Anderson v. St. Tammany Parish Hospital Service District No. 2 et al

Filing 13

ORDER AND REASONS denying 5 MOTION to Dismiss or, in the alternative, stay. Signed by Judge Lance M Africk on 5/3/2013.(blg)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

JANA STEELE ANDERSON

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

No. 13-00428

ST. TAMMANY PARISH HOSPITAL
SERVICE DISTRICT NO. 2 ET AL.

SECTION I

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a motion1 to dismiss or, in the alternative, stay the above-captioned
matter pursuant to the Colorado River abstention doctrine filed by defendant, St. Tammany
Parish Hospital Service District No. 2 d/b/a Slidell Memorial Hospital (“Slidell Memorial”).
Plaintiff, Jana Steele Anderson (“Anderson”), has filed an opposition,2 to which Slidell
Memorial has replied.3 For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Anderson alleges that she was sexually assaulted by defendant Lloyd Lamy (“Lamy”), a
Slidell Memorial employee, while a patient at Slidell Memorial.4 On October 21, 2010,
Anderson filed a complaint in the 22nd Judicial District Court for the Parish of St. Tammany.5
On March 6, 2013, Anderson filed a complaint in the above-captioned matter, alleging that
Slidell Memorial was negligent in numerous ways, including in its hiring and training of Lamy

R. Doc. No. 5
R. Doc. No. 8.
3
R. Doc. No. 12.
4
R Doc. No. 1, ¶¶ 6, 7.
5
Id. ¶ 15.
1
2

1

and in its response to Anderson’s complaints.6 Anderson’s complaint acknowledges the pending
state court suit, characterizing it as “involving the matters and things involved in this case.”7
Slidell Memorial contends that the Court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction over
Anderson’s case pursuant to the Colorado River doctrine because the parallel proceedings will
result in piecemeal litigation.8 Anderson responds that the motion should be denied because
exceptional circumstances do not exist that would justify the court’s abstention from its statutory
jurisdiction.9
STANDARD OF LAW
Abstention is the relinquishment of a federal court’s jurisdiction “when necessary to
avoid needless conflict with a state’s administration of its own affairs.” Black’s Law Dictionary
(9th ed. 2009). “Abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the
rule.” Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976). “‘The
doctrine of abstention . . . is an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District
Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it.’” Id. (quoting Cnty. of Allegheny v. Frank
Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89 (1959)). “‘Abdication of the obligation to decide cases can
be justified under [the abstention doctrine] only in the exceptional circumstances where the order
to the parties to repair to the state court would clearly serve an important countervailing
interest.’” Id. (quoting Allegheny, 360 U.S. at 188-89).
In Colorado River, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that, generally, “ ‘the pendency of an
action in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal court
having jurisdiction. . . .’ ” Id. at 817 (quoting McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910)).
Id. ¶ 6, 7.
Id. ¶ 15.
8
Id.
9
R. Doc. No. 8.
6
7

2

This is because of the “virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise the
jurisdiction given them.” Id. at 817-18 (citing England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 375
U.S. 411, 415 (1964)). Accordingly, a court may abstain from a case because of parallel
litigation in state court only under “exceptional” circumstances. Id. at 818.
In order to determine if the Colorado River abstention doctrine applies, courts must first
inquire into whether the federal and the state actions are parallel. A suit is parallel when it has
“the same parties and the same issues” as a case in a different forum. Stewart v. W. Heritage Ins.
Co., 438 F.3d 488, 491 (5th Cir. 2006).
Second, to determine whether “exceptional” circumstances exist in a given case, courts
consider six factors: (1) the assumption by either court of jurisdiction over a res, (2) the relative
inconvenience of the forums, (3) the avoidance of piecemeal litigation, (4) the order in which
jurisdiction was obtained by the concurrent forums, (5) the extent to which federal law provides
the rules of decision on the merits, and (6) the adequacy of the state proceedings in protecting
the rights of the party invoking federal jurisdiction. Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 818-19; Moses H.
Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 18-26 (1983). No one factor is
determinative, and all applicable factors must be carefully balanced in a given case, “with the
balance heavily weighted in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction.” Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at
16.
DISCUSSION
The federal and state cases here are parallel cases. Each case has the same defendants, the
same plaintiff, and the same issues involved. Accordingly, it is necessary to weigh the
aforementioned factors to determine whether exceptional circumstances exist which would
require abstention. Considering all of the factors, this Court finds that abstention is not required.

3

When a court has not taken control over property or any res, then the first factor weighs
against abstention. Evanston Ins. Co. v. Jimco, Inc., 844 F.2d 1185, 1191 (5th Cir. 1988). The
parties agree that the first factor weighs against abstention in this case because there is no res or
property at issue.10
The parties also agree that the second factor, the relative inconvenience of the forum,
does not weigh in favor of abstention. This factor “primarily involves the physical proximity of
the federal forum to the evidence and witnesses.” Id. at 1191. Where, as here, “[t]he federal and
state courts are in approximately the same geographic location within the state,” this factor
weighs against abstention. Black Sea Inv., Ltd. v. United Heritage Corp., 204 F.3d 647, 650 (5th
Cir. 2000).
The parties disagree as to the significance of the third factor, avoidance of piecemeal
litigation, in this case. Anderson contends that the pending litigation would be duplicative, rather
than piecemeal.11 Slidell Memorial contends that because certain claims are timely within the
state suit but are prescribed within the federal suit, the federal lawsuit presents fewer claims.12
Slidell Memorial further contends that Anderson collapses factors one and three by arguing that
if there is no res, then there is no risk of piecemeal litigation.13
A passage from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Black Sea
supports Anderson’s approach:

E.g., R. Doc. No. 5-1, at 5.
R. Doc. No. 8, at 5.
12
R. Doc. Nos. 5-1, at 6 & 10, at 4.
13
R. Doc. No. 12, at 3.
10
11

4

The district court expressly granted a stay primarily to avoid
wasteful, duplicative litigation. But “[t]he prevention of
duplicative litigation is not a factor to be considered in an
abstention determination.” Duplicative litigation, wasteful though
it may be, is a necessary cost of our nation’s maintenance of two
separate and distinct judicial systems possessed of frequently
overlapping jurisdiction. The real concern at the heart of the third
Colorado River factor is the avoidance of piecemeal litigation, and
the concomitant danger of inconsistent rulings with respect to a
piece of property. When, as here, no court has assumed jurisdiction
over a disputed res, there is no such danger. This factor therefore
weighs against abstention.
204 F.3d at 650-51 (quoting Evanston, 844 F.2d at 1192) (footnotes omitted). In support of its
argument, however, Slidell Memorial cites Stewart, 438 F.3d at 492, in which the Fifth Circuit
noted that the potential for piecemeal litigation existed because the state court would hear a
claim that the federal court would not. In Stewart, however, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that
the application of res judicata can eliminate the danger of inconsistent rulings. Id. The Court
concludes that the third factor weighs against abstention in this matter.
The fourth factor is measured by the amount of progress made in each action. Moses H.
Cone, 460 U.S. at 21. Anderson asserts that the state and federal cases are in exactly the same
position,14 but Anderson has not disputed defendants’ assertion that numerous pleadings have
been filed in the state court case and discovery requests have been exchanged.15 In federal court,
the only pleadings filed have been the complaint and the briefing related to the pending motion.
The Court concludes that the fourth factor weighs in favor of abstention.
With respect to the fifth factor, the parties agree that the case directly involves only state
law. However, “[t]he absence of a federal-law issue does not counsel in favor of abstention,” and
the “presence of state law issues weighs in favor of surrender only in rare circumstances.”
Evanston, 844 F.2d at 1193. While generally this would suggest the fifth factor is neutral in this
14
15

R. Doc. No. 8, at 6.
R. Doc. No. 5-1, at 7 (describing state court litigation).
5

case, Slidell Memorial argues that a “rare circumstance” is present here.16 Specifically, Slidell
Memorial cites a decision issued by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in which that
court concluded that plaintiffs should not be permitted to file a first complaint in state court and
a second complaint in federal court because doing so permitted plaintiffs to circumvent statutory
restrictions on removal. See Am. Int’l Underwriters, Inc. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 843 F.2d 1253 (9th
Cir. 1988).
Slidell Memorial does not cite, and this Court is not familiar with, any Fifth Circuit
authority adopting the relevant holding in American International Underwriters. The Court has
reviewed the Ninth Circuit’s opinion as persuasive authority, however, and finds it inapplicable.
First, the discussion of removal principles was an alternative basis for affirmance, rather than a
subcomponent of the abstention analysis. See id. at 1255, 1260. Slidell Memorial’s attempt to
position the removal analysis within the abstention framework is inconsistent with the clear text
of American International Underwriters. 17 Slidell Memorial’s motion to dismiss was predicated
solely on abstention, and the separate, removal-related argument, is raised only in its reply brief.
More important, however, is that the analysis in American International Underwriters repeatedly
emphasizes and relies on the importance of a plaintiff’s “choice” or “selection” of a forum. Id.
The rationale that “a plaintiff should not be permitted to alter the forum that it selects” for
litigation is not as forceful when the desired forum was not initially available.18 Id. at 1260.
Given the absence of Fifth Circuit authority cited by Anderson and the circumstances of this

R. Doc. No. 9-2, at 5.
E.g., R. Doc. No. 12, at 8 n. 2 (requesting that the Court consider removal principles as part of the
fifth factor or as an additional factor).
18
Slidell Memorial asserts that “Anderson originally chose to file suit in Louisiana State Court,” but
it does not dispute Anderson’s assertion that diversity jurisdiction only arose after the state court
complaint was filed. R. Doc. No. 8, at 2. Slidell Memorial does not suggest Anderson moved to
Tennessee with the objective of creating diversity jurisdiction.
16
17

6

case, the Court concludes that removal principles do not provide an alternative justification for
staying or dismissing Anderson’s claims.
With respect to the sixth factor, the parties agree that Anderson’s interests would be
adequately protected in state court.19 Slidell Memorial contends that this factor weighs in favor
of abstention,20 but the Fifth Circuit has held that the sixth factor “can only be a neutral factor or
one that weighs against, not for, abstention.” Evanston, 844 F.2d at 1193.
The Court briefly notes Slidell Memorial’s allegation that Anderson is forum shopping,
and that her “sole purpose of filing this federal court proceeding” is to obtain a “more liberal jury
pool.”21 The only Fifth Circuit case cited by Slidell Memorial, Art 57 Properties v. 57 BB
Property, 212 F.3d 596 (5th Cir. 2000), is a one paragraph unpublished opinion. Moreover, the
Fifth Circuit has observed in the separate context of declaratory judgments that “[t]he fact that
federal forums are sought by some plaintiffs in an attempt to avoid the state court system, does
not necessarily demonstrate impermissible forum selection when the [] out-of-state plaintiff
invokes diversity. Rather it states the traditional justification for diversity jurisdiction, to protect
out-of-state defendants.” AXA Re Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Day, 162 F. App’x 316, 321 (5th Cir.
2006) (quotation omitted).
CONCLUSION
Only the relative amount of progress in the state court proceeding weighs in favor of
abstention. The remaining factors are neutral or weigh against abstention. The Court has
considered each factor and the circumstances of the case and concludes this is not the
exceptional circumstance in which abstention is warranted.

R. Doc. No. 8, at 6; R. Doc. No. 5-1, at 8.
R. Doc. No. 8, at 6.
21
R. Doc. No. 5-1, at 8.
19
20

7

IT IS ORDERED that the motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, stay the abovecaptioned matter is DENIED.

New Orleans, Louisiana, May 3, 2013.

___________________________________
LANCE M. AFRICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

8