Tajonera et al v. Black Elk Energy Offshore Operations, L.L.C.

Filing 798

ORDER denying 755 Motion to Stay. Signed by Judge Nannette Jolivette Brown. (Reference: all cases)(jrc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
EDNA TAJONERA, et al.

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 13-0366
c/w 13-0550, 13-5137, 13-2496,
13-5508, 13-6022, 13-6099, 136413, and 14-374

BLACK ELK ENERGY OFFSHORE OPERATIONS,
L.L.C., et al.

SECTION: “G”(5)

ORDER
Before the Court is Wood Group PSN, Inc.’s (“Wood Group”) and Grand Isle Shipyard
L.L.C.’s (“GIS”) “Motion to Stay Civil Proceedings,”1 wherein Wood Group and GIS seek to stay
the instant proceedings pending the outcome of parallel criminal charges against Wood Group,
Black Elk Energy Offshore Operations, L.L.C. (“BEEOO”), GIS, GIS supervisor Curtis Dantin,
Compass Engineering and Consultants, LLC (“Compass”) contract superintendent Don Moss, and
Wood Group lead production operator Chris Srubar.2 Having considered the motion, the memoranda
in opposition and in support, the record, and the applicable law, the Court herein denies the motion
to stay proceedings.
I. Background
The pending civil case and the nine civil cases consolidated with it arise out of a November
16, 2012 explosion that occurred on the West Delta 32 Block Platform (“WD-32”), an offshore oil
production platform owned by BEEOO. The explosion resulted in the deaths of three individuals,

1

Rec. Doc. 755.

2

Rec. Doc. 603.

1

injury to others, and the spillage of 500 barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico. Plaintiffs allege that
BEEOO, Wood Group, Shamrock Management, L.L.C. (“Shamrock”), Compass,3 Enviro Tech
Systems, LLC,4 and GIS were contractors of BEEOO allegedly involved in work being done on the
Platform that day.5
On November 19, 2015, the federal government filed a criminal indictment charging
BEEOO, GIS, Wood Group, GIS supervisor Curtis Dantin (“Dantin”), Compass contract
superintendent Don Moss (“Moss”), and Wood Group lead production operator Chris Srubar
(“Srubar”) with various felony and misdemeanor counts.6 BEEOO and GIS were each charged with
three felony counts of involuntary manslaughter, eight felony counts under the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”), and one misdemeanor count under the Clean Water Act.7 Dantin, a
plaintiff in the civil case, was charged with eight felony counts under the OCSLA, and one
misdemeanor count under the Clean Water Act.8 Wood Group and Srubar, who is also a plaintiff in
the civil litigation, were each charged with six felony counts under the OCSLA and one
misdemeanor count under the Clean Water Act.9 Moss was charged with three felony counts under
the OCSLA, and one misdemeanor count under the Clean Water Act.10 All criminal defendants are

3

Compass was dismissed from this lawsuit on August 26, 2014. See Rec. Doc. 406.

4

Enviro-Tech was dismissed from this lawsuit on September 19, 2014. See Rec. Doc. 477.

5

Rec. Doc. 590 at ¶¶ 22-27.

6

Rec. Doc. 755-2.

7

Id.

8

Id.

9

Id.

10

Id.

2

set to be arraigned on December 9, 2015.11
Throughout this litigation, the parties have referred to the plaintiffs in the various cases as
follows:
C

13-0366: Tajonera Plaintiffs

C

13-0550: Corporal Plaintiffs

C

13-5137: Canencia Plaintiffs

C

13-5508: Tamayo and Ilagan Plaintiffs

C

13-6022: Plaintiff Voclain

C

13-6413: Srubar and Gipson Plaintiffs

C

14-0374: Plaintiff Dominguez

Recognizing the number of individual plaintiffs spread out across each of these cases, the Court will
continue with the parties’ naming convention for simplicity.
Wood Group filed the pending motion, along with a motion to expedite hearing,12 on
November 25, 2015.13 The Court initially denied the motion to expedite hearing on November 30,
2015.14 On December 2, 2015, Wood Group sought reconsideration of the order denying expedited
hearing and re-urged the Court to grant its request for a stay.15 The Court, in an exercise of its broad
discretion, set the motion for hearing on the briefs at 10:00 a.m. on December 4, 2015, and ordered

11

Rec. Doc. 755-3.

12

Rec. Doc. 756.

13

Rec. Doc. 603.

14

Rec. Doc. 757.

15

Rec. Doc. 761.

3

that any memoranda in opposition to the motion be filed by 9:00 a.m. on December 4, 2015.16 The
following parties have filed memoranda in opposition to Wood Group and GIS’s motion to stay:
Gipson Plaintiffs,17 Canencia Plaintiffs,18 Plaintiff Dominguez,19 Tamayo and Ilagan Plaintiffs,20
Corporal Plaintiffs,21 and BEEOO.22 GIS has filed a memorandum joining in Wood Group’s motion
and adopting in whole Wood Group’s arguments requesting that the Court stay the instant
proceedings.23
II. Parties’ Arguments
A.

Wood Group and GIS’s Arguments in Support
Wood Group urges the Court to stay the civil proceedings, pending resolution of the criminal

case.24 GIS filed a response to Wood Group’s motion, joining and adopting in whole Wood Group’s
arguments.25 Wood Group and GIS note that district courts within the Fifth Circuit have recognized
several factors in considering whether to stay a civil proceeding: “(1) the extent to which the issues
in the criminal case overlap with those presented in the civil case; (2) the status of the criminal case,

16

Rec. Doc. 772.

17

Rec. Doc. 773.

18

Rec. Doc. 774.

19

Rec. Doc. 775.

20

Rec. Doc. 776.

21

Rec. Doc. 777.

22

Rec. Doc. 778.

23

Rec. Doc. 779.

24

Rec. Doc. 755.

25

Rec. Doc. 779.

4

including whether defendants have been indicted; (3) the private interests of the plaintiff in
proceeding expeditiously, weighed against the prejudice to plaintiffs caused by the delay; (4) the
private interests of the burden on the defendants; (5) the interests of the courts; and (6) the public
interest.”26
Wood Group and GIS assert that the first factor is the most important factor in determining
whether a stay should be granted.27 They argue that there is a common nucleus of operative facts in
both the consolidated civil and criminal cases.28 Wood Group and GIS contend that “[t]he overlap
between the consolidated civil and criminal cases creates special circumstances which expose [them]
to the risk of prejudice in the criminal case if both are allowed to proceed together.”29 According to
Wood Group and GIS, the risk of prejudice is particularly acute because it does not have a Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.30 Wood Group and GIS note that “the discovery
process in the civil case has already yielded work product that the Government may attempt to offer
as an admission at any criminal trial e.g., deposition testimony given by Chris Srubar, Philip
Broussard, and Danny Gipson, all employees of WGPSN, and Curtis Dantin, an employee of GIS.”31
Wood Group and GIS assert that “[i]f the civil case proceeds on its current schedule, the process of
further streamlining the case to make it ready for trial (for example, by stipulations) will only

26

Rec. Doc. 755-1 at p. 3 (citing Heller Healthcare Fin., Inc. v. Boyes, No. 300-1335, 2002 WL 1558337,
at * 2 (N.D. Tex. July 15, 2002); SEC Mutuals.com, Inc., 2004 WL 1629929, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jul. 20, 2004);
Frierson v. City of Terrell, 2003 WL 21355969, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jun. 6, 2003).
27

Id.

28

Id. at p. 3.

29

Id.

30

Id. at p. 4.

31

Id. at p. 4.

5

increase the number of alleged admissions the Government may choose to offer at any criminal
trial.”32 Wood Group and GIS argue that if the civil case proceeds the Government will be able to
obtain information about its defenses beyond the scope of what it could obtain under Rule 16 of the
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure.33
As to the second factor, Wood Group and GIS note that they has been indicted, and [t]he
‘strongest case’ for staying civil proceedings is that in which a defendant must simultaneously
defend against criminal and civil cases arising from the same incident.”34 Wood Group and GIS
assert that “the Government should not be permitted to gain a greater tactical advantage than it
would have if the civil case was not pending.”35
Addressing the third and fourth factors, Wood Group and GIS acknowledge that the plaintiffs
in the civil case have an interest in resolving the civil litigation quickly.36 However, Wood Group
and GIS argue that the plaintiffs will not be substantially prejudiced by a relatively brief delay
pending resolution of the criminal proceedings.37 Wood Group and GIS note that under the Speedy
Trial Act, a trial date in the criminal matter will be set within 70 days of its December 9, 2015
arraignment.38 In the event that the criminal case is continued, Wood Group and GIS assert that this

32

Id.

33

Id.

34

Id. at p. 5 (citing SEC v. Dresser Indus., 628 F.2d 1368, 1375-76 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).

35

Id.

36

Id.

37

Id.

38

Id.

6

Court could reconsider whether to continue the stay.39
As to the fifth and six factors, Wood Group and GIS contend that the interests of the Court
and the public will be advanced by the stay.40 In support of its position, Wood Group and GIS rely
on Campbell v. Estland, where the Fifth Circuit stated, “‘[t]he very fact that there is clear distinction
between civil and criminal actions requires a government policy determination of priority: which
case should be tried first,’ and ‘[a]dministrative policy gives priority to the public interest in law
enforcement.’”41 Wood Group and GIS assert that judicial economy will likely be served by a stay
because “[t]he parties have not yet had to contend with the possibility that witnesses who were
willing to testify or give depositions before the criminal charges were returned will now invoke their
Fifth Amendment privileges.”42 According to Wood Group and GIS, “[t]he very brief delay
contemplated by this motion is insignificant when balanced against the confusion and duplication
that will inevitably result if the criminal and civil cases proceed simultaneously.”43
In its motion for reconsideration of the Court’s order denying its motion for expedited
hearing on the motion to stay, Wood Group raises several additional arguments in support of its
motion to stay.44 GIS also joined the arguments asserted by Wood Group in the motion for
reconsideration.45 Wood Group and GIS assert that three critical depositions of liability experts

39

Id. at p. 6.

40

Id.

41

Id. (quoting Campbell v. Eastland, 307 F.2d 478, 487 (5th Cir. 1962)).

42

Id. at 7.

43

Id.

44

Rec. Doc. 761-1 at p. 1.

45

Rec. Doc. 779.

7

remain, which will explore Wood Group’s alleged negligence in connection with the November 16,
2012 incident.46 Wood Group and GIS argue that these depositions will be used by the Government
against it, “putting [them] at a significant disadvantage as compared to other criminal indictees, and
giving the United States a significant advantage it does not ordinarily enjoy.”47 Wood Group and
GIS aver that they are “concerned that if the civil trial proceeds before the criminal trial, the civil
trial could be stymied and impeded by witnesses who may refuse to testify and the briefing of
extraneous issues.”48 Wood Group and GIS also cite Waste Management of Louisiana, LLC v. River
Burch, Inc., wherein this Court previously granted a stay of a civil case pending resolution of
criminal proceedings.49
B.

Arguments in Opposition
Srubar and Gipson Plaintiffs,50 Canencia Plaintiffs,51 Plaintiff Dominguez,52 Tamayo and

Ilagan Plaintiffs,53 Corporal Plaintiffs,54 and BEEOO55 all filed oppositions to the motion to stay.
Srubar and Gipson Plaintiffs note that Plaintiff, Christopher Srubar, was indicted in the criminal

46

Id. at pp. 1–2.

47

Id. at p. 2.

48

Id. at p. 4.

49

Id. at 4 (citing Waste Mgmt. of Louisiana, LLC v. River Birch, Inc., No. 11-2405, 2012 WL 520660, at *5
(E.D. La. Feb. 15, 2012)).
50

Rec. Doc. 773.

51

Rec. Doc. 774.

52

Rec. Doc. 775.

53

Rec. Doc. 776.

54

Rec. Doc. 777.

55

Rec. Doc. 778.

8

case.56 However, Srubar and Gipson Plaintiffs assert that any prejudice in proceeding with the civil
case has already occurred because their depositions have been taken.57 Accordingly, Srubar and
Gipson Plaintiffs urge the Court to deny the motion to stay or, alternatively, allow settlement
negotiations to continue.58
According to the Canencia Plaintiffs, “the ship has already sailed discovery is virtually
completed – all fact witnesses have been heard from, and only a few experts remain to be
deposed.”59 Canencia Plaintiffs note that when the Government earlier moved to stay these
proceedings, Wood Group opposed the stay, arguing that a stay would prejudice Wood Group.60
Canencia Plaintiffs note that none of Wood Group’s witnesses have invoked the Fifth Amendment.61
Canencia Plaintiffs assert that Wood Group cannot show how it will be prejudiced because
discovery has been virtually completed.62 Canencia Plaintiffs argue that allowing Wood Group “to
stay the action without the ability to show evidence of prejudice is contrary to the law and could
potentially prejudice these Plaintiffs who already have waited far too long for their day in court.”63
Plaintiff Dominguez notes that Wood Group previously opposed the Government’s motion

56

Rec. Doc. 773 at p. 1.

57

Id.

58

Id. at pp. 1–2.

59

Rec. Doc. 774 at p. 2.

60

Id.

61

Id..

62

Id. at p. 4 (citing Day v. Apoliona, 505 F.3d 963, 965 (9th Cir. 2007)).

63

Id. at p. 5.

9

to stay these proceedings.64 Plaintiff Dominguez asserts that the criminal and civil matters are not
identical because the Government has not indicted “all potentially contributorily negligent plaintiffs
and defendants.”65 Plaintiff Dominguez asserts that “Wood Group’s main reason for seeking a stay
is so it may keep its defense strategy secret from the Government.”66 However, according to Plaintiff
Dominguez, “that genie is already out of the bottle” because discovery is nearly complete.67 Plaintiff
Dominguez argues that a stay at this stage would harm the plaintiffs’ interests in a speedy
resolution.68 Moreover, Plaintiff Dominguez notes that at least two of the criminal defendants oppose
a stay.69 Finally, Plaintiff Dominguez avers that proceeding to trial in the civil case is in both the
Court and the public’s interest.70
Tamayo and Ilagan Plaintiffs also point to the fact that Wood Group previously opposed the
Government’s request for a stay in this case.71 Moreover, Tamayo and Ilagan Plaintiffs note that
criminal defendants BEEOO and Christopher Srubar oppose a stay.72 Finally, Tamayo and Ilagan
Plaintiffs assert that “all discovery has been conducted and completed in this civil matter and Wood
Group cannot claim that this is a situation where the civil case will continue to unfold the facts and

64

Rec. Doc. 775 at p. 3.

65

Id.

66

Id. at p. 4.

67

Id.

68

Id. at p. 5.

69

Id. at p. 6.

70

Id. at pp. 6–7.

71

Rec. Doc. 776 at p. 1.

72

Id. at p. 2.

10

testimony outside of the criminal case.”73 Therefore, Tamayo and Ilagan Plaintiffs urge the Court
to deny Wood Groups request for a stay or, alternatively, defer ruling until the eve of the civil trial.74
Tajonera and Corporal Plaintiffs contend that, at this late stage of the litigation, the stay
would serve only to delay the few remaining expert witness depositions, prevent the Court from
ruling on pretrial and discovery motions, halt settlement discussions, and prevent the trial from
proceeding.75 Tajonera and Corporal Plaintiffs note that “Wood Group has already produced
documents, produced a corporate representative for deposition, had employees deposed, filed agreed
facts, and hired and produced its experts.”76 Tajonera and Corporal Plaintiffs assert that the risk of
the Government obtaining information through discovery in the civil proceedings has passed.77 To
the extent that Wood Group is concerned about the effect of stipulations, Tajonera and Corporal
Plaintiffs argue that Wood Group is not obligated to make any stipulations.78 Tajonera and Corporal
Plaintiffs assert that they will be prejudiced by a continuance of trial.79 They note that it is unlikely
the criminal trial will occur within 70 days of arraignment.80 Finally, they aver that the interests of
the Court and the public will be advanced by resolving this case.81

73

Id.

74

Id. at p. 3.

75

Rec. Doc. 777 at p. 2.

76

Id.

77

Id. at p. 3.

78

Id. at p. 3.

79

Id. at p. 4.

80

Id.

81

Id.

11

BEEOO, which was indicted in the criminal case, also opposes the Motion to Stay.82 BEEOO
notes that liability discovery in this case is nearly complete, with the exception of depositions of
liability experts, whose reports have been released.83 Moreover, BEEOO notes that Wood Group’s
defense strategy has been outlined in its liability expert’s report, the expert’s deposition, Wood
Group’s corporate deposition, the deposition testimony of Wood Group’s employees and in the
preliminary Pretrial Order.84 BEEOO asserts that “any arguable damage to Wood Group stemming
from this civil proceeding has already been done.”85 BEEOO argues that the issues in the criminal
and civil proceedings are not identical “[b]ecause the fault of fewer than all potentially culpable
parties to the civil suit will be the focus of the criminal case.”86 BEEOO contends that any concerns
Wood Group has about the effect of stipulations are unfounded because Wood Group would not be
required to stipulate to anything that could be used against it in the criminal case.87 BEEOO contends
that the fact that Wood Group has been indicted should be given little weight because Wood Group
and its employees have already been deposed in the civil suit.88 BEEOO avers that “another stay of
the case will do nothing but needlessly protract this litigation, causing the parties and the Court to
expend additional time and costs for more years to come.”89 BEEOO asserts that Wood Group has

82

Rec. Doc. 778 at p. 1.

83

Id.

84

Id.

85

Id. at p. 2.

86

Id. at p. 4.

87

Id. at p. 5.

88

Id. at p. 6.

89

Id. at p. 8.

12

only asserted the possibility of prejudice, and has not shown the specific harm it will suffer if the
civil case proceeds.90
III. Law and Analysis
A.

Legal Standard
There is no question that a district court has inherent power to “control the disposition of the

causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants,”91 and
that this authority includes the district court’s wide discretion to grant a stay in a pending matter.92
When “the interests of justice seem[] to require such action,” a court may exercise its discretion to
stay civil proceedings, postpone discovery, or impose protective orders and conditions.93 Although
it is not required to do so, a district court “may stay a civil proceeding during the pendency of a
parallel criminal proceeding,”94 or “until the criminal case or the likelihood of a criminal case is
ended.”95 Therefore, although “[t]he simultaneous prosecution of civil and criminal actions is
generally unobjectionable,”96 a stay of a pending civil action may be appropriate “when there is a
real and appreciable risk of self-incrimination.”97

90

Id. at p. 10.

91

Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936).

92

In re Ramu Corp., 903 F.2d 312, 318 (5th Cir. 1990).

93

United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 12 n.27 (1970); see also, Mayo v. Tri-Bell Indus., 787 F.2d 1007,
1012 (5th Cir. 1986).
94

S.E.C. v. First Fin. Grp. of Tex., Inc., 659 F.2d 660, 668 (5th Cir. 1981).

95

DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi, 488 F.3d 649, 655 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S.
384, 394 (2007) (citing Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 730 (1996))).
96

First Fin. Grp., 659 F.2d at 667.

97

Brumfield v. Shelton, 727 F.Supp. 282, 284 (E.D. La. 1989) (Mentz, J.) (citing Kordel, 391 U.S. at 8–9).

13

However, whether to stay a civil action pending resolution of a related criminal proceeding
is a matter left to the court’s discretion,98 and the Fifth Circuit has determined that such a stay may
be warranted only where “special circumstances” exist such that a party would suffer substantial and
irreparable prejudice otherwise.99 Therefore, the “the mere possibility of prejudice” to the criminal
defendant arising from discovery in the civil case does not necessarily warrant a stay.100 The burden
to show that a stay is warranted rests on the movant,101 and in determining whether a civil action
should be stayed due to a criminal matter, courts within the Fifth Circuit have looked to six
factors.102 These factors are:
1.

The extent to which the issues in the criminal case overlap with those presented in
the civil case;

2.

The status of the criminal case, including whether the defendant has been indicted;

3.

The private interests of the plaintiff in proceeding expeditiously, weighed against the
prejudice to the plaintiff caused by the delay;

4.

The private interests of and burden on the defendant;

5.

The interests of the courts; and

98

Kordel, 397 U.S. at 12 n.27.

99

First Fin. Grp., 659 F.2d at 668; see also United States v. Little Al, 712 F.2d 133, 136 (5th Cir. 1983).

100

In re Ramu Corp., 903 F.2d at 320.

101

Ruiz v. Estelle, 666 F.2d 854, 856 (5th Cir. 1982); Drummond v. Fulton Cty. Dep’t of Family &
Children’s Servs., 532 F.2d 1001, 1002 (5th Cir. 1976).
102

Alcala v. Tex. Webb Cty., 625 F.Supp.2d 391, 399 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (collecting district court cases within
the Fifth Circuit applying this test); see also Lebouef v. Global X-Ray and Testing Corp., No. 07-5755, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6470, at *4 (E.D. La. Jan. 29, 2008) (Barbier, J.) (“To determine whether special circumstances exist,
the court must ‘balance the competing constitutional and procedural interests of the parties,’ as illustrated through
the six-factor test . . . .”) (citation omitted).

14

The public interest.103

6.
B.

Analysis
1.

The extent to which the issues in the criminal case overlap with those presented
in the civil case

Where there exists overlap between the civil and criminal proceedings, courts often feel
compelled to grant a stay.104 Many courts have found that “the similarity of the issues in the
underlying civil and criminal actions is considered the most important threshold issue in determining
whether to grant a stay.”105 Having reviewed the indictments, the Court is convinced that the subject
matter of this suit is “identical” or very similar, albeit broader, to the nature of the criminal
proceedings.
Overlap between civil and criminal cases is an important factor specifically because such
overlap increases the risk of a defendant’s self-incrimination in civil proceedings.106 As numerous
opposing parties point out, that “ship has already sailed.”107 Discovery in this case is almost entirely
complete, with only three liability experts left to be deposed remaining at the time Wood Group’s
motion for reconsideration was filed on December 2, 2015.108 However, Wood Group stated that two
of the liability experts were scheduled for depositions on December 3, 2015, and Wood Group
103

Alcala, F.Supp. 2d at 399.

104

Astoria Entm’t, Inc. v. Edwards, No. 98-3359, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6040, at *3 (E.D. La. Apr. 22,
1999) (Duval, J.).
105

See, e.g., Dominguez v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., 530 F. Supp.2d 902, 906–07 (S.D. Tex. 2008).

106

See S.E.C. v. AmeriFirst Funding, Inc., No. 07-1188, 2008 WL 866065, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 2008)
(citing Trustees of Plumbers & Pipefitters Nat. Pension Fund v. Transworld Mech., Inc., 886 F. Supp. 1134, 1139
(S.D.N.Y. 1995)); Librado v. M.S. Carriers, Inc., 2002 WL 31495988, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 2002).
107

Rec. Doc. 774 at p. 2; see also Rec. Docs.775 at p. 1; 776 at p. 2; 777 at p. 2; 778 at p. 1.

108

Rec. Doc. 761-1 at p. 1.

15

originally asked for an expedited submission date of December 10 or 11—after the depositions
would have been taken.109 Furthermore, because the remaining depositions are of expert witnesses,
their reports have already been released.110 It is disingenuous for Wood Group and GIS to argue now
that proceedings must be immediately stayed after the vast majority of discovery has been completed
and only two depositions—the content of which can be anticipated by the published expert
reports—remain.
Although Wood Group and GIS argue that their strategy and tactics would be irreparably
harmed if they must defend themselves simultaneously in civil and criminal proceedings, it is clear
that any such damage has already been done.111 Civil litigation in this matter has been pending for
nearly three years, and liability discovery is almost complete. The parties have filed a joint proposed
pretrial order and two drafts of jury instructions and verdict forms. Any incriminating statements
that Wood Group and GIS now seek to avoid making have already been made. The motion to stay
relies heavily on an issue that is largely moot at this point, and which Wood Group agreed was moot
even in February 2015, when it filed an opposition to the government’s motion to intervene in and
stay the civil proceedings.112 More than nine months ago, Wood Group argued that a stay was
unnecessary because “all fact discovery is now, essentially, complete.”113
The case is nearly ready for trial, and therefore the overlap between the civil and criminal

109

Id.

110

Rec. Doc. 778 at p. 1.

111

Srubar, for example, who has also recently been indicted, argues that since his deposition has already
been taken, any potential prejudice has already occurred. Rec. Doc. 773 at p. 1.
112

Rec. Doc. 621.

113

Id. at p. 1.

16

cases—and thus the risk that Wood Group and GIS would incriminate themselves—does not weigh
as heavily in favor of a stay as it would have if the government had issued an indictment toward the
beginning of the civil litigation. At this stage of the proceedings, however, the damage, if any, is
done. Therefore, this factor does not weigh in favor of a stay.
2.

Status of Criminal Proceedings

Generally, a stay of a civil case is “most appropriate” when a party to the civil action has
already been indicted for the same conduct.114 Here, the government has indicted numerous parties
in this case. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of a stay. However, this factor alone is not
dispositive of the issue.
3.

Plaintiffs’ Interest

Plaintiffs contend that they would be prejudiced by a stay, considering that the trial in this
matter is set to commence on June 20, 2016. Wood Group, when it opposed the government’s
motion to stay proceedings in February of 2015, recognized even then that a stay “would mean
additional years of delay for these plaintiffs whose financial futures are likely to be significantly
impacted by the outcome of this litigation. They are entitled to know what, if anything, they may
recover and they are entitled to know in a timely fashion.”115 The Court is unpersuaded by Wood
Group and GIS’s argument now that Plaintiffs face no substantial prejudice and that they may, after
all, see some recovery in the event that the defendants in the criminal case are convicted or plead
guilty and because the applicable sentencing statutes “may allow” the sentencing court to “consider

114

See United States ex rel. Gonzalez v. Fresenius Med. Care N. Am., 571 F. Supp. 2d 758, 762–63 (W.D.

Tex. 2008).
115

Rec. Doc. 621 at p. 7.

17

restitution.”116
In February 2015, Wood Group argued that the government provided no time frame for its
investigation, and that a stay could therefore result in “years” of delay.117 Although the Court
ultimately granted a limited stay of just 60 days,118 Wood Group and GIS now seek an indefinite stay
until the criminal proceedings are resolved, noting that because they have not waived their Speedy
Trial rights, “a short stay may be all that is required.”119 Clearly, they are not factoring in the
possible delays during appeal should convictions be imposed. Such appeals could take years.
Given the numerous delays in this complex civil litigation, the Court is unconvinced that any
criminal proceedings in this matter will be resolved so quickly that Plaintiffs will suffer no
significant prejudice in this civil litigation. Although Wood Group and GIS suggest that the Court
could grant this motion to stay the case and then reconsider whether a further stay is necessary in
the event that the trial in the criminal case is later delayed,120 the Court finds that the harm that
would be caused by such a stay, coupled with the unlikelihood that the criminal trial would proceed
as rapidly as alleged by Wood Group and GIS, weigh against granting even a temporary stay.
Plaintiffs have a strong interest in the resolution of this matter, as they have noted in five
oppositions filed to the instant motion. The incident at issue—in which three individuals died and
numerous others were severely injured—occurred on November 16, 2012, and more than three years
have passed since, with multiple continuations of the trial date, which is now six months away.
116

Rec. Doc. 755-1 at p. 6.

117

Rec. Doc. 621 at p. 7.

118

Rec. Doc. 636.

119

Rec. Doc. 761-1 at p. 4.

120

Rec. Doc. 755-1 at p. 6.

18

Therefore, this factor weighs against staying the case.
4.

Defendants’ Interest

When the government was still investigating its case, and when Wood Group presumably
was aware that it was the target of a government investigation but before it had been indicted,121
Wood Group argued that it would be prejudiced by a stay because it was eager for its day in court
and was entitled to resolution of the pending claims.122 Then, Wood Group argued that a stay would
push any hope of a resolution of this matter “years into the future,” and that witnesses and experts
may be unavailable at that time.123 Now, however, Wood Group has changed its tune, arguing that
it will be substantially prejudiced if a stay is not granted, presumably because of the arguments,
articulated above, concerning privilege and strategy.124
The Court begins by noting that two of the criminal defendants who have been indicted—
Srubar, a plaintiff in the civil matter, and BEEOO, a defendant in the civil matter—oppose Wood
Group and GIS’s motion.125 BEEOO notes that it “is in the exact same predicament as Wood
Group,” insofar as it faces a criminal indictment, “albeit for additional and more serious charges,”
but that any damage allegedly done to its criminal defense has already been completed.126 In
particular, BEEOO argues that there is no prejudice to defendants in the civil matter because liability
discovery is “very nearly complete,” because Wood Group’s “defense strategy” has been published

121

Rec. Doc. 778 at p. 10.

122

Rec. Doc. 621 at p. 7.

123

Id.

124

Rec. Doc. 755-1 at pp. 5–6.

125

Rec. Docs. 773, 778.

126

Rec. Doc. 778 at p. 8.

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and outlined in its own liability expert’s report, the expert’s deposition, Wood Group’s two-day
corporate deposition testimony, the deposition testimony of its employees on the platform, and the
preliminary Pre-Trial Order filed on October 22, 2015.127 BEEOO further notes that Wood Group
has previously admitted that “[t]he Government has had unfettered access to all documents filed in
connection with [the civil case] . . . .”128 The Court addressed these facts under the first factor of the
standard for determining whether to grant a motion to stay, and found that any risk of selfincrimination has already occurred through the extensive discovery already completed in this matter.
Moreover, it is hypocritical for Wood Group and GIS to have enjoyed the benefits of civil
discovery, which is considerably broader than provided for in criminal proceedings, and to now
argue that any additional discovery, however limited, will prejudice them in the criminal
proceedings. Wood Group previously opposed a stay when the government requested one to aid its
criminal investigation, yet now it seeks to delay the civil proceedings indefinitely when almost all
parties who have opined on the matter—including two criminal defendants—seek to move forward
with the case.
Wood Group’s arguments of February 2015, when it initially opposed a stay of the
proceedings, and not those it and GIS have now opportunistically alleged immediately following an
indictment that they were well aware could be coming, prevail here. Therefore, the Court finds that,
weighing the defendants’ interests and burdens here, weighs in favor of a stay.
5.

The Court’s Interest

In determining the propriety of a stay, a court can consider its own interests in efficient

127

Rec. Doc. 778 at p. 1.

128

Id. at p. 2.

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administration and judicial economy,” and courts have an interest in moving cases forward
expeditiously.129 “Further, before granting a stay pending the resolution of another case, the court
must carefully consider the time reasonably expected for resolution of the ‘other case,’ in light of
the principle that ‘stay orders will be reversed when they are found to be immoderate or of an
indefinite duration.’”130
Wood Group and GIS cite Waste Management of Louisiana, LLC v. River Birch, Inc., a case
in which this Court previously granted a motion to stay a civil trial while criminal proceedings were
pending, in arguing that a stay would be warranted in this matter.131 In River Birch, however, the
Court granted a motion to stay proceedings just months after civil complaints were filed.132 There,
this Court sought to avoid duplicative discovery, and to possibly streamline the issues presented in
the civil matter in light of the results of any criminal proceedings.133 Here, however, the civil matter
has already been pending for three years, and discovery is almost complete. Motions practice is also
largely complete and trial is scheduled to commence on June 20, 2016. A preliminary Pre-Trial
Order, as well as two drafts of jury instructions and verdict forms, have been submitted.
Wood Group and GIS argue that allowing the criminal trial to proceed first “may guide the
parties in settlement discussions and potentially eliminate the need to litigate some or all of the

129

United States ex rel. Gonzalez v. Fresenius Med. Care N. Am., 571 F. Supp. 2d 758, 765 (W.D. Tex.

2008).
130

Wedgeworth v. Fibreboard Corp., 706 F.2d 541, 545 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting McKnight v. Blanchard,
667 F.2d 477, 479 (5th Cir. 1982) (vacating an indefinite and protracted stay where the court had not even weighed
competing interests in ordering the stay)).
131

Rec. Docs. 755-1 at p. 2; 761-1 at p. 4 (citing Waste Mgmt. of La., LLC v. River Birch, Inc., No. 112405, 2012 WL 520660, at *1 (E.D. La. Feb. 15, 2012) (Brown, J.).
132

See River Birch, 2012 WL 520660, at *1.

133

Id. at *5.

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issues in this case.”134 The Court has lost track of the number of times it has been assured that the
parties are on the cusp of settling. Further delay in order to aid settlement negotiations is clearly
unwarranted. The Court has a strong interest in speedily resolving a case that has been pending
before it for three years, and therefore this factor also weighs in favor of denying a stay.
6.

The Public Interest

Although the public interest in law enforcement sometimes weighs in favor of prioritizing
criminal proceedings over civil matters,135 the public also has an interest in the prompt resolution
of civil cases.136 In its previous Order granting a motion to stay in this case, the Court found that a
narrowly tailored stay would not substantially harm Plaintiffs’ interests, and the public interest in
law enforcement therefore weighed in favor of a stay.137 Now, however, another seven months have
passed, and Wood Group and GIS seek an indefinite stay pending the resolution of all criminal
proceedings in this matter. As noted repeatedly above, this case is set for trial on June 20, 2016 and
the parties have made substantial additional steps toward preparing the case for trial. On the other
hand, Wood Group and GIS have offered no persuasive argument that the public interest favors a
stay. Therefore, this factor weighs against staying the case.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that only one of the six factors considered on
a motion to stay warrants in favor of granting a stay. On a motion to stay proceedings, the moving

134

Rec. Doc. 761-1 at p. 5.

135

Campbell v. Eastland, 307 F.2d 478, 487 (5 Cir. 1962).

136

Fresenius, 571 F. Supp. 2d at 765.

137

Rec. Doc. 636 at p. 22.

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party bears the burden to show that a stay is warranted.138 Here, Wood Group and GIS have failed
to meet their burden or show that “special circumstances” exist such that a party would suffer
substantial and irreparable prejudice if a stay is not granted.139 Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Wood Group and GIS’s Motion to Stay Civil
Proceedings140 is DENIED.
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this ______ day of December, 2015.
4th

________________________________
NANNETTE JOLIVETTE BROWN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

138

Ruiz v. Estelle, 666 F.2d 854, 856 (5th Cir. 1982); Drummond v. Fulton Cty. Dep’t of Family &
Children’s Servs., 532 F.2d 1001, 1002 (5th Cir. 1976).
139

S.E.C. v. First Fin. Grp. of Tex., Inc., 659 F.2d 660, 668 (5th Cir. 1981).

140

Rec. Doc. 755.

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