Maqbool v. Louisiana Professional Engineering and Land Surveying Board

Filing 22

ORDER and REASONS denying as moot 6 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Regarding Defendant's 15 Second Motion to Dismiss - IT IS ORDERED that the motion is Granted to the extent that Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and denying Plaintiff's 18 Motion for Summary Judgment, as stated within document. Signed by Judge Kurt D. Engelhardt on 1/13/2014. (cbs)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MUBASHIR MAQBOOL

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 13-552

LOUISIANA PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERING AND
LAND SURVEYING BOARD

SECTION "N" (4)

ORDER AND REASONS
In this suit, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant’s denial of his application for a Louisiana
professional engineer’s license violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Dormant
Commerce Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, and asks the
Court to declare Louisiana Revised Statutes 37:388, et seq., unconstitutional. See First Amended
Complaint (Rec. Doc. 11). Plaintiff further asks the Court to order Defendant to “issue [a]
professional engineering license to [him] without further delay.” Id. at p. 9. Presently pending
before the Court are two motions to dismiss filed by Defendant (Rec. Docs. 6 and 15) and a motion
for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff (Rec. Doc. 18). The Court rules on the motions as stated
herein.
Addressing Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment first, IT IS ORDERED that
the motion (Rec. Doc. 18) is DENIED. The motion does not demonstrate, as required by Rule 56

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of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that no genuine dispute of material fact exists and that
Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Rather, the motion
essentially simply repeats the factual allegations and generally stated conclusions of law set forth
in Plaintiff’s original and amended complaints. Further, the motion does not include the supporting
memorandum required by Local Rule 7.4 of the Local Civil Rules of the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana.1
Turning to Defendant’s initial motion to dismiss, and considering Plaintiff’s
subsequent submission of an amended complaint (albeit without seeking leave of court), along with
Defendant’s exclusion of its prior defense of insufficient service of process in its (second) motion
to dismiss directed to the amended complaint, IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s initial motion
to dismiss (Rec. Doc. 6) is DENIED as MOOT.
Regarding Defendant’s second motion to dismiss (Rec. Doc. 15), IT IS ORDERED
that the motion is GRANTED to the extent that Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE. In so ruling, the Court acknowledges, as Defendant emphasizes, that Plaintiff’s prior
request for licensure by comity was denied on March 16, 2009, more than four years prior to his
filing of this action, and that claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. §1983 are subjected to Louisiana's
one-year prescription period applicable to tort claims. See, e.g., Elzy v. Roberson, 868 F.2d 793, 794
(5th Cir. 1989). Defendant does not address jurisprudence, however, recognizing the authority of
federal courts to address complaints alleging ongoing violations of federal law by a state official in
his or her official capacity and seeking relief that is “declaratory or injunctive in nature and

1

These rules may be viewed on the Court’s website (www.laed.uscourts.gov) or in the
office of the Clerk of Court.
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prospective in effect.” See Aguilar v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 160 F.3d 1052, 1054 (5th Cir.
1998); see also, e.g., Verizon Maryland Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Maryland, 535 U.S.
635, 645-47 (2002) (discussing doctrine of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) allowing prayers
for injunctive relief against state officials charged with enforcing state law); Planned Parenthood
v. Sanchez, 405 F.3d 324, 329-335 (5th Cir. 2005) (addressing federal preemption claim seeking
injunctive relief); England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 259 F.2d 626, 626-27
(5th Cir. 1958) (recognizing federal jurisdiction to consider action for declaratory and injunctive
relief asserting federal unconstitutionality of Louisiana statute); Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo v. Laney,
199 F.3d 281, 285-86, 288-90 (5th Cir. 2000) (Ex Parte Young doctrine allowing action against state
officials for prospective, rather than retrospective relief, not applicable to real property title dispute);
Robicheaux v. Caldwell, No. 13-5090, 2013 WL 6198279, *3 (E.D. La. 11/27/13) (discussing Ex
Parte Young doctrine in context of action seeking injunctive relief regarding Louisiana ban on samesex marriages). Significantly, as reflected in Plaintiff’s amended complaint, he maintains that
Louisiana’s laws governing the licensure of certain types of professional engineers are
unconstitutional and seeks equitable relief, not monetary damages. For that reason, the Court, at
this juncture, does not dismiss Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice.
On the other hand, the authority cited above applies solely to requests for prospective
relief. As pled, however, Plaintiff’s amended complaint seemingly purports to seek injunctive
relief relative to an application that was submitted and denied in 2009, rather than alleging the
current status of Louisiana’s law regarding professional engineering licensing requirements and
requesting that Defendant, in prospectively applying and enforcing state law, be restrained from
violating federal law. Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff desires to proceed any further with this

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action, and can, in good faith, remedy his pleading deficiencies by amending his complaint a second
time, he must do so no later than Monday, February 4, 2014.2 Otherwise, if a second amending
complaint is not filed, the Court will simply close the case.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 13th day of January 2014.

_____________________________________
KURT D. ENGELHARDT
United States District Judge

2

Should Plaintiff file a second amended complaint, the filing would be without
prejudice to Defendant's right to thereafter file a dispositive or other responsive motion.
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