Patterson v. Blue Offshore BV et al

Filing 156

ORDER granting 148 Motion for Entry of Judgment under Rule 54(b). Signed by Judge Nannette Jolivette Brown on 5/3/16. (jrc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DANNY PATTERSON

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

CASE NO. 13-337

BLUE OFFSHORE BV, et al.

SECTION: “G” (3)
ORDER

This litigation arises from an accident that occurred at sea off the coast of Russia.1 Pending
before the Court is Plaintiff Danny Patterson’s (“Patterson”) “Motion and Incorporated
Memorandum to Certify as Final Judgment Under FRCP 54 (b).”2 Having considered the motion,
the memorandum in support, the memorandum in opposition, and the recent stipulation to the motion
by the parties who have appeared, the Court will grant the motion.
I. Background
A.

Factual Background
Patterson alleges that he injured his knee and leg on August 21, 2012 while working for Blue

Offshore as a Jones Act seaman on the vessel “M/V Simon Stevin,” then located off the coast of
Russia.3 Patterson, claiming negligence, alleges that Defendants Blue Offshore BV, Aker Solutions,
Inc. (“Aker”), and FMC Technologies, Inc. (“FMCTI”) “jointly and severally” caused his injuries,
which rendered him unfit for duty.4 In an amended complaint, Patterson identifies FMC Eurasia,
LLC, FMC Kongsberg Subsea AS (“FMC Kongsberg”), and Aker Subsea AS (“Aker Subsea”) as
1

Rec. Doc. 1; Rec. Doc. 73.

2

Rec. Doc. 148.

3

Rec. Doc. 1 at p. 2; Rec. Doc. 20 at p. 1.

4

Rec. Doc. 1 at 2–3, 5.

1

likewise “indebted unto [him] for all damages to which he is entitled to receive[.]”5 Patterson
alleges that FMCTI, FMC Eurasia, LLC, FMC Kongsberg, Aker, and Aker Subsea served as
contractors charged with providing sub-sea umbilical equipment and/or technical supervision on the
project where he sustained his injuries while working for Blue Offshore, and that each defendant is
liable to him in connection with their performance of their role in the project.6 As of this date,
Patterson has not served FMC Eurasia, LLC despite having added it has a defendant two years ago.
B.

Procedural Background
Patterson filed the present lawsuit on February 22, 2013.7 On July 11, 2013, Patterson

amended his complaint to allege that he is a resident of Texas, that his injury occurred off of the
coast of Russia, and requested a trial by jury.8 On May 13, 2014, Patterson, with leave of Court,
amended his complaint again, adding FMC Eurasia, LLC, FMC Kongsberg, and Aker Subsea as
defendants.9 On July 6, 2015, the Court granted FMC Kongsberg’s “Re-Urged Motion [to] Dismiss
for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2),” and Aker Subsea’s “Motion to
Dismiss” on the grounds that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendants.10
On August 4, 2015, prior to filing the instant motion, Patterson filed Notices of Appeal,
seeking review of the Court’s July 6, 2015 Order and Reasons granting Aker Subsea and FMC

5

Rec. Doc. 73 at pp. 1–2.

6

Rec. Doc. 1 at pp. 3–4; Rec. Doc. 73 at pp. 1–2.

7

Rec. Doc. 1.

8

Rec. Doc. 20.

9

Rec. Doc. 73.

10

Rec. Doc. 145.

2

Kongsberg’s motions to dismiss.11 In Patterson’s motion, Patterson stated that both FMC Kongsberg
and Aker Subsea opposed the motion.12 FMC Kongsberg filed an opposition on August 11, 2015.13
On May 2, 2016, the Fifth Circuit issued an order granting Patterson’s unopposed motion to dismiss
the appeal as to appellee FMC Kongsberg.14 The Fifth Circuit stayed the appeal as to appellee Aker
Subsea pending this Court’s disposition of the instant motion.15
On May 3, 2016, the Court contacted the parties by email, noting that the only party that had
filed an opposition to the instant motion, FMC Kongsberg, had since been dismissed, and requesting
that the parties inform the Court whether any other party opposes the motion at this time.16 Aker
Subsea responded to the Court’s email stating that it did not oppose the instant motion.17 The Court
did not contact FMC Eurasia, LLC, also alleged to be a foreign corporation, as it has not yet been
served and so has not made an appearance.
II. Parties’ Arguments
A.

Patterson’s Arguments in Support of Rule 54(b) Certification
Patterson requests that the Court certify as a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) judgment

its Order and Reasons18 granting Defendant FMC Kongsberg’s “Re-Urged Motion [to] Dismiss for

11

Rec. Docs. 149, 150.

12

Id.

13

Rec. Doc. 151.

14

Rec. Doc. 155.

15

Id.

16

See attached correspondence.

17

Id.

18

Rec. Doc. 145.

3

Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2)” and Aker Subsea’s “Motion to Dismiss.”19
Patterson asserts that a final Rule 54 judgment as to these defendants is appropriate because all
claims against those two parties have been dismissed due to lack of personal jurisdiction.20
B.

FMC Kongsberg’s Arguments in Opposition to Rule 54(b) Certification
In opposition, FMC Kongsberg asserts that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) provides

for an entry of a final judgment as to some but not all claims in a lawsuit “if the court expressly
determines that there is no just reason for delay.”21 FMC Kongsberg asserts that in determining
whether no just reason for delay exists, the Court should weigh the potential inconvenience and cost
of piecemeal review against the potential danger of hardship or injustice through delay that would
be alleviated by immediate appeal.22 FMC Kongsberg contends that Rule 54 certification “is not to
be granted routinely, or as a courtesy to counsel or the parties, but only when an immediate appeal
is necessary to alleviate a danger of hardship or injustice.”23 FMC Kongsberg asserts that in light
of the disfavored nature of Rule 54(b) certification, it is incumbent on Patterson to show why
certification of the Court’s July 6, 2015 is appropriate; however, Patterson has made no effort to do
so.24 FMC Kongsberg contends that Patterson has not identified any hardship or injustice that would
result from requiring him to appeal the Court’s July 6, 2015 Order and Reasons following the

19

Rec. Doc. 148.

20

Id.

21

Rec. Doc. 151.

22

Id. at 3 (citing Eldredge v. Martin Marietta Corp., 207 F.3d 737, 740 (5th Cir. 2000)).

23

Id. at 3–4 (citing PYCA Indus., Inc. v. Harrison Cty. Waste Water Mgmt. Dist., 81 F.3d 1412, 1421 (5th
Cir. 1996)).
24

Id. at 4.

4

conclusion of the entire case.25
Furthermore, FMC Kongsberg asserts that in deciding whether to grant Rule 54(b)
certification, courts must also take into account judicial administrative interests, as well as the
equities involved, factors that it asserts do not support Rule 54(b) certification.26 FMC Kongsberg
contends that there is no justification in this case for the abandonment of the federal policy against
piecemeal appeals.27 It asserts that although Patterson may suggest that another trial may be required
if the Court’s Order and Reasons were to be reversed following conclusion of the case, that fact
should not outweigh the fact that if certification is granted, piecemeal appeals certainly will result.28
FMC Kongsberg also asserts that in considering judicial administrative interests, courts should
consider whether an appellate court will have to decide the same issues more than once.29 FMC
Kongsberg asserts that the Court, in its Order and Reasons, dismissed Patterson’s claims against it
and Aker Subsea on the grounds that it lacked personal jurisdiction over those defendants.30 FMC
Kongsberg contends that the issue of personal jurisdiction is likely to arise again in the litigation
because FMC Kongsberg and Aker Subsea are not the only foreign entities sued by Patterson.31
FMC Kongsberg asserts that Patterson has not yet perfected service of process upon another foreign
defendant, FMC Eurasia, LLC, but when service is made, FMC Eurasia, LLC will likely file a

25

Id. at 5.

26

Id. (citing Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 6 (1980)).

27

Id.

28

Id. at 5–6.

29

Id. (citing Curtiss-Wright Corp., 446 U.S. at 8).

30

Id.

31

Id.

5

motion to dismiss based upon lack of personal jurisdiction.32 According to FMC Kongsberg, if the
Court’s order on FMC Eurasia, LLC’s motion is appealed as well, this could result in a total of three
separate appeals being filed.33
FMC Kongsberg also contends that although Patterson has not suggested any inequity in
requiring him to wait until the entire case is resolved before appealing the Court’s Order, counsel
for FMC Kongsberg, who also represents Defendant FMC Technologies, is required to litigate the
case at both the trial and appellate levels simultaneously.34 FMC Kongsberg argues that such results
are another reason why Rule 54(b) judgments are disfavored.35
FMC Kongsberg also contends that a court in deciding whether to certify pursuant to Rule
54(b) should consider miscellaneous factors such as delay, shortening the time of trial, and
expense.36 FMC Kongsberg asserts that it expects Patterson to delay the trial until his appeal is
resolved, despite the fact that the case has already been pending for two and a half years.37 In
addition, FMC Kongsberg contends that it will be more costly to engage in successive appeals rather
than wait until the case is concluded to appeal all appealable rulings.38

32

Id.

33

Id. at 6–7.

34

Id. at 7.

35

Id. (citing Resolution Trust Corp. v. Evans, Civ. A. No. 92-0756, 1994 WL 43818, at *1 (E.D. La. Feb. 9,
1994) (Livavdais, J.)).
36

Id. (citing Gen. Acquisition, Inc. v. GenCorp., Inc., 23 F.3d 1022, 1030 (6th Cir. 1994)).

37

Id.

38

Id.

6

III. Law and Analysis
A.

Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) empowers the Court to “direct entry of a final

judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties.”39 The first inquiry the Court must
make is whether it is dealing with a “final judgment.”40 It must be a “judgment” in the sense that it
is a decision upon a cognizable claim for relief, and it must be “final” in the sense that it is “an
ultimate disposition of an individual claim entered in the course of a multiple claims action.”41
Second, “having found finality, the district court must go on to determine whether there is any just
reason for delay.”42 Rule 54(b) requests should not be granted routinely,43 and in making the
determination regarding whether there is any just reason for delay, a court must consider the judicial
administrative interests as well as the equities involved.44 Rule 54(b) “reflects a balancing of two
policies: avoiding the danger of hardship or injustice through delay which would be alleviated by
immediate appeal and avoid[ing] piecemeal appeals.”45 The propriety of a Rule 54(b) certification
is reviewable by the Fifth Circuit for abuse of discretion.46

39

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).

40

Curtiss–Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 7 (1980).

41

Id.

42

Id. at 8.

43

Brown v. Miss. Valley State Univ., 311 F.3d 328, 332 (5th Cir. 2002); PYCA, 81 F.3d at 1421.

44

Curtiss–Wright Corp., 446 U.S. at 8.

45

Eldredge v. Martin Marietta Corp., 207 F.3d 737, 740 (5th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting PYCA Indus. v. Harrison Cty. Waste Water Mgmt. Dist., 81 F.3d 1412, 1421 (5th Cir. 1996)).
46

PYCA Indus., Inc. v. Harrison Cty. Waste Water Mgmt. Dist., 81 F.3d 1412, 1421 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding
that a district court’s certification of a denial of a motion to amend was improper because “[t]he district court’s
certification articulates no hardship or danger warranting immediate appeal of this nondispositive motion” and

7

B.

Analysis
Patterson appeals the Court’s Order and Reasons granting FMC Kongsberg and Aker

Subsea’s motions to dismiss on the grounds that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over these
defendants.47 The Court’s Order and Reasons dismissed all of Patterson’s claims against FMC
Kongsberg and Aker Subsea, but did not dismiss all of the parties. Therefore, the Court’s decision
is both a decision upon a cognizable claim for relief and “an ultimate disposition of an individual
claim entered in the course of a multiple claims action.”48 Accordingly, the first inquiry is satisfied.
The second inquiry requires the Court to determine whether there is any just reason for
delay.49 In support of his motion for Rule 54(b) certification, Patterson asserts only that the claims
against two of the defendants in the case have been dismissed and therefore a Rule 54(b) judgment
is appropriate.50 However, as stated above, Rule 54(b) requests should not be granted routinely and
are appropriate only after considering the judicial administrative interests, as well as the other
equities involved.51 Patterson offers no reason that distinguishes this case from any other case in
which the Court dismisses fewer than all defendants from a case. Nor does Patterson assert any
hardship or injustice that he will suffer if his motion is denied.
Prior to the Fifth Circuit’s Order dismissing the appeal against it, FMC Kongsberg offered
because the denial of leave to amend was not final for purposes of appeal).
47

Rec. Doc. 145.

48

Id.

49

Curtiss–Wright Corp., 446 U.S. at 8. See Eldredge v. Martin Marietta Corp., 207 F.3d 737, 740 (5th Cir.
2000) (determining that the district court’s order granting summary judgment on all of the claims against one
defendant, such that the defendant was no longer a party before the court, was properly on appeal pursuant to Rule
54(b) where there were other parties remaining in the case).
50

Rec. Doc. 148 at 1.

51

Brown v. Miss. Valley State Univ., 311 F.3d 328, 332 (5th Cir. 2002); PYCA, 81 F.3d at 1421.

8

several arguments in opposition to the instant motion.52 FMC Kongsberg argued that Patterson had
yet to effect service of process upon FMC Eurasia, LLC, another foreign entity that would likely
also file a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.53 The Supreme Court in CurtissWright Corp. v. General Electric Co. stated that judicial administrative interests include whether
the appellate court will have to decide the same issues more than once.54 Here, if there were
subsequent appeals, the appellate court would have to review the personal jurisdiction issues
regarding several different parties in the same case in separate appeals. Turning to the equities, FMC
Kongsberg asserts that a Rule 54(b) certification would require counsel to litigate simultaneously
in the trial court and appellate level.55 Although FMC Kongsberg has now been dismissed from the
case, it appears that counsel for Aker Subsea is in the same position that FMC Kongsberg was
because the same counsel represents both Aker Subsea as well as Aker Solutions Inc., parties that
are now litigating at both the appellate and trial level.

52

Rec. Doc. 148.

53

Rec. Doc. 151 at 6.

54

446 U.S. 1, 7 (1980).

55

Rec. Doc. 151 at 7.

9

IV. Conclusion
The only party that filed an opposition to the motion has now been dismissed. Aker Subsea
has represented to the Court that it does not oppose the instant motion.56 Furthermore, it does not
appear that Defendant FMC Eurasia, LLC has been served and perhaps never will be. In light of
these considerations, the Court concludes that there is no just reason for delay and therefore certifies
its Order and Reasons regarding lack of personal jurisdiction over FMC Kongsberg and Aker Subsea
as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b).
Based on the foregoing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Patterson’s “Motion and Incorporated Memorandum to
Certify as Final Judgment Under FRCP 54 (b)”57 is GRANTED.
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this 3rd day of May, 2016.

________________________________________
NANNETTE JOLIVETTE BROWN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

56

See attached correspondence.

57

Rec. Doc. 148.

10