec. Fund, L.P., 829 A.2d at 151; see also In re WorldCom, Inc., 323 B.R. 844, 856 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2005) (applying Delaware law and finding claims at issue derivative because that they were “based upon
allegations of fraud and misrepresentation on the corporation that resulted in its diminution of value”); Met.
Commc’n Corp. BVI v. Advanced Mobilecomm Tech., 854 A.2d 121, 168 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“Distilled down,
[plaintiff’s] theory is that the bribery scheme destroyed the economic value of Fidelity Brazil, preventing it from
being a viable enough company to go public. Thus, the injury that Metro alleges is, in the first instance, an injury to
Fidelity Brazil itself and is therefore derivative in nature.”); Litman v. Prudential-Bache Prop., Inc., 611 A.2d 12,
15–16 (Del. Ch. 1992) (concluding that plaintiffs’ claims were derivative where “plaintiffs’ true argument is that the
alleged misconduct resulted in diminished income to the Partnership, diminished distributions to Unitholders and a
diminished value of the Units”).
203

854 A.2d 121 (Del. Ch. 2004).

204

Id. at 132.

205

Id. at 133.

206

Id. at 134.

207

Id. at 130.

36

candid with Metro regarding the bribery, and thus caused Metro to lose its investment in Fidelity
Brazil.208 Although Metro characterized its claims as direct, the court held that they were derivative:
Any harm that Metro suffered in this regard, such as lost profits from the scuttled
IPO, is entirely contingent on harm suffered by Fidelity Brazil as a whole as result
of alleged mismanagement. . . . Metro’s complaint seeks damages for lost profits
because the bribery scheme deprived Fidelity Brazil of the possibility of going
public. Distilled down, its theory is that the bribery scheme destroyed the economic
value of Fidelity Brazil, preventing it from being a viable enough company to go
public. Thus, the injury that Metro alleges is, in the first instance, an injury to
Fidelity Brazil itself and is therefore derivative in nature.209
Plaintiffs offer three reasons why the general rule that diminution in value claims are
derivative should not apply here. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that their claims are direct because
(1) Safeguard is a pass-through entity; (2) Plaintiffs had a disproportionate, non-pro rata interest in
distributions; and (3) the Morgan Stanley Defendants made efforts to seize control of Safeguard
through their conduct. These contentions are addressed in turn.
a.

Whether Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Direct Because Safeguard Is a PassThrough Entity

Plaintiffs assert that their claims are direct because Safeguard is a pass-through entity. As
discussed above, Plaintiffs cite the Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision in Anglo American for
the proposition that “the direct/derivative claims analysis in the LP or LLC context must be different
than in the corporate context.”210 According to Plaintiffs, Anglo American “determined that
diminution in value claims were direct for a number of reasons relating to the pass-through structure
of the limited partnership at issue, causing ‘a fleeting injury to the Fund, one that is immediately and
irrevocably passed through to the partners.’”211

208

Id.

209

Id. at 167–68.

210

Rec. Doc. 209 at p. 26.

211

Id. (quoting Anglo Am. Sec. Fund, L.P., 829 A.2d at 152–53).

37

Plaintiffs appear to inappropriately read Anglo American for broad propositions regarding
the direct/directive analysis in the LP and LLC context. However, the court in Anglo American
expressly recognized that “[t]he test for distinguishing direct from derivative claims in the context
of a limited partnership is substantially the same as that used when the underlying entity is a
corporation.”212 The court further acknowledged that “Delaware corporate and limited partnership
cases have agreed that a diminution of the value of a business entity is classically derivative in
nature.”213 Anglo American did not upset these general rules; rather, it drew a narrow distinction in
a specific factual context.
In Anglo American, plaintiffs, limited partners in a hedge fund, brought claims against the
limited parntership, the general partner, and the limited partnership’s auditor alleging that the
general partner had made improper capital withdrawals from the hedge fund.214 The court held that
plaintiffs’ claims were derivative because “[d]ue to the structure and operation of the Fund,
whenever the value of the Fund is reduced, the injury accrues irrevocably and almost immediately
to the current partners but will not harm those who later become partners.”215 In its opinion, the court
emphasized how the structure and function of the hedge fund was “dissimilar to the corporate
structure.”216 Specifically, it observed, that “limited partners have absolutely no control over the
governance and management of the Fund”; that “the limited partners’ interests in the Fund are not
freely transferable or tradeable”; and that “the Fund solely exists to utilize the assets of its Partners
in various investment vehicles and maintains its books to account separately for the value of each

212

Anglo Am. Sec. Fund, L.P., 829 A.2d at 149.

213

Id. at 151.

214

Id. at 147–48.

215

Id. at 152.

216

Id. at 153.

38

partners’ assets at all times.”217 According to the court, “the Fund operates more like a bank with the
individual partners each having accounts.”218 Further, the hedge fund had no value as a going
concern: “This is not a typical corporate business venture in which the value to the investors is based
not only upon the physical assets of the entity but also upon the speculative value of the entity as
a going concern. Other than a general partners’s interest in management fees, there is no goingconcern value.”219
Safeguard is fundamentally different from the hedge fund at issue in Anglo American. Rather
than functioning essentially as a bank, Safeguard is a business operating self-storage facilities. Its
value derives not only from its physical assets—e.g., the facilities it owns—but from intangible
asserts, such as its brand and reputation. Accordingly, Anglo American is not applicable in this case,
and Plaintiff’s argument that their claims are direct because Safeguard is a pass-through entity fails.
b.

Whether Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Direct Because Plaintiffs Had a
Disproportionate, Non-Pro Rata Interest in Distributions

Second, Plaintiffs assert that “[u]nder the LLC Agreement, any recovery by the BCR parties
will be distributed in accordance with the agreed-upon waterfall distribution provisions rather than
in proportion to the BCR parties’ membership.”220 According to Plaintiffs, this distinction matters
because “[a] claim is direct when injury is suffered disproportionate to a member’s pro rata
ownership interest.”221 In support of this proposition, Plaintiffs cite to the Delaware Court of
Chancery’s decisions in Anglo American and Kelly v. Blum.
As discussed above, in Anglo American, the court deviated from the general rules concerning

217

Id. at 154.

218

Id.

219

Id.

220

Rec. Doc. 209 at p. 27.

221

Id.

39

direct and derivative claims due to unique circumstances presented by the structure and operation
of the hedge fund in that particular case. Anglo American is not applicable to the above-captioned
matter, however, given its particular facts in the hedge fund context.
Turning to Kelly v. Blum, Plaintiffs appear to extract from footnote number 63 a rule that a
claim is direct where the entity in question has an alternative distribution scheme. Footnote 63 must
be placed in its proper context. The decision in Kelly includes a discussion of how a court should
evaluate whether a claim is direct or derivative.222 In this high-level discussion, the Kelly court notes
that a court applying the Tooley standard “looks to the nature of the wrong alleged, not merely at
the form of words used in the complaint.”223 In footnote 63, the court cites its authority for this
statement, stating:
Specifically, the Court evaluates whether the nature of the alleged injury is such that
it falls directly on the LLC as a whole and only secondarily on an individual member
as a function of and in proportion to his pro rata investment in the LLC, in which
case the claim would be derivative, or whether the injury inflicts direct harm on the
rights of the member as an individual. See In re Syncor Int’l Corp. S’holders Litig.,
857 A.2d 994, 997 (Del. Ch. 2004); Tooley, 845 A.2d at 1033; see also In re
Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 954 A.2d 346, 371 n.112 (Del. Ch. 2008).224
This Court will not infer that a claim is direct where the entity in question has an alternative
distribution scheme based on a footnote that happens to contain the words “pro rata” but cites
authority for an entirely unrelated proposition. The facts in Kelly do not address an alternative
distribution scheme, such as the waterfall provisions in Safeguard’s LLC Agreement, and thus, it
would be improper to apply Kelly in the manner suggested by Plaintiffs.
In this case, Plaintiffs argue that the Morgan Stanley Defendants’ conduct prevented
Safeguard from recovering insurance proceeds, which in turn prevented distributions to Plaintiffs.

222

See Kelly, 2010 WL 629850, at *9.

223

Id.

224

Id. at *9 n.63.

40

Thus, the harm to Plaintiffs—not receiving distributions—is predicated on the diminished value of
Safeguard. In Litman v. Prudential-Bache Properties, Inc.,225 the Delaware Court of Chancery
rejected the idea diminished distributions represent a different harm than the diminished value of
the entity. The court observed that “the initial injury for which plaintiffs seek redress was to the
Partnership. That is, plaintiffs complain that the Partnership received a lower amount of income
because of the alleged misconduct.”226 It then explained that unless plaintiffs allege that the
defendants violated a contractual obligation to make distributions in a prescribed manner, the claims
are derivative:
The second alleged injury, the diminished distributions, is merely a different way of
repeating the first claim. That is, the cause of this injury was that the Partnership had
less income on account of defendants’ alleged misconduct, not that the general
partners had somehow failed to abide by an agreement with the limited partners to
distribute certain amounts to the limited partners. Thus, the defendants did not inflict
the injury of lower distributions directly on the plaintiffs. Rather, the injury flowed
from a direct injury to the Partnership (i.e., the lower income of the Partnership).227
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ argument that their claims are direct because Plaintiffs had a
disproportionate, non-pro rata interest in distributions fails.
c.

Whether Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Direct Because the Morgan Stanley
Defendants Made Efforts to Seize Control of Safeguard Through Their
Conduct

Finally, Plaintiffs argue that their claims are direct because the Morgan Stanley Defendants
made efforts to seize control of Safeguard through their conduct. In support of this position,
Plaintiffs first cite the Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision in Brinckerhoff v. Texas Eastern
Products Pipeline Company, LLC228 for the proposition that “[a]s a matter of Delaware law, when

225

611 A.2d 12 (Del. Ch. 1992).

226

Id. at 16.

227

Id. at 16 (emphasis added).

228

986 A.2d 370 (Del. Ch. 2010).

41

a limited partnership is involved in a merger, there is effectively no distinction between direct and
derivative claims by the limited partners.”229 Plaintiffs then assert that
[t]he Delaware Court of Chancery applied this framework even more broadly to the
LLC context in Kelly v. Blum, holding that (1) controlling members in an LLC owe
minority members ‘the additional fiduciary duties that controlling shareholders owe
minority shareholders,’ including ‘the duty not to cause the corporation to effect a
transaction that would benefit the fiduciary at the expense of the minority
stockholders,’ and that (2) facts stating a claim that a controlling stockholder with
the aid of appointed managers effected a merger to benefit itself allege a direct
claim.230
As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that, unlike Brinckerhoff, the above-captioned
matter does not involve a limited partnership or a merger; thus it is dubious that any rule that “there
is effectively no distinction between direct and derivative claims” would apply in this context.
Further, Plaintiffs appear to misread Brinckerhoff. In Brinckerhoff, the plaintiffs were holders of
limited partnership units in Teppco Partners, L.P. (“Teppco”); defendants included Teppco’s general
partner, the directors of Teppco’s general partner, and Daniel L. Duncan, an individual who
controlled Teppco’s general partner.231 Plaintiffs brought a derivative suit (the “Derivative Action”),
alleging that defendants breached their fiduciary duties to Teppco by entering into transactions with
Enterprise Products Partners, L.P (“Enterprise”), which was also controlled by Duncan.232 According
to Plaintiffs, the transaction unfairly favored Enterprise.233 During the course of the Derivative
Action, a merger between Teppco and Enterprise extinguished plaintiffs’ interests in Teppco, and
resulted in plaintiffs’ bringing another suit, challenging the merger (the “Merger Action”).234 In

229

Rec. Doc. 209 at p. 29.

230

Id. (quoting Kelly, 2010 WL 629850, at *12–13).

231

Brinckerhoff v. Tex. E. Products Pipeline Co., LLC., 986 A.2d 370, 373 (Del. Ch. 2010).

232

Id.

233

Id.

234

Id.

42

Brinckerhoff, the Delaware Court of Chancery was called upon to approve a settlement resolving
both the Derivative Action and the Merger Action.235 In its decision approving the settlement, the
court noted that it would “not consider in detail whether the closing of the Merger extinguished the
plaintiffs’ standing” to assert their claims.236 First, the court observed that “[n]o party has raised the
plaintiffs’ potential loss of standing as a basis for dismissal or sought to modify the settlement.”237
Further, the court explained that the specific claims asserted by plaintiffs, although styled as
derivative, could be characterized as derivative or direct:
[T]he Teppco limited partnership agreement specifically prohibited the actions that
were challenged in the Derivative Action, and the plaintiffs had standing as limited
partners to enforce the limited partnership agreement directly. The wrongs
challenged in the Derivative Action thus gave rise to both a derivative right of action
on behalf of Teppco and a direct right of action by the limited partners for breach of
the limited partnership agreement.238
Accordingly, the court concluded that “[i]n light of the dual nature of the claim, I would see no
reason why plaintiffs could not have continued their action post-Merger as a de facto class action
on behalf of holders of Teppco LP units as of the effective time [of the Merger].”239 The court
ultimately approved the agreed-upon settlement among the parties.240
Unlike Brinckerhoff, the above-captioned matter does not involve approval of a settlement
where no party has raised the standing issue. This litigation is at the motion-to-dismiss stage and the
Plaintiffs’ standing is vigorously contested. Further, in this case, Plaintiffs’ do not assert that their
claims could be recharacterized as claims for breach of the LLC agreement; thus, the “dual nature”

235

Id.

236

Id. at 383.

237

Id.

238

Id.

239

Id.

240

Id. 374.

43

observed in Brinckerhoff is absent here.
Turning to Kelly v. Blum, first, the Court observes that Kelly does not apply the Brinckerhoff
framework “even more broadly,” as Plaintiffs suggest; Kelly does not cite Brinkerhoff at all and
addresses a fundamentally different context. In Kelly, the plaintiff—the founder and former member,
manager, and president of Marconi Broadcasting Company, LLC (“Marconi”)—purported to bring
both derivative and direct claims for breach of fiduciary duties against Marconi’s two other
members.241 The Delaware Court of Chancery first dismissed the plaintiff’s derivative claims for
lack of standing, noting that the plaintiff no longer held an interest in Marconi.242 Next, the court
considered whether plaintiff could bring his direct claim, and as a threshold matter, examined
whether the other two members owed fiduciary duties to the plaintiff, as opposed to the LLC.243 The
court explained that absent contractual provisions to the contrary, controlling members of an LLC
owe “traditional fiduciary duties” to minority members:
[I]n the absence of provisions in the LLC agreement explicitly disclaiming the
applicability of default principles of fiduciary duty, controlling members in a
manager-managed LLC owe minority members the traditional fiduciary duties that
controlling shareholders owe minority shareholders. Controlling
shareholders—typically defined as shareholders who have voting power to elect
directors, cause a break-up of the company, merge the company with another, or
otherwise materially alter the nature of the corporation and the public shareholder’s
interests—owe certain fiduciary duties to minority shareholders. Specifically, and
very pertinently to this case, such fiduciary duties include the duty not to cause the
corporation to effect a transaction that would benefit the fiduciary at the expense of
the minority stockholders.244
The court in Kelly concluded that the other Marconi members were “controlling members” who thus

241

Id. at *1.

242

Id. at *1.

243

Id. at *12.

244

Id.

44

owed the plaintiff the “traditional fiduciary duties.”245 In making this determination, the court first
noted that the two defendants had the authority to appoint two managers with 24% and 51% of the
voting power of the board of managers.246 Further, the defendants in Marconi “held the power to,
on their own or through their designed Managers, issue membership units, enter affiliated
transactions, sell a material amount of Marconi’s asserts, enter agreements involving any merger,
conversion, consolidation, or business combination, amend the [LLC] Agreement or Certificate of
Formation, and incur any indebtedness without [Plaintiff’s] input or approval.”247
For Kelly to apply, the Morgan Stanley Defendants must have been controlling members of
Safeguard. The allegations of the complaint, however, do not support such a conclusion. Plaintiff
BCR was the “Managing Member” or “Administrative Member” of Safeguard.248 In this capacity,
Plaintiff BCR “had the sole and exclusive right, power, authority and discretion to conduct the
business and affairs of the Company and the Property Owners, and to do all things necessary to carry
on the business of the Company and the Property Owners, . . . and to take any action of any kind and
to do anything and everything the Administrative Member deems necessary, desirable, or
appropriate in accordance with the provisions of [the LLC Agreement] and applicable law.”249
Furthermore, the LLC Agreement gave Plaintiff BCR the right to designate two of the four members
of Safeguard’s Management Committee.250 According to the complaint, “Major Decisions” required

245

Id. at *13.

246

Id.

247

Id.

248

Rec. Doc. 161 at ¶ 25.

249

Id. at ¶ 27 (alteration in original).

250

Id. at ¶ 29.

45

the unanimous approval of the Management Committee.251 Finally, Roch and Chaney served as CEO
and COO, respectively.252 Unlike the defendants in Kelly, the Morgan Stanley Defendants’ did not
control 75% of the management committee, and were not empowered to take unilateral actions.
Thus, “controlling member” framework set forth in Kelly does not apply.
Given that neither Brinckerhoff nor Kelly apply to the allegations in this case, Plaintiffs’
argument that their claims are direct because the Morgan Stanley Defendants made efforts to seize
control of Safeguard through their conduct fails.
3.

Harm Related to the Buy/Sell Provision

In addition to contending that they were injured by the frustration of the Insurance Litigation,
Plaintiffs also aver that they were harmed because the Morgan Stanley Defendants invoked the
Buy/Sell provision in bad faith, prevented Plaintiffs from becoming “Purchasing Members,” and
seized control of Safeguard; thus, Plaintiffs were deprived of their future profit interest in Safeguard.
Under Tooley, this harm may present a direct claim. With respect to who suffered the harm,
Plaintiffs appear to allege not that the Morgan Stanley Defendants reduced the value of Safeguard
by invoking the Buy/Sell provision, but rather that Defendants eliminated Plaintiffs’ right to share
in Safeguard’s profits without fairly compensating Plaintiffs. Turning to who would benefit from
any recovery, if Plaintiffs prevail, they might receive the value of their interest in Safeguard.
The Morgan Stanley Defendants admit that characterizing the harm in this manner may
appear to state a direct claim.253 However, as discussed above, they contend that based on the
Stipulated Judgment in the Delaware Litigation, Plaintiffs are judicially estopped from asserting that
the Morgan Stanley Defendants improperly invoked the Buy/Sell provision or paid an inappropriate

251

Id. at p. 2.

252

Id. at ¶ 26.

253

See Rec. Doc. 186-1 at p. 29.

46

price. Thus, the Morgan Stanley Defendants maintain that “Plaintiffs are precluded from establishing
the factual predicates for their claims (including that they suffered any damages),” and cannot
establish standing.254 Plaintiffs counter that the Stipulated Judgment addressed a narrow contractual
issue, and thus does not preclude Plaintiffs from establishing that they were harmed by the Buy/Sell
transaction.
a.

Collateral Estoppel

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that in analyzing whether collateral estoppel bars
Plaintiffs from asserting harms associated with the Buy/Sell transaction, it may take judicial notice
of the contents of public records, including the Stipulated Judgment entered in the Delaware I
Litigation and the pleadings filed in that case.255
The parties agree that “[t]o determine the preclusive effect of a state court judgment in a
federal action, ‘federal courts must apply the law of the state from which the judgment emerged.’”256
In this case, the judgment at issue comes from the Delaware Court of Chancery, and thus Delaware
law applies. As the Delaware Supreme Court has explained, “where a court or administrative agency
has decided an issue of fact necessary to its decision, the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes
relitigation of that issue in a subsequent suit or hearing concerning a different claim or cause of
action involving a party to the first case.”257 Collateral estoppel applies where:
(1) The issue previously decided is identical with the one presented in the action in
question, (2) the prior action has been finally adjudicated on the merits, (3) the party
against whom the doctrine is invoked was a party or in privity with a party to the

254

Rec. Doc. 216 at p. 14.

255

See, e.g., Norris v. Hearst Trust, 500 F.3d 454, 461 n.9 (5th Cir. 2007); Jefferson v. Leads Indus. Ass’n,
Inc., 106 F.3d 1245, 1250 n.14 (5th Cir. 1997).
256

Black v. N. Panola Sch. Dist., 461 F.3d 584, 588 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Moak,
55 F.3d 1093, 1096–97 (5th Cir. 1995)); see also La Croix v. Mashall Cnty, Miss., 409 F. App’x 794, 798 (5th Cir.
2011).
257

Betts v. Townsends, Inc., 765 A.2d 531, 534 (Del. 2000).

47

prior adjudication, and (4) the party against whom the doctrine is raised had a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action.258
“The party asserting collateral estoppel has the burden of showing that the issue was already decided
in the first proceeding.”259
b.

Application to the Stipulated Judgment in the Delaware I
Litigation

In this case, the parties do not dispute whether the second and third prongs of the Delaware
test for collateral estoppel are met. With respect to the second prong—whether the Delaware I
Litigation has been finally adjudicated on the merits—the Stipulated Judgment expressly states that
“[o]nce entered, this Order shall constitute a final, unappealable judgment in the above-captioned
action, which shall be closed immediately thereafter.”260 Further, the third prong—whether the party
against whom the doctrine is invoked was a party or in privity with a party to the prior
adjudication—is satisfied. Plaintiffs in the above-captioned matter—BCR, JAC, and SDG—were
defendants in the Delaware I Litigation.261 However, the parties contest prong one—whether the
issue decided in the Delaware I Litigation is the same as the issue here—and prong four—whether
Plaintiffs had a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue.
The Stipulated Judgment in the Delaware I Litigation provides that: (1) “[PPF’s] invocation
of the Buy/Sell provision of the LLC Agreement on May 14, 2009 was proper”; and (2) “[PPF] acted
appropriately in setting the Total Purchase Price in the Buy/Sell transaction.”262 According to the
Morgan Stanley Defendants “[t]his means that Plaintiffs have already received full compensation

258

Id. at 535 (quoting State v. Machin, 642 A.2d 1235, 1239 (Del. Super. 1993)).

259

Troy Corp. v. Schoon, 959 A.2d 1130, 1134 (Del. Ch. 2008).

260

Rec. Doc. 186-2, “Stipulated Order of Judgment,” entered March 15, 2011 by Judge Leo E. Strine, in
Case No. 4594, Delaware Court of Chancery, at p. 125.
261

Id. at p. 124.

262

Id. at p. 125.

48

for their interest in Safeguard and consequently also for any interest they had in Safeguard’s
insurance recovery.”263 They aver that “the Buy/Sell Price necessarily took into account the value
of Safeguard’s contingent claim in the Insurance Litigation—which means that Plaintiffs have not
suffered the damages they seek to recover in this action.”264 Plaintiffs counter that “[t]he Delaware
1 litigation only determined whether the invocation of and application of the Buy/Sell were
mechanically carried out in accordance with the terms of the Buy/Sell provision (§ 11.03) of the
LLC Agreement” and that “[t]he parties there did not litigate any issues beyond whether PPF
complied with the express terms of the § 11.03 of the LLC Agreement.”265 Specifically, Plaintiffs
contend that the Delaware I Litigation did not address “whether the Morgan Stanley defendants and
Lloyd’s engaged in a criminal racketeering conspiracy, breached their fiduciary duties to the BCR
parties, or engaged in any otherwise tortious actions.”266
First, the Court notes that whether RICO conspiracy, breach of fiduciary duty, or tort claims
were asserted in the Delaware I Litigation does not determine whether collateral estoppel applies.
As the Delaware Supreme Court has explained, collateral estoppel applies to a subsequent suit
“concerning a different claim or cause of action.”267 The question the Court must determine is
whether the claims asserted in the above-captioned matter involve an identical issue of fact as the
Delaware I Litigation.268
Turning to the issues of fact resolved in the Delaware I Litigation, by the plain language of

263

Rec. Doc. 216 at p. 13.

264

Rec. Doc. 216 at p. 14 (emphasis in original).

265

Rec. Doc. 209 at p. 23 (emphasis in original).

266

Id.

267

268

Betts, 765 A.2d at 534 (emphasis added).
See id.

49

the Stipulated Judgment, the Delaware I Litigation determined that the invocation of the Buy/Sell
provision was “proper” and that PPF “acted appropriately in setting the Total Purchase Price in the
Buy/Sell transaction.” Plaintiffs urge this Court to rule that although the Delaware I Litigation
concluded that the transaction was “proper” and the price was “appropriately” set, that somehow
Plaintiffs may now argue that the price failed to compensate them for the value of their interest in
Safeguard. The pleadings in the Delaware I Litigation belie this interpretation. In its complaint in
the Delaware I Litigation, PPF specifically sought
. . . declaratory relief from [BCR’s, JAC’s, and SDG’s] continuing improper
campaign to frustrate PPF’s contractual right to purchase Defendant’s interest in
Safeguard Storage Properties, LLC for a fair and adequate price pursuant to the
Buy/Sell provision of the Amended & Restated Limited Liability Company
Agreement among the parties.269
According to PPF’s allegations, BCR, JAC, and SDG had “through their words, deeds and actions,
express and implied, threatened PPF that they deem such invocation and closing a contractual and
fiduciary breach and will pursue a claim for damages as a result.”270 Further, the complaint in the
Delaware I Litigation specifically contemplated that the parties disputed how the potential recovery
in Insurance Litigation would affect the value of Plaintiffs’ interests in Safeguard. The complaint
quoted a letter from Roch, alleging that Roch “attempted preemptively to price and control any
Buy/Sell transaction by insisting that any valuation of Safeguard’s assets be consistent with a
valuation made in the Katrina Coverage Litigation.”271 As quoted in the complaint, Roch wrote: “[t]o
the extent that a member must prepare a valuation of Safeguard or its assets for any purpose, it is
imperative that the valuation include among Safeguard’s assets the Claims at a present value

269

Rec. Doc. 225-1, “Verified First Amended Company for Declaratory Relief,” filed Dec. 8, 2009, in Case
No. 4594, Delaware Court of Chancery., at p. 1 (emphasis added).
270

Id. at p. 2.

271

Id. at p. 9.

50

consistent with the Expert Valuation.”272
In light of these allegations, whether Plaintiffs were fairly compensated for the value of their
interest in Safeguard was a key factual issue in the Delaware I Litigation. The parties entered into
a Stipulated Judgment determining that the Buy/Sell transaction was “proper” and that the price was
“appropriately” set. Turning to the above-captioned matter, in order to show that they were harmed
by being deprived of the value of their interest in Safeguard, Plaintiffs would have to relitigate the
same factual issue. Thus, the Court finds that prong one—whether the issue decided in the Delaware
I Litigation is the same as the issue here—is satisfied.
The fourth and final prong of the Delaware test for collateral estoppel asks whether the party
against whom the doctrine is raised had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior
action. In the Stipulated Judgment, Plaintiffs acknowledged that “having taken discovery with
respect to [PPF’s] claim in the amended complaint and in light of the facts disclosed thereby, [PPF]
and [BCR, JAC, and SDG] agree that further prosecution of this Action is unneccessary.”273
Plaintiffs then proceeded to stipulate that (1) “[PPF’s] invocation of the Buy/Sell provision of the
LLC Agreement on May 14, 2009 was proper”; and (2) “[PPF] acted appropriately in setting the
Total Purchase Price in the Buy/Sell transaction.”274 Plaintiffs may disagree with this stipulation
now; however, as the Delaware Court of Chancery explained in Troy Corp. v. Schoon, “it is not for
this court to rectify [Plaintiff’s] litigation choices by now refusing the apply the doctrine of collateral
estoppel.”275
Therefore, the Court determines that collateral estoppel applies and that Plaintiffs are
272

Id.

273

Rec. Doc. 186-2, “Stipulated Order of Judgment,” entered March 15, 2011 by Judge Leo E. Strine, in
Case No. 4594, Delaware Court of Chancery, at p. 125.
274

Id.

275

Troy Corp., 959 A.2d at 1137.

51

precluded from asserting that they were deprived of the fair value of their interest in Safeguard. As
discussed above, in order to have standing, a plaintiff must have suffered an injury that is “concrete,
particularized, and actual or imminent.”276 Here, it has already been determined that Plaintiffs were
not harmed by the Buy/Sell transaction or the price paid for their interests in Safeguard.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs cannot show any actual injury, and they thus lack standing.
D.

Conclusion
In this litigation, Plaintiffs bring numerous causes of action but essentially allege two harms:

(1) that the Morgan Stanley Defendants undermined Safeguard’s recovery in the Insurance
Litigation, and thus, Plaintiffs never received the distributions from the Insurance Litigation to
which they were entitled; and (2) that the Morgan Stanley Defendants invoked the Buy/Sell
provision in bad faith, prevented Plaintiffs from becoming “Purchasing Members,” and seized
control of Safeguard, and thus, Plaintiffs were deprived of their future profit interest in Safeguard.
The first harm asserted by Plaintiffs is derivative, and because Plaintiffs are no longer members of
Safeguard, they lack standing to bring this derivative claim. The second harm asserted by Plaintiffs
may be direct. However, pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel, Plaintiffs cannot establish
that they were deprived of the fair value of their interest in Safeguard. Considering that Plaintiffs
cannot show any injury, they do not having standing to bring this claim.
Since the Court concludes that Plaintiffs do not have standing, the Court grants the Morgan
Stanley Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the Court need not address the portions of Defendants’ motion relating to lack of
personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2) or failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

276

Monsanto Co., 561 U.S. at 149.

52

IV. Lloyd’s Underwriters’ Motion to Dismiss
In their “Motion to Dismiss,” Lloyd’s Underwriters “move this Court pursuant to Rules
12(b)(6), 12(b)(1), 12(b)(4) and 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for an order dismissing
Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint for Damages (‘Complaint’) for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, insufficient process, and failure to plead
fraud with particularity.”277 The Court first addresses the parties’ arguments regarding subject matter
jurisdiction.
A.

Parties’ Arguments Regarding Subject Matter Jurisdiction
1.

Lloyd’s Underwriters’ Arguments in Support

Lloyd’s Underwriters argue that “Plaintiffs seek damages for two purported wrongs.”278
According to Lloyd’s, Plaintiffs assert that Lloyd’s Underwriters “conspired” with the Morgan
Stanley Defendants first “to delay and minimize the payment on Safeguard’s Katrina insurance
claims,”279 and second “to prevent Plaintiffs from receiving the insurance proceeds (via distributions
from Safeguard) in sufficient time to prevent a buyout of their 6% interest in Safeguard by MSREA
and Safeguard’s former business partner, PPF, apparently by effectuating their own buyout of PPF’s
94% interest.”280
According to Lloyd’s, “Plaintiffs do not have standing to bring claims relating to Lloyd’s
payment under the Excess Policies.”281 First, Lloyd’s asserts, “Plaintiffs have no more rights under

277

Rec. Doc. 188 at p. 1.

278

Id.

279

Id. at p. 2.

280

Id.

281

Rec. Doc. 188-1 at p. 26.

53

the Excess Policies than the named insured, Safeguard.”282 Lloyd’s contends that “[t]he Buyout
extinguished Plaintiffs’ interests in Safeguard as of July 2009,” and thus “even if Safeguard could
have brought the instant claims . . . Plaintiffs lost any legal right to bring such claims themselves
upon completion of the Buyout and the termination of their interests in Safeguard.”283
Second, citing two cases from the Eastern District of Louisiana—Lee v. Safeco Insurance
Company of America284 and Axis Surplus Insurance Company v. Third Millennium Insurance and
Financial Services, Inc.285—Lloyd’s argues that “Plaintiffs never had the right to pursue claims
related to the propriety of Lloyd’s payment under the Excess Policies. Only a named insured,
additional insured, or third-party beneficiary may bring suit under an insurance policy.”286
According to Lloyd’s, Plaintiffs do not allege “that they are either named or additional insured
parties under the Excess Policies” or “facts that would qualify them as third party beneficiaries to
the policies.”287 Lloyd’s asserts that “[a] third-party is a beneficiary to a contract only if a
‘stipulation pour autrui’ exists, which occurs only where: ‘1) the stipulation for a third party is
manifestly clear; 2) there is certainty as to the benefit provided to the third party; and 3) the benefit
is not a mere incident of the contract between the promisor and the promisee.’”288 Citing Harrison
v. Safeco Insurance Company of America, a case from the Eastern District of Louisiana, Lloyd’s
avers that “[i]n the context of insurance contracts, Louisiana federal courts have determined that

282

Id.

283

Id.

284

No. 08-1100, 2008 WL 2622997, at *2 (E.D. La. July 2, 2008) (Africk, J.).

285

781 F. Supp. 2d 320 (E.D. La. 2011) (Vance, J.).

286

Id. at pp. 26–27 (emphasis in original).

287

Id. at p. 27.

288

Id. (quoting Williams v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 398 F. App’x 44, 47 (5th Cir.

2010)).

54

the ‘proper means to include a stipulation pour autrui in an insurance contract is to name the third
party as an additional insured.’”289 According to Lloyd’s, “Plaintiffs are not additional insureds
under the Excess Policies, and they are not third-party beneficiaries of those policies.”290
Lloyd’s further argues that “[e]ven were Plaintiffs able to assert rights under the Excess
Policies, Louisiana law precludes released parties from bringing subsequent actions based on
compromised claims.”291 Lloyd’s explains that on October 19, 2012, a “Settlement and Release
Agreement” ended the Insurance Litigation.292 According to Lloyd’s, “[i]n the Settlement
Agreement, Safeguard released all Insurers, including Lloyd’s, from ‘all past, present and future
claims alleged or that could have been alleged or claimed in the Coverage Litigation [i.e., the
Insurance Litigation], including ‘any claims based on unfair claims handling or insurer bad faith.’”293
Looking to the language of the Settlement Agreement, Lloyd’s maintains that “[t]he Settlement
Agreement here absolutely precludes further claims against Lloyd’s arising from the Excess
Policies.”294 Lloyd’s contends that “‘Releasers’ in the Settlement Agreement include Safeguard’s
‘members,’ as well as their ‘respective predecessors, successors, assigns, affiliates and
subsidiaries.’”295 According to Lloyd’s, “[s]uch language clearly includes Plaintiffs, each of whom

289

Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Harrison v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., No. 06-4664, 2007 WL 1244268,
at *5 (E.D. La. Jan. 26, 2007) (Barbier, J.)).
290

Id.

291

Id. at pp. 27–28 (citing Tran v. Farmers & Merchants Ins. Co., 04-793 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/14/04), 892
So. 2d 88, 90).
292

Id. at p. 22.

293

Id. (quoting Rec. Doc. 188-8, Settlement and Release Agreement, Safeguard Storage Props., LLC, et al
v. Donahue-Favret Contractors, Inc., et al, No. 07-9359 (Civ. Dis. Ct. Orleans Parish Oct. 19, 2012)).
294

Id. at p. 28.

295

Id. (quoting Rec. Doc. 188-8, Settlement and Release Agreement, Safeguard Storage Props., LLC, et al
v. Donahue-Favret Contractors, Inc., et al, No. 07-9359 (Civ. Dis. Ct. Orleans Parish Oct. 19, 2012)).

55

previously was ‘a member of Safeguard.’”296 Further, Lloyd’s contends that “[t]he Settlement
Agreement specifically releases Lloyd’s from ‘any claim that was or could have been alleged in the
lawsuit by an insured.’”297 Lloyd’s additionally argues that “[t]he Settlement Agreement also triggers
res judicata under La. R.S. § 13:4231.”298
With respect to Plaintiffs’ allegations that Lloyd’s wrongfully aided the buyout, Lloyd’s
contends that these claims “are barred by Plaintiffs’ voluntary entry into a ‘Stipulated Order of
Judgment’ in the Delaware Litigation.” According to Lloyd’s, “[t]he issues conceded in the
Delaware Stipulated Judgment are necessary to resolve Plaintiffs’ case here.”299 Lloyd’s explains:
For Plaintiffs to demonstrate they would have received a better price in the Buyout
absent Lloyd’s alleged conduct (or that they were otherwise damaged by the
purchase of their shares), Plaintiffs must prove that they received a price inconsistent
with that to which they were entitled under the LLC Agreement. But Plaintiffs
stipulated in Delaware that they received an “appropriate” price for their shares,
thereby foreclosing any claim that they were entitled to more under the LLC
Agreement. Similarly, for Plaintiffs to demonstrate that, but for Lloyd’s conduct,
Plaintiffs would have been able to purchase Morgan Stanley’s interest in Safeguard,
Plaintiffs would have to demonstrate that Morgan Stanley improperly invoked the
Buy/Sell provision.300

2.

Plaintiffs’ Arguments in Opposition

In their omnibus opposition to both Lloyd’s “Motion to Dismiss” and the Morgan Stanley
Defendant’s “Motion to Dismiss,” Plaintiffs assert that “[t]he BCR parties have standing to bring
this lawsuit.”301 First, Plaintiffs aver that “[t]he Insurance Litigation Settlement Agreement did not
296

Id. (quoting Rec. Doc. 161 at p. 2).

297

Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Rec. Doc. 188-8, Settlement and Release Agreement, Safeguard
Storage Props., LLC, et al v. Donahue-Favret Contractors, Inc., et al, No. 07-9359 (Civ. Dis. Ct. Orleans Parish
Oct. 19, 2012)).
298

Id.

299

Id. at p. 30.

300

Id.

301

Rec. Doc. 209 at p. 20.

56

release the BCR parties’ claims.”302 According to Plaintiffs, “Safeguard could not release claims it
did not own . . . . The BCR parties were not even members of Safeguard when the settlement and
release were entered into.”303 Plaintiffs maintain that their claims exist “separate and apart from the
claims owned by Safeguard in the Insurance Litigation.”304 Additionally, Plaintiffs argue that res
judicata under Louisiana Revised Statute § 13:4231 does not apply. According to Plaintiffs, “under
La. R.S. § 13:4231, a judgment is conclusive only ‘between the same parties.’”305 Further, Plaintiffs
assert that “[t]he release also has no preclusive effect because the BCR parties’ causes of action did
not accrue until the Insurance Litigation concluded; therefore, their causes of action did not exist
at the time of the release.”306 Plaintiffs also contend that “because the claims against Lloyd’s were
‘future’ claims, the settlement cannot release such claims.”307 Citing the Louisiana Supreme Court’s
decision in Brown v. Drillers, Inc., Plaintiffs urge that “[u]nder Louisiana law, releases of future
actions ‘are narrowly construed to assure that the parties fully understand the rights released and the
resulting consequences. As a result, if the release instrument leaves any doubt as to whether a
particular future action is covered by the compromise, it should be construed not to cover such
future action.’”308
Second, Plaintiffs argue that “[t]he Stipulated Judgment in Delaware 1 does not preclude the
BCR parties’ claims.”309 As discussed above in the context of the Morgan Stanley Defendants’
302

Id. at p. 21.

303

Id. (emphasis in original).

304

Id.

305

Id. at p. 22 (alterations omitted).

306

Id.

307

Id.

308

Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Brown v. Drillers, Inc., 630 So. 2d 741, 753 (La. 1994)).

309

Id.

57

“Motion to Dismiss,” Plaintiffs contend that “[t]he Delaware I judgment cannot preclude the claims
here because the narrow factual issues resolved through the stipulated judgment were not the same
questions of fact underlying the BCR parties’ claims here.”310 According to Plaintiffs, the Delaware
judgment “only determined whether the invocation of and application of the Buy/Sell were
mechanically carried out in accordance with the terms of the Buy/Sell provision (§ 11.03) of the
LLC Agreement.”311 They maintain that “[t]he parties there did not litigate any issues beyond
whether PPF complied with the express terms of § 11.03 of the LLC Agreement.”312
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that they may bring claims pursuant to the insurance policy.
According to Plaintiffs, “Lloyd’s asserts, with little analysis, that the BCR parties have not alleged
facts sufficient to render them third party beneficiaries as a result of a stipulation pour autrie.”313
Plaintiffs contend that “[s]tipulations pour autrie are favored under Louisiana law.”314 They assert
that “the insurance contract with Lloyd’s was for the ultimate benefit of Safeguard’s members, and
particularly to protect the BCR parties in light of their entitlement to the disproportionate waterfall
distribution under the LLC Agreement.”315
3.

Lloyd’s Reply

In its reply, Lloyd’s first argues that “Plaintiffs can make no claims related to the excess
policies.”316 According to Lloyd’s, “[t]o the extent Plaintiffs allege claims derivatively under the

310

Id. at p. 23.

311

Id.

312

Id.

313

Id. at p. 64.

314

Id. (citing Torch, Inc. v. Bridge Assoc., LLC, No. 08-3738, 2009 WL 874506, at *2 (E.D. La. Feb. 10,
2009) (Lemmon, J.)).
315

Id.

316

Rec. Doc. 214 at p. 10.

58

Excess Policies, such claims plainly are barred by the terms of the Release and of the Excess
Policies themselves.”317 Lloyd’s further asserts that “[r]ecognizing that they do not stand in privity
with Lloyd’s under the Excess Policies, Plaintiffs assert that they may bring direct claims relating
to the Excess Policies as third-party beneficiaries of those policies, but they point to no allegation
in the Complaint that the parties to the insurance contracts intended Plaintiffs to be third-party
beneficiaries, as required by both Louisiana and Delaware law.”318
Additionally, Lloyd’s maintains that “Plaintiffs argue that they were not parties to the
Coverage Litigation settlement and that res judicata applies only ‘between the same parties,’ but this
only highlights Plaintiff’s lack of standing to re-litigate the time, propriety or amount of payment
to Safeguard under the Excess Policies.”319 Thus, Lloyd’s concludes, “Plaintiffs either stand in
Safeguard’s shoes, in which case they are successors to Safeguard and their claims are barred by the
Release and res judicata, or Plaintiffs bring suit in their own right, in which case they lack standing
to sue under the policies.”320 Further, Lloyd’s contends that “Plaintiffs also argue that neither a
release nor res judicata can bar future claims, although they cannot avoid the fact that these very
claims were brought back in 2009 against Morgan Stanley in state court, and a bad faith claim was
brought against the primary insurer (but not Lloyd’s) in the Coverage Litigation while Plaintiffs
were still members of Safeguard.”321 Thus, Lloyd’s maintains that “Plaintiffs are reduced to arguing
that releases are narrowly construed, but ignore the case law holding that agreements barring future

317

Id.

318

Id. at pp. 10–11 (citations omitted) (citing Williams, 398 F. App’x at 47; Madison Realty Partners 7,
LLC v. Ag ISA, LLC, No. 18094, 2001 WL 406268, at *5 (Del. Ch. Apr. 17, 2001)).
319

Id. at p. 11 (citations omitted).

320

Id.

321

Id.

59

claims are enforceable.”322
Second, Lloyd’s reiterates its position that “[t]he Delaware Stipulated Judgment bars
Plaintiffs’ buy-out related claims.”323
3.

Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Briefing

As discussed above in the context of the Morgan Stanley Defendant’s “Motion to Dismiss,”
following oral argument, Plaintiffs submitted a supplemental brief “regarding the scope of the
Stipulated Judgment in the matter referred to by the parties as ‘Delaware 1.’”324 According to
Plaintiffs, “in Delaware I PPF was requesting narrow relief regarding compliance with the terms of
‘the Buy/Sell Provision of the LLC Agreement,’ which [PPF] conceded was ‘unrelated’ to the ‘far
more complicated’ issues in the Louisiana Action (and which are still at issue in this litigation).”325
Plaintiffs contend that the Delaware judgment “cannot be construed as providing PPF any more than
what it requested, a declaration that ‘[PPF’s] invocation of the Buy/Sell provision of the LLC
Agreement on May 14, 2009 was proper,’ and a declaration that ‘[PPF] acted appropriately in setting
the Total Purchase Price in the Buy/Sell transaction.’”326
4.

Lloyd’s Supplemental Briefing

Lloyd’s did not file any supplemental brief following oral argument.
B.

Standard on a Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss
As discussed above, a motion to dismiss filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

challenges a federal district court’s subject matter jurisdiction. “A case is properly dismissed for lack

322

Id.

323

Id.

324

Rec. Doc. 225 at p. 1.

325

Id. at p. 4.

326

Id.

60

of subject matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate
the case.”327Under Article III of the United States Constitution, in order to invoke the judicial power
of the United States, there must be a “case or controversy” between the parties; one element of the
case-or-controversy requirement is that the plaintiff must have standing to sue.328 To have standing,
a plaintiff must have suffered an injury that is “concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent;
fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling.”329 The party seeking
to invoke federal jurisdiction has the burden of establishing that it has standing to bring its claims.330
C.

Analysis
1.

Identifying Plaintiffs’ Alleged Injuries

Whether a plaintiff has standing to seek relief from a federal court depends on the alleged
injury the plaintiff has suffered. Thus, as a threshold matter in determining whether Plaintiffs have
standing in the above-captioned matter, the Court must carefully evaluate Plaintiffs’ lengthy
complaint to ascertain what specific injuries Plaintiffs allege. The Court is cognizant that some of
the analysis that follows may be repetitive of the discussion of Plaintiff’s complaint found above in
the context of the Morgan Stanley Defendants’ “Motion to Dismiss.” However, considering that the
Morgan Stanley Defendants and Lloyd’s had different relationships with Plaintiffs and appear to
have engaged in somewhat different conduct, the Court will conduct a separate review of the
complaint to specifically identify the alleged injuries asserted with respect to Lloyd’s.
First, Plaintiffs bring a claim against Lloyd’s pursuant to the Racketeer Influence and
Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), alleging that “Lloyd’s conspired and agreed to abet, assist,
327

Krim, 402 F.3d at 494 (quoting Home Builders Ass’n of Miss., Inc., 143 F.3d at 1010) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
328

See Raines, 521 U.S. at 818; Hays, 515 U.S. at 742–43.

329

Monsanto Co., 561 U.S. at 149.

330

Grant ex rel. Family Eldercare, 324 F.3d at 387.

61

and further Morgan Stanley’s pattern of racketeering activity.”331 According to Plaintiffs, the goal
of the conspiracy was “to minimize the amount paid as a result of the Katrina-related claims in the
Insurance Litigation.”332
Second, Plaintiffs assert a claim against all defendants pursuant to the Louisiana
Racketeering Act, codified at Louisiana Revised Statute § 15:1351, et seq.333 This claim is based on
the same allegations as Plaintiffs’ federal RICO claim.334
Third, Plaintiffs bring a claim against Lloyd’s for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.335 According to the complaint, Lloyd’s “has the duty to its insured, including
Safeguard and its members, to act in good faith in payment of claims made against the coverage it
provides.”336 Plaintiff urge that Lloyd’s breached this duty by:
(a) failing until compelled to do so during the January 2009 depositions to disclose
to Safeguard that the full scope of available coverage on the business interruption
claims extended to gross revenues of the lost developments; (b) ignoring the barrier
between claims and underwriting by threatening to allow Safeguard’s pursuit of its
right in the Insurance Litigation to impact underwriting of Morgan Stanley’s
insurance renewal, knowing that this would cause Morgan Stanley to undermine
Safeguard’s position in the Insurance Litigation; and (c) seeking and making use of
confidential information regarding Safeguard’s litigation strategy in the Insurance
Litigation.337
As a result of Lloyd’s conduct, Plaintiffs allege that their injuries include:
loss of the financial benefits that the BCR parties would have received from a
resolution of the Insurance Litigation as quarterly distributions but for the delay and
corruption of that litigation caused by the defendants’ misconduct, and the incurring
331

Rec. Doc. 161 at ¶ 128.

332

Id. at ¶ 129.

333

Id. at ¶ 135.

334

Id. at ¶ 134–38.

335

Id. at ¶¶ 139–53.

336

Id. at ¶ 147.

337

Id. at ¶ 148.

62

of additional costs (including capital investments) as a result of that delay and
interference, and the financial losses the BCR parties suffered as a result of the bad
faith action by Morgan Stanley in connection with the invocation of the Buy/Sell
provision.338
Next, Plaintiffs assert a cause of action against Lloyd’s for tortious inference with contract.339
According to Plaintiffs, Lloyd’s induced PPF and Mr. Brown to breach the LLC Agreement by
“creating circumstances that prevented the BCR parties from becoming ‘Purchasing Members,”340
and by:
(a) failing until compelled to do so during the January 2009 depositions to disclose
to Safeguard that the full scope of available coverage on the business interruption
claims extended to gross revenues of the lost developments; (b) ignoring the barrier
between claims and underwriting by threatening to allow Safeguard’s pursuit of its
right in the Insurance Litigation to impact underwriting of Morgan Stanley’s
insurance renewal, knowing that this would cause Morgan Stanley to undermine
Safeguard’s position in the Insurance Litigation; and (c) seeking and making use of
confidential information regarding Safeguard’s litigation strategy in the Insurance
Litigation.341
Again, Plaintiffs assert that their injuries include:
loss of the financial benefits that the BCR parties would have received from a
resolution of the Insurance Litigation as quarterly distributions but for the delay and
corruption of that litigation caused by the defendants’ misconduct, and the incurring
of additional costs (including capital investments) as a result of that delay and
interference, and the financial losses the BCR parties suffered as a result of the bad
faith actions taken by Morgan Stanley in connection with the invocation of the
Buy/Sell provision.342
Fifth, Plaintiffs bring a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.343 Plaintiffs allege that “Lloyd’s

338

Id. at ¶ 152.

339

Id. at ¶¶ 154–61.

340

Id. at ¶ 156.

341

Id. at ¶ 159.

342

Id. at ¶ 160.

343

Id. at ¶¶162–76.

63

had fiduciary duties to Safeguard and its members as the insurer of Safeguard”344 and that Lloyd’s
breached these duties “by not paying Safeguard’s claims in good faith recognition of the expansive
business interruption coverage applicable to Safeguard’s losses, and by deliberating commingling
underwriting considerations with claims handling.345 As a result, Plaintiff s maintain that they have
. . . suffered the loss of millions of dollars, in a specific amount to be determined at
trial, due to the undermining of Safeguard’s settlement and litigation position in the
Insurance Litigation through, inter alia, the sharing of confidential litigation
information, the refusal to seek bad faith damages against all of the Insurers, the
initial concealment of the availability of expansive business-interruption coverage,
the delay in and failure to seek the full value of Safeguard’s claims, and the stripping
of control over the litigation from the BCR parties.346
Sixth, Plaintiffs assert a claim against Lloyd’s for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary
duty.347 According to the complaint,
Lloyd’s induced Morgan Stanley to engage in actions to breach fiduciary duties and
to cause PPF to breach its fiduciary duties under the LLC Agreement and the implied
contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing, through Lloyd’s actions to gain
confidential litigation information about the Insurance Litigation and through its
threats to not renew insurance coverage for Morgan Stanley’s properties if Morgan
Stanley did not gain control over Safeguard.348
Next, Plaintiffs assert a claim for civil conspiracy,349 alleging that Lloyd’s acted in concert
with MSREA
. . . to undermine the value of the recovery in the Insurance Litigation, and to
wrongfully dislodge the BCR parties from any control over or ownership interest in
Safeguard, to wrongfully disable the BCR parties from becoming “Purchasing
Members” of Safeguard, and/or to wrongfully thwart the BCR parties from receiving
any profits from Safeguard, including but not limited to proceeds of the Insurance

344

Id. at ¶ 173.

345

Id. at ¶ 174.

346

Id. at ¶ 175.

347

Id. at ¶¶ 177–82.

348

Id. at ¶ 181.

349

Id. at ¶¶ 183–89.

64

Litigation, much less the highest amount of proceeds possible from the Insurers to
compensate Safeguard’s members for damages incurred as a result of Hurricane
Katrina.350
Eighth, Plaintiffs bring a claim for unjust enrichment.351 Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that
“Lloyd’s was unjustly enriched at the expense of the BCR parties through its avoidance of its
obligation to pay the Katrina-related insurance claims under the expansive excess policy that
provided coverage for, without limitation, all gross revenues and business development opportunities
lost as a result of Hurricane Katrina.”352
Finally, Plaintiffs bring a claim against all defendants under the Louisiana Unfair Trade
Practices and Consumer Protection Law.353 According to Plaintiffs, as a result of defendants’ unfair
trade practices, “the BCR parties have been and continue to be damaged, including through loss of
control over or ownership interest in Safeguard, with the attendant loss of revenues and profits from
Safeguard, including but not limited to proceeds from the Insurance Litigation.”354
As was similarly evident in the breakdown of Plaintiff’s claims against the Morgan Stanley
Defendants, although Plaintiffs assert nine causes of action against Lloyd’s, Plaintiffs allege only
a few underlying harms. First, Plaintiffs contend that they were harmed because Lloyd’s acted in
concert with the Morgan Stanley Defendants to avoid paying business interruption claims to
Safeguard; thus Plaintiffs never received the portion of the insurance proceeds to which they were
entitled. Second, Plaintiffs aver that they were harmed because when Lloyd’s improperly delayed
payment under the insurance policy, Plaintiffs were unable to become “Purchasing Members” during

350

Id. at ¶ 184.

351

Id. at ¶¶196–201.

352

Id. at ¶ 200.

353

Id. at ¶¶ 202–06.

354

Id. at ¶ 205.

65

the Safeguard buyout; thus, Plaintiffs were deprived of their future profit interest in Safeguard. The
Court now turns to whether Plaintiffs have standing to bring claims premised on these harms.
2.

Harms Related to Payment of the Insurance Proceeds

As just discussed, Plaintiffs first contend that they were harmed because they never received
the portion of the insurance proceeds to which they would have been entitled. Under Louisiana
law,355 “[a] plaintiff has standing to sue under an insurance policy if the plaintiff is a named insured
or additional named insured, or if the plaintiff is an intended third-party beneficiary.”356 A contract
for the benefit of a third party—or a “stipulation pour autrui”—is addressed in Louisiana Civil
article 1978, which provides that “[a] contracting party may stipulate a benefit for a third person
called a third party beneficiary.”357 Although article 1978 states that stipulations pour autrui are
permissible, “[t]he code provides no analytic framework for determining whether a third party
beneficiary contract exists” in any given situation.358 Rather, “the code has left to the jurisprudence
the obligation to develop the analysis to determine when a third party beneficiary contract exists on
a case by case basis. Each contract must be evaluated on its own terms and conditions in order to
determine if the contract stipulates a benefit for a third person.”359 In making this determination, a

355

Both parties apply Louisiana law in analyzing whether Plaintiffs may bring suit under the insurance

policy.
356

Williams v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 398 F. App’x 44, 47 (5th Cir. 2010) (internal
citations omitted); see also Axis Surplus Ins. Co. v. Third Millennium Ins. and Fin. Serv., Inc., 781 F. Supp 2d 320,
323 (E.D. La. 2011) (Vance, J.) (“Under Louisiana law, only a named insured, additional insured, or third-party
beneficiary may bring suit under an insurance policy.”); Lee v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., No. 08-1100, 2008 WL
2622997, at *2 (E.D. La. July 2, 2008) (Africk, J.) (“In Louisiana, a plaintiff may sue under an insurance policy
where he is a named insured, additional insured, or third-party beneficiary.”); Harrison v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am.,
No. 06-4664, 2007 WL 1244268, at *4 (E.D. La. Jan. 26, 2007) (Barbier, J.) (“This Court finds that Plaintiffs have
no standing to bring their claims against Defendants as Plaintiffs are not parties to any insurance contracts with
Defendants and because Plaintiffs are not the direct or third party beneficiaries of the insurance contracts at issue.”).
357

La. Civ. Code art. 1978; Williams, 398 F. App’x at 47; Joseph v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 2 of Parish of St.
Mary, 2005-2364 (La. 10/15/06), 939 So. 2d 1206, 1211.
358

Joseph, 939 So. 2d at 1211.

359

Id. at 1212.

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court should consider whether “1) the stipulation for a third party is manifestly clear; 2) there is
certainty as to the benefit provided the third party; and 3) the benefit is not a mere incident of the
contract between the promisor and the promisee.”360 The existence of a third party beneficiary
contract “is never presumed.”361 “The party claiming the benefit bears the burden of proof.”362
In their opposition to Lloyd’s “Motion to Dismiss,” Plaintiffs do not appear to contend they
are the named or additional insured under Safeguard’s insurance policy. Indeed, it seems that such
an argument would certainly fail. An LLC “is a separate legal entity from its member owners,”363
and pursuant to Louisiana statute, “[a] member, manager, employee, or agent of a limited liability
company is not a proper party to a proceeding by or against a limited liability company, except when
the object is to enforce such a person’s rights against or liability to the limited liability company.”364
Relying on these principles, another court in the Eastern District of Louisiana determined in Axis
Surplus Insurance Company v. Third Millennium Insurance and Financial Services, Inc. that LLC
members may not bring suit under a policy naming only the LLC as the insured.365
Plaintiffs suggest that they may bring their claims as third party beneficiaries “[b]ecause the
insurance contract with Lloyd’s was for the ultimate benefit of Safeguard’s members, and
particularly to protect the BCR parties in light of their entitlement to the disproportionate waterfall
distribution under the LLC Agreement.”366 Plaintiffs, however, have the burden of proving a
stipulation pour autri, and as noted above, the existence of a third party beneficiary contract “is
360

Id.

361

Id.

362

Id.

363

Ne. Realty, L.L.C. v. Misty Bayou, L.L.C., 40,573 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/25/06), 920 So. 2d 938, 940.

364

La. R.S. § 1320(C).

365

Axis Surplus Ins. Co., 781 F. Supp. 2d at 324.

366

Rec. Doc. 209 at p. 64.

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never presumed.”367 To meet this burden, Plaintiffs must show “1) the stipulation for a third party
is manifestly clear; 2) there is certainty as to the benefit provided the third party; and 3) the benefit
is not a mere incident of the contract between the promisor and the promisee.”368 In this case,
Plaintiffs do not point to any language that could be construed as a “manifestly clear” stipulation that
the insurance policy was for the benefit of Plaintiffs as members of the LLC. As Axis Surplus
Insurance Company observed, “a person is not a third-party benefit of a contract just because he or
she has an ownership interest in a company that is a party to the contract.”369 Further, Harrison v.
Safeco Insurance Company of America, another case from the Eastern District of Louisiana, suggests
that “Louisiana federal courts have determined that the ‘proper means’ to include a stipulation pour
autri in an insurance contract is to ‘name the third party as an additional insured.’”370 Here, Plaintiffs
have not alleged that they were additional insureds on the policy.
Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are not a named insured, additional insured, or third party
beneficiary of the insurance policy. Accordingly, they lack standing to sue under the policy and
cannot bring claims premised on their entitlement to insurance proceeds.
3.

Harm Related to the Buy/Sell Provision

Additionally, Plaintiffs assert that because Lloyd’s improperly delayed payment under the
insurance policy, Plaintiffs were unable to become “Purchasing Members” during the Safeguard
buyout; thus, Plaintiffs were deprived of their future profit interest in Safeguard. As discussed above
in the context of the Morgan Stanley Defendant’s “Motion to Dismiss,” the Court has determined

367

Joseph, 939 So. 2d at 1212.

368

Id.

369

Axis Surplus Ins. Co., 781 F. Supp. 2d at 324.

370

Harrison, 2007 WL 1244268, at *5 (quoting Nesom v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 633 F. Supp. 55, 58 (E.D.
La. 1984) (Wicker, J.)); see also St. Julien v. Diamond M. Drilling, 403 F. Supp. 1256, 1259 (E.D. La. 1975) (Rubin,
J.) (“It is not uncommon to include a stipulation for the benefit of a third person in an insurance contract; the means
used is to name the third party as an additional insured.”).

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that based on the Stipulated Judgment in the Delaware I Litigation, collateral estoppel applies. Thus,
Plaintiffs are precluded from asserting that they were deprived of the fair value of their interest in
Safeguard. As the Court has noted, in order to have standing, a plaintiff must have suffered an injury
that is “concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent.”371 Here, it has already been determined
that Plaintiffs were not harmed by the Buy/Sell transaction or the price paid for their interests in
Safeguard. Accordingly, Plaintiffs cannot show any actual injury, and they thus lack standing.
D.

Conclusion
In this litigation, Plaintiffs bring numerous causes of action but essentially allege two harms:

(1) that they never received the portion of the insurance proceeds to which they were entitled, and
(2) that because Lloyd’s improperly delayed payment under the insurance policy, Plaintiffs were
unable to become “Purchasing Members” during the Safeguard buyout, and thus, were deprived of
their future profit interest in Safeguard. Considering that Plaintiffs are not named insureds,
additional insureds, or third party beneficiaries of the insurance policy, Plaintiffs lack standing to
bring the first claim. With respect to the second harm, pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel,
Plaintiffs cannot establish that they were deprived of the fair value of their interest in Safeguard.
Considering that Plaintiffs cannot show any injury, they do not have standing.
Since the Court concludes that Plaintiffs do not have standing, the Court grants Lloyd’s Rule
12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court need
not address the portions of Lloyd’s motion relating to failure to plead fraud with particularity under
Rule 9(b), insufficient process under Rule 12(b)(4), or failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

371

Monsanto Co., 561 U.S. at 149.

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V. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs BCR Safeguard Holding, L.L.C.’s, JAC
Safeguard Holding, L.L.C.’s, and Safeguard Development Group II, L.L.C.’s “Motion to Dissolve
Injunction”372 is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, and the May 19, 2009 email
thread is no longer subject to the Court’s injunction;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Morgan Stanley Real Estate Advisor, Inc.’s,
PPF Safeguard, L.L.C.’s, and Scott Allen Brown’s “Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint”373 is
GRANTED, as the Court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and all claims against
Defendants Morgan Stanley Real Estate Advisor, Inc., PPF Safeguard, L.L.C., and Scott Allen
Brown are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Lloyd’s Underwriters’ “Motion to Dismiss
Amended Complaint for Damages”374 is GRANTED, as the Court finds that it lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, and all claims against Defendant Lloyd’s Underwriters are DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this ______ day of September, 2014.

_________________________________
NANNETTE JOLIVETTE BROWN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

372

Rec. Doc. 229.

373

Rec. Doc. 186.

374

Rec. Doc. 188.

70