Thompson v. Alabama Great Southern Railroad Company

Filing 27

ORDER & REASONS denying 14 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Martin L.C. Feldman on 3/12/2014. (caa, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ANTHONY N. THOMPSON

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 13-921

THE ALABAMA GREAT SOUTHERN
RAILROAD COMPANY

SECTION “F”

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is defendant's motion for partial summary
judgment.

For the reasons that follow, the motion is DENIED.
Background

This is a personal injury case arising under the Federal
Employer's Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51.
On May 25, 2011, Anthony Thompson was working for Alabama
Great Southern Railroad Company (AGS) as a conductor on a light
locomotive engine in its Hattiesburg, Mississippi railroad yard.
Around 6:00 a.m., the locomotive engine headed northward into the
Old Main Track to couple up to three railcars scheduled for
delivery to Picayune, Mississippi.

As the engine approached the

railcars, locomotive engineer Uriah Parish attempted to apply the
independent brake, but it would not respond.

The engine collided

with the railcars at a speed of about 8 miles per hour.

Thompson

sustained injuries to his back and right-shoulder, which have ended
his career.
On April 16, 2013, Thompson sued AGS, asserting claims of
negligence under FELA and strict liability under the Federal Safety
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Appliance Act (FSAA), 49 U.S.C. § 20302, and the Locomotive
Inspection Act (LIA), 49 U.S.C. § 20701.

Thompson contends that

AGS is strictly liable for his injuries because it failed to ensure
that the independent brake was in proper condition and safe to
operate.

AGS now moves for partial summary judgment on the FSAA

and LIA claims.
I. Standard for Summary Judgment
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 instructs that summary
judgment is proper if the record discloses no genuine issue as to
any material fact such that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.

No genuine issue of fact exists if

the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact
See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.

to find for the non-moving party.

v. Zenith Radio., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

A genuine issue of

fact exists only "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the non-moving party."

Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The Court emphasizes that the mere argued existence of a
factual dispute does not defeat an otherwise properly supported
motion.

See

id.

Therefore,

"[i]f

the

evidence

is

merely

colorable, or is not significantly probative," summary judgment is
appropriate.

Id. at 249-50 (citations omitted).

Summary judgment

is also proper if the party opposing the motion fails to establish
an essential element of his case.

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See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

In this regard, the non-moving party

must do more than simply deny the allegations raised by the moving
party.

See Donaghey v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., 974 F.2d

646, 649 (5th Cir. 1992).

Rather, he must come forward with

competent evidence, such as affidavits or depositions, to buttress
his claims.

Id.

Hearsay evidence and unsworn documents do not

qualify as competent opposing evidence.

Martin v. John W. Stone

Oil Distrib., Inc., 819 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1987). Finally, in
evaluating the summary judgment motion, the court must read the
facts

in

the

light

most

favorable

to

the

non-moving

party.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
II.

Law & Application

Under FELA, an injured railroad employee may bring a cause of
action without proof of negligence based on the failure of safety
appliances mandated by either the FSAA, 49 U.S.C. § 20302, or the
LIA, 49 U.S.C. § 20701.

The FSAA and the LIA impose strict

liability on railroad carriers for their violations of safety
standards.

Under the FSAA, any vehicle used on a railroad line

must be equipped with "efficient hand brakes."
20302(a)(1)(B).

49 U.S.C. §

Under the LIA, a locomotive may only be used on a

railroad line when "its parts and appurtenances . . . are in proper
condition

and

safe

personal injury."

to

operate

without

unnecessary

danger

of

49 U.S.C. § 20701(1).

The LIA's coverage is not limited to defects in construction

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or mechanical operation.
481, 487 (1943).

Lily v. Grand Trunk W. R. Co., 317 U.S.

"Conditions other than mechanical imperfections

can plainly render equipment unsafe to operate without unnecessary
peril to life or limb."

Id. at 488; see also S. Ry. Co. v. Bryan,

375 F.2d 155, 158 (5th Cir. 1967)(holding that "[t]he employee did
not have to show the existence of a defect" to establish strict
liability under the Boiler Inspection Act, the LIA's predecessor
statute).

Similarly, with respect to the FSAA, "[p]roof of an

actual break or physical defect . . . is not a prerequisite to
finding that the statute has been violated." Myers v. Reading Co.,
331 U.S. 477, 483 (1947). Instead, the plaintiff need only present
"proof that the mechanism failed to work efficiently and properly
even though it worked efficiently and properly before and after the
occasion in question."
of the appliance."

Id.

"The test in fact is the performance

Id.

Defendant contends that summary judgment on plaintiff's FSAA
and LIA claims is appropriate because there is no evidence that the
independent

brake

malfunctioned

or

was

defective.

Defendant

concedes that the independent brake did not work at the time of the
incident, but argues that it was not damaged; the argument goes, it
had somehow been flipped into the "off" position.
maintains

that

without

a

mechanical

defect

plaintiff's FSAA and LIA claims are foreclosed.

or

Defendant
malfunction,

But, the plain

language of the statutes and the case law clearly establish that no

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"physical defect" is required.
Lily, 317 U.S. at 487.

See, e.g., Myers, 331 U.S. at 483;

The Court is therefore persuaded that

genuine disputes exist regarding whether or not the independent
brake functioned efficiently, was in proper working condition, and
was safe to operate at the time of the incident.

49 U.S.C. §

20302; 49 U.S.C. § 20701.
Accordingly,

the

motion

for

partial

summary

judgment

DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, March 12, 2014
______________________________
MARTIN L. C. FELDMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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is