Wells v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company

Filing 110

ORDER granting defendant's 43 Motion in Limine, as stated herein. Signed by Judge Susie Morgan on 11/6/2013. (tsf)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MCREYNOLD WELLS,
Plaintiff

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 13-120

STATE FARM FIRE AND
CASUALTY COMPANY,
Defendant

SECTION “E”

ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant’s motion in limine to exclude from evidence and
argument “any and all testimony and documentary evidence[] regarding the fact that there
has been no criminal arrest, indictment, and/or prosecution[] that has been pursued
against the plaintiff McReynold Wells[] in connection with the subject fire, alleged damage,
and insurance claim.”1 Plaintiff opposes the motion “insofar as it [seeks] to exclude fire
officials’ testimony that the fire at issue here was determined not to be incendiary and no
ensuing law enforcement investigation took place.”2
The rule in this Circuit is clear: “‘We adopt and apply here the rule that a federal
trial court commits reversible error when it permits the plaintiff in a suit for fire insurance
proceeds to present evidence of his nonprosecution or acquittal on related criminal arson
charges.’” Munoz v. State Farm Lloyds of Tex., 522 F.3d 568, 572 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Rabon v. Great Sw. Fire Ins. Co., 818 F.2d 306, 309 (4th Cir. 1987)). Accordingly, to the
extent Defendant wishes to preclude Plaintiff from presenting evidence of “his
nonprosecution” for criminal arson, the motion is well taken. Plaintiff may not adduce
evidence that he was not prosecuted for arson (or that investigators decided not to
1

R. Doc. No. 43.

2

R. Doc. No. 51.
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prosecute him for arson).
Plaintiff may, however, present evidence from fire officials that “the fire at issue here
was determined not to be incendiary,” although those officials may not testify that “no
ensuring law enforcement investigation took place,” which would be tantamount to
testifying that they decided Plaintiff was not prosecuted. Testimony about the former
concerns a disputed issue of fact, and one on which fire officials might have unique
knowledge that substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect. See, e.g., Westfield Ins. Co.
v. Harris, 134 F.3d 608, 611–13 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that “the fact that the deputy [fire]
marshal's testimony might be given ‘much credibility’ by the jury or that it might ‘bolster’
a similar opinion that was expected from the insurance company’s investigator are not
grounds to exclude the evidence.”). Testimony about the decision not to prosecute Plaintiff
concerns the legal decisions made by officials based on their investigation, which, inasmuch
as they “go[] directly to the principal issue before the jury,” would be “highly prejudicial.”
Munoz, 522 F.3d at 572.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s motion in limine is GRANTED,
as further explained above.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 6th day of November, 2013.

_____________________________
SUSIE MORGAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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