Doe v. Holy See et al

Filing 57

ORDER & REASONS granting in part and denying in part 36 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Signed by Judge Martin L.C. Feldman on 7/24/2013. (caa, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
JOHN DOE I

CIVIL ACTION

v.

NO. 13-128

HOLY SEE, ET AL.

SECTION "F"
ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is The Society of the Roman Catholic Church
of the Diocese of Lake Charles and the Most Reverend Glen J.
Provost's motion for judgment on the pleadings. For the reasons
that follow, the motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part,
without prejudice.
Background
This case arises out of troubling allegations that a Catholic
priest sexually abused a pre-adolescent parishioner, and that
leadership within the Roman Catholic Church concealed and coveredup the sexual abuse.
John Doe alleges that he has suffered damages as a result of
being sexually abused by former Catholic Priest Mark Anthony
Broussard at various locations in Louisiana from 1985 to 1988 and
in 1992, when Doe was just a young boy.

Doe alleges that he was so

severely traumatized by Broussard's deviant sexual conduct that he
lost all recollection and memory of the specific incidents and acts

1

of sexual abuse until March 2012.1
On January 23, 2013 Plaintiff, suing pseudonymously as John
Doe, sued Most Reverend Gregory M. Aymond, his predecessors and
successors as Archbishop of the Roman Catholic Church of the
Archdiocese of New Orleans; the Holy See (State of the Vatican);
the Roman Catholic Church of the Archdiocese of New Orleans; the
Society of the Roman Catholic Church of the Diocese of Lake
Charles; Most Reverend Glen J. Provost, his predecessors and
successors as Bishop of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Lake Charles;
and

Mark

Anthony

Broussard.

In

his

40-page

complaint,

the

plaintiff details the history of concealment of sexual abuse by the
Roman Catholic Church, and presents various claims against each of
the defendants, including a claim that the defendants were aware of
the harm to the plaintiff and the concealment effort was part of a
civil conspiracy to keep the rampant sexual abuse in the church a
secret; the defendants committed fraud in their concealment of
Broussard's
defendants

sexual

misconduct;

negligently

employed

the

Archdiocese

Broussard,

failed

and

Diocese

to

provide

reasonable supervision, failed to investigate, used deception to

1

According to the plaintiff, in March 2012, Calcasieu Parish
Sheriff contacted Plaintiff after the Sheriff had reviewed the
Diocese of Lake Charles' personnel file on Broussard; in a
deposition given by Broussard in 1998, Broussard apparently
confessed that he had sexually abused plaintiff and other
children as a Catholic cleric and priest with the Archdiocese of
New Orleans and the Diocese of Lake Charles. Only after hearing
about Broussard's confession did plaintiff recall Broussard's
sexual abuse.
2

conceal his sexual misconduct, and breached their fiduciary duty to
plaintiff;

the Holy See breached its duties to the protect and

warn plaintiff, and to provide reasonable supervision of its
employees, as well as concealed child sexual abuse, breaching its
duties under federal common law, state law, and international law;
and that the Holy See, Father Broussard, and the Archdiocese and
Diocese

defendants

emotional distress.

are

liable

for

intentional

infliction

of

Plaintiff seeks $6,000,000 in damages and

$12,000,000 in exemplary damages.
On April 24, 2013 the Court granted Archbishop Aymond's motion
to dismiss the claims against him (as well as the claims asserted
against

"the

"predecessors

Archbishops"
and

generally

successors");

the

or

Archbishop

Court

also

Aymond's

granted

the

Archdiocese of New Orleans' motion to dismiss the punitive damages
claims asserted against it.
Now, Bishop Provost seeks to dismiss the claims asserted
against

him

(and

those

claims

asserted

generally

against

"Predecessor and Successor Bishops"), and the Diocese of Lake
Charles seeks to dismiss the punitive damages claims asserted
against it.
I.
The standard for deciding a motion for judgment on the
pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
is the same as the one for deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(6).

3

Gentilello v. Rege, 627 F.3d 540, 543-44 (5th Cir. 2010). “A motion
brought pursuant to [Rule 12(c)] is designed to dispose of cases
where the material facts are not in dispute and a judgment on the
merits can be rendered by looking to the substance of the pleadings
and any judicially noticed facts.”

Great Plains Trust Co. v.

Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir.
2002)(citation omitted).
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows
a party to move for dismissal of a complaint for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Such a motion is rarely

granted because it is viewed with disfavor.

See Lowrey v. Tex. A

& M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Kaiser
Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d
1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982)).
Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a
pleading must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."

Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009)(citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 8).

"[T]he

pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require 'detailed
factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation."

Id. at 678 (citing

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
Thus,

in

considering

a

Rule

12(b)(6)

motion,

the

Court

“accepts ‘all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light

4

most favorable to the plaintiff.’”

See Martin K. Eby Constr. Co.

v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting
Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999)).

But, in

deciding whether dismissal is warranted, the Court will not accept
conclusory allegations in the complaint as true.
at 1050.

Kaiser, 677 F.2d

Indeed, the Court must first identify allegations that

are conclusory and, thus, not entitled to the assumption of truth.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). A corollary: legal
conclusions “must be supported by factual allegations.”
678.

Assuming

the

veracity

of

the

well-pleaded

Id. at
factual

allegations, the Court must then determine “whether they plausibly
give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679.
“‘To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d
600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009)(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678)(internal
quotation marks omitted).

“Factual allegations must be enough to

raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the
assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even
if doubtful in fact).”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555 (2007) (citations and footnote omitted).

“A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.”

5

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“The

plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’
but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted

unlawfully.”).

This

is

a

“context-specific

task

that

requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense.”

Id. at 679.

“Where a complaint pleads facts that

are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short
of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to
relief.” Id. at 678 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Twombly,
550 U.S. at 557).

“[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the

‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’”, thus, “requires more
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at

555 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
Finally, “[w]hen reviewing a motion to dismiss, a district
court ‘must consider the complaint in its entirety, as well as
other sources ordinarily examined when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6)
motions to dismiss, in particular, documents incorporated into the
complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take
judicial notice.”

Funk v. Stryker Corp., 631 F.3d 777, 783 (5th

Cir. 2011)(quoting Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,
551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007)).
II.
A.
Bishop Provost contends that the plaintiff has failed to state
a

claim

against

him

and

generically
6

his

"predecessors

and

successors" because he fails to allege a sufficient basis for
imposing liability against him or his predecessors and successors.
The Court agrees but, for the reasons that follow, declines to rule
on

this

issue

pending

the

magistrate

judge's

ruling

on

the

plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint.
Bishop Provost contends that the plaintiff makes no claim that
he is the cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injury, and that the
claim against his unspecified "predecessors and successors" must
fail.

The plaintiff concedes that this Court previously addressed

identical arguments raised by Archbishop Aymond (in which the
Archbishop challenged nearly identical allegations), and granted
the Archbishop's motion to dismiss.
the

Court

to

consider

the

However, the plaintiff urges

contents

of

his

proposed

amended

complaint, which the plaintiff insists will remedy any defects in
the original complaint.

The Court declines to do so.

Whether or

not the plaintiff will be permitted to amend his complaint is an
issue

for

the

Magistrate

Judge

to

resolve;

that

hearing

is

scheduled on July 31, 2013.
By waiting until July 16, 2013 to request leave to file an
amended complaint, counsel for plaintiff did not heed this Court's
admonishment when it ruled on June 5, 2013:
To the extent that the plaintiff suggests in his papers
that he intends to file an amended complaint, the Court
reminds counsel to familiarize herself with the Federal
and Local Rules and admonishes counsel not to delay any
request to amend the complaint that was filed on January
23, 2013. No further continuances of the defendants'
7

motion will be entertained.
See Order dated June 5, 2013, in which the Court granted the
plaintiff's unopposed motion to continue the submission date on the
defendants'

motion

for

previously

scheduled

judgment
for

on

the

submission

pleadings,
on

June

which

was

2013.2

12,

Nevertheless, the Court will not punish the individual plaintiff
for the dilatory conduct of his attorney.3
Accordingly,

the

Bishop's

request

for

judgment

on

the

pleadings, to dismiss the claims asserted against him and his
"predecessors and successors", is hereby DENIED without prejudice,
pending resolution of the plaintiff's motion to amend complaint.
If the motion to amend is denied, the Bishop should promptly refile his request for judgment on the pleadings.
B.
Under Louisiana law, punitive damages are not recoverable
unless expressly authorized by statute.
Credit

Corp.

v.

I.T.

Seale,

518

International Harvester
So.2d

1039,

1041

(La.

1988)(citations omitted); Albert v. Farm Bureau Ins., Inc., 940

2

It is worth noting that counsel for plaintiff was placed on
notice of the deficiency of the complaint as early as March 22,
2013 (when the Archbishop filed his motion to dismiss); April 24,
2013 (when this Court granted the Archbishop's motion to
dismiss); and May 23, 2013 (when Bishop Provost filed the pending
motion for judgment on the pleadings based on identicallydeficient allegations).
3

If the Magistrate Judge determines that the plaintiff is
entitled to amend his complaint, then the Bishop's request to
dismiss the current complaint's allegations is moot.
8

So.2d 620, 622 (La. 2006)(citation omitted).

Even when a statute

authorizes recovery of punitive damages, the statute must be
strictly construed.

Id. (citations omitted).

The plaintiff's

allegations of criminal sexual activity by Broussard appear to
implicate one of the narrow circumstances permitting punitive
damages:

Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.7, which provides:
Art. 2315.7.

Liability for damages caused by
criminal sexual activity during
childhood

In addition to general and special damages,
exemplary damages may be awarded upon proof that the
injuries on which the action is based were caused by a
wanton and reckless disregard for the rights and safety
of the person through criminal sexual activity which
occurred when the victim was seventeen years old or
younger, regardless of whether the defendant was
prosecuted for his or her acts. The provisions of this
Article shall be applicable only to the perpetrator of
the criminal sexual activity.
Even though the plaintiff's allegations regarding Broussard's
conduct appear to fall within the scope of this punitive damages
provision, the defendants seek to dismiss the plaintiff's punitive
damages claim. First, the defendants contend that the plaintiff is
not legally entitled to recover punitive damages from them because
the Louisiana statute authorizing punitive damages did not take
effect until after the alleged factual bases for awarding them.
Second, even if La. Civ. Code article 2315.7 applied retroactively,
the defendants contend that the authorizing statute expressly
applies only to the actual abuser, not to the Diocese or the
Bishop.

The Court agrees.
9

The plaintiff does not oppose the Diocese's and Bishop's
request to dismiss the plaintiff's punitive damages claims; rather,
he "defers to the Court's prior ruling on Plaintiff's right to
punitive relief."

Accordingly, for the reasons articulated in the

Court's April 24, 2013 Order and Reasons, to the extent the
defendants

seek

dismissal

of

the

plaintiff's

punitive

damage

claims, the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings is
GRANTED in part; and, as previously noted, to the extent the Bishop
seeks judgment on the pleadings in his favor, dismissing the
plaintiff's

claims

against

him

and

his

"predecessor

and

successors", the motion is DENIED in part, without prejudice, to be
re-urged pending the outcome of the plaintiff's pending motion to
amend his complaint.
New Orleans, Louisiana, July 24, 2013

______________________________
MARTIN L. C. FELDMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

10