Wright et al v. AT&T Mobility, LLC

Filing 25

ORDER AND REASONS denying 14 MOTION to dismiss pursuant to the Colorado River abstention doctrine or, in the alternative, stay the matter. Signed by Judge Lance M Africk on 6/12/2013.(blg)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

CLARA WRIGHT ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

No. 13-136

AT&T MOBILITY, LLC

SECTION I

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a motion1 to dismiss the above-captioned matter pursuant to the
Colorado River abstention doctrine filed by plaintiffs, Clara Wright (“Wright”) and Dennis
Drury (“Drury”). Defendant, AT&T Mobility, LLC, filed an opposition.2 AT&T Mobility, LLC,
is an affiliated entity of Cingular Real Estate Holdings of the Southeast, LLC (the defendant in
the original quiet title lawsuit that gives rise to this removed petition for eviction).3 For
simplicity, the Court will refer to the defendant in this lawsuit and the quiet title lawsuit
collectively as “AT&T.” For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs purchased a piece of property on June 9, 2004, at a property tax sale.4 After the
requisite three years passed without payment by AT&T (the previous owner of the property), on
October, 27, 2012, Wright filed a lawsuit in the 22nd Judicial District Court of Louisiana to
confirm and quiet title.5 The court confirmed her ownership and the First Circuit Court of
Appeals for the State of Louisiana affirmed the court’s judgment on July 1, 2010.6 Shortly
R. Doc. No. 14-1.
R. Doc. No. 16.
3
R. Doc. No. 6.
4
R. Doc. No. 14-1, at 2.
5
Id.
6
Wright v. Cingular Real Estate Holdings of La., L.L.C., No. 2009 CA 1825, 2010 WL 2637907,
at *4 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2010).
1
2

1

thereafter, Wright and AT&T began discussions relative to a potential lease, which ultimately
led to AT&T filing a petition to enforce settlement in the 22nd Judicial District Court of
Louisiana.7 Wright filed a reconventional demand to the petition, alleging unlawful use and
occupancy of the property and seeking damages.8 Plaintiffs then filed a petition for eviction in
the 22nd Judicial District Court of Louisiana on December 17, 2012.9 According to the petition,
AT&T has occupied the property for more than eight years without paying rent.10 On January 24,
2013, AT&T removed the case,11 and on April 11, 2013, the Court denied plaintiffs’ motion to
remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.12
Plaintiffs contend that this matter should be remanded pursuant to the Colorado River
abstention doctrine in order to avoid piecemeal litigation of collaterally related matters.13 AT&T
responds that the motion should be denied because there are no exceptional circumstances in this
case that warrant abstention of statutory jurisdiction under the Colorado River doctrine.14
STANDARD OF LAW
Abstention is the relinquishment of a federal court’s jurisdiction “when necessary to
avoid needless conflict with a state’s administration of its own affairs.” Black’s Law Dictionary
(9th ed. 2009). “Abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the
rule.” Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976). “‘The
doctrine of abstention . . . is an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District
R. Doc. No. 12-1, Ex. A.
R. Doc. No. 12-2, Ex. B.
9
R. Doc. No. 1-1, at 4.
10
Id. According to the defendant, the property is uninhabited, “in a raw state, without clearing,
except for the construction of a properly maintained, zoned, and permitted [cellular
communications] tower.” R. Doc. No. 6, at 1. Plaintiffs do not dispute this characterization.
11
R. Doc. No. 1.
12
R. Doc. No. 13.
13
R. Doc. No. 14-1.
14
R. Doc. No. 16.
7
8

2

Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it.’” Id. (quoting Cnty. of Allegheny v. Frank
Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89 (1959)). “‘Abdication of the obligation to decide cases can
be justified under [the abstention doctrine] only in the exceptional circumstances where the order
to the parties to repair to the state court would clearly serve an important countervailing
interest.’” Id. (quoting Allegheny, 360 U.S. at 188-89).
In Colorado River, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that, generally, “‘the pendency of an
action in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal court
having jurisdiction. . . .’” Id. at 817 (quoting McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910)).
This is because of the “virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise the
jurisdiction given them.” Id. at 817-18 (citing England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 375
U.S. 411, 415 (1964)). Accordingly, a court may abstain from a case because of parallel
litigation in state court only under “exceptional” circumstances. Id. at 818.
In order to determine if the Colorado River abstention doctrine applies, courts must first
inquire into whether the federal and the state actions are parallel. An action is parallel when it
has “the same parties and the same issues” as a case in a different forum. Stewart v. W. Heritage
Ins. Co., 438 F.3d 488, 491 (5th Cir. 2006). The Fifth Circuit has noted “[i]t might not be
necessary that the parties and issues are absolutely identical in every instance for Colorado River
abstention to be appropriate.” Am. Family Life Assurance Co. of Columbus v. Biles, No. 1260235, 2013 WL 1809766, at *2 (5th Cir. Apr. 30, 2013) (citing Brown v. Pac. Life Ins. Co., 462
F.3d 384, 394 n.7 (5th Cir. 2006)).
Second, to determine whether “exceptional” circumstances exist in a given case, courts
consider six factors: (1) the assumption by either court of jurisdiction over a res, (2) the relative
inconvenience of the forums, (3) the avoidance of piecemeal litigation, (4) the order in which

3

jurisdiction was obtained by the concurrent forums, (5) the extent to which federal law provides
the rules of decision on the merits, and (6) the adequacy of the state proceedings in protecting
the rights of the party invoking federal jurisdiction. Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 818-19; see also
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 18-26 (1983). No one factor
is determinative, and all applicable factors must be carefully balanced in a given case, “with the
balance heavily weighted in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction.” Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at
16.
DISCUSSION
The parties disagree as to whether the removed eviction petition and state petition to
enforce settlement are parallel cases. Plaintiffs argue the cases are parallel because they involve
the same parties and overlapping issues.15 Plaintiffs assert that the judgment in one lawsuit will
have a res judicata effect in the other lawsuit.16 AT&T responds that the cases are not parallel
because while they bear some relation, the parties and issues are not the same.17 AT&T asserts
that the state court proceedings concern AT&T’s request to enforce a settlement agreement and
Wright’s reconventional demand for unlawful use and occupancy of the property, whereas this
federal lawsuit concerns an eviction proceeding.18 Additionally, AT&T claims that the parties are
not the same because Drury is not involved in the state court lawsuit.19
Though the issues and parties are not entirely the same, the Fifth Circuit has held that the
parties and issues do not have to be identical to be parallel. Biles, 2013 WL 1809766 at *2
(citing Brown, 462 F.3d at 394). “Of central concern” in determining whether actions are
parrallel “is whether there is a substantial likelihood that the state litigation will dispose of all
R. Doc. No. 14-1, at 5.
Id.
17
R. Doc. No. 16, at 2.
18
Id. at 2-3.
19
Id. at 2.
15
16

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claims presented in the federal case.” Kenner Acquisitions, LLC v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc.,
No. 06-3927, 2007 WL 625833, at *2 (E.D. La. Feb. 26, 2007) (Vance, C.J.) (quotation omitted).
The federal and state cases here are “sufficiently parallel” because the issues arise from the same
dispute, and the resolution of the state lawsuit would dispose of the claim in the removed
lawsuit. See id. at *2-3. Accordingly, it is necessary to weigh the aforementioned factors to
determine whether exceptional circumstances exist which would require abstention. Considering
all of the factors, the Court finds that abstention is not required.
When a court has not taken control over property or any res, then the first factor weighs
against abstention. Evanston Ins. Co. v. Jimco, Inc., 844 F.2d 1185, 1191 (5th Cir. 1988). Both
parties agree that this Court has not assumed jurisdiction over a res.20 Plaintiffs argue that the
state court assumed jurisdiction over a res as far back as 2007, when it resolved the ownership of
the property in question.21 AT&T argues that, while it is true the state court assumed jurisdiction
over a res as far back as 2007, the lawsuit to quiet title is over and no longer pending.22 It asserts
that the pending state court action to enforce a settlement agreement and Wright’s
reconventional demand for money damages are in personam claims.
“The preexisting exercise of jurisdiction over a piece of property clearly favors
abstention in a subsequent federal proceeding involving the same property.” Kenner
Acquisitions, 2007 WL 625833, at *3. However, the status of the property at issue here has
already been established by a judgment, and no court currently has jurisdiction over the res,
distinguishing this case from Kenner Acquisitions, where the property dispute was ongoing. See
R. Doc. No. 14-1, at 6; R. Doc. No. 16, at 3. AT&T characterizes evictions as similar to trespass
actions, which qualify as in personam actions. Id. at 3. (citing Hayes v. Gulf Oil Corp., 821 F.2d 285,
287 (5th Cir. 1987)) (“an action for trespass to land” is “an in personam action”); Hallaba v.
Worldcom Network Servs., Inc., 196 F.R.D. 630, 646-47 (N.D. Okla. 2000) (“Trespass actions . . .
. are clearly in personam actions.”).
21
R. Doc. No. 14-1, at 6.
22
R. Doc. No. 16, at 3.
5
20

id. at *3-4; see also Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 818-20. Had the parties asked that this case be
stayed during the pendency of the quiet title lawsuit, it is possible that this situation might be
appropriate for Colorado River abstention. Compare King v. Martin, No. 10-1774, 2013 WL
1193678 at *5 (W.D. La. Mar. 22, 2013) (Stagg, J.) (abstaining because the state court quiet title
lawsuit which would determine the status of the property at issue was currently on appeal).
However, because the quiet title lawsuit is no longer pending, there is no state court jurisdiction
over a res. Moreover, the settlement action was filed as a separate lawsuit from the quiet title
lawsuit. Accordingly, the state court lawsuit at issue never involved a res. The absence of
jurisdiction over a res supports exercising federal jurisdiction. Stewart, 438 F.3d at 492 (quoting
Murphy v. Uncle Ben’s, Inc., 168 F.3d 734, 738 (5th Cir. 1999)).
The parties agree that the second factor, the relative inconvenience of the forum, does not
weigh in favor of abstention. This factor “primarily involves the physical proximity of the
federal forum to the evidence and witnesses.” Evanston, 844 F.2d at 1191. Where, as here,
“[c]ourts are in the same geographic location, the inconvenience factor weighs against
abstention.” Stewart, 438 F.3d at 492.
The parties disagree as to the significance of the third factor, avoidance of piecemeal
litigation. AT&T contends that the pending litigation would be duplicative, rather than
piecemeal.23 Further, AT&T argues that plaintiffs created piecemeal litigation by filing a
separate lawsuit for eviction and that there will still be two lawsuits even if the federal court
abstains.24 Plaintiffs argue that either AT&T’s alleged lease is in effect or plaintiffs’ eviction
action, which is premised on the absence of a lease, will be successful. Accordingly, plaintiffs
argue that the lawsuits create a danger of piecemeal litigation which should be avoided.25
Id. at 4.
Id.
25
R. Doc. No. 14-1, at 7.
23
24

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Duplicative litigation, wasteful though it may be, is a necessary
cost of our nation’s maintenance of two separate and distinct
judicial systems . . . The real concern at the heart of the third
Colorado River factor is the avoidance of piecemeal litigation and
the concomitant danger of inconsistent rulings with respect to a
piece of property.
Black Sea Inv., Ltd. v. United Heritage Corp., 204 F.3d 647, 650-51 (5 Cir. 2000) (quoting
Evanston, 844 F.2d at 1192) (footnotes omitted). Because the federal and state lawsuits concern
a petition to enforce settlement and an eviction, which do not involve jurisdiction over a res, the
risk of piecemeal litigation and danger of inconsistent rulings with respect to a piece of property
is not great. See id.
The Fifth Circuit has acknowledged that the application of res judicata can eliminate the
danger of inconsistent rulings in a case with the potential for piecemeal litigation. Stewart, 438
F.3d at 492. Here, plaintiffs acknowledge that one lawsuit will have a res judicata effect on the
other.26 The Court concludes that the third factor weighs against abstention in this matter.
The fourth factor is measured by the amount of progress made in each action. Moses H.
Cone, 460 U.S. at 21. AT&T does not dispute that the state court proceeding was filed prior to
plaintiffs’ eviction action.27 Plaintiffs argue that extensive discovery has taken place on the lease
issue in state court which weighs in favor of abstention.28 The federal lawsuit has not progressed
past the removal and remand motions of the parties. The Court concludes that the fourth factor
weighs in favor of abstention.
With respect to the fifth factor, the parties agree that the case directly involves only state
law. However, “[t]he absence of a federal-law issue does not counsel in favor of abstention,” and
the “presence of state law issues weighs in favor of surrender only in rare circumstances.”

Id. at 5.
R. Doc. No. 16, at 5.
28
R. Doc. No. 14-1, at 8.
26
27

7

Evanston, 844 F.2d at 1193. While generally this would suggest the fifth factor is neutral in this
case, plaintiffs argue that a “rare circumstance” is present here.29 Specifically, plaintiffs cite
several decisions in which courts abstained from hearing eviction matters despite having the
power to exercise jurisdiction in an effort to “avoid completely emasculat[ing] the state structure
for dealing with such disputes.”30 Plaintiffs also argue that several courts have abstained because
there is no basis for jurisdiction over summary proceedings in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure or in statutes governing federal court procedures.31 Evictions are considered summary
proceedings under Louisiana law. Betts v. Hoffman, 975 So. 2d 200, 204 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2008).
Plaintiffs do not cite, and this Court is not familiar with, any Fifth Circuit authority
holding that summary proceedings give rise to a “rare circumstance” exception preventing the
Court from hearing the case pursuant to the Colorado River abstention doctrine. The Court has
reviewed the authority of other Circuits cited by the plaintiff and finds such other decisions
inapplicable. In fact, plaintiffs ignore that in the primary case they rely upon, MCC Mortgage, the
court refused to abstain, holding that despite some authority to the contrary, evictions do not
represent the kind of exception to the rule envisioned by the Colorado River doctrine. See MCC
Mortg., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 947. Plaintiffs have not set forth any precedent or reason which would
support the argument that an eviction proceeding would fit into this narrow exception. Ultimately,
the Court finds that the issues presented here are not “rare circumstances” in which the presence
of state law could support abstention, so this factor is neutral.
With respect to the sixth factor, plaintiffs argue that AT&T’s rights will be adequately
protected by state court proceedings, which weighs in favor of abstention.32 AT&T argues that

Id. at 9-10.
Id. at 10. (citing MCC Mortg. LP v. Office Depot, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 2d 939, 947 (D. Minn. 2010)).
31
Id. at 9. (citing MCC Mortg., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 945-46).
32
R. Doc. No. 14-1, at 10.
8
29
30

even if its’ rights will be adequately protected in state court, this factor does not support
abstention.33 The Fifth Circuit has held that the sixth factor “can only be a neutral factor or one
that weighs against, not for, abstention.” Evanston, 844 F.2d at 1193.
CONCLUSION
Only the relative amount of progress in the state court proceeding weighs in favor of
abstention. The remaining factors are neutral or weigh against abstention. The Court has
considered each factor and the circumstances of the case and concludes this is not the exceptional
circumstance in which abstention is warranted.
IT IS ORDERED that the motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, stay the abovecaptioned matter is DENIED.

New Orleans, Louisiana, June 12, 2013.

___________________________________
LANCE M. AFRICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

33

R. Doc. No. 16, at 5-6.
9